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THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

AND

THE FOUNDER OF THE EMPIRE

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# THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

AND

THE FOUNDER OF THE EMPIRE

BY

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PER LA STORIA DI ROMA ANTICA

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[The plan of Massilia is based mainly upon the researches of Commandant Rouby, whose plan (*Le Spectateur militaire*, xxxv, 1874, Pl. II) Stoffel followed, partly upon those of G. Vasseur (see pp. 410-2, 416, n. 1). Vasseur infers from the nature of the soil found in excavations that the harbour called Lacydon extended a little further eastward than Rouby believed, and that a narrow artificial basin, intended to provide more accommodation for shipping, may have extended northward from it on the eastern side of Massilia to a point about midway between the two siege terraces (Caes., *B. C.*, ii, 1, 2) which, in agreement with Rouby, I have shown on the plan. If this conjecture should ever be verified, one might reasonably conclude that the basin did not exist in the time of Caesar; for Strabo said nothing about it, though (iv, 1, 4) he accurately described Lacydon.

For the map of the operations near Dyrrachium I am largely indebted to Colonel G. Veith (*Der Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, 1920, pp. 9, 147-67, 180-4, and Karte II b. Cf. pp. 445-7, *infra*): but hachures have been substituted for contours; I have omitted parts of Colonel Veith's map; and my spelling of certain names differs from his.


In the plan of the battle of Pharsalia the river Kapakli has been drawn from a tracing of its course in a reproduction on a reduced scale of the Greek staff map (75000, Φάρσαλος). The sheet Φάρσαλος is not on sale, and even the British Museum does not possess a copy.

According to Neroutsos Bey (*L'ancienne Alexandrie*, 1888, map facing p. 132), a mole projected from the eastern end of Pharos as well as from Lochias. The latter, which I have reproduced from the well-known map of Mahmud Bey (see his *Mémoire sur l'ancienne Alexandrie*, 1872, p. 42), is attested by Josephus (*Bell. Iud.*, iv, 10, 5. Cf. Strabo, xvii, 1, 6), but not the former: the walls (τείχη μέγιστα) which, according to Josephus, surrounded Pharos (περὶ ταύτην τὴν νησίδα καταβέβληται) probably were or included the breakwater that protected the lighthouse. See pp. 485-6, *infra*.]









## CHAPTER XIV

### THE BLOODLESS CONQUEST OF ITALY

ON the 12th of January <sup>1</sup> Caesar entered Ariminum, Nov. 24, where Curio, Caelius, and the fugitive tribunes were 50 B. C. awaiting him.<sup>2</sup> He bade them relate what had befallen Caesar secures his communications. them to the assembled troops, and confirmed the effect by a few well-chosen words.<sup>2</sup> The legions which he had summoned from Gaul were on the march ; but a fortnight or more must elapse before they could arrive, and it was necessary not only to assure his communications with them, but also to anticipate any attempt which might be made to bar his own advance. Accordingly, remaining with two cohorts at Ariminum in order to raise fresh troops, he sent three several cohorts to occupy Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona on the coastal road, while Antony marched with five others across the Apennines to seize Arretium, which commanded the great central road called [Arezzo.] the Cassian Way, leading from Rome to Gaul.<sup>3</sup> By the 15th all these towns were secured. But the rumours Nov. 27 which Caesar had refused to believe came true : Labienus, (Julian). followed by his personal baggage, which Caesar with contemptuous good nature sent after him, deserted to Labienus Pompey.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile the Pompeians were making their final preparations for war. After the flight of the two tribunes Final the Senate selected a place of meeting outside the city, arrange-ments of the Senate. so that Pompey might be enabled to attend. Proclamation was made that a state of war existed in Italy.<sup>5</sup> A resolution was passed that troops should be levied

<sup>1</sup> See the article on 'The Chronology of Caesar's Italian Campaign' (pp. 375-83). Dates which are certain are distinguished by an asterisk prefixed to the corresponding Julian date. Some others may be one day wrong.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. ii, pp. 334-7.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 353-4, 382-3.

<sup>4</sup> Cic., *Att.*, vii, 11, 1 ; Plut., *Caes.*, 34, 2-3 ; Dio, xli, 4, 2-4.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 354.

50 B. C.

throughout the country and that a grant should be made to Pompey from the treasury. It was proposed, further, that Juba, the King of Numidia, who was notoriously hostile to Caesar, should be honoured with the title of Friend and Ally of the Roman People, and that Faustus Sulla, Pompey's son-in-law, should be sent as pro-praetor to Mauretania, in order to conciliate the two kings, Bocchus and Bogud, who were disposed to side with Caesar. The former proposal was carried, despite the opposition of the consul Marcellus ;<sup>1</sup> the latter was vetoed by a tribune, Marcius Philippus, a moderate Caesarian. Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus was appointed to succeed Caesar in Gaul, and the important province of Syria was assigned to Scipio. Pompey, reviewing the military situation, assured the House that Caesar's troops were thoroughly disaffected, and that it was doubtful whether they would even obey the order to march. He himself, on the other hand, was master of ten legions, which were ready to take the field at once.<sup>2</sup> Evidently in making this statement he reckoned the seven legions which his lieutenants commanded in Spain, and which were not available for the defence of Italy. At home only the two legions which Caesar had been obliged to return were qualified to contend with veterans ;<sup>3</sup> and though Pompey was not, perhaps, aware of their temper, they could not yet be trusted to fight against their old commander.

Pompey's  
statement  
of his  
available  
forces.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. C. E. Moberly (in his note on *B. C.*, i, 6, 4) may have been right in conjecturing that ' Marcellus stopped [or rather, tried to stop] this measure probably because the combination of Bocchus with Juba, even as allies of the senate, would be dangerous, especially considering that a stoppage of the African corn-ships might starve Rome, if events led the two kings to form such a plan '. To starve Rome (and Italy) was precisely what Pompey intended to do. See *Cic., Att.*, ix, 9, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 6, 1-5 ; *App., B. C.*, ii, 36, 142 ; *Dio*, xli, 3, 3. Did Pompey really believe that Caesar's troops were disaffected ? Doubtless he thought it expedient to reassure his hearers ; but he was a thorough soldier, and when I remember that he told Cicero, a month before Caesar crossed the Rubicon, that there was no hope of maintaining peace (*Att.*, vii, 4, 2), and that a fortnight later he hinted that, in the event of war, it might be necessary to abandon Rome (*ib.*, 8, 5. Cf. 9, 3), I do not feel sure that he was quite as credulous as Plutarch (*Pomp.*, 57, 4) and Appian (ii, 30, 118) supposed.

<sup>3</sup> The troops which Pompey had raised in 52 B. C. (vol. ii, p. 168) had never been in action. See p. 357, n. 10.

Cicero, indeed, wrote exultingly on the 12th of January that Pompey was pushing on his preparations with the utmost vigour. Italy was mapped out into districts, for the supervision of each of which a prominent senator was made responsible, and the Campanian seaboard was assigned to Cicero.<sup>1</sup> But to train the new levies would be a work of time; and to pit them untrained against old soldiers would be folly.

50 B. C.

Nov. 24.

Cicero placed in charge of Campania.

By the 14th of January it was known in Rome that Caesar had occupied Ariminum, and that people were fleeing southward in dread of the invaders.<sup>2</sup> Evidently Caesar's troops were not so disaffected after all. Favonius, an ardent admirer and imitator of Cato, dissatisfied with what Pompey had done, reminded him that he had boasted that he need only stamp his foot and troops would flock to join him.<sup>3</sup> Cato advised that Pompey should be appointed Commander-in-Chief with absolute powers; but, probably from motives of jealousy, his counsel was ignored, and Pompey could only rely upon his political ascendancy and his military renown. We are told that the populace clamoured that both Caesar and Pompey should be ordered to resign, while Cicero urged that envoys should be sent to Caesar to treat for peace, but that the consuls disregarded the clamour and rejected the advice.<sup>4</sup> The Senate, however, dispatched Roscius and Lucius Caesar, whose father had served against Vercingetorix, to inform Caesar of the decree that required him to give up his province; and Pompey privately

Nov. 26.

Cato in vain urges that Pompey should be made Commander-in-Chief.

Pompey entrusts Roscius and L. Caesar with a message for Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, xvi, 11, 3. Cf. *Att.*, vii, 11, 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Plut.*, *Caes.*, 33, 1; *App.*, ii, 35, 141. See p. 358.

<sup>3</sup> *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 60, 3; *Caes.*, 33, 2; *App.*, ii, 37, 146.

<sup>4</sup> *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 61, 1; *App.*, ii, 36, 145. Velleius (ii, 49, 2) incorrectly says that Pompey was made Commander-in-Chief. See pp. 432-3. E. Meyer (*Cæsars Monarchie*<sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 295, n. 5) holds that Appian confounded Volcacius Tullus (Τύλλου [*Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 60, 3]) with Tullius (Cicero). Appian may have blundered, but I see no reason for supposing that he made any confusion. If, as Plutarch says, Volcacius Tullus proposed to send envoys to treat for peace, that does not prove that Cicero did not make the same suggestion. [My view is supported by Kornemann (*Jahrb. f. class. Philol.*, Suppl. xxii, 1896, p. 679). Holzapfel (*Klio*, iii, 1903, p. 229, n. 1), remarking that Plutarch drew from the same source as Appian, believes that he really wrote Τυλλίου.]



50 B. C. urged them to appeal to the good feeling of his rival.<sup>1</sup> On  
 Nov. 29. the 17th they arrived at Ariminum. The message which  
 they were charged by Pompey to deliver was expressed  
 in conciliatory terms. Pompey begged Caesar not to  
 construe as a personal attack measures which he had  
 adopted solely on public grounds. He hoped that Caesar  
 would follow his example and, remembering what was  
 due to his own position, would subordinate personal  
 resentment to the public interest. Caesar noticed that  
 the message, notwithstanding its amicable tone, did not  
 tend to remove any of his grievances; but it gave him an  
 opportunity of reopening negotiation. Accordingly he  
 requested the messengers to oblige him by returning to  
 Pompey and conveying to him a reply which might  
 perhaps prevent civil war. He would remind Pompey  
 that the privilege of standing for the consulship in  
 absence, which had been granted to him by the Law of  
 the Ten Tribunes, had been withdrawn, and that his  
 tenure of office had consequently been curtailed by six  
 months; for (as he evidently meant) instead of being  
 allowed to retain it until the end of the year, he would  
 be obliged to return by the beginning of July in order  
 to announce his candidature.<sup>2</sup> This indignity he had on  
 public grounds patiently endured: in the letter which  
 he had addressed to the consuls, proposing that both he  
 and Pompey should resign, he had forborne to stipulate  
 that the privilege guaranteed to him by the tribunician  
 law should be maintained, and he was quite willing to  
 present himself as a candidate in Rome. Now, however,  
 levies were being held throughout Italy, and the legions  
 which had been abstracted from him on the pretext of  
 war with the Parthians<sup>3</sup> were not restored. There could  
 be no other object in this than to effect his ruin. Still,  
 he was prepared to make any reasonable concession for  
 the sake of peace. His proposals then were these: let

Caesar's  
 proposals  
 in reply.

<sup>1</sup> See W. Drumann's *Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 376, n. 4, and pp. 358-61. *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Hardy (*Journ. of Philol.*, xxxiv, 1918, pp. 220-1) has satisfactorily explained the significance of the words *erepto semenstri imperio* (*B. C.*, i, 9, 2).

<sup>3</sup> See vol. ii, pp. 321-2.



Pompey proceed to his province and disband his army, including the recruits whom he had raised. He would simultaneously disband his and hand over his provinces to his successors. Freedom of elections would then be assured, and the administration of public affairs would be left to the Senate and to the sovereign people. In order to give effect to these proposals and to have them embodied in a definite agreement and sanctioned by oath, he would be glad to meet Pompey if Pompey did not wish to come to him : a personal interview would enable them to settle all disputes.<sup>1</sup>

The envoys departed, and Caesar provided against the contingency of an unfavourable reply by strengthening his military position.<sup>2</sup> Fifty miles south-west of Ancona, near the Flaminian Way, was a town called Iguvium, garrisoned by five Pompeian cohorts under one of the praetors, Minucius Thermus. Caesar, learning that the inhabitants were well disposed towards him, directed Curio to move down the coastal road with the two cohorts which remained at Ariminum, to withdraw the cohort which occupied Pisaurum, and thence to march to Iguvium. Thermus was aware that the people of Iguvium would not support him, and accordingly removed his cohorts from the town. But, whether they were new levies or belonged to the original Pompeian army, they had no mind to fight for a discredited commander or a doubtful cause, and, deserting on the road, they dispersed to their homes. Meanwhile Curio took possession of Iguvium and received a hearty welcome. The Flaminian Way and the Cassian Way were now in the power of Caesar, and he could without anxiety advance. As soon as he learned that Iguvium was secure he sent orderlies

Caesar controls the Flaminian Way and the Cassian Way.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 9 ; Cic., *Fam.*, xvi, 12, 3. O. E. Schmidt (*D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, p. 124), citing *Att.*, vii, 15, 3 and x, 8, 5, which are inconclusive, holds that Caesar made these proposals with the aim of severing Pompey from the Senate. Dr. Hardy, on the other hand (*op. cit.*, p. 220), says that Caesar's offer to stand for the consulship in person if Pompey would accept his conditions was 'made of course because he knew that it would be refused'. What, then, would have been gained by making it ?

<sup>2</sup> See p. 383.

50 B. C. to Curio and Antony, directing them to move to Ancona and unite their forces with the cohort already stationed there. Dec. 10. Curio reached Ancona on the 28th, and Antony on the following day.

Pompey had not remained in Rome to await the return of his messengers. Panic-stricken fugitives were hourly arriving, and Pompey had long since foreseen that if Caesar were to advance upon the capital it would be hopeless to resist.<sup>1</sup> On the 17th of January, directing the consuls and the senators to follow him and threatening to treat as a Caesarian any one who should stay behind, he quitted his suburban house for Capua. Next day the consuls and the bulk of the senators followed, accompanied for the most part by their wives and families.<sup>2</sup> The consuls removed the keys of the treasury, but in their hurry left the treasure itself behind.<sup>3</sup> Cicero, who was one of the number, forgetting that Pompey had warned him, several weeks before, that it would be necessary to abandon Rome,<sup>4</sup> indignantly complained. His leader, who had then appeared to him a statesman 'of courage, military skill, and supreme influence',<sup>5</sup> had now become an imbecile. On the night before he started he wrote to Atticus, 'I don't know what to do now or hereafter: I am so utterly upset by the reckless folly of this most insane decision . . . unless I am out of my mind, everything Gnaeus has done is fatuous and rash.'<sup>6</sup> 'Every one

\*Nov. 29.  
Pompey  
and the  
consuls  
abandon  
Rome.

Cicero's  
disap-  
proval of  
Pompey  
and  
Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> See vol. ii, p. 264. L. Holzapfel (*Klio*, iv, 1904, pp. 352-3) argues that Pompey did not leave Rome for military reasons (for it was in no danger so long as Caesar was not master of Picenum), but because he feared that if Caesar negotiated with the Senate, he himself would get the worst of it (Dio, xli, 6, 1). Thenceforward, says Holzapfel, Pompey and the consuls had the decision in negotiations, for the Senate was a mere council (*consilium*) (*Att.*, vii, 15, 2; *B. C.*, iii, 83, 3). Therefore Pompey's flight gave him a great political advantage. The texts which Holzapfel cites are, as any one who consults them will see, inconclusive. Dio's ascription of motives is never trustworthy: Holzapfel misunderstands *consilio* in *Att.* vii, 15, 2; and *B. C.*, iii, 83, 3 is obviously irrelevant. No doubt Pompey predominated over other senators after they left Rome and practically ceased to be a corporate body; but there is no evidence that he made them leave in order to acquire such predominance. He acted for strategical reasons. See pp. 24, 362.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 377.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. ii, p. 264.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>3</sup> *Caes.*, *B. C.*, i, 14, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Att.*, vii, 10. Cf. 11, 3.

knows', he added a few days later, 'that he is in a state of abject alarm and agitation.'<sup>1</sup> But if Pompey was a weakling, Caesar was a villain:—'He is mad! The wretched man has never glimpsed even the shadow of the Right! And he says that he is doing all this to support his honour!'<sup>2</sup> The Pompeians were beginning to suspect that their champion intended to abandon Italy;<sup>3</sup> and the prospect made Cicero despair. 'If he leaves,' he told Atticus, 'I don't know where to go, or where to stay, or what to do. For the man whose Phalarism you dread will, I believe, commit every kind of abomination. . . . Shall I commit myself unreservedly to this side? I am not deterred by the danger, but I am bursting with vexation. Everything has been done with such utter lack of judgement or so completely against my judgement. Am I to procrastinate and trim, and then join the winning side? . . . Your own troubles are the same, but do write something to an utterly distracted man.'<sup>4</sup> His one consolation was that Labienus had abandoned Caesar:—'I regard Labienus as a demigod. . . . If he has done no other good, he has at least given *him* pain.'<sup>5</sup> But Caesar might, after all, come to terms with Pompey, or he might prove to be the stronger; and it would be wise to avoid giving him offence. Caesar was of course anxious to obtain the support or at all events to secure the neutrality of all reputable senators; and he hoped that some of them might be induced to remain in Rome. As soon as he heard of the exodus he asked Trebatius to urge Cicero to stay and to tell him that by doing so he would be conferring a great favour. Cicero replied that, having already left Rome, he could not well return, but that he had not taken any part in raising troops.<sup>6</sup> Had he forgotten that it was to levy troops that he had been placed in charge of Capua?

He writes  
to Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 13 A, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 11, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Nissen (*Hist. Zeitschr.*, xlv, 1881, p. 104) maintains that the Senate was not yet aware that Pompey intended to leave Italy; but, as Holzapfel remarks (*Klio*, iv, 1904, p. 350), this view is stultified by Dio, xli, 7, 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, vii, 12, 2-4. Cf. *Fam.*, xiv, 14, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Att.*, vii, 13 A, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 17, 3-4.

50 B. C.

\*Dec. 5.

Pompey  
replies to  
Caesar's  
proposals.Cicero  
comments  
on Pom-  
pey's mili-  
tary posi-  
tion.

On the 23rd of January Lucius Caesar arrived at Teanum, near Capua, where Pompey, Labienus, and the consuls, besides other senators, were assembled.<sup>1</sup> He informed them of Caesar's offer. They resolved to accept it on the condition that Caesar would immediately withdraw the garrisons from the towns which he had occupied, in order that the Senate might securely meet at Rome and discuss details.<sup>2</sup> Pompey, who was about to leave Teanum, commissioned Publius Sestius to draft the reply<sup>3</sup> and to assure Caesar that, 'in consideration of his splendid services' in Gaul, his election, when he stood for the consulship, should be guaranteed and he should be authorized to celebrate a triumph.<sup>4</sup> Two days later Cicero met the consuls and the senators, who had moved on to Capua; and they finally considered the reply. Most of them thought that Caesar would not adhere to his offer and had only made it in the hope of preventing Pompey from completing his preparations; but, except Favonius, who was not listened to, all were in favour of taking him at his word. 'Even Cato himself', wrote Cicero, 'now prefers slavery to fighting.'<sup>5</sup> On the same day Roscius and his companion started to rejoin Caesar.<sup>6</sup> Cicero and other Pompeians awaited the result in mingled hope and fear; for they were aware that their chief was not prepared to resist Caesar in case he should decline to accept the terms. Even Pompey's old soldiers were slow to come in.<sup>7</sup> 'His whole hope', wrote Cicero, 'rests on the two legions somewhat treacherously retained, which can hardly be called his own. For the men whom he has so far enlisted are reluctant to serve and do not want to fight.'<sup>8</sup> Still, the Pompeians clung to the delusion that the Gauls were exasperated against Caesar; and, besides, were not the seven legions in Spain threatening his rear, and how was he to recover from the blow which the defection of Labienus had inflicted? So Cicero tried to

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, vii, 13 B, 2; 14, 1.<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 14, 1; *Fam.*, xvi, 12, 3.<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, vii, 13 B, 3; 17, 2.<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 26, 2. Cf. viii, 9, 2; 11 D, 7; 12, 2.<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, vii, 15, 2.<sup>6</sup> See p. 377, n. 10.<sup>7</sup> *Att.*, vii, 14, 2.<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 13 A, 2.



console himself:—‘If he persists in his mad career, 50 B. C.  
I think he may be crushed, provided that the capital can  
be saved.’<sup>1</sup> Pompey, though he was not himself deceived,  
wrote to tell him that in a few days he would have a strong  
army,<sup>2</sup> and led him to believe that it would soon be safe  
to return to Rome. ‘He has got Labienus with him’,  
wrote Cicero exultingly, ‘who has no doubt about the  
weakness of Caesar’s force; our friend Gnaeus is in much  
better spirits since his arrival.’<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile Caesar was awaiting the reply of Pompey.  
On the 29th of January Roscius and Lucius Caesar met Dec. 11.  
him at Ancona or somewhere in its neighbourhood.<sup>4</sup>  
Caesar perused the letter. The substance (as he has  
reported it) was that he should abandon Ariminum, return  
to Gaul, and disband his army; and that, if he fulfilled  
these conditions, Pompey would depart for Spain.  
Meanwhile, however, and until he had given a pledge  
that he would abide by his proposal, Pompey and the  
consuls would continue to raise troops.<sup>5</sup> The flattering  
offer of the consulship and of a triumph did not move  
Caesar. ‘It was unfair of Pompey’, he afterwards said,  
‘to demand that Caesar should evacuate Ariminum and  
return to his province, while he himself retained provinces  
and legions which did not belong to him; to require that  
Caesar’s army should be disbanded, while he continued  
himself to levy troops; and to specify no date for his pro-  
mised departure, which implied that if he had not started  
before the close of Caesar’s consulship, he would not be  
chargeable with perjury. Moreover, his refusal to grant  
an opportunity for an interview, or to promise that he  
would come and meet Caesar made peace utterly hopeless.’<sup>6</sup>  
Those who compare these remarks with the repeated  
statement of Cicero—‘We accept his proposals, but on

Caesar  
rejects  
Pompey’s  
counter-  
proposals;

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, xvi, 12, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Holzapfel (*Klio*, 1904, p. 357, n. 2) thinks that *firmum exercitum* (*Att.*, vii, 16, 2) means ‘an army which could be depended upon’, i. e. Caesar’s two legions, which, says Holzapfel, Pompey hoped that Labienus would make loyal! I infer from the words ‘in a few days’ (*paucis diebus*) that Pompey was referring to his new levies; but the point is unimportant.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, vii, 16, 2.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 378–81.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 10, 3–4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 11, 1 3.



50 B. C. condition of his withdrawing his garrisons from the places he has occupied, so that the Senate may be able to meet at Rome and discuss these same proposals in security' <sup>1</sup>—may be inclined at first sight to suspect that Caesar strained the truth. It is true that this condition would leave Caesar helpless in case the negotiation failed : it is also true that Pompey declined the request for a personal interview, and we may believe Caesar when he says that Pompey did not name a date for his departure : but if Pompey insisted upon retaining the two legions and continuing his levies until Caesar should have evacuated Ariminum and disbanded his army in Gaul, we must suppose, unless Cicero's report was incomplete, that, without the knowledge of his colleagues, he instructed Sestius to add this stipulation. The looseness of Cicero's statements is notorious, and since the dispatch which Sestius drafted is not extant, we cannot fully judge the merits of the case ; but unless each party could rely upon the good faith of his antagonist, it was futile to propose that they should both disarm. As might have been expected, Caesar unhesitatingly rejected Pompey's terms.

On the 29th of January Caesar, who had been joined by Curio at Ancona, reached Auximum, eleven miles further down the road. This town was garrisoned by three Pompeian cohorts under Attius Varus, who, assisted by divers senators, was levying recruits in the surrounding country. Pompey had estates in Picenum, and his influence there was strong ; but the inhabitants of Auximum were not disposed to sacrifice themselves for his cause. As soon as the municipal councillors heard that Caesar was approaching, they went in a body to Varus and told him that while it was not their business to offer an opinion on the merits of the political controversy, they and their fellow burgesses could not allow Caesar, who had rendered such great services to his country, to be excluded from the town. Varus would therefore do well to make arrangements for his own safety. Varus immediately withdrew the garrison ; but a single century,

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, xvi, 12, 3.

forming Caesar's advanced guard, overtook him. He endeavoured to make a stand, but his men instantly deserted. Some of them dispersed to their homes; the rest joined Caesar, who thanked them for their support, and assured the inhabitants of Auximum that he would never forget the service which they had performed. He now proceeded to overrun Picenum. Everywhere the urban authorities made his troops welcome, readily furnishing supplies. A day's march west of the trunk road was a town called Cingulum, which Labienus had enlarged at his own expense and the municipal charter of which he, as the appointed commissioner, had framed.<sup>1</sup> Caesar was therefore both surprised and gratified when a deputation came to announce that the townsmen would gladly execute any orders which he might give; and the recruits whom he asked for were promptly dispatched. About the same time his army was reinforced by the troops of Antony and by the 12th legion, which he had summoned when Pompey first began to arm.<sup>2</sup> He determined therefore to march by way of Firmum against Asculum, the chief town and the fortress of Picenum, although it was situated in an inland district, where the influence of Pompey was strong. The garrison, consisting of ten cohorts, was commanded by Lentulus Spinther, who, on hearing of his advance, immediately fled; but he had not gone far before the bulk of his troops deserted. Caesar had now no motive for going to Asculum.<sup>3</sup> Marching steadily down the coastal road, he took possession of Firmum on the 3rd of February; halted an entire day there to collect supplies; occupied Castrum Truentinum on the 6th; and thence pushed on for Corfinium, which was held by Domitius with a numerous force.

50 B. C.

[Cingoli.]

is reinforced by the 12th legion;

[Ascoli.]

Dec. 14.

Dec. 17.

and marches against Corfinium.

Corfinium—the most important stronghold of Central Italy and the town which the Italians had made their

<sup>1</sup> *constituerat suaque pecunia exaedificaverat* (B. C., i, 15, 2). Cf. *Eph. epigr.*, ix, 1903, p. 3, and *Journ. Rom. Studies*, v, 1915, pp. 241-2. Mr. L. R. Taylor (*Class. Rev.*, xxxv, 1921, p. 159) takes *constituerat* 'to indicate a complete reconstruction (an idea suggested also by *ex-aedificare*)'.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. ii, pp. 324, 337.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 362-5.

50 B. C. capital at the outset of the Social War—stood upon the site of the modern village of Pentima, at the junction of several roads, where the valley of the Aterno is encompassed by some of the loftiest heights of the Apennines.

Position of Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium. Domitius, instead of departing for Gaul, where his presence would have been useless, had established himself there, hoping doubtless that the strength of the position would enable him to check Caesar's advance. Officially, as a proconsul, he was independent of Pompey, who could exercise over him no authority except such as he derived from acknowledged pre-eminence. Domitius had raised twelve cohorts, amounting to four or five thousand men, in the highlands westward of Corfinium;<sup>1</sup> and reinforcements were hurrying to join him from the north. Pompey, who was at Luceria, a hundred and thirty miles to the south-east, could communicate with him in a couple of days, and was ready to guide him—if he would follow his advice.

Ignorant criticisms of Pompey's generalship.

Pompey had committed himself to a struggle for which circumstances had made it impossible adequately to prepare; but he was doing his utmost to atone for his initial blunder. He had already decided that it would be impossible to hold Italy, and that when he had assembled a sufficient number of recruits, his best course would be to sail for Greece, whither Caesar would be unable to follow him, to train his army there, and to raise additional troops in the East, where his achievements had made him all-powerful.<sup>2</sup> Few, however, of his supporters were capable men or had any knowledge of war, and many of them, contrasting his apparent inaction with Caesar's obvious vigour, hastily concluded that, after all, he was an incompetent commander. During the first few days that followed the abandonment of Rome Titus Ampius, a bitter enemy of Caesar, whose impetuous zeal led men

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 368–71.

<sup>2</sup> When Pompey moved the two legions which Caesar had restored into Apulia (*Att.*, vii, 12, 2; *B. C.*, i, 14, 3), it was evident that he intended to go to Greece. (*Cf. Fam.*, ii, 16, 3; *Att.*, vii, 10; 12, 4; 17, 1; viii, 11, 2; ix, 10, 4–6; *App.*, ii, 37, 146, and p. 6, n. 4, *supra*.)

to call him 'the clarion of the civil war',<sup>1</sup> succeeded by indefatigable energy in raising a considerable number of recruits in the district of Capua;<sup>2</sup> but Cicero, to whom the superintendence of this tract had been assigned, did practically nothing, and soon resigned or left his post.<sup>3</sup> Thenceforward, when he was not thinking about his own safety or trying to decide what course he ought to follow, he was engaged in making criticisms on his leader, which have no value except in illustrating the general opinion. The steady advance of Caesar gave rise to a rumour that he was about to march on Rome;<sup>4</sup> and Cicero, who was at Capua in the first week of February, found that the levy was making no way. 'The recruiting officers', he told Atticus, 'do not venture to show their faces with Caesar close at hand.' Then followed an outburst of indignation, which, indeed, in one respect, was not unreasonable: 'But Gnaeus, our Gnaeus,—what an inconceivably miserable spectacle! What an utter breakdown! No courage, no plan, no troops, no energy! . . . On the 7th of February the tribune Gaius Cassius came with an injunction from him to the consuls, to go to Rome, remove the money from the reserve treasury, and immediately withdraw. . . . Lentulus wrote back to say that Pompey must himself first make his way into Picenum.<sup>5</sup> . . . What I am to do is a serious problem, though indeed for me it would be no problem but for the disgraceful mismanagement of the whole business and my not having been consulted by either side. . . . My perplexity is positive torture.'<sup>6</sup> Two days later he wrote

50 B. C.

Cicero resigns the superintendence of Campania; his perplexities.

\*Dec. 18.

Feb. 10,  
705  
(Dec. 21,  
50 B. C.).

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, vi, 12, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, viii, 11 B, 2.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 365–8.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, i, 14, 2–4. Cf. the next note.

<sup>5</sup> Unless Caesar was misled by a rumour originating in Pompey's order, Lentulus did after all attempt to fetch the treasure, but hastily withdrew after opening the treasury (*aperto sanctiore aerario*), on a false report that Caesar's cavalry were just outside Rome (*B. C.*, i, 14, 1). Meusel, who (pp. 305–6 of his edition) follows Rubenius in inserting *non* before *aperto*, forgets that, though it was left to Caesar to plunder the treasury (p. 44, *infra*), Lentulus may well have opened it and then fled because to remove and cart away a great weight of bullion would require a considerable time. The treasury would of course have been closed again either by Lentulus or the proper official.

<sup>6</sup> *Att.*, vii, 21.



50 B. C. to his friend again : ‘ I agree with you that I should not commit myself to an indefinite and dangerous flight, by which I should do no good either to the country or to Pompey, for whom I can loyally and gladly die. I will therefore remain. . . . The whole business of Capua and the levy in this neighbourhood are at a standstill. We are in despair, and everybody is ready to bolt unless Pompey can effect a junction of his own forces with those of Domitius, or something else happens like that.’<sup>1</sup>

Pompey  
urges  
Domitius  
to join  
him at  
Luceria.

[Canosa.]

Dec. 15  
or 16.

Meanwhile Pompey was thinking out a plan for effecting that concentration of which Cicero wrote. He had fourteen cohorts, or about five thousand men, at Luceria, belonging to the two legions which Caesar had surrendered: of the remaining six cohorts he had sent two to Brundisium, with the view of embarking them for Greece, while the other four garrisoned Canusium, on the road which led to the port.<sup>2</sup> The fourteen cohorts were, as he now knew, so untrustworthy that he dared not even order them to construct a camp; and indeed the ground was so hard that it was hardly possible to use the pick.<sup>3</sup> He expected that one of the consuls would soon join him with the recruits from Campania, while the other would go to Sicily, in order to prevent that important source of supply from being occupied by Caesar.<sup>4</sup> The success of his plans depended upon Domitius. On the 4th or the 5th of February he had sent one Quintus Fabius to urge him to march immediately to Luceria.<sup>5</sup> While Fabius was posting to Corfinium reinforcements were marching rapidly from Asculum to join Domitius. Some weeks earlier Pompey had sent one of his most energetic followers, Vibullius Rufus, to stimulate the efforts of the senators in Picenum.<sup>6</sup> It happened that Vibullius met Lentulus Spinther soon after the latter,

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, vii, 23, 2-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, viii, 12 c, 2; 12 A, 2. Cf. Stoffel, *Hist. de J. César*, i, 1887, p. 245.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, viii, 12 c, 2-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, § 3; 12 A, 3; 11 D, 1. Pompey sent this request to the consuls on Feb. 13 or 14 (O. E. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 126).

<sup>5</sup> Inferred from *Att.*, viii, 11 A. See Stoffel, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, i, 15, 4 with *Att.*, viii, 2, 4; 11 B, 1.



followed by the few men who remained faithful to him, 50 B. C.  
 had quitted Asculum. Vibullius, learning from Lentulus  
 that Picenum was irretrievably lost, took over his troops,  
 assembled all the newly raised recruits from the surround-  
 ing districts, and marched on rapidly over the mountains  
 to Corfinium, whither he arrived with fourteen cohorts on  
 the 8th of February. Close behind him followed Lucilius \*Dec. 19.  
 Hirrus, who had fled from Camerinum in Umbria with  
 five cohorts about the time when Lentulus abandoned  
 Asculum. Domitius, recognizing the wisdom of Pompey's  
 counsel, resolved to start for Luceria on the following day  
 in company with Vibullius ; and Hirrus, if he should not  
 have reached Corfinium in time, was to follow without  
 delay. On the 10th Fabius returned to Luceria, conveying \*Dec. 21.  
 this news.<sup>1</sup>

But Domitius did not adhere to his resolve for a single  
 day. After Hirrus joined him he determined to hold his  
 ground unless it should appear that Caesar intended to  
 avoid Corfinium and continue his advance along the  
 coast. Retaining eighteen cohorts therefore to defend  
 Corfinium, he detached seven to occupy the neighbouring  
 town of Sulmo and sent the remaining six to Alba, a hill-  
 fort two long marches to the west. What had induced  
 him to change his mind we learn from Pompey himself.  
 Five of Pompey's dispatches have been preserved with  
 the correspondence of Cicero ; and these priceless docu-  
 ments not only illuminate the military situation, but also  
 enable us to discern the lineaments of his military charac-  
 ter. They are not less valuable than the six letters of  
 Caesar which are included in the same collection.

On the day after Fabius returned Pompey wrote to  
 Domitius : ' I am amazed at your not writing, and leaving  
 me to be informed about affairs of state by others. We  
 cannot make head against the enemy with our troops  
 scattered ; but by concentrating our forces we shall be  
 able, I hope, to serve our country and the common weal.  
 That being so, as you had determined (according to  
 Vibullius's letter to me of the 9th) to leave Corfinium

Domitius  
 resolves  
 to defend  
 Corfinium.

Feb. 11,  
 705  
 (Dec. 22,  
 50 B. C.).

Pompey  
 reiterates  
 his advice  
 to Domi-  
 tius.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 15, 4-6 ; *Att.*, viii, 11 A ; 12 B, 1.

50 B. C. and join me, I cannot imagine why you have changed your mind. The reason given by Vibullius—that you delayed because you heard that Caesar had moved on from Firmum and reached Castrum Truentinum—is wholly inadequate. The nearer your enemy approached, the more promptly ought you to have effected a junction with me before Caesar could hamper your march or prevent you from reaching me. Once more therefore I earnestly exhort you, as I have repeatedly requested in my former letters, to come at the earliest possible moment to Luceria before the troops which Caesar has begun collecting unite and separate you from us. If certain individuals are stopping you in order to save their own estates, it is only fair that you should grant my request for the dispatch of those cohorts which have come from Picenum and Camerinum.’<sup>1</sup>

Dec. 24  
or 25.

Domitius received this letter on the 13th or the 14th of February. It was not too late to follow the advice which it contained ; but Domitius thought that he knew better than Pompey. His scouts were endeavouring to get information of Caesar’s movements ; and he felt sure that he would have time to retreat if, after all, retreat should prove necessary. Meanwhile Pompey was anxiously

\*Dec. 27. awaiting his arrival. On the 16th he received a letter from Domitius, to which he immediately replied.<sup>2</sup> ‘ You say ’, he wrote, ‘ that you intend to watch Caesar and, if he marches along the coast against me, to come with all speed into Samnium and join me, but that if he stops near the towns in your neighbourhood, you purpose to resist, in case of his approaching you. Your plan seems

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, viii, 12 B.

<sup>2</sup> O. E. Schmidt (*op. cit.*, p. 138), wrongly premising that Caesar reached Corfinium on Feb. 14, not 15 (see p. 378), concludes that Domitius must have written this letter on the 13th. He adds that Pompey had resolved before he received it to go to Brundisium, and finds it surprising that in his reply (*Att.*, viii, 12 c) he apparently did not inform Domitius of his change of plan. Probably, he conjectures, in § 3—*Consules praesidia omnia deducturi sunt*—*Brundisium* has dropped out before *deducturi*. But Pompey urged Domitius to join him at Luceria (§ 2), and he had already urged the consuls to do the same. He had of course decided to go eventually to Brundisium ; but there is no evidence that before Feb. 17 or 18 he fixed the date of his departure, and he did not start till Feb. 19. Evidently he then expected that Domitius, if he followed his advice, would march after him.

to me spirited and resolute ; but I must provide against the risk of our being unable, if we are divided, to make head against the enemy, whose forces are large and will soon be increased. As a far-seeing commander, you are bound to consider, not only how many cohorts Caesar can oppose to you now, but how many horse and foot he will be able soon to assemble. This is proved by a letter sent to me by Bussenius, in which he writes (confirming reports which are being sent to me by others) that Curio is massing the garrisons in Umbria and Etruria and marching to join Caesar.<sup>1</sup> If these forces unite, then, even supposing a part of the army is sent to Alba, while only a part opposes you, even if Caesar does not attack you but merely defends the positions which he has occupied, you will be in an impasse and will be unable with your force to make a stand against his powerful army even so far as to enable you to get supplies. I therefore strongly urge you to come here with your whole force as soon as possible. . . . Even now we can save the country if we act in unison ; but if we are disunited we shall be helpless. Of this I am sure. P.S. After I had written this letter Sicca brought me a dispatch from you and a verbal message. You urge me to join you : that in my view is impossible, because I have no great confidence in these legions.'<sup>2</sup>

The dispatch to which Pompey alluded in his postscript was written on the 14th. Evidently Domitius had just learned that Caesar was marching against Corfinium and would soon arrive. The bridge by which he would attempt to cross the Aternus was close to the site of Popoli, about three miles north of Corfinium.<sup>3</sup> Domitius instantly sent five cohorts to destroy it. They were too late. Caesar's advanced guard beat them off, and the two veteran legions, accompanied by the Pompeian cohorts which had joined the column on the march, encamped on the 15th outside Corfinium.

Caesar  
prepares  
to block-  
ade Cor-  
finium.

\*Dec. 26.

<sup>1</sup> Pompey was evidently alluding to the movements which I have described on p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, viii, 12 c.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 365.

50 B. C.

Domitius  
implores  
Pompey  
to rescue  
him.

Domitius immediately wrote a second and piteous appeal, begging and imploring Pompey to come to his assistance. It would be easy, he urged, to take advantage of the confined nature of the position, hem in Caesar, and cut off his supplies. With his own army on the spot and Pompey's coming up from the south the thing could surely be done. If Pompey would not help him, he and his army—more than thirty cohorts—besides all the senators and other prominent men who were with him, would be in the extremest peril. Huge rewards were promised to the messengers if they should succeed in delivering the dispatch. In two days they ought to be able to reach Pompey; but another week must elapse before his army—if he were not obdurate—could come to the rescue. Domitius mounted artillery on the wall, assigned to each maniple its proper place, and exhorted all to resist to the last. In consequence of the Sullan confiscations he had acquired enormous wealth, and at a general parade he promised to give every private two acres and a half of land and proportionately larger holdings to the centurions and the old soldiers who had volunteered.

Caesar  
invests  
Corfinium.

Meanwhile Caesar was steadily investing the town. Owing to the presence of vineyards the excavations that have been made in order to determine the extent of Corfinium were necessarily restricted;<sup>1</sup> but it is easy for a practised eye to trace the line which the contravallation must have followed. The town stood upon a plateau whose north-eastern flank slopes evenly down to the stream which is now called the Sagittario, while on the north-west it falls abruptly towards the Aterno. The village of Pentima occupies the site of the ancient citadel: the rest of the town extended south-westward, probably as far as the cathedral of San Pelino. The line of investment, which on the north, east, and south encompassed the wall at a distance of less than three hundred yards, was formed on the west by the Aternus. Caesar spent

<sup>1</sup> *Not. d. Scavi*, 1879, pp. 318-20; Stoffel, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-3; *Paulys Real-Ency.*, iv, 1227.



the first two days in collecting grain from the neighbouring towns and fortifying his camp, which, situated about three hundred yards from the north-eastern angle of the wall, dominated the road to Sulmo. On the 16th or 17th the inhabitants of that town spontaneously opened their gates to Antony,<sup>1</sup> and the seven cohorts which garrisoned it transferred their allegiance to Caesar. On the 17th the 8th legion, twenty-two cohorts composed of the recruits recently levied in Cisalpine Gaul,<sup>2</sup> and about three hundred horsemen lent by the King of Noricum,<sup>3</sup> whose friendship Caesar had probably secured when he ruled Illyricum, reached the camp. Caesar's force now comprised three veteran legions and more than thirty cohorts of recruits—in all at least twenty thousand men—besides a few hundred horse.<sup>4</sup> He proceeded forthwith to construct another camp close to the south-western angle of the town, which, under the command of Curio, barred the only remaining roads by which troops could arrive. The Aternus formed a sufficient obstacle on the west; the remainder of the circuit was fortified by rampart and trench, and redoubts were erected at intervals along the line.

50 B.C.

Dec. 27  
or 28.

Spontaneous  
surrender of  
Sulmo.

Caesar is  
further re-  
inforced.

On the day when Caesar's reinforcements arrived, the appeal of Domitius was delivered to Pompey. The pain which it gave him is apparent in the reply which he immediately dispatched and in a letter which he wrote to the consuls. After informing them of the attempt which he had made to save Domitius from his own folly he continued, 'You will understand that I am in extreme

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 18, 1-3. Cicero (*Att.*, viii, 4, 3) incorrectly says that Sulmo was surrendered by Attius.

<sup>2</sup> A. von Domaszewski (*Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, p. 163, n. 5), remarking that Caesar reached Corfinium about a month [five weeks] after the outbreak of war, concludes that he must have begun to raise recruits long before. Perhaps those who were liable for service may have been ordered before, as a precaution, to hold themselves in readiness. Cf. *B. G.*, i, 10, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, i, 18, 5. Cf. *B. G.*, i, 53, 4. Noricum was in the region which lies between the Inn, the Danube, Hungary, and Italy.

<sup>4</sup> According to Plutarch (*Caes.*, 32, 1), Caesar had not more than 300 horse when he left Ravenna.



50 B.C. anxiety. I am anxious to relieve men of high standing, Pompey declines to attempt to relieve Corfinium, when there are so many of them, from the danger of a siege; but I cannot go to their assistance, because I do not think that these two legions can be trusted to march there. . . . I urge you to collect all the troops you can and to join me at Brundisium as soon as possible.<sup>1</sup> In another letter, sent off on the same day, hoping perhaps to safeguard his old soldiers settled in Campania, he requested Lentulus to leave a garrison in Capua.<sup>2</sup>

Dec. 30. On the 19th the returning messengers contrived to make their way into Corfinium, and Pompey's reply was handed to Domitius. He broke the seal and read: 'February 17. Your letter to hand, in which you say that Caesar has encamped close to Corfinium. What I thought and warned you against has happened: he will not in the circumstances give battle, but by concentrating his forces he has got you in a vice, preventing you from marching to join me. . . . I am not sufficiently confident in the disposition of the troops whom I have with me to risk an action involving the safety of the country, and the levies made for the consuls have not yet come in. Do your best therefore, if it is still by any means possible, to extricate yourself and come here as soon as you can, before your opponent is joined by all his troops; it is impossible for the new levies to get here quickly, and, if they could, you cannot fail to see how little we could trust them—they do not even know each other—against veteran legions.'<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, viii, 12 A, 2-4.

<sup>2</sup> When I first read this letter, quoted in one which Cicero wrote to Atticus (viii, 6, 2) and in another which he wrote to Pompey (viii, 11 D, 3), I was inclined to think that it was his précis of the longer letter (12 A); but it was evidently different, for the request which it contains, that Lentulus shall leave a garrison at Capua, is not included in the other. In the short letter Pompey tells the consuls that he is sure that they understand how important it is that all troops should concentrate as soon as possible in one spot. Cicero tells Pompey (viii, 11 D, 3) that he himself and everybody else assumed that the spot was Corfinium! It is hard to understand how they could have been such fools; but perhaps Pompey gauged their folly, and, as O. E. Schmidt thinks (*op. cit.*, p. 139), wrote the longer letter to make it clear that the consuls were to come to Brundisium. *They* had of course understood that that was Pompey's wish.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 12 D.

The contravallation was nearly complete ; the roads were all barred ; and Domitius saw that for his army escape was impossible. But not, perhaps, for individuals, who, aided by local guides, might follow the mountain paths. Calling a council of war, Domitius assured his officers that Pompey with a strong force would speedily arrive : therefore let them pluck up courage and join with him in making a resolute defence. After the officers dispersed he took a few of his intimate friends aside, told them the truth, and arranged with them that they should all attempt to escape. Individuals who happened afterwards to be near Domitius noticed that a change had come over him : his countenance belied the confidence which he had affected in the council of war ; his manner showed that he was uneasy ; and it was observed that he frequently closeted himself with his friends and generally kept out of the way of officers and men. His purpose soon became known. On the evening of the 20th the military tribunes, the centurions, and prominent soldiers who represented the men met privately to talk over the situation and take steps to secure their own safety. The Marsian contingent, who did not yet know that their general intended to forsake them, kept aloof, took up a position in the strongest part of the fortress, and actually prepared to attack their comrades ; but delegates were sent to inform them of the real state of affairs, and they at once sided with the rest. Domitius was surrounded and placed under a guard ; while envoys were sent to apprise Caesar that the garrison were ready to open the gates, to obey any orders which he might give, and to surrender Domitius as a prisoner of war.

50 B. C.

Futile attempt of Domitius to abandon the garrison.

\*Dec. 31.

Caesar was too wary to accept the offer ; for he reflected that circumstances might arise which would prevent it from being carried out. The men might be bribed to change their minds, or perhaps misled by false information ; and if the gates were opened, his own soldiers might pillage the town and outrage the civil population. Accordingly, after thanking the envoys for their good

50 B. C. will, he sent them back and gave orders that the gates and the wall should be closely watched. Then, withdrawing the piquets from their usual positions, he posted the men who composed them in a continuous line along the rampart and the banks of the river, and charged the officers not only to guard against the possibility of a sortie but also to prevent individuals from stealing out. Not a man in the besieging army slept that night : all were resolved not only to watch the movements of the garrison, but also to look out for Domitius and Lentulus Spinther and if they were detected to seize them.

\*Feb. 21, 705  
(Jan. 1, 49 B. C.). Towards dawn Lentulus suddenly appeared upon the wall and spoke to the nearest sentries : would they allow him to have an interview with Caesar ? His request was granted ; but the soldiers of Domitius who were standing by determined that he should have no opportunity of sneaking off and insisted upon accompanying him to the General's tent. Caesar, like his men, was keeping vigil. Lentulus earnestly besought him to have mercy, appealing to him to add one more to the many favours which he had conferred upon an old friend. Caesar bade him say no more : it was not to harm any one that he had invaded Italy, but merely to defend his honour against the attacks of personal enemies, to restore the tribunes to the position from which they had been foully ousted, and to vindicate the liberties of the Roman People. Lentulus was deeply grateful <sup>1</sup> and asked leave to return to the town : certain individuals, he explained, were so terrified by the thought of what might be in store for them that they were contemplating suicide ; but if they heard from his lips that mercy had been shown to him they would no longer despair. Caesar readily agreed.

Lentulus  
appeals  
success-  
fully to  
Caesar for  
mercy.

\*Jan. 1, 49 B. C. At daybreak on the 21st Caesar sent a representative into the town to order that all the senators and their sons, the military tribunes, and the members of the equestrian order should be conducted to his presence. Presently Domitius appeared with forty-nine other notables, including Lentulus and Vibullius Rufus ; and all were

Surrender  
of Cor-  
finium :  
Domitius  
and the  
other  
notables  
released ;

<sup>1</sup> B. C., i, 22 ; *Att.*, ix, 11 A, 3 ; 11, 1.

set at liberty,<sup>1</sup> perhaps without even being required to give their parole.<sup>2</sup> Six million sesterces, equivalent to sixty thousand pounds sterling, which had been entrusted by Pompey to Domitius for the payment of the troops and deposited by him in the municipal treasury, were handed over by the civic authorities to Caesar, and instantly returned. The garrison, comprising eighteen cohorts—some six or seven thousand men—were then required to swear allegiance to Caesar, and were immediately dispatched under Asinius Pollio along with the troops that had surrendered at Sulmo to take possession of Sicily. In the afternoon Caesar started with the rest of the army to encounter Pompey at Brundisium.<sup>3</sup>

the troops  
swear alle-  
giance to  
Caesar.

For some days past Cicero had been anxiously waiting for news from Corfinium, mingling in his letters protestations of loyalty to Pompey with denunciations of his conduct. 'For Pompey', he wrote, 'I could gladly die : there is nobody on earth whom I value more.'<sup>4</sup> But—he had disappointed all his followers : 'I am sorry for him. He abandoned the city, that is, his country, for which and in which it would have been glorious to die.'<sup>5</sup> Did he intend to abandon Corfinium also ? 'One thing only remains to complete our friend's disgrace, failure to relieve Domitius.'<sup>6</sup> On the 23rd of February Cicero, who was staying at Formiae on the coast of Latium, heard that Pompey was about to abandon Italy ; and on the next day came the announcement that Corfinium had fallen. 'Our hero,' he wrote to Atticus, 'bidding a long farewell to honour, is on his way to Brundisium.'<sup>7</sup> Caelius, whom Caesar had recently dispatched to quell a tribal revolt in the Maritime Alps, and who still found time to correspond with his old mentor, expressed a

Jan. 3.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 23, 1–3 ; Seneca, *De benef.*, iii, 24 ; Suet., *Nero*, 2, 3.

<sup>2</sup> See *Att.*, ix, 16, and cf. p. 120, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 369. Schmidt (*op. cit.*, pp. 149–50), differing from Stoffel (pl. 1), thinks that Caesar marched to Anxanum not over the hills, but *via* Interpromium and Teate, that is along the line of the later Via Claudia Valeria. This route was longer, but doubtless easier. From Anxanum to Brundisium the route is certain.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, viii, 2, 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, § 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 7, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 8,



49 B. C. similar opinion : ' Did you ever see a more futile person than your friend Pompey, creating such a disturbance, and he the veriest trifle ? ' <sup>1</sup>

Criticisms  
of Pom-  
pey's  
general-  
ship ex-  
amined.

It will be worth while to pause and consider whether such criticisms, which would seem to have been not uncommon,<sup>2</sup> were more than the petulant outbursts of men who, knowing nothing of war, vented their disappointment at the turn which the course of events had taken. Cicero may have been not far wrong when, after the fall of Corfinium, he said of Pompey, ' Long ago I knew that he was the most incapable of politicians ' ; but when he added, ' I now know that he is also the least capable of generals ' ,<sup>3</sup> he merely paraded his own ignorance. Pompey, it is true, relying perhaps on the fleet and the army which he could raise by his prestige in the East, had let himself drift into a war for which he was not prepared ; unless he was traduced, he was almost incredibly credulous in accepting rumours about the untrustworthiness of the army which he had to face ; and he did not yet appreciate the greatness of his adversary. Adequate preparation was, however, impossible. Caesar was master of ten seasoned and devoted legions. Pompey had no troops except raw recruits, a few cohorts of some years' standing which had never served in the field, and two legions which he could not trust : his veterans were in Spain, and there they were doomed to stay. To transport them to Italy by sea was out of the question : if they should attempt to march by land, they would incur the risk of being intercepted by the legions of Caesar in Gaul. Therefore when Pompey decided to abandon Rome and even to quit Italy, his decision was wise. A great mistake was made, though perhaps the consuls rather than Pompey were to blame, when the national treasure was not removed from Rome ; and when Pompey urged the consuls to rectify the mistake, they shrank from the venture. Since, moreover, he judged that Italy was indefensible, it is hard to understand why

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, viii, 15.

<sup>2</sup> See, for instance, *Att.*, viii, 2, 4 ; 3, 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 16, 1.



he did not promptly withdraw his garrisons from Picenum and Umbria to the south. But the loss of Corfinium cannot be laid to his charge. The advice which he gave to Domitius was worthy of the conqueror of Sertorius and of Mithradates; and the surrender which transferred three legions from his army to that of Caesar was chargeable to Domitius alone.<sup>1</sup>

Two days before the fall of Corfinium Pompey had quitted Luceria for Brundisium;<sup>2</sup> and on the next day the consuls joined him at Canusium.<sup>3</sup> He wrote thence to Cicero, urging him to come to Brundisium and give his support to the Conservative party;<sup>4</sup> but Cicero could not make up his mind. On the 25th Pompey reached Brundisium. The two cohorts which he had sent to garrison the port were reinforced by the four which had occupied Canusium: the remaining fourteen arrived from Luceria about the end of the month;<sup>5</sup> and the new levies, amounting to thirty cohorts, with some eight hundred horsemen, raised from the slaves who herded cattle on Pompey's own estates, presently joined them.<sup>6</sup> It was some compensation for the loss of the Domitian

49 B. C.

\*Feb. 19  
(Dec. 30).Pompey  
retreats  
to Brun-  
disium.

\*Jan. 5.

<sup>1</sup> 'C'est Rome', wrote the great Napoleon (*Précis des guerres de César*, 1836, p. 125), 'qu'il fallait garder; c'est là qu'il [Pompey] eût dû concentrer toutes ses forces au commencement des guerres civiles. . . . Si les trente [really twelve] cohortes de Domitius [raised later in the neighbourhood of Corfinium!] eussent été campées devant Rome avec les deux premières légions de Pompée [which, as Pompey himself said, were utterly untrustworthy]; si les légions d'Espagne, celles d'Afrique, d'Égypte, de Grèce se fussent portées par un mouvement combiné sur l'Italie par mer (!) [by which time Caesar's veteran army would have arrived], il eût réuni avant César une plus grande armée que celui-ci.' Did Napoleon realize that Pompey was not his own master, and that his two legions were in Apulia?

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, viii, 9, 4. Stoffel (*op. cit.*, i, 245) has overlooked this text and misdated Pompey's departure.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, viii, 11 c. Cf. 11 D, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, viii, 11 c. Cicero excused himself (11 D, 2) for not going to Brundisium by the plea that the road was barred. Schmidt (*op. cit.*, pp. 146-7) thinks that he was alienated from Pompey by his abandonment of Domitius, and that he was unwilling to abandon his own neutrality. He cites *Att.* x, 8, 5, which I shall quote in the next chapter (p. 47), giving Cicero's real reasons in his own words.

<sup>5</sup> Stoffel, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 357. The 800 mounted herdsman referred to in *B. C.*, iii, 4, 4 were evidently the same as those mentioned in i, 24, 2, where accordingly D should be inserted before CCC.

49 B. C.

The Pompeians  
confident  
of ultimate  
victory.

legions that the detention of Caesar at Corfinium enabled him to assemble these recruits in time. Transports, which he had chartered, were lying in the harbour or on their way; but they were too few to convey more than half the force. Notwithstanding the victorious advance of Caesar and their own ignominious retreat, he and his colleagues were confident of ultimate victory, anticipating the vengeance which they would inflict upon the Caesarians and the profits which they would derive from the confiscation of their property. Already at Luceria they had talked of the proscription which they purposed, in imitation of Sulla, to hold.<sup>1</sup> While old associations impelled Cicero to side with Pompey, he was under no illusion as to his aims: both he and Caesar, it seemed to him, aimed at tyranny. 'It amazes me,' he wrote, 'how our friend Pompey has set his heart on imitating Sulla's reign. I speak that which I know. He never made less of a secret of anything. . . . I promise you, if he wins, he will not leave a tile on any roof in Italy.—"You his ally, then?" Yes, and against my own judgement, and against the warnings of all history.'<sup>2</sup> At Brundisium Theophanes and the Greek sycophants who surrounded Pompey clamoured for a proscription.<sup>3</sup> Pompey could not or would not restrain his soldiery from committing outrages against the Brundisians, whom he, for his part, treated with disdain. He was already collecting galleys with the intention of blockading the provinces which supplied Italy with corn, and thus starving his countrymen who favoured Caesar into submission.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, expecting that Caesar would carry the war into Spain, he hoped to make himself master of Massilia and so to intercept the communications of Caesar with Italy. Domitius, notwithstanding the generosity with which Caesar had treated him at Corfinium, intended,

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, viii, 11, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, ix, 7, 3. 5. Cf. 10, 6. Did Cicero really speak that which he knew? He afterwards (*Fam.*, vii, 3, 2) exempted Pompey from the blame which he heaped on the Pompeian notables at Dyrrachium.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 11, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 9, 4.

as proconsul, to proceed to Massilia, and was assembling ships at the Tuscan port of Cosa, manning them with his tenants, freedmen, and slaves.<sup>1</sup> Some weeks before, the Massilian Government had sent an embassy to Rome, doubtless to consult the Senate on the political situation ; and Pompey, on the eve of his departure, had exhorted the envoys to remember the benefits which he had long since conferred upon them, and not to side with Caesar against a tried friend.<sup>2</sup>

Attitude  
of the  
Massi-  
lians.

Meanwhile Caesar was marching rapidly towards Brundisium. In the hope of arriving before Pompey could embark he stimulated his men by the promise of liberal rewards ;<sup>3</sup> and they marched on an average twenty miles a day.<sup>4</sup> With the view of detaching the consul Lentulus from the Pompeian side he had sent the younger Balbus to offer him a provincial governorship if he would return to Rome : but Balbus, when he reached Capua, found that the consuls had gone ; and the message was never delivered.<sup>5</sup> On one of the earlier stages of the march a Pompeian officer, Numerius Magius, was captured and brought to Caesar, who immediately released him, requesting him to ask Pompey to grant Caesar a personal interview, in order that he might submit proposals for peace.<sup>6</sup> On the 1st of March Caesar was at Arpi, about midway between Corfinium and Brundisium. While the troops rested he wrote to Oppius and the elder Balbus, who had congratulated him on the clemency with which he treated Domitius and his other prisoners. Oppius was the devoted friend to whom, when he was taken ill, Caesar, as the readers of Suetonius<sup>7</sup> know, gave up the one bedroom in a rustic inn, sleeping himself in the open air. ‘ I am truly delighted ’, he said, ‘ that your letter expresses such strong approval of what happened at Corfinium. I will gladly follow your advice, all the more because I had already spontaneously resolved to

Caesar  
marches  
for Brun-  
disium.

\*Jan. 9.

His letter  
to Oppius  
and Bal-  
bus.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 2 ; *B. C.*, i, 34, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, viii, 14, 1.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 23, n. 3, 375-6.

<sup>5</sup> *Att.*, viii, 9, 4 ; 6, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, i, 24, 4-6 ; *Att.*, ix, 7 c, 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 72.

49 B. C. show the greatest clemency and to do my best to reconcile Pompey. Let us try whether we can in this way recover the goodwill of all parties and secure a lasting victory, since cruelty has prevented others from escaping odium and permanently maintaining their success, with the single exception of Lucius Sulla, whom I am not going to imitate. Let us adopt a new method of conquest,—to fortify ourselves by mercy and generosity. As to how that may be done, several ways suggest themselves to my mind, and many more may be found. I beg you to take these matters into consideration.’<sup>1</sup> Cicero did not yet believe that Caesar, in releasing the prisoners at Corfinium, had been actuated by motives of humanity: ‘I fear’, he told Atticus, ‘all this clemency is only an elaborate preparation for a Cinna-like massacre.’<sup>2</sup> ‘How’, he asked a few days later, ‘can he avoid a desperate course? His character, his past, the nature of the enterprise on which he has embarked, his associates . . . all forbid it.’<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless he wrote to congratulate Caesar, remarking that ‘nothing was more alien from his disposition than cruelty.’<sup>4</sup> The fame of Caesar’s clemency preceded him; he was welcomed in every town through which he passed; and his reputation was rising throughout Italy. Before he reached Corfinium the panic was so great that money-lenders declined all business: now prominent Conservatives were confidently returning to Rome.<sup>5</sup> While Caesar was halting at Arpi Cicero wrote, ‘We are waiting for news from Brundisium,—nothing else. If Caesar has caught our friend Gnaeus, there is a dubious hope of peace; if the latter has got across beforehand, fear of a fatal war. But . . . do you see what manner of man he is into whose hands the Republic has fallen? How clear-

\*Feb. 25  
(Jan. 5).

Mar. 8  
(Jan. 16).

Cicero  
congratu-  
lates  
Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, ix, 7 c, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, viii, 9, 4. E. Meyer (*Caesars Monarchie*<sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 298, n. 2) rejects the emendation *Cinneam* (illam crudelitatem) and prefers the manuscript reading *unam*, which to my mind is evidently corrupt. Schmidt (*op. cit.*, p. 150) assures us that Caesar’s object in pardoning the prisoners at Corfinium was to bring about a cleavage in the ranks of his enemies.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, ix, 2 A, 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 16, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, vii, 18, 4; ix, 1, 2.



sighted, how alert, how thoroughly prepared ! Upon my word, if he refrains from murder and robbery, he will be most worshipped by those who most dreaded him. The inhabitants of the country towns and the small farmers talk to me a good deal. They don't care a straw for anything but their lands, their farmhouses, and their money. And now observe the reaction : the man in whom they once trusted they now dread ; the man whom they dreaded they adore.' <sup>1</sup> Again, three days later, ' See how the Conservatives are rushing to welcome Caesar and ingratiating themselves with him. Why, the country towns are offering prayers to him as though he were a god. . . . What ovations from the towns ! What honours ! " Pure fright," you will say. Very likely ; but they are still more frightened of the other. The artful clemency of the one delights, the wrath of the other terrifies them.' <sup>2</sup>

49 B. C.  
He testi-  
fies to  
Caesar's  
popu-  
larity.

When Caesar was nearing Brundisium Numerius Magius met him, bearing a reply from Pompey to the message with which Caesar had entrusted him. The reply was unsatisfactory, and Caesar sent Magius back with the comments which it seemed to demand.<sup>3</sup> On the 9th Caesar reached Brundisium.<sup>4</sup> His army had been reinforced on the march, first by the six cohorts from Alba and three from Tarracina in Latium, which deserted their respective commanders, and afterwards by various other corps ; <sup>5</sup> but the Alban cohorts were immediately dispatched to reinforce their comrades in Sicily.<sup>6</sup> The consuls with more than half of the Pompeian army—as many as could find room in the transports—had already sailed for Dyrrachium. Why, Caesar asked himself, had Pompey remained behind ? Was it only from lack of shipping ? If so, he would certainly endeavour to embark as soon as the transports returned. But perhaps he intended to establish himself for some time at Brundisium, in order that, master of that port as well as of the ports

\*Jan. 17.

Departure  
of part of  
the Pom-  
peian  
army.  
Mar. 4  
(Jan. 12).

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, viii, 13.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 16, 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, ix, 13 A, 1. See *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 253-4.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 24, 2-4. See pp. 372-3.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 371.



49 B. C.

of Epirus and Illyricum, he might be able to control the whole Adriatic and prevent Caesar from crossing while the consuls were raising a new force. Caesar had no means of solving the question, and he therefore decided to blockade the port. If he succeeded, Pompey would be forced to surrender: if Pompey wished to escape, he must abandon Italy before the blockade was complete.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar  
tries to  
blockade  
Brun-  
disium,

Brundisium stood upon a headland facing the north-east and washed by two narrow inlets, which formed the harbour and communicated with the open sea by a channel less than four hundred yards wide. While Caesar constructed contravallations round the landward side of the town and along the shores which fringed the inlets, the engineers sunk masses of stone in the water on either side of the channel. Each of the moles thus formed was prolonged for about eighty yards, where the depth compelled the workers to desist. Four centuries before, as Caesar of course knew, the Syracusans had blocked their harbour by a line of vessels; <sup>2</sup> but Caesar had no ships, and the method which he or his chief engineer devised was more elaborate and more difficult. At the extremity of either mole a raft thirty feet square was floated, covered with layers of fascines and earth in order to facilitate the movement of troops, protected in front and on either side by wooden shields, and made fast by anchors at its four corners. Similar rafts were successively fixed in line, and on every fourth raft a two-storied turret was to be set up, designed to carry quick-firing catapults. More than twenty rafts, however, were required to fill the space; <sup>3</sup> and meanwhile Pompey was not idle. Some large trading vessels were lying in the harbour. Pompey erected three-storied turrets upon their decks, in which he placed artillery, archers, and slingers, and sent them to baffle the engineers. Fighting continued day after day. Meanwhile although Magius had not returned, Caesar again attempted to negotiate.<sup>4</sup> Caninius Rebilus, who

but at-  
tempts to  
reopen ne-  
gotiations.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 25, 2-4; *Att.*, ix, 14, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Thuc.*, vii, 59, 3.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 374-5.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, i, 26, 2-3 with *Cic.*, *Att.*, ix, 13 A, 1, and see *Klio*, iv, 1904, p. 371, n. 2.

had served on his staff in Gaul, was in his camp, and 49 B. C.  
Scribonius Libo, an intimate friend of Rebilus, was in  
Brundisium. Rebilus was sent, as an accredited envoy,  
into the town, to endeavour to arrange an interview  
between Caesar and Pompey.<sup>1</sup> He was to explain to  
Libo that Caesar felt confident that, if Pompey would  
consent to meet him, it would be possible to secure peace  
on terms agreeable to both, and that if Libo could induce  
Pompey to make this concession, much of the credit  
would accrue to him. Libo, after hearing what Rebilus  
had to say, reported the conversation to Pompey. The  
result justified the forebodings of Cicero. Libo soon  
returned to Rebilus and informed him that in the absence  
of the consuls Pompey was unable to treat.<sup>2</sup> Pompey  
had persuaded the consuls to leave Brundisium because  
he wished to prevent them from sanctioning any terms  
of peace;<sup>3</sup> and we may reasonably conclude that his  
motive for sending Magius to Caesar was merely to gain  
time.

Early on the 17th of March the transports returned from \*Jan. 25.  
Dyrrachium, and, as the line of rafts was barely half  
finished, sailed into the harbour. Pompey instantly  
prepared to embark. In order to prevent Caesar from  
interfering, he detached troops to bar all the approaches  
to the quays. The gates were blocked; the streets and  
the squares were barricaded; trenches were dug across  
the streets, and sharp stakes, just hidden by thin wattle  
overspread with earth, were planted in them; while two  
roads, which gave access outside the walls to the harbour,

<sup>1</sup> L. Holzapfel (*Klio*, 1904, pp. 370-1) argues that, as Caesar had been declared a public enemy, Rebilus dared not enter Brundisium, where his safety would have been imperilled, but met Libo outside. Does he suppose that Rebilus would have been put to death if he had presented himself as an accredited envoy at the gate? Clodius on a like mission was safe in meeting Scipio (*B. C.*, iii, 57), and Pompey did not hesitate to send Magius to negotiate with Caesar.

Holzapfel (p. 374) confutes objections which Drumann (*Gesch. Roms.*, iii, 1837, p. 438, n. 44) makes against Caesar's sincerity in sending Rebilus, but which are too fatuous to require notice.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 26, 3-6. According to Dio (xli, 12, 2), Pompey promised to refer Caesar's proposal to the consuls.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, § 1.

49 B. C. were fenced off by rows of pointed beams. When these obstacles were complete, archers and slingers were posted at intervals along the wall, and the rest of the troops began to move silently down to the quays. As soon as they were all on board, the archers and slingers were to repair on a preconcerted signal to a spot which was easily accessible, and were then to embark in small craft and row out to the transports.

But the Brundisians resented the brutality of the Pompeian soldiery and the insolence of Pompey. Perceiving from the hurried movements of the troops that the army was about to embark, they made signs from the house-tops and put the Caesarians on the alert. Caesar immediately gave orders to prepare scaling-ladders and to arm. Towards nightfall the hawsers were cast off; and the archers and slingers, observing the signal, descended from their posts. The Caesarians instantly swarmed up the ladders and lined the wall, but, warned by the townsmen to beware of the hidden trenches, they stood still until guides came and conducted them by a circuitous route to the port. The bulk of the fleet were already standing out to sea; but two of the transports had fouled the mole, and before they could be got clear the leading companies of the Caesarians put off in boats and captured them.<sup>1</sup> Except these prisoners, not one Pompeian soldier remained upon Italian soil; and in sixty-five days the conquest of the peninsula had been achieved almost without a blow.

Pompey transports the rest of his force to Greece.

While Caesar was overrunning Italy he had not forgotten the pledge which he had given years before to the people from whom many of his troops were raised. Taking advantage of the flight of the Pompeian senators from Rome, he had commissioned the praetor Lucius Roscius to propose a bill for the enfranchisement of the Transpadanes and probably also of the few Cispadanes who had not yet received the citizenship. On the 11th of March

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 27-8. Cf. *Lucan*, ii, 609-713; *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 12, 2-3 (chronologically perverted); *Flor.*, ii, 13, 19-20; *Suet.*, *Div. Iul.*, 34; *App.*, ii, 40, 159; *Dio*, xli, 12, 3.

the bill became law, and thenceforward every free Italian was a Roman citizen.<sup>1</sup> Provisionally, however, Cisalpine Gaul remained under a provincial governor, and a tribune, named Rubrius,<sup>2</sup> was charged to draft a supplementary bill, by which, as the Transpadanes as well as the Cispadanes now became subject to Roman law, the judicial principles that obtained in the rest of Italy were applied also to them, and the powers of the local in relation to the imperial authorities were exactly defined. Before the end of the year this bill also passed into law.<sup>3</sup>

49 B. C.

Caesar enfranchises the Transpadanes.

<sup>1</sup> Dio, xli, 36, 3 (chronologically incorrect); C. G. Bruns, *Fontes iur. Rom.*, 1893, p. 103, l. 13. Cf. Th. Mommsen (*Wiener Studien*, xxiv, 1903, pp. 238-9) and E. G. Hardy, *Roman Laws and Charters*, 1912, pp. 110-1.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps he was the L. Rubrius mentioned by Cicero in the *Second Philippic* (16, 40).

<sup>3</sup> Bruns, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-103; Hardy, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-1, 116, 118, 124. Dr. Hardy (*Eng. Hist. Rev.*, xxxi, 1916, pp. 353-79) refutes the theories of J. M. Nap (*Themis*, lxxiv, 1913, pp. 178-207; lxxv, 1914, pp. 149-86) that the 'Table' of Veleia, on which the law of Rubrius was engraved, belongs to the dictatorship of Sulla, and that the *lex Rubria* mentioned therein (xx, 29, &c.) was the law, authorizing the foundation of a colony at Carthage, passed by the tribune Rubrius in the time of Gaius Gracchus; but the arguments of Nap are such that the refutation, unanswerable though it is, seems almost a work of supererogation. Incidentally (p. 355) Dr. Hardy disposes of the view of Mommsen (*Gesamm. Schr.*, i, 1905, pp. 152, 192-3 [*Eph. epigr.*, ix, 1913, p. 4]) that the Table was a law, otherwise unknown, dealing with *damnum infectum* (damage not done, but apprehended).

## CHAPTER XV

### PRECAUTIONS FOR THE SAFETY OF ITALY.— THE ATTEMPT OF CAESAR TO CONCILIATE CICERO.—PREPARATIONS FOR THE CON- QUEST OF SPAIN

49 B. C.      ON the day after the departure of Pompey, Caesar made  
Mar. 18      his formal entry into Brundisium and addressed the  
(Jan. 26).      inhabitants, thanking them, we may be sure, for their  
                 goodwill and for the help which they had given him.<sup>1</sup>  
                 Some weeks earlier he had determined that his best course,  
                 after he had made Italy secure, would be to attack the  
                 Pompeian army in Spain.<sup>2</sup> He knew, indeed, that if only  
                 he could cross the Adriatic, he would be able to end the  
                 war at a blow ; but to follow Pompey was impossible, for  
                 want of ships. Pompey had taken advantage of his posi-  
                 tion to hire every available transport ; no more were then  
                 to be obtained except from Picenum, Sicily, and Gaul ;  
                 and if Caesar were to wait for them he would arrive in  
                 Illyricum too late. Moreover, if he were then to cross  
                 the sea, Italy would be exposed to attack ; Domitius or  
                 other partisans of Pompey might work serious mischief ;  
                 Afranius and Petreius would have time to raise fresh levies  
                 and to strengthen their position in Spain. Evidently the  
                 first need was to secure Italy and to get possession of the  
                 provinces which supplied Rome with corn. When  
                 arrangements had been made for achieving this aim  
                 Caesar might without anxiety engage the army which  
                 occupied the western peninsula.

Accordingly Caesar sent instructions to the authorities  
of all the maritime towns to procure every vessel that was  
adapted for the transport of troops and to have them  
assembled at Brundisium by the time when he should be

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Att.*, ix, 15, 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 6 A, compared with *B. C.*, i, 29.



ready to start for Greece. Probably he had already given orders for the construction of ships of war, for a few weeks later his squadrons were patrolling the Adriatic and the Tuscan Sea. The three veteran legions were quartered respectively at Brundisium, Tarentum, and Sipontum, to frustrate any attempt which the Pompeian fleet might make to seize those ports; the three newly raised legions were distributed in neighbouring towns.<sup>1</sup> Quintus Valerius with a legion of recruits was directed to seize Sardinia, which was held by a Pompeian governor; Curio was to proceed to Sicily and take over the command of the troops which had been sent thither under Pollio,<sup>2</sup> to expel Cato if he should offer resistance, and afterwards to invade Africa. On the 19th of March Caesar left Brundisium for Rome, intending to convene those senators who still remained in Italy, to establish a provisional government, and, with or without legal sanction, to obtain the money which he required for carrying on the war. So many of his partisans were discredited adventurers<sup>3</sup> that he was intensely anxious to conciliate men of established reputation; and he determined above all to make a final effort to gain the countenance or at least the neutrality of Cicero. Since he had himself failed to induce Pompey to negotiate, Cicero, who longed for peace, might help to avert a decisive struggle.

The letters which Cicero wrote in those stressful days reflect hopes and fears and doubts which were common to him and to many lesser men.<sup>4</sup> After he abandoned the superintendence of the Capuan district he at first thought of fleeing to some place of safety; but, believing that Domitius would be able to make a stand, he gave up his intention a few days before Caesar reached Corfinium.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Caes.*, *B. C.*, i, 32, 1; *Cic.*, *Att.*, ix, 15, 1; *App.*, *B. C.*, ii, 40, 161. Cf. O. E. Schmidt, *D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, p. 158. I am not sure whether all the three newly raised legions were quartered in neighbouring towns. Appian, who mentions the garrisons of Brundisium and Tarentum, but omits Sipontum, says that troops were stationed at Hydruntum: Dio (xli, 15, 1) alludes to Brundisium only.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, ix, 18, 2; 19, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero's letters *passim*, e. g. *Att.*, ix, 13, 7; 19, 1; *Fam.*, iv, 2, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Att.*, vii, 24; 26, 1.

Caesar takes steps to secure Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily.

Jan. 27.

Perplexities and hesitations of Cicero.

50 49 B. C. So far no blood had been spilt ; and it seemed possible that a settlement might be made. ' If there is war ', he told Atticus, ' I have resolved to be with Pompey. ' <sup>1</sup> But the elation which false reports had inspired soon died away. A vessel which he had chartered was waiting at Caieta, near Formiae, in case he should decide to flee, and another at Tarentum. <sup>2</sup> On the 17th of February he wrote to Atticus, ' You think that if Pompey goes, I must even quit Italy. In my judgement that would be of no use either to the Republic or to my children, and, what is more, would neither be right nor honourable. ' <sup>3</sup> From this moment his anxieties hourly increased. Alternately denouncing Pompey and professing devotion to him, he implored Atticus to tell him what he ought to do if Pompey were to leave the country, <sup>4</sup> and asked for the loan of a book, *On Concord*, by Demetrius of Magnesia, to help him in striving to promote peace : <sup>5</sup> ' I find some relief ', he said, ' in all this misery from, as it were, talking to you. ' <sup>6</sup> Then, begging his friend not to scoff at his vacillation, he avowed that his resolve was shaken by the thought that it was his duty to associate himself with Pompey. <sup>7</sup> By the next day he had elaborated a decision, not indeed as to what he would, but what he ought to do—he ought to accompany or to follow his chief:—' Considerations of duty are torturing and have been torturing me all along. . . . As to what you think and, pretty well, what is right, Mar. 3 (Jan. 11). I am clear. ' <sup>8</sup> Presently he confesses that it is not duty nor loyalty that impels him, but dread of public opinion ; for a friend warns him that he ' is being pulled to pieces by the Conservatives ' . <sup>9</sup> Two days later, although he hears that at fashionable dinner-parties ' many severe reflexions are being made upon ' him, he despises his critics : no real Conservatives exist : Pompey will undoubtedly conduct his operations with crime, but Pompey alone influences him. <sup>10</sup> He remembers that in the matter of

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, vii, 26, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, viii, 11 B, 1 ; 3, 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 2, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 3, 1. 3 ; 9, 3 ; 12, 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 11, 7 ; 12, 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 14, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, § 6.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 15, 2-3.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, 16, 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, ix, 1, 3-4.

his return from exile Pompey befriended him, and he tells Atticus that he has 'a horror of ingratitude'.<sup>1</sup> Believing that Pompey is responsible for the disasters of the campaign, he avows that he feels 'more hostile to him than to Caesar himself'; but a moment later his anger is dissolved in sympathy, for he is sure that the one object of Caesar is to compass Pompey's death.<sup>2</sup> On the 11th of March, while he was writing to Atticus, a messenger delivered a letter which he paused to open: it contained a false report that Pompey had already sailed for Dyrrachium. And he, who had resolved to follow him, remained behind! 'Believe me,' he protested, 'I am really beside myself to think of the disgrace I have brought upon myself. . . . I am reading over your letters from the beginning. They somewhat relieve me. The earliest ones warn and entreat me not to be precipitate. The next show that you are glad I stayed. While I am reading them I feel less base, but only while I read them. . . . Wherefore, my dear Titus, do, I beseech you, pluck out this sorrow from my heart, or at least mitigate it by consolation or advice or anything you can. But what can you or any human being do? Divine Power could avail little now.'<sup>3</sup> Save when he was writing to his friend or eagerly reading the answers which he received, he could never desist from self-torture. While Caesar and Pompey were wrestling with grim realities he formulated nine questions of casuistry, which, he explained, 'bear upon the duty of a citizen and also relate particularly to the present crisis. . . . By keeping myself at work on these questions and discussing both sides both in Greek and in Latin I distract my mind for a time from anxiety, and also attempt to solve a serious problem.'<sup>4</sup> The problem, however, remained for some time insoluble. Cicero was quite sure that the Pompeian cause was just, but not less sure that Pompey would defend it by atrocious means. After a remark the psychological significance of which has not been appreciated—'The one thing I dread is doing, or, perhaps I should say, having done anything dishonourable'—he concluded that

49 B. C.

Mar. 8

(Jan. 16).

Jan 19.

Mar. 12..

(Jan 20).

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 2 A, 2.<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 5, 2-3.<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 4 5.<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 4.

- 49 B. C. as Caesar would probably commit as gross atrocities as Pompey, his best course would be to stay where he was and await events ; but in the next paragraph he announced that he was determined to sail.<sup>1</sup> ' I am philosophizing ',
- Mar. 13 (Jan. 21). he wrote a few days later, ' all the time I am walking about my estate, and in the course of my perambulations I never cease meditating on my theses.'<sup>2</sup> At last, by the time
- Mar. 17. when Pompey had landed at Dyrrachium, he arrived at a decision : he would leave Formiae and go—somewhere. Pompey, indeed, did not deserve loyalty.—' As in love affairs men lose all fondness for women who are dirty, stupid, and indelicate, so the indecency of his flight and his mismanagement put me off from my affection for him. . . . Now affection again rises, and my regret for him is unbearable.'<sup>3</sup> Another week passed, and Cicero expressed the wish that Caesar would allow him to remain neutral ; but, he added, ' we are as undecided as ever ; for I can scarcely hope that he will grant me this indulgence.'<sup>4</sup>

Caesar  
hopes to  
enlist his  
support.

Cicero was mistaken. Caesar admired him as much as ever ; and though he was trying, personally and through his agents, if he could not enlist his sympathy, to prevent his joining Pompey, he never dreamed of restricting his freedom. While Caesar was marching to Brundisium Balbus wrote to Cicero, entreating him to effect a reconciliation between Caesar and Pompey. ' Believe me,' he said, ' Caesar will not only put himself in your hands, but will also consider himself under the deepest obligation to you if you throw yourself into this task. . . . Whatever Caesar has written, I am sure he will convince you by his acts that he has written with the most absolute sincerity.'<sup>5</sup>

Mar. 6  
(Jan. 14).

A few days later Balbus wrote again, ' I know for certain

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, ix, 7, 1 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 9, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 10, 2. Mr. J. D. Duff (*Journ. of Philol.*, xxxiii, 1914, p. 159) thinks that ' the motive [for not joining Pompey] to which he [Cicero] himself gives chief prominence . . . (*Att.*, ix, 10, 3 [written on March 18]) was probably the strongest . . . he was no longer young . . . and he felt it impossible to face the hardships of a second exile and a campaign'. But see the extract from *Att.*, x, 8 quoted on p. 47, *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, ix, 15, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, viii, 15 A, 1. 3. Cf. ix, 7 A and 13 A, 2.



you will fully satisfy Caesar by taking no part in the war against him and by not associating yourself with his opponents.' <sup>1</sup> Caesar himself, when he was approaching Brundisium, made time to write a few words : ' Though I had only just seen our friend Furnius, and had not been able conveniently to speak to him or to hear what he had to say, being in a hurry and on the march . . . I could not neglect the opportunity of writing to you and sending him to thank you, although I have done so often and in view of your great services shall doubtless often have to do so again. I particularly beg of you, as I feel sure that I shall soon be coming to town, to let me see you there and enable me to avail myself of your advice, your influence, your prestige and support of every kind.' <sup>2</sup> Cicero, however, was not to be convinced that Caesar desired peace : apparently he thought it a sufficient comment on the letters of Balbus to say that his son-in law, Dolabella, who was at Brundisium with Caesar, ' talked of nothing but war ' ; <sup>3</sup> but Caesar might win, and his letter called for an answer. Cicero was not quite sure what he had meant by the last sentence, and he therefore showed it to Gaius Matius, an intimate friend of Caesar, who took no part in politics. Matius told him that he had no doubt that Caesar desired his help and influence for effecting a pacification. <sup>4</sup> Cicero accordingly assured Caesar that he would gladly do what he could. ' Since the commencement of hostilities ' , he continued, ' I have taken no part whatever in the war ; and I have always held that in that war you were being wronged, for your enemies and those who were jealous of you were striving to prevent your obtaining an office granted you by the favour of the Roman People. But as at that period I not only supported your claims myself, but also counselled everybody else to assist you, so I am now strongly moved by consideration for the just claims of Pompey. A good many years have passed since I selected you two as the special objects of my political devotion and—as you both are still—of my warm personal friendship. . . . Though I have already thanked

Cicero  
writes to  
Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 7 B, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 6 A.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 13, 8. Cf. 14, 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 11, 2.



- 49 B. C. you in regard to Lentulus—for you spared the man who saved me—yet, after reading a letter in which he wrote to me with a heart full of gratitude for your generous treatment and kindness, I felt that in conferring a boon upon him you had done the same to me ; and if you realize that I am grateful, pray give me the chance of showing my gratitude to Pompey too.’<sup>1</sup> About the 22nd of March Caesar received this letter, and immediately sent it to Rome for publication.<sup>2</sup>
- Jan. 30.

In a few days Caesar would be passing Formiae on his way to Rome, and Cicero would have to meet him. Meanwhile the news which he received from acquaintances who had been with Pompey increased the repugnance which he felt to the spirit in which the Pompeians were entering upon war. ‘All’, he assured Atticus, ‘tell the same story of threatening utterances, alienation from the Moderates, hostility to the municipal towns, undisguised proscriptions,—Sullas pure and simple. . . . And yet there is no hope of safety except in them ; and I am on the watch and unable to get a wink of sleep and anxious to be with men the very opposite of myself, in order to escape the abominations going on here.’<sup>3</sup>

- Mar. 20  
(Jan. 28).
- Feb. 4. On the 27th of March Caesar was to reach Sinuessa, only a few hours’ drive from Formiae. Would he allow Cicero to absent himself from the Senate and to remain neutral ? Notwithstanding the assurances of Balbus, Cicero feared that he would not.<sup>4</sup> On the 26th he received a letter from Caesar,<sup>5</sup> answering the one in which he had congratulated him on having released the notables at Corfinium :—‘ You judge me quite correctly—you know me well—when you say that nothing is more alien to my nature than cruelty ; and while I derive great pleasure from clemency for its own sake, I rejoice and exult in your approval. Nor am I disturbed by the report that those whom I allowed to go free have gone off with the intention of attacking me again :

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, ix, 11 A, 2-3. Cf. 11, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, viii, 9, 1. Cf. C. Bardt in *Festschr. zu O. Hirschfelds sechzigstem Geburtstage*, 1903, pp. 12-3, and R. Y. Tyrrell and L. C. Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, iv<sup>2</sup>, 1918, p. 90.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, ix, 11, 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 15, 1. 3. 6.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 16, 2-3.

I desire nothing better than to be true to myself and that they should be—what they are. I should be glad if you would meet me in town, that I may, as ever, avail myself in all matters of your counsel and influence.’ 49 B. C.

Cicero understood what Caesar required of him. In Formiæ, as in other towns, a notice was posted, stating that Caesar expected all senators who could attend to meet him on the 1st of April; <sup>1</sup> and evidently he was as anxious as he had always been to secure the support of Cicero. He would be passing through Formiæ within a couple of days; and he would then expect a definite reply. If Cicero hesitated, it was only for a moment.<sup>2</sup> There was no room for doubt. He could not reconcile it with his conscience to follow the example of consulars like Servius Sulpicius and Volcacius Tullus, who, though they had left Rome in obedience to Pompey, deemed it expedient to obey Caesar’s summons. He was quite sure that he ought not to attend the meeting of the Senate; for he could give no support to Caesar without violating the duty which he owed to Pompey. On the 28th of March Caesar arrived; and presently the two men were standing face to face. Cicero was rather nervous; but he did not flinch. Immediately after the interview he wrote to Atticus: ‘I followed your advice in both respects, for I spoke in such a way as to win his respect rather than his gratitude, and I stuck to my resolution not to go to Rome. We were mistaken in thinking that he would be easy to deal with: I never saw anything less so. He kept saying that my decision amounted to a vote of censure; if I did not come the others would hang back. I remarked that their case was unlike mine. After much discussion he said, “Come then and discuss the question of peace.” “At my own discretion?” I asked. “Am I to dictate to you?”’ said he. “What I shall urge”, I said, “will be that the Senate disapproves of any expedition to Spain and of transporting armies to Greece,<sup>3</sup> and”, I added, “I shall

His interview with Caesar at Formiæ. Feb. 9.

Feb 5.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 17, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, ‘Ought I to refuse him?’ (*Ergo ei negandum est?*)

<sup>3</sup> Did Cicero mean that the Senate should disapprove of Pompey’s

49 B. C. express much sympathy with Gnaeus." Thereupon he said, "Of course I strongly object to remarks of that kind." "So I supposed," said I, "but I must decline to attend, because I must either speak in this sense, and say many things which I could not possibly pass over if I were present, or I must not come at all." The upshot was, as he suggested by way of ending the discussion, that I was to think it over. I couldn't say "No". So we parted. I feel certain therefore that he has no love for me. But I was delighted with myself, which hasn't been the case for some time past. For the rest, good God! What a following he has! To use your expression, what an Inferno, with the arch-villain in their midst! What a gang of bankrupts and desperadoes . . . His closing remark, which I had almost forgotten to mention, was most offensive: if he might not avail himself of my counsel, he would consult whom he could and would stick at nothing . . . I feel certain I have offended him.' <sup>1</sup>

Caesar  
meets the  
remaining  
senators  
outside  
Rome;

Caesar reached the outskirts of Rome by the 1st of April, and on the same day the Senate, convened by Antony and Quintus Cassius, duly met. Constitutional forms were of course observed; and as Caesar could not legally enter the city, the meeting was held outside.<sup>2</sup> Caesar insisted that

transporting an army to Greece, or only of Caesar's intention to do so? O. E. Schmidt (*op. cit.*, p. 162) remarks that if Cicero had before held Pompey responsible for the first breach of the peace, he now held Caesar responsible for the unscrupulous energy and rigour with which he used Pompey's unpreparedness for war. In other words, Schmidt, who rightly insists that Caesar was still anxious to make peace and that Pompey was bent upon war, holds with Cicero that Caesar ought to have sat still in Italy and abstained from countering Pompey's preparations in the East by attacking his lieutenants in Spain!

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, ix, 18. Schmidt (*op. cit.*, pp. 163-4) most acutely and, I think, with moral certainty conjectures that in § 2 for the corrupt (*Qui comitatus! quae, ut tu soles dicere, révua, in qua erat) ero sceleris* we should read *erus sceleris, erus* being the true form of *herus*. Schmidt (p. 161) says that the meeting between Caesar and Cicero marked a . . . turning-point in Cicero's political life . . . the passing from the neutrality, which he had hitherto strictly observed, between Caesar and Pompey to open defiance of Caesar'. My readers, who have doubtless formed their own opinion about the strictly observed neutrality, will presently gauge the openness of the defiance.

<sup>2</sup> Dio, xli, 15, 2. When Pompey left Rome some senators, Caesarian and neutral, had remained (*ib.*, 9, 7). Caesar had no authority as proconsul to convene the Senate: therefore the tribunes did so.

he had not made any revolutionary demand ; for by the Law of the Ten Tribunes the privilege had been granted to him of standing for the consulship in his absence. If Pompey disapproved the concession, why had he, when he was consul, permitted it to pass ? If he approved it, why had he prevented him from reaping the benefit ? Then, reminding his hearers that he had spontaneously offered to resign before the legal termination of his government, Caesar recounted the bitterness of his personal enemies, the unfairness with which two of his legions had been taken away from him, the terms which he had offered, the attempts which he had made to induce Pompey to consent to an interview. Since he had failed, he must appeal to the senators to co-operate with him in carrying on the government ; but if they were half-hearted, he would shoulder the burden himself. Finally he proposed that the Senate should officially send delegates to Pompey with a view to concluding an accommodation ; for, he explained, although Pompey had remarked in a former meeting of the Senate that to send envoys for such a purpose was a sign of fear, which merely enhanced the prestige of the person to whom they were sent, he was not afraid of incurring this reproach : the remark was itself a sign of narrowness and weakness ; and as he had ever been ambitious of excelling in the field of action, so he desired to excel in justice and equity.<sup>1</sup>

The House was willing to send delegates ; but no one would volunteer to go, for members had not forgotten Pompey's parting threat,—that he would regard those who remained in Rome as not less hostile to himself than those who followed Caesar. The debate was continued on the two following days, and all sorts of excuses were made. Then followed an incident which Caesar did not record, but which was surely in his recollection when he wrote that Metellus, one of the tribunes, ' obstructed every other measure which Caesar proposed '.<sup>2</sup> He requested the Senate to sanction his drawing upon the public treasure, and apparently they agreed ; but Metellus interposed his

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 32.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 33, 1-3.



49 B. C.

seizes the  
State  
treasure;

veto. The treasure, which the consuls had neglected to remove, was in the temple of Saturn at the western end of the Forum. Necessity knows no law, and if Caesar forbore to take the money it would probably be used to crush him; but he might exculpate himself by appealing to the proclamation which had declared a state of war in Italy. When he was about to enter the treasury, Metellus forbade him in the name of the law to proceed. Men who did not know Caesar now learned that, notwithstanding the mildness and the clemency of his temper, he was absolutely ruthless in crushing opposition, and that when he was angered his temper was formidable. Exasperated by the futile discussions of the previous days, he warned Metellus that if he attempted to interfere he should be put to death, adding that to execute this threat would be easier than to threaten. As the keys had been removed he sent for smiths to burst open the door.<sup>1</sup> Fifteen thousand bars of gold, thirty thousand bars of silver, and thirty million sesterces were carted away.<sup>2</sup> The populace were aghast; and Caesar, who had intended to harangue them on the political situation, deemed it expedient to say nothing.<sup>3</sup> Caelius and Curio, if they told Cicero the truth, were profoundly impressed by his demeanour. 'Caesar', said Curio, 'now hates the Senate far more than ever.'<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plut., *Pomp.*, 62, 1-2; *Caes.*, 35, 3; Flor., ii, 13, 21; App., ii, 41, 164; Dio, xli, 17, 1-2. Dio's statement is confirmed by what Caelius says (*Fam.*, viii, 16, 1) about 'the recent tribunician vetoes'. Drumann (*Gesch. Roms.*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 339) thinks that Caesar got the Senate to authorize his drawing on the treasury.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxiii, 3 (17), 56, whose figures, as given in the MSS., are hardly certain. Cf. Oros., vi, 15, 5. In a hoard of Roman bars of gold found in Transylvania in 1887 the heaviest weighed 524 grammes = 1 lb. 2½ oz. (*C. I. L.*, iii, Suppl. 1, No. 8080).

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, x, 4, 8—not, I think, necessarily inconsistent with Vell., ii, 50, 2, and Dio, xli, 16, 1, who say that Caesar did address the people—perhaps when he first came to Rome.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, x, 4, 9. When Curio told Cicero (§ 8) that Caesar 'was not by nature or inclination averse from cruelty, but only because he thought clemency would make him popular', either he was merely expressing his own opinion, which was not only refuted by events, but frequently contradicted by Cicero himself, or his object was to deter Cicero from joining Pompey. The latter alternative, suggested by Schmidt (*op. cit.*, p. 170), is perhaps hardly consistent with the assurance which Curio gave to Cicero (§ 10) that Caesar had not the slightest objection to his leaving Italy.



'He left town', wrote Caelius, 'in a rage with the Senate : 49 B. C. he was thoroughly roused by the interference of the tribunes : there will be no room, I tell you, for entreaty.' <sup>1</sup>

Before Caesar set out from Rome he made arrangements on his own responsibility for the administration of affairs. Aemilius Lepidus was appointed Prefect of the City : <sup>2</sup> and makes arrangements for administration. Mark Antony was to be Governor of Italy and Commander-in-Chief, <sup>3</sup> and Caesar enjoined him to allow no one to quit the country without his permission. <sup>4</sup> The galleys that had been already built were grouped in two squadrons, one of which, under Hortensius, was to patrol the Tuscan Sea, the other, under Dolabella, the Adriatic. <sup>5</sup> The province of Illyricum was assigned to Antony's brother Gaius, and that of Cisalpine Gaul to Marcus Crassus. <sup>6</sup> Caesar, notwithstanding his anger, bore no malice against Cicero, and before his departure he wrote to assure him that he excused his absence from the Senate and did not take it in the least amiss. <sup>7</sup>

Cicero, for his part, adhered to his resolve of leaving Italy, and was only waiting for fair weather ; <sup>8</sup> but he Cicero resolves to leave Italy. he could not yet bring himself to join Pompey : he intended to live somewhere in retirement, perhaps at Athens, perhaps in Malta, and to take no part in the war. Remark- ing that nobody had left the country except those who regarded Caesar as a personal enemy, he told Atticus that his only motive for doing so was to prevent people from saying that he had treated Pompey with ingratitude. <sup>9</sup> The recollection of his own consulship was a perennial consolation : 'Not only', he wrote, 'do I not rate the achievements of these great commanders as superior to my own ; I do not even consider that their position is better, though theirs is brilliant and mine one of hard struggle.' <sup>10</sup> On the 14th of April, when he was staying in Feb. 22. his villa at Cumae, he received a visit from Curio, who was Curio visits him. about to take up his command in Sicily. Curio assured

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, viii, 16, 1.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 296.

<sup>3</sup> *Plut.*, *Ant.*, 6, 2 ; *App.*, ii, 41, 165.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, x, 10, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *App.*, ii, 41, 166.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, § 165.

<sup>7</sup> *Att.*, x, 3 A, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, ix, 18, 3 ; x, 6, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, ix, 19, 2 ; x, 1, 2 ; 2, 1 ; 7, 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, 4, 4.

49 B. C.

him that Caesar would have gladly given him leave to go and live where he pleased if he had not been afraid to ask a favour. 'Take for granted', said Curio, 'that you have got it. I'll write to him from your dictation, to say that we have talked over the matter. As you don't attend the Senate, what difference does it make to him where you are?'<sup>1</sup>

Caelius  
and  
Caesar  
advise  
Cicero to  
remain  
neutral.

About the end of April two letters reached Cicero at Cumæ. They had been written by Caelius and Caesar on the 16th while Caesar was posting to Massilia. Caelius implored his old friend not to join Pompey. 'Consider this,' he pleaded: 'whatever offence your hesitation has given to Pompey you have already incurred: to act against Caesar now that he is victorious when you refused to attack him while the issue was doubtful, would be most outrageous folly . . . the Spanish provinces will be ours as soon as Caesar arrives . . . the war will be over almost directly.'<sup>2</sup> When Cicero opened Caesar's letter, he found the same thought, without the rash prophecy, developed in another way:—'Although I had concluded that you were not likely to do anything rash or imprudent, still, as common report made me anxious, I thought I had better write and beg you, in the name of our mutual goodwill, not to take any step now that matters have taken a turn in my favour, which you did not think necessary when the issue was open. For you will have committed a somewhat serious offence against friendship without having consulted your own interest, since it will be evident that you have not followed the winning side (for manifestly all the luck has been on our side and against our opponents), and that you have not been guided by the merits of the case (for it has not changed since you decided to hold aloof from their counsels), but that you have found something to condemn in my conduct; and you could inflict on me no greater blow than that. By the right our friendship gives me I pray you not to do so. Finally, what can be more becoming to an upright man or a good and peaceable citizen than to hold aloof from civil strife?

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, x, 4, 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Fam.*, vii, 16, 2. 3. 5.

. . . When you have carefully weighed the evidence furnished by my life and the proofs which I have given of friendship, you will find that there is no safer or more honourable course than to abstain altogether from all participation in the struggle.' <sup>1</sup> 49 B. C.

Neither of these letters had any influence on Cicero. A false report led him to believe that Pompey was marching through Illyricum into Gaul; <sup>2</sup> and, notwithstanding the confident prediction of Caelius, he hoped that Caesar would fail in Spain.<sup>3</sup> Antony wrote twice to warn him not to leave Italy; <sup>4</sup> but he remembered what Curio had said. On the 2nd of May he wrote a letter to Atticus, in which, for the first time, he candidly revealed his motives. Atticus had advised him to await the result of the Spanish campaign, but he replied that he did not intend to shape his policy thereby: 'If Caesar is driven out, how can I then join Pompey with any grace or honour, when I should think that Curio himself would desert to him? . . . If Caesar wins, I foresee massacre, an attack on private property, recall of exiles, repudiation of debts, promotion of the vilest scoundrels, and a despotism intolerable, I don't say to any Roman, but even to a Persian. . . Besides, consider this, the decision of the whole struggle does not depend on Spain. . . Pompey's view is that of Themistocles: he holds that the master of the sea must inevitably be master of the empire . . . he will put to sea therefore at the proper time with an enormous fleet, and come to Italy; and what then will become of us, who sit here idle? . . . Let me confess the real truth. . . I thought there would be a reconciliation, and in that case I did not want Caesar to be angry with me while he was friends with Pompey.' Then, as his pen moved, Cicero thought exultingly of the odium which Caesar had incurred at Rome. 'You will understand', he continued, 'that this despotism can hardly last six months. . . Fall he must, either by the hands of his opponents or by his own. . . I hope it will happen in our lifetime.'<sup>5</sup> He rejoiced in

Mar. 11.

Cicero reveals to Atticus his motives for trimming.

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, x, 8 B.<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 3.<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 8, 1.<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 8 A, 1-2; 10, 2.<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 8, 2. 4. 5. 7-9.

49 B. C. hearing from Atticus that the Roman populace had expressed their disapprobation by an outburst in the theatre;<sup>1</sup> but, replying to Caelius, who would certainly show his letter to Caesar, he was careful to write what Caesar might read without offence. He intended, as he told Atticus,<sup>2</sup> to sail for Malta and to remain there pending the arrival of news from Spain. To Caelius he wrote, 'What surprises me is that you, who ought to know me well, could be induced to think that I was either so short-sighted as to desert a fortune in the ascendant for one that is waning and all but prostrate, or so fickle as to throw away the favour that I have found with a man at the height of success and so be untrue to myself and—what I have consistently avoided from the beginning—take part in a civil war. . . . I never thought of leaving the country without the approbation of your party. . . . I am not waiting for the result of the Spanish campaign, as to which I am fully convinced that the truth is as you say.'<sup>3</sup>

His disin-  
genuous  
letter to  
Caelius.

He leaves  
Italy to  
join Pom-  
pey.

Apr. 16.

Cicero did not, after all, await the result of the campaign. He heard that several of the cohorts which Caesar had left in Italy were about to mutiny, and it would seem that he had a momentary thought of trying to induce Curio to join Pompey.<sup>4</sup> On the 7th of June he embarked at Caieta for Epirus, and ultimately arrived, an unwelcome guest, in the camp of Pompey.<sup>5</sup>

Feb. 27.

When Cicero set sail Caesar had not yet joined his army in Spain. He arrived about the 19th of April at Massilia,<sup>6</sup> and there learned that Vibullius, whom he had released at Corfinium, had been sent by Pompey to Spain, doubtless

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, x, 12, 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 9, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Fam.*, ii, 16, 1. 2. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Prof. Tenney Frank (*Class. Philol.*, xiv, 1919, pp. 287-9), comparing *Att.*, x, 10. 3, 12. 2. 5, 15. 2, 16. 3, and inferring from 7. 3 and 8. 2 that Curio was not unlikely—I should say that Cicero thought he was not unlikely—to desert Caesar, conjectures that Cicero, developing a suggestion made by Caelius some time before, contemplated an attempt to induce Curio to join the Pompeians in Sicily. Unlike Tyrrell and Purser (*The Correspondence of Cicero*, iv<sup>2</sup>, 1918, pp. xliii-xlv, n. 6), he identifies the Caelius whom Cicero refers to in these letters with our old friend Caelius Rufus. His conjecture is at all events more probable than theirs—that 'Cicero actually meditated an appeal to force, probably in Sicily'. Cicero was not such a fool.

<sup>5</sup> *Fam.*, xiv, 7, 2; xi, 1, 1; 2, 1. Cf. O. E. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-4.

<sup>6</sup> Stoffel, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-4; Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 176.



in order to warn Afranius, and that Domitius was sailing towards Gaul. The message with which Pompey charged the Massilian envoys had produced the desired effect : Caesar was not permitted to enter the city. The fifteen leading councillors who composed the Government<sup>1</sup> came, however, at his request to confer with him. He endeavoured to persuade them to refrain from opposing his advance, arguing that they ought to be guided by the attitude of the Italian population and not by the arbitrary will of Pompey. They reported to the Council what he had said, and presently announced their decision. The substance was that though it was not within the competence of the Council to decide which of the two parties into which the Roman people was then divided was in the right, they recognized that the leaders of those parties, Gnaeus Pompeius and Gaius Caesar, were both alike patrons of Massilia, and that both had conferred benefits upon them,<sup>2</sup> and they considered it their duty to show their gratitude impartially by not assisting either against his rival and not admitting either into the town.<sup>3</sup>

Caesar tries to dissuade the Massilians from opposing his advance.

But the Massilians knew that neither of their patrons could tolerate neutrality. Domitius with his fleet had by this time arrived. In virtue of his proconsular dignity he was at once recognized as Governor of Massilia and vested with the supreme control of all operations by land and sea. The Massilians were already preparing to repel the onslaught which they foresaw. Caesar could not afford to ignore their opposition ; for unless they were subdued, they would sever the communication between Spain and

His preparations for the siege of Massilia.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 35, 1. Cf. *Cic.*, *Pro Flac.*, 26, 63 ; *De rep.*, i, 27, 43 ; *Strabo*, iv, 1, 5.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 387-8.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, i, 35. Cf. *Att.*, x, 12, 6. Camille Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 1909, p. 583, n. 2), citing *Lucan*, iii, 371-3, argues that the negotiations between Caesar and the Massilians 'ont dû se produire en route, peut-être à Nice'. This inference from the words

*sic postquam fatus, ad urbem*

*haud trepidam convertit iter*

is surely rash, especially as *Lucan* says (305-6),

*hostemque propinquom*

*orant ;*

and anyhow *Lucan's* testimony is not to be preferred to *Caesar's*.




- 49 B. C. Italy, while their unpunished defiance might encourage the malcontents and unsettle the minds of the loyal throughout the whole of Gaul. He therefore summoned three of the newly raised legions from North Italy, requesting Trebonius to come and take command of them;<sup>1</sup> began to prepare for a siege; and directed that twelve galleys should be built with all possible speed at Arelate, or Arles, on the Rhône. At the same time he ordered Fabius to move from his winter-quarters in and around Narbo, expel the piquets which were guarding the pass of the Pyrenees, occupy it himself, and march against the Pompeian army; while the three veteran legions which Trebonius would leave behind were to follow Fabius from Matisco and reinforce him.<sup>1</sup> The galleys were built in thirty days and, dropping down the river, appeared off Massilia about the 25th of May. Trebonius, who had already arrived, was completing under the supervision of his chief the preparations for the siege. Caesar, who, if we may trust an unsupported statement of Dio,<sup>2</sup> had expected to take the city without difficulty, found that the garrison were able and determined to make an obstinate resistance. Leaving Trebonius therefore to direct the attack by land and Decimus Brutus, who had destroyed the naval power of the Veneti, to command the fleet, he started about the 5th of June with an escort of nine hundred cavalry for Spain.<sup>3</sup>
- Apr. 3.
- Apr. 14.  
He sets  
out for  
Spain.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 384-7.

<sup>2</sup> xli, 19, 3. I do not believe that Dio had any authority for this statement.

<sup>3</sup> Caesar reached Ilerda (Lerida) on June 23 (see p. 408). Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 254), supposes that the march took 18 days: Camille Jullian (*op. cit.*, p. 585, n. 8) holds that Caesar covered the distance—630 kilometres (about 392 miles)—in 10 days!







N.B. The numbers  
metres above the  
A-Afranius C.

# The Campaign of ILERDA

1: 280,000  
English Miles



Kilometres



## CHAPTER XVI

### THE CAMPAIGN OF ILERDA

POMPEY's lieutenants, warned by Vibullius Rufus, were preparing to defend Spain against the impending invasion. Their forces were distributed in three groups. Afranius held the north-eastern province with three legions; Varro, the illustrious scholar, who was also a man of affairs and had served under Pompey in the war against the pirates,<sup>1</sup> occupied Further Spain between the Sierra Morena and the Guadiana with two legions; Petreius with two legions was responsible for Lusitania and the country east of it, between the Tagus and the Douro. The three generals came to an understanding. It was agreed that Varro should take charge of Petreius's district, and that Petreius should join Afranius. Petreius summoned cavalry and auxiliaries from Lusitania, while Afranius raised similar troops from Celtiberia and the maritime tribes of the north-west.<sup>2</sup> As soon as these levies were mobilized Petreius marched to join his colleague, and the two determined to establish themselves close to Ilerda, the fortress on the western bank of the Segre which is now called Lerida. Afranius, as the senior officer, had the superior authority. The native levies comprised some five thousand cavalry and about thirty cohorts of foot,—heavy-armed auxiliaries from the north-east, who carried long wooden shields, and light-armed from Further Spain, who, like the Highlanders of Killiecrankie, used small round leathern shields and may be called targeteers.

49 B. C.

Afranius and Petreius ready to defend the Spanish provinces.

<sup>1</sup> Varro, *R. R.*, ii, prooem., 6; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xvi, 4 (3), 7.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar (*B. C.*, i, 38, l. 3) says that Afranius and Petreius proceeded to raise auxiliaries, &c., after the arrival of Vibullius, that is some time—the time required for travelling from Corfinium to Spain—after Feb. 21 (*ib.*, 34, l. Cf. p. 379). If Cicero (*Fam.*, xvi, 12, 4) was rightly informed, they already had 'a large force of auxiliaries' on Jan. 27. But the two statements are not incompatible.

49 B. C. Including the legions, some of which had had experience of warfare with native tribes, the entire force, besides camp-followers, may have numbered about forty thousand men.

Caesar's  
available  
force.

[The 6th,  
7th, 9th,  
10th, 11th  
and  
14th.<sup>3</sup>]

To encounter this army, Caesar could muster six veteran legions,<sup>1</sup> about seven thousand cavalry, and five thousand <sup>2</sup> light-armed auxiliaries,—slingers from the Balearic Isles, archers from South-Western Gaul and Crete. Of the cavalry he had retained nine hundred for his own escort ; three thousand were seasoned men—Gauls, Germans, and perhaps also Spaniards <sup>4</sup>—who had served in the Gallic War ; the remaining three thousand were picked troopers whom the most warlike chiefs of Gaul had raised from their retainers in response to his appeal. Some of these levies had not yet joined Fabius, but were marching, along with the Gallic archers, towards the Spanish frontier. A rumour was current that Pompey was advancing through Mauretania towards Spain and would soon reinforce his lieutenants ; and this idle tale, which they may have been disposed to believe, certainly influenced the native tribes. Caesar, deeming it prudent, in view of an arduous campaign, to stimulate the enthusiasm of the legionaries, borrowed money from the tribunes and centurions, for whose fidelity he thus obtained a guarantee, and distributed it among the rank and file.<sup>5</sup>

Fabius  
marches  
on Ilerda.

It will be remembered that while Caesar was detained at Massilia he ordered Fabius to advance from Narbo against Ilerda. Fabius instantly put his troops in motion, expelled the piquets that were guarding the pass of the Pyrenees, and pushed on by forced marches down the valley of the Segre against Afranius. The three legions that had served in Gaul under Trebonius were marching rapidly to join him.<sup>6</sup>

Theatre  
of the  
campaign.

The country now dominated by the fort and the cathedral of Lerida is an undulating tract, enclosed between

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Stoffel, *Hist. de J. César*, i, 1887, pp. 262–3.

<sup>2</sup> The number is uncertain. See p. 389.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *B. G.*, v, 26, 3 ; *B. C.*, iii, 22, 3.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 390.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 390.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 50.



the Segre and the Cinca, which joins the Segre some twenty miles south-west of the spot where Afranius was encamped. South of the Noguera-Ribagorzana—a broad torrential stream, which enters the Segre on the west six miles north of Lerida—the greatest breadth of this region is about thirty miles. The Segre, which is unfordable, flows rapidly in a wide channel, part of which is generally exposed, between precipitous banks, fifteen or twenty feet high; and both it and the Cinca are often swollen by destructive floods. South-west of Lerida, separated from it and from the river by narrow strips of level ground, there extends in a south-westerly direction a long low eminence, resembling an embankment, called the hill of Gardeny. On the narrow plateau which formed its summit and the sides of which were so steep that they needed no fortification, Afranius encamped his infantry, while his cavalry, auxiliaries, and transport were doubtless quartered on the low ground adjoining the Segre. He used Ilerda as a magazine, and he could communicate with the further bank by a stone bridge,<sup>1</sup> not more than three-quarters of a mile from his camp, the approaches to which were commanded by the fort.

49 B. C.

On reaching the outskirts of Ilerda, Fabius encamped on the southern slopes of the hill of Larrala, about two miles north of Afranius's camp.<sup>2</sup> His army was too weak as yet to attack the enemy; but while he was awaiting the arrival of the legions from Matisco he sent emissaries to enlist the aid of the neighbouring tribes and constructed two bridges—one about two miles above Lerida, the other four miles higher up—to enable his foragers to enter the country on the eastern bank. By the time when the grass on the western side had been consumed the bridges were finished and the three legions had arrived. The Afranian foragers were also obliged to cross the river, and the troops of cavalry which accompanied the two groups frequently encountered one another. One day, after the Fabian foragers had crossed by the nearer bridge, escorted, as usual, by two legions and followed by all the cavalry,

Hostilities  
begin.<sup>1</sup> Lucan, iv, 15.<sup>2</sup> See p. 391.

49 B. C. a violent storm arose ; the bridge was destroyed by wind and flood, and a considerable part of the cavalry found its passage barred. Afranius and Petreius, noticing timber and fascines floating down stream, divined what had happened, and Afranius, instantly crossing the river with four legions and all his cavalry, attacked the imprisoned force. Lucius Plancus, who commanded the infantry, was compelled to take refuge on rising ground, and, to avoid being outflanked by the enemy's cavalry, he formed his line of battle on divergent fronts.<sup>1</sup> The cavalry on both sides engaged, while Plancus, thanks to the strength of his position, managed to hold out. Meanwhile Fabius, feeling sure that Afranius would take instant advantage of the disaster, had sent two legions to the rescue by the further bridge. As soon as they were seen approaching Afranius desisted from the attack ; and the armies returned to their respective camps.

June 23<sup>2</sup> On the following day Caesar, escorted by his nine  
(May 2). hundred horse, joined Fabius, and at once proceeded to  
Caesar observe the features of the country. Midway between the  
joins Fa- hill of Gardeny and the hill of Ilerda he noticed a strong  
bius and position, which Afranius had neglected to occupy. The  
constructs a new repair of the bridge, which had already made considerable  
camp. progress, was completed in the night that followed his  
arrival. Next day, leaving about two thousand legion-  
aries to protect the camp and the nearer bridge, he marched  
June 24 with the rest of the force in three parallel columns past  
(May 3). Ilerda, and halted in the plain about five furlongs north-  
west of the enemy's camp. Every man made a quarter-  
turn to the left, and thus the columns were converted into  
lines of battle. Afranius led out his army ; but as he  
formed his line half-way down the hill instead of at its foot,  
it was evident that he did not intend to fight. Caesar pro-  
ceeded to construct a new camp about seven hundred  
yards from the foot of the hill.<sup>3</sup> The work was done by  
the men of the third line while the first two lines screened  
and protected them. In order to conceal his purpose,

<sup>1</sup> See p. 391.<sup>2</sup> For the chronology of the campaign see p. 408.  
Cf. Stoffel, *op. cit.*, pp. 267 8.

Caesar ordered the workers not to erect a rampart, which could not have escaped notice, but merely to dig a trench fifteen feet wide, which was completed before the enemy had any inkling of what was being done. Towards evening the whole force was withdrawn behind the trench, and there passed the night. In the morning work was resumed. The workers had to go to a considerable distance in order to fetch the wood which was required for fortification. For the present therefore Caesar contented himself, as before, with digging the trenches. Each of the three remaining sides of the camp was assigned to one legion : the other three protected them. Caesar's purpose, however, was now of course apparent, and the enemy, descending to the foot of the hill, tried to intimidate the covering legions ; but, though Caesar would not withdraw a man from the trenches, they shrank from advancing to attack and soon returned to their camp. On the third day the rampart was built up out of the excavated earth ; and the detachment which had protected Fabius's position was transferred along with the baggage to the new camp.

49 B. C.

June 26  
(May 5).

Midway between the lowest slopes of Ilerda and the hill of Gardeny a knoll, now called the Puig Bordel, rose above the plain. This was the strong position which Caesar had observed. He saw that if he could get possession of it, he would be able to cut off Afranius from communication with the fort, in which the bulk of his supplies were stored, and with the stone bridge. Deeming it worth while to run a considerable risk for such a stake, he formed three of the legions in front of his camp, as if he intended to challenge the enemy again, and ordered the foremost line of the 14th legion, which was on the left, to advance at the double and seize the knoll. The men selected for this service were called *antesignani* and were the best soldiers of the legion. As their name implies, they usually fought in front of the standards of their several companies ; and in every legion the *antesignani* formed a definite body, available for any extraordinary duty.<sup>1</sup> The men dashed forward, but the Afranian out-

He tries to  
seize a  
command-  
ing posi-  
tion.June 27  
(May 6).<sup>1</sup> See pp. 391-7.

49 B. C.

posts, being nearer the knoll, were too quick for them : they were forced back, and, on the arrival of reinforcements from the enemy's camp, were compelled to rejoin the legion. The men who composed it were apprehensive of being assailed on their unshielded flank ; for it had always been impressed upon them that they must preserve their coherence and remain massed by their respective standards, and even the experience of irregular tactics which Caesar had gained in Britain had not tended to give greater elasticity to the traditional formation : Petreius's legionaries, on the other hand, who for years had been accustomed to the desultory fighting of native guerrillas, had learned to modify Roman methods and to charge in open order or in scattered groups. Thus, unnerved by the repulse of their best men, the 14th abandoned their position and retreated to higher ground in their rear. Caesar, seeing that not they only but almost the whole force was panic-stricken, spoke a few words of encouragement to the 9th, which formed the centre, and led them to support their comrades. The enemy, hotly pursuing the 14th, were checked, then compelled in their turn to retreat and take refuge below the wall of Ilerda. The 9th, now unduly elated, pressed after them and found themselves in a dangerous position on the hill. They attempted to retire, but the enemy at once attacked them, and their only hope was to stand and fight. They were on a gentle slope, extending about seven hundred yards from the town to the plain, just wide enough to admit of three cohorts fighting abreast, and scarp'd on right and left. The Afranians shrank from coming to sword's point with Caesar's veterans, who for their part were too wary to charge on unfavourable ground : for a long time therefore sling-bullets were principally used by both sides, and the Afranian bullets fell with greater momentum. From time to time Afranius sent reinforcements, which moved round the hill and joined their comrades by passing through the town ; while Caesar reinforced his troops from behind. Men who were tired out fell back from the fighting line through the

Combat  
outside  
Ilerda.



spaces between the files, and fresh men stepped forward to take their places. At the end of five hours the 9th had spent all their missiles,<sup>1</sup> and they were beginning to be overborne. Conscious of superiority they nerved themselves to ignore the disadvantage of position, and, drawing their swords, charged up the slope; the Afranians could not withstand their rush and retreated to the very foot of the wall, while some even sought shelter inside the town. Caesar's cavalry just found room to walk their horses on either side of the legionaries up the hill, and, by engaging the disheartened Afranians, enabled the exhausted infantry to return to camp. But Caesar's loss was severe. About seventy men were killed and more than six hundred wounded, while some two hundred of the Afranians had fallen. Caesar had lost the prize for which he fought; and Afranius, now recognizing the value of the knoll, strongly entrenched it and detailed a force for its protection.

Next day a second and more violent storm swept along the valley: the Segre, swollen by rains and Pyrenean snows, rushed down in a flood more devastating than any which the oldest inhabitant could remember, and the bridges which Fabius had constructed were both destroyed. Imprisoned in the peninsula between the Segre and the Cinca, Caesar could get no grain from the friendly tribes; many of his foragers were isolated; and convoys, coming from Gaul and Italy, could not arrive. The standing corn was not yet ripe; the granaries had been nearly emptied by Afranius, and Caesar had consumed the little that was left; the cattle had been driven away for safety by the herdsmen. Caesar's foragers beyond the Cinca were hunted by the targeteers, who were accustomed to crossing rivers on inflated skins. Afranius had long ago laid in a vast stock of provisions; and, as he commanded the

49 B. C.

June 28  
(May 7).Caesar's  
bridges on  
the Segre  
destroyed  
by flood.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 46, 1. As the only offensive weapon which the legionary carried, as a rule, besides his sword, was a single javelin (*pilum*), the missiles (*telis*) must have been either stones (cf. *B. C.*, iii, 63, 7—*lapidum, quod unum nostris erat telum*) or, more probably, sling-bullets. Bullets inscribed with the names of the 11th and 15th legions have been found at Ascoli (Asculum). *C. I. L.*, ix, p. 633.



49 B. C.

stone bridge, his foragers could pass and repass in security. Caesar endeavoured to repair the wooden bridges : but the floods lasted several days ; the working parties found it difficult to contend with the swift current ; and, massed in one narrow spot, they were so harassed by the missiles which the Afranian cohorts showered into them that they were forced to abandon their attempt. Meanwhile Afranius received word that a large Gallic convoy on its way to join Caesar had been arrested by the river. Besides supplies, the column comprised archers and cavalry who had responded to Caesar's summons, a long train of wagons, and a miscellaneous multitude of about six thousand souls, including drivers, slaves, Roman citizens of birth and position, envoys whom Caesar had dispatched to Gaul, and even children. As it commonly happened when Gauls were on the march, there was no order and no discipline. Nobody was in command, or at all events exercised command ; every one trekked as he pleased and did what he liked. Afranius crossed the stone bridge in the night with three legions. His cavalry, who had been sent on in advance, attacked the disordered column ; but the Gallic horsemen, though they were greatly outnumbered, withstood every charge until, seeing the legions approaching, they were obliged to retreat to the nearest hill. Their resolute stand, however, had given the rest of the column time to seek refuge on high ground ; and, besides two hundred archers, who had fought side by side with the cavalry, only a few horses and camp-followers were lost.

He is  
pressed  
for sup-  
plies,

[About  
tenpence.]

But Caesar's difficulties were thickening. The price of grain, which was ordinarily supplied to the soldiers at the rate of four sesterces a peck,<sup>1</sup> rose fiftyfold. Caesar requisitioned cattle from the friendly tribes, and did all that he could to remedy the dearth ; but from want of the food to which they were accustomed the strength of the men was impaired. Afranius and Petreius wrote triumphantly to their friends in Rome, and the tale of Caesar's

<sup>1</sup> To be strictly accurate, a *modius* ( = .948, about nineteen-twentieths, of a peck).

reverses lost nothing in the telling. The war seemed 49 B. C.  
 virtually over. Callers flocked to Afranius's house in Rome to offer their congratulations ; and many who had hitherto doubted which side was going to win embarked for Macedonia. As Caesar remarked, some were eager to have the credit of being the first to announce the glad tidings ; others were afraid that, if they remained longer, they would be branded as time-servers<sup>1</sup> or at least accused of undue delay.

But Caesar was not yet beaten. Five years before, he had seen British coracles on the Great Stour and the Thames, and had taken note of their construction. Similar boats are used to this day by fishermen on the rivers of Wales.<sup>2</sup> Formed of a framework of laths and wattle covered with hides, they could be carried as easily as an outriggered skiff. Caesar ordered a sufficient number to be built and conveyed by night, each on two carts lashed together, to a place on the Segre about twenty miles above his camp<sup>3</sup> and opposite a point where a hill descended to the eastern bank. The troops who had accompanied the boats immediately crossed the river and fortified the hill. An entire legion followed, and within two days a bridge again spanned the Segre. The Gallic column at length moved on ; the isolated foragers returned safely ; supplies began to reach the camp ; and a strong detachment of cavalry crossed the river. The enemy's foragers, ignorant of the existence of the bridge, were roaming securely and without an escort in scattered groups when the cavalry swooped down and captured many of them together with their mules. Afranius, who was by this time on his guard, sent some cohorts of targeteers to the rescue. But the commander of the cavalry kept cool. Part of the force was detached to guard the prisoners ; the rest charged and

but  
 builds  
 a new  
 bridge  
 high up  
 the river,

July 10  
 (May 18)

<sup>1</sup> Dr. E. S. Shuckburgh (*The Letters of Cicero*, ii, 1900, p. xvii), who suggested that among those who had been sitting on the fence was Cicero, did not take the trouble to master chronological details. Caesar did not reach Ilerda until the 22nd or the 23rd of June, and his difficulties did not begin before the 28th (see p. 408)—just three weeks after Cicero had gone (*Fam.*, xiv, 7, 2-3).

<sup>2</sup> *Ency. Brit.*, vii, 131.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 397.

49 B. C.

beat back the targeteers, surrounded and destroyed one cohort, which in its eagerness had become separated from the line, and returned to camp with all their booty. About the same time Caesar received a dispatch, from which he learned that Brutus had defeated the combined fleets of Massilia and Domitius. The Afranian foragers were becoming cowed; for Caesar's cavalry not only outnumbered their opponents but were of higher quality. Some were afraid to venture far from Ilerda and could get little provender; others were attacked and dispersed; others, as soon as they descried a troop approaching, dropped their loads and fled. The natives saw that Caesar's star was in the ascendant and hastened to support him. Six tribes who dwelt between the Pyrenees and the Ebro sent envoys to assure him that his commands should be obeyed, and began to forward the supplies which he demanded.<sup>1</sup> An Afranian cohort from the lower valley of the Ebro, learning that the tribe to which it belonged had sent envoys, went over to Caesar in a body. It was now known that the rumours about Pompey's approach were false, and many even of the more distant tribes transferred their allegiance to Caesar. But the campaign must not be suffered to drag on; and since Afranius could not be compelled to fight a decisive battle, the only course was to starve him into surrender. The difficulty with which Caesar now had to contend was the necessity of sending his cavalry a long way up the stream. To remedy this, he determined to make an artificial ford. The spot which he selected was about a mile and a half above Ilerda, where the river flowed in three channels.<sup>2</sup> In order to divert the stream, trenches, each thirty feet wide, were cut through the nearer bank, and the water was carried off into the Segre below.<sup>3</sup> Afranius and Petreius saw that if the work succeeded Caesar's powerful cavalry would stop their foraging altogether, and their position would become untenable. Accordingly they determined to abandon Ilerda and transfer the campaign to the southern side of the Ebro. There the native tribes, to whom Caesar

and proceeds to make a ford near Ilerda.

July 19  
(May 27).

Why Afranius resolved to quit Ilerda.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 60, 1-2. Cf. Dio, xli, 21, 4. <sup>2</sup> See pp. 397, 399. <sup>3</sup> See pp. 397-9.

was comparatively unknown, would be on their side, 49 B. C. for the renown which Pompey had acquired in the war against Sertorius still survived: those who had then supported him were grateful for the favours which he had conferred upon them, and the terror with which he had inspired rebels was not forgotten. Cavalry and other auxiliaries would flock to join them, and they would be able to keep Caesar in the field until the winter, when the Pyrenees would be impassable and Pompey would have strengthened his position in the East. They decided to cross the Ebro at Octogesa, which stood upon the site of the modern village of Ribarroja, about thirty miles south of Ilerda.<sup>1</sup> The natives were ordered to collect barges along the line of the river, assemble them at Octogesa, and there use them for the construction of a bridge. At the same time two of the five legions crossed the stone bridge and entrenched themselves, opposite Ilerda, on the eastern bank of the Segre. Afranius had not yet completely reconnoitred the country through which he would have to march; but its features were easily discernible from his commanding position, and it was evident that the final stage of the route would pass through the mountains which hemmed in the northern bank of the great river.

The aspect of the country which extends southward from Lerida towards the Ebro is weirdly sombre. Standing on the outskirts of the quaint old town, one gazes upon a dark red chaos—hazily red beneath the dazzling sun—low rugged hills, precipitous bluffs, valleys, contracted plains, all bounded by the long line of the distant range; and far away on the right front one solitary mountain, outlined as sharply as the Wrekin or Schiehallion, constrains the eye that has once discerned it to look again and again. Moving along the road towards Sarroca and Mayals, you traverse a few miles of nearly level ground: then, climbing, descending, speeding across rolling dusty plain, you pass grim hamlets built of sun-dried mud, steep rocky declivities, truncated knolls; and though here and there olive trees or rows of low green vines

The country between Ilerda and the Ebro.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 399–404.



49 B.C.

relieve the prevailing colours—grey passing into ochre, ochre into yellowish red or dull maroon—not one meadow is to be seen ; everywhere the landscape is patchy : it is a thirsty land. In France and Belgium and Germany, here and there in Switzerland and Italy, even, however rarely, in Northern Africa, there are spots where an English traveller might fancy that he was at home ; but if he awoke to find himself near Lerida he could not be persuaded that he was in any other land than Spain.

July 25  
(June 2).

Caesar's  
cavalry  
harass the  
retreating  
column.

Caesar's scouts were vigilant. Learning what had happened at Octogesa, he pushed on with increased energy, but with a different purpose, the work of diverting the river ; and when night set in fresh gangs of men relieved their comrades. Meanwhile the flood had been diminishing by mere lapse of time. At the end of twenty-four hours the cavalry could just get across ; but the infantry who ventured in had only their heads and shoulders above water, and the current was so strong that they could not advance without great peril. About the same time news arrived that the bridge at Octogesa was almost ready. Afranius and Petreius saw that it was time to depart. Leaving two auxiliary cohorts to hold Ilerda, they transported the rest of their army to the eastern bank, and with the two legions which were already there marched soon after midnight up the road which runs through the little town of Sarroca towards the Ebro. What was Caesar to do ? He could not expose his infantry to the risk of drowning ; the stone bridge, fortified and strongly guarded at its further end,<sup>1</sup> was impregnable ; his own was a long day's march to the north. Only one course seemed open. The bulk of his cavalry forded the Segre and began to harass the enemy's rearguard. Day broke, and men ascended the high ground near Caesar's camp to observe what was going on. Slowly

<sup>1</sup> Though there is no direct evidence for this, it is true. The bridge, which Caesar was prevented from using (*B. C.*, i, 63, 2), was perhaps already connected by earthworks with both Ilerda and the Afranian camp and probably protected also by artillery. Moreover, the camp which Afranius constructed just before he began his retreat (*ib.*, 61, 4) probably formed a *tête de pont* [I find that Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 59) says the same].



and painfully, harassed without respite, the enemy, 49 B. C. formed in parallel columns, were still making way. Repeatedly the cavalry charged the rearmost ranks or plied them with missiles. They endured the punishment as long as they could; but from time to time they were forced to face about and defend themselves, and occasionally all the cohorts that composed the rear-guard simultaneously charged.<sup>1</sup> The cavalry trotted back to a safe distance, then, swinging round, pursued again. For lack of fire-arms, ancient armies could not effectively fight a rear-guard action, and Afranius's cavalry, cowed and conscious of inferiority, were apparently useless; but one may perhaps suppose that he had slingers, who did what they could. Caesar's soldiers became more and more excited: when, they asked one another, would the war be at an end? Running up to their centurions and tribunes, they urged them to tell Caesar not to spare his legions; the cavalry had forded the river, and they could and would follow. Caesar saw that they were in earnest, and he resolved to take them at their word. Timid men, all who were not robust, were weeded out and left with one legion to guard the camp. No baggage that could be dispensed with was to be taken. Transport cattle were formed up in the water above and below the ford; and the infantry plunged into the stream. A few men were swept off their feet, but the mounted men caught hold of them, and not one was drowned.<sup>2</sup> As the dripping soldiers climbed the eastern bank they took their places in three lines, ready to wheel at a moment's notice into order of battle, and marched rapidly up the road. About three o'clock in the afternoon they were getting into touch with the retreating column.

Afranius and Petreius, seeing that they must either fight or gain some coign of vantage, moved off the road to

His  
infantry  
ford the  
Segre and  
pursue.

<sup>1</sup> Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 274), differing from von Göler (*Cæsars gall. Krieg*, &c., ii<sup>2</sup>, 1880, p. 53), believes that *universarum cohortium* (*B. C.*, i, 64, 2) means the cohorts 'du gros de l'armée', not merely those of the rear-guard. Such charges as Stoffel imagines would have been not only unnecessary but, even if they could have been made, would have involved prodigious waste of time.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 404.

49 B. C.

the right about two miles south-west of Sarroca, and gradually formed the columns into line of battle upon rising ground. Caesar, who did not intend to fight at a disadvantage, halted and allowed his men to rest. The Afranians attempted to move on, but, instantly pursued, they were obliged to stop. Five miles ahead rose the mountains, in the defiles of which they would be safe from Caesar's cavalry and, by posting piquets at suitable places, would be able to check his infantry and cover their own passage of the Ebro. But they had been marching almost without intermission for twelve hours and fighting as they marched. Afranius was therefore obliged reluctantly to encamp for the night; and Caesar encamped likewise on a hill not far north.

About midnight Caesar's patrols captured a party which had gone some distance to fetch water, and gathered that Afranius and Petreius were silently beginning to resume their march. In Roman armies it was customary to give the signal for collecting the baggage and loading the cattle by loud shouts; and although this signal was occasionally, for special reasons, omitted, the omission was considered discreditable. On receiving the report of the patrols Caesar ordered the signal to be given. Afranius and Petreius heard it and, fearing that their troops might be forced to fight under the encumbrance of their packs or that Caesar's cavalry might seize the defile that led to Octogesa, stopped their preparations.<sup>1</sup> Early in the morning Petreius rode out with a few troopers to reconnoitre; and Caesar sent a Celtiberian, to whom he had granted Roman citizenship, with a similar escort on a like errand. The report was in each case the same. Between Afranius's

July 26  
(June 3).

<sup>1</sup> . . . *veriti ne noctu impediti sub onere configere cogerentur* . . . *iter supprimunt* (B. C., i, 66, 2). Is *sub onere* equivalent to *sub sarcinis*—'burdened by their packs' (B. G., iii, 24, 3)—or can it mean 'encumbered by their baggage train,' which, when they marched on the next morning but one, they actually left behind (B. C., i, 70, 2)? I once doubted whether *sub onere* could mean *sub sarcinis*, because Caesar's men would be at the same disadvantage; but the objection would equally apply to *noctu*—Caesar's men also would be fighting in the dark. I think therefore that the obvious interpretation must be right. Afranius's men were conscious of inferiority (47, 1-2).

camp and the mountains there extended for four or five miles a comparatively open tract ; whoever first gained the defile would have no difficulty in barring his enemy's advance. 49 B. C.

All that day the two armies remained in their respective camps. Petreius and Afranius called a council of war. The question was, when were they to move on ? Nobody knew that the watering party had been intercepted, and had given information which Caesar might otherwise have failed to obtain. Most of the officers argued that it would be best to march in the night : then they might reach the defile before Caesar knew what they were about. The minority, however, objected that on the previous night the signal sounded in Caesar's camp showed that their attempt to march off in silence had been detected ; it would be detected again. Besides, Caesar's cavalry, who were on the move everywhere by night, would bar the roads ; and in a civil war, when law and government were in solution and men were not fighting the enemies of their country, they were prone to think more of their personal safety than of the duty which they had sworn to perform. In the daylight, on the contrary, they were restrained by fear of their officers and of public opinion. These arguments prevailed ; and it was decided to postpone the march till daybreak.

Caesar had taken care to reconnoitre the country on his flank as well as in his front, for the direct route to Octogesa was still commanded by the enemy. His only chance of success was to make a *détour*. At dawn he began a retrograde movement. The Afranians, thronging out of camp to look on, were exultant. Knowing that Caesar had left the bulk of his transport at Ilerda,<sup>1</sup> they fancied that he was perforce returning for supplies, and followed the retreating column with derisive shouts. Even the officers congratulated one another on having done the right thing when they had decided to stand fast till dawn. Presently, however, they saw the distant column working round to the right ; and soon it was abreast of

July 27  
(June 4).

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 404-5.

49 B. C.

their own camp. 'To arms' was the cry. A few cohorts were detached to guard the camp and the baggage, which there was no time to remove; the rest hurriedly fell in and moved straight on towards Octogesa.

He intercepts the direct road to the Ebro.

A desperate race then began. Caesar's legions were marching through a trackless region, up hill and down dale, and sometimes they were confronted by rocky declivities so steep that men were forced to hand their weapons to their comrades while they struggled or were assisted to ascend; but they had got a start, every man was doing his utmost, and the inevitable cavalry relentlessly dogged the Afranians, who, moreover, must have been distracted by the thought that if they escaped disaster and attained their goal, their baggage and the cohorts which protected it would be sacrificed. Caesar won the race and, emerging from the rocks, wheeled his legions into line of battle on the plain which extends south-westward from Mayals. Harassed in rear by the cavalry, menaced in front by the infantry which he had reason to dread, Afranius again sought refuge on a hill. Two miles away on his right was that mountain—the Spaniards call it Monmaneu—which dominated the whole theatre of war and which he had so often viewed from the hill of Gardeny. It commanded the approach to a ridge—the Sierra de Campells—which led to the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, and if he could occupy it he might still reach Octogesa by doubling back. Four cohorts of the targeteers, light-armed active men, were ordered to make for the spurs of the mountain at their utmost speed. They started at a run; but Caesar's cavalry descried their movement, galloped down, enveloped them, and charged. In full view of friends, who dared not stir to help, and of enemies, the devoted targeteers were butchered to the last man.

The butchery at Monmaneu.

For the moment the Afranians were safe: but they were unnerved by the dreadful carnage which they had just seen, and, sooner or later, they must descend into the plain, where Caesar's legions were eagerly awaiting them and his redoubtable cavalry would have a fair field.



Brigadiers, tribunes, centurions flocked round Caesar and urged him to fight there and then : the men were ready and bloodthirsty, the enemy, huddled together in disorder, were manifestly cowed, and if he shrank from storming the height on which they had taken refuge, want of water would soon force them to come down. Caesar calmly listened. He did not intend to fight at all ; for he had reason to believe that, having cut off the enemy's supplies, he would be able to end the campaign without bloodshed, and without aggravating the bitterness of a civil war which must be followed by civil reconstruction. He afterwards explained his reasons ; and his words are memorable. ' Why should he sacrifice his own men even to win a battle ? Why expose soldiers who had served him well to wounds ? Why tempt fortune, seeing that it was a general's business to conquer not by the sword alone, but by thought ? Besides, he was moved by pity for fellow countrymen who, if he fought, must perish ; and he chose rather that while he gained his end they should remain safe and sound '.<sup>1</sup> His purpose did not commend itself to the majority. The men said audibly that, as he threw away a chance like this, when he wanted them to fight they would not obey. Caesar adhered to his resolve, and withdrew the army from its threatening position with the deliberate intention of reassuring his terrified adversaries. Petreius and Afranius availed themselves of the opportunity and returned to their camp. Caesar posted piquets in the mountains to close every route that led to the Ebro, and encamped in the closest proximity to the enemy.

49 B. C.  
Caesar rejects the opportunity of destroying the enemy.

On the following day Petreius and Afranius took counsel together. The question of supply was becoming urgent. Should they try to return to Ilerda or should they make for Tarraco ? This town, which stood upon the site of Tarragona, was four days' march to the south-east ; and the tribes whose country they would have to traverse were now on the side of Caesar. Their deliberations were interrupted by the news that a detachment which they had sent in quest of water was threatened by Caesar's

July 28  
(June 5).

<sup>1</sup> B. C., i, 72, 2-3.



49 B. C. cavalry. The rivulets that enter the Segre are dry in summer, and the people of the country have to depend upon rain-water caught in small reservoirs. The two generals proceeded to construct a rampart and trench from their camp to the nearest reservoir, and posted piquets to protect the workers. Each of them took charge of a section of the work, which extended to a long distance from the camp.

Friendly  
inter-  
course  
between  
Afranians  
and Cae-  
sarians.

What followed may remind the reader of those interludes in the Peninsular War when French and English soldiers faced each other on opposite banks of a stream and exchanged friendly greetings as they drank. In the absence of Petreius and Afranius many Pompeians left their camp and walked across to the camp of Caesar. Every one inquired for his acquaintances or townsmen. The poor fellows were touched by the forbearance with which they had been treated on the previous day, and they offered heartfelt thanks. But could Caesar be depended upon? Should they be safe in trusting their lives to him? If only they had trusted him at the beginning and not taken up arms against friends and kinsmen! Then they began to think of their generals as well as of themselves: would Caesar spare them, for they did not want people to fancy that Pompey's soldiers were disloyal? Reassured on every point, they declared that they would join Caesar's standard forthwith, deputed their chief centurions to negotiate with him, and invited old friends to come over to their camp and accept their hospitality. Many tribunes and centurions approached Caesar and placed themselves at his disposal. Spanish chieftains, whom Afranius had detained as hostages, followed their example; and Afranius's son, through the medium of Sulpicius Rufus, who had been one of Caesar's lieutenants for the last six years, obtained a promise of pardon for himself and for his father. On both sides there was universal rejoicing and goodwill; and Caesar's troops now gladly recognized that their general had done right.

Suddenly Afranius and Petreius, who had been informed of what was going on, returned. Afranius, as every one

could see, was prepared to accept the situation. Petreius instantly armed his slaves, summoned a cohort of targeteers, who formed his bodyguard, and a few troopers who habitually attended to him, summarily interrupted all friendly intercourse, killed all the Caesarians whom he could catch, and drove the rest out of camp. Clinging instinctively together, they wrapped their cloaks round their left arms, drew their swords, and, keeping at bay the targeteers and the troopers who assailed them, got back to their own camp, where the cohorts on guard outside the gates protected them. Petreius meanwhile was re-establishing his authority. Walking from company to company, he adjured the men with tears in his eyes not to betray him or Pompey, his absent chief, to the vengeance of the enemy. At his bidding the officers thronged to the space in front of the generals' quarters. Insisting that every one must swear not to desert or to betray the army and the generals and not to consider his own interests apart from the common weal, he took the oath himself and compelled his colleague, the tribunes, and the centurions to follow his example. Finally the privates were called up by their respective centurions and sworn. Every one who had entertained a Caesarian in his tent was ordered to produce him; and all who were given up were put to death in front of the generals' tent and in view of the army. But most of the Afranians, although they were overawed by the ruthless vigour of Petreius and felt the obligation of the oath which they had renewed, concealed their trusting guests and in the darkness let them out of camp. Caesar of course took care that every Afranian who had joined him should be permitted to return: but several tribunes and centurions voluntarily remained; and afterwards, as vacancies occurred, posts of equal rank were given to them.

Petreius and his submissive superior decided to return to Ilerda, where they had left some grain in reserve, instead of undertaking the long and hazardous march to Tarraco. They had great difficulty in getting water, and their foragers in the presence of Caesar's cavalry were helpless.

49 B. C.  
Truculence of  
Petreius

The  
Afranians  
attempt  
to return  
to Ilerda,  
July 29  
(June 6).

49 B. C.

The legionaries, who had taken several days' rations on their backs, had still enough to go on with ; but the auxiliaries, who were not used to carrying burdens and whose slender pay did not admit of their buying freely at an enhanced price, had no food,<sup>1</sup> and deserted to Caesar in large numbers. So soon as the army, ranged in parallel columns, began to move, Caesar's cavalry began, as before, to harass them. Petreius's rear-guard was composed of cohorts which marched, their packs being carried by mules, ready for action. Defended by them, the rest, while they were on the level, made a shift to advance as they had done when they retreated from Ilerda.<sup>2</sup> Ascending hilly ground, the rearmost companies were in little danger, for they were protected by the missiles thrown by those who had gone on in front ; but descending they were exposed to a shower of missiles from their pursuers, and their comrades could not retaliate with effect. There was only one resource. On approaching a descent the columns halted : the rear-guard faced about, vigorously attacked the cavalry, and beat them off : then the infantry crossed the valley at a run and gained the high ground on the further side. Petreius's cavalry were useless. Thoroughly cowed by the punishment which they had suffered in former combats, they had been placed for safety in the centre of the column. After painfully advancing about four miles Petreius occupied a hill and entrenched the side which faced his pursuers. The pack-horses and mules were not unloaded. Caesar encamped likewise. His men leisurely pitched their tents ; and cavalry dispersed over the country-side to forage. Seizing their opportunity, the Afranians again moved on : instantly Caesar pressed in pursuit with the legions, leaving a few cohorts to guard his baggage, which was to follow as soon as the beasts could be loaded : the foragers and their escort were recalled ;<sup>3</sup> and presently the cavalry resumed their habitual tactics. This time they pushed home their attacks with such vigour that many legionaries and some centurions were killed, and once the rearmost companies seemed on the

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 405-6.<sup>2</sup> See p. 406.<sup>3</sup> See pp. 406-7.

point of bolting. Progress became impossible; and 49 B. C.  
 Petreius was forced to encamp on ground which was both  
 in itself unfavourable and remote from the nearest  
 reservoir. For the present Caesar forbade his men to  
 pitch their tents, so that he might be ready to move on at  
 a moment's notice. The armies were now nearly midway  
 between Sarroca and the Segre, about seven miles north  
 of Mayals. Petreius, recognizing the faulty nature of his  
 position, tried to improve it by extending the lateral  
 entrenchments and constructing a new one to connect  
 them, so that his camp was nearly in contact with that of  
 Caesar; and his men remained at work throughout the  
 night and the following day. But one evil was remedied by  
 another; as the camp advanced the watering-place  
 receded. On the next day thirst became unendurable; July 30  
 and, except a detachment which remained to protect the (June 7).  
 camp, the whole force went out to water. To forage was  
 of course impossible; and the cattle were gradually  
 starving. Meanwhile Caesar, foreseeing that the enemy  
 would be compelled in desperation to attempt to break  
 away, was constructing a contravallation round their camp.  
 Having no provender and desiring, in view of a sortie, to rid  
 themselves of every impediment, they slaughtered all the  
 beasts except the cavalry horses.<sup>1</sup> The contravallation,  
 however, was progressing so rapidly that, unless the work  
 could be stopped, they would be forced to surrender.  
 About three o'clock on the following afternoon Afranius  
 and Petreius marched out and ranged their troops in order  
 of battle in the space, barely seven hundred yards wide,  
 which separated the camps. Their first two lines were  
 formed by the legions; the third by the auxiliaries.  
 Caesar was as determined as ever to refrain from an attack:  
 indeed if he overpowered them, the enemy could retreat  
 at once into their camp, and the victory would be in-  
 decisive. On the other hand, he could not afford to ignore  
 their challenge, for fear of exasperating his own men and  
 forfeiting their good opinion; and unless he confronted  
 them, they would be emboldened to attack the workers.

July 31  
(June 8).

Aug. 1  
(June 9).

<sup>1</sup> See p. 407.



49 B. C.

Accordingly he also formed his legions in three lines, placing his slingers and archers in the centre of each line,<sup>1</sup> while the cavalry were drawn up on the flanks. The two armies, separated by a space of little more than two hundred yards, stood confronting each other till sunset, and then, as it were by mutual consent, returned to their respective camps. Next morning the work of constructing the contravallation was resumed, while Afranius and Petreius, in the faint hope that they might be able to get across the Segre, sent horsemen to search for a ford. Instantly a detachment of Caesar's cavalry with the light infantry who belonged to his German squadrons crossed the river, established a chain of posts along the bank, and baffled the attempt.

Aug. 2  
(June 10).

but are  
out-ma-  
nœuvred  
and forced  
to surren-  
der.

The inevitable end had come. The patient beasts, which had dumbly beheld the slaughter of their companions, had been standing in the beleaguered camp for four days without food. Their masters could no longer procure water ; they had no fire-wood ; their grain was all consumed. Afranius and Petreius sent an envoy to beg Caesar for an interview : would he, if such a concession were possible, allow it to take place out of sight and hearing of the men ? Caesar replied that he was willing to negotiate, but that the interview must be public. Afranius sent his son as a hostage and walked with his staff to a spot which Caesar indicated, close to the Pompeian camp. The soldiers of the two armies were standing expectant on their respective ramparts. Humbly, abjectly, Afranius ventured to speak :—Caesar would not bear hardly on him and his colleagues or their troops for having chosen to be loyal to Pompey, their chief. But now they had done and suffered enough : trapped like wild beasts, they could no longer endure physical torture or the anguish of humiliation. They confessed that they were beaten : if there was still a place left for compassion, they would beseech and implore him not to inflict the extreme penalty.

<sup>1</sup> *media acie* (B. C., i, 83, 2). *Media acies* in Caesar (B. G., iii, 24, 1 ; B. C., iii, 88, 1. 3 ; 89, 2) invariably denotes the centre as opposed to the flanks. If, as von Göler thinks (*Gall. Krieg*, &c., ii<sup>2</sup>, p. 72), Caesar had meant the second line, he would have written *secunda acie* (H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, i, 85–6).

Caesar replied that no one had less right to complain or to appeal for mercy than Afranius and his colleague. Every one else in the two armies had done what was right. For his own part, he had forborne, in the hope of smoothing the way for an accommodation, from fighting when victory was in his grasp ; his troops, notwithstanding gross provocation, had been humane and merciful ; their troops had striven for peace. Only the two generals had been treacherous and cruel. Their fate was that which commonly overtook the obstinate and arrogant : they were compelled to sue for the boon which they had spurned. The legions which their chief had sent to Spain had been sent to oppose him, and him alone. For many years they and their political associates had been intriguing against him, and to gain their end they had violated every principle of law and equity. Still, he would remain, as heretofore, patient under provocation ; he had no desire to humiliate them, nor did he wish to convert their army to his own use, but only to prevent it from being used against him. Therefore they were to quit their respective provinces and disband their troops. On this condition, which was final, he would spare them all.

49 B. C.

The Afranian soldiers had been listening anxiously ; and their gestures signified amazement and delight. Afranius asked Caesar when they were to be disbanded and whither they were to go. 'At once,' they shouted ; 'now, at once.' After a brief discussion it was settled that all the men who were domiciled in Spain—about a third of the whole number—should be disbanded immediately, and the rest as soon as they reached the river Var,—the south-eastern boundary of Transalpine Gaul. Caesar pledged his word that no harm should befall them and that no one should be compelled to take the oath of allegiance to him. He promised, further, to supply them with grain until they reached their destination and to restore all property, belonging to them, which his own men had looted, undertaking at the same time to compensate his men for what they lost. The Afranians were angrily clamouring for arrears of pay, which, their leaders asserted,

Caesar  
spares  
Afranius  
and Pe-  
treius, but  
requires  
them to  
disband  
their  
army.

49 B. C.

was not yet due. The dispute was referred to Caesar ; and both parties accepted his decision. Fufius Calenus, one of Caesar's generals, was entrusted with the duty of shepherding the troops on their march to the Var ; and four of Caesar's legions were assigned to him. Two of them marched in front, two in rear ;<sup>1</sup> and in due course what remained of Pompey's Spanish army was dissolved.

So ended this unique campaign. Four months ago<sup>2</sup> I stood upon the plain where the targeteers were doomed to die, and where Caesar had it in his power to annihilate the Pompeian army. It seemed to me that just as in describing that awful scene and the clamour which he thereupon subdued the terse vividness of his restrained narrative reached its zenith, so at that moment of his life his character was most admirable. Serenely confident that he could win a bloodless victory, considerate towards his own men, compassionate towards his enemy, deaf to mutinous threats, tenacious of his purpose, inexorable in enforcing his authority, he set an example which, notwithstanding what men call progress, is needed still.

Caesar was obliged to remain in the peninsula ; for Varro was in possession of the Further Province, and, backed by those tribes of Nearer Spain which still felt the spell of Pompey's renown, he might, if he were not checked, undo the results that had been achieved at Ilerda. Therefore, although Caesar was anxious to return to Italy, where certain social problems had to be solved before he could encounter Pompey, he determined, first of all, to complete his work in Spain.

At the outset of the war, when Varro heard how Caesar had carried all before him in Italy, it seemed to him doubtful whether Pompey was going to win. How then was he to secure his own interests ? When he discussed the state of affairs with his acquaintances he spoke of Caesar in the most cordial terms, remarking that although he was bound by his official position and by loyalty to Pompey, he was none the less an old friend of Pompey's rival, and

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 407-8.

<sup>2</sup> Written in September, 1914.

that while he knew the duty which a general owed to his commander-in-chief, he appreciated the weakness of his own army and the sympathy which the provincials felt for Caesar. Meanwhile he was careful not to commit himself by any overt act. Then came the news that while Afranius and Petreius had concentrated their forces and were strengthened by numerous auxiliaries, Caesar was detained by the resistance of Massilia; and a few weeks later dispatches arrived from Afranius, describing in florid terms the straits to which Caesar was reduced by lack of supplies. Varro felt that his time had come. He raised his two legions by fresh levies to their full strength, and in addition formed thirty auxiliary cohorts; forwarded grain to his colleagues at Ilerda; and ordered ships of war to be constructed at Gades and Hispalis (now Seville). He stripped the famous temple of Hercules, hard by Gades, of its treasure and ornaments, which he deposited in the town; sent a detachment to hold the fortress; and directed that weapons belonging to individuals as well as those which were in the arsenal should be stored in the house of the commandant. Meanwhile he was doing his utmost to undermine Caesar's authority, inveighing against him in set speeches and assuring his hearers that he had been more than once defeated and that many of his troops had deserted to Afranius. The Roman residents were so alarmed by these harangues that they promised under pressure to make large contributions in money and in kind, while heavy taxes were imposed upon native tribes which were said to favour Caesar. Suddenly Varro heard that Afranius and Petreius had been forced to surrender.<sup>1</sup> Plainly it was too late to pose again as a friend of the victor; but if he provisioned the island on which Gades stood he would be able to hold out in that strong position

<sup>1</sup> *Cognitis iis rebus quae sunt gestae in citeriore Hispania, bellum parabat* (B. C., ii, 18, 6). Mr. Peskett in his edition takes these words as meaning, 'Varro heard of the hard fighting that was going on at Ilerda, and, knowing how fully occupied Caesar was, decided to begin hostilities.' But Caesar had already (17, 3) described how Varro was affected by the news of 'the hard fighting': and if Mr. Peskett will compare that passage with 18, 7, he will see that I am right.



49 B. C.

until the approach of winter should compel Caesar to quit the country.

He  
masters  
Further  
Spain,

But Caesar was too quick for him. He had already dispatched Quintus Cassius with the two legions which he had retained at Ilerda into Further Spain; and, promulgating an edict which summoned the magistrates and the notables of all the tribes to assemble at Corduba, he hastened to that town with an escort of six hundred cavalry. The edict was punctually obeyed. The Roman residents at Corduba provided for the defence of the city and shut the gates against Varro; while the inhabitants of Carmo (now Carmona), an important stronghold not far from Hispalis, expelled a detachment which Varro had stationed there. While Varro was hurrying anxiously towards Gades, hoping to avoid being intercepted, he received a letter which informed him that the leading citizens, supported by his own officers, had resolved to dismiss the commandant and to hold the town and the island in the interest of Caesar. The news soon leaked out; and one of Varro's legions, which was composed of provincials, openly deserted and marched to Hispalis, where it was hospitably entertained by the Roman community. The unhappy scholar, seeing that he had no friends, sent a messenger to Caesar to say that he was prepared to surrender the remaining legion to any representative whom he chose to appoint. The surrender was duly effected; and Varro, waiting upon Caesar at Corduba, handed over his official papers and his treasure.

settles the  
province,

Caesar's final arrangements were speedily completed. He convened a meeting at Corduba and formally thanked all who had supported him. The Roman citizens who had been compelled to offer contributions to Varro were informed that they might keep their money; fines which he had imposed upon individuals who had betrayed their sympathies were remitted; pecuniary rewards and honorary distinctions were bestowed upon communities which had rendered special service. Two days sufficed for all the business which had to be performed at Corduba. Thence Caesar travelled to Gades, where he rested to the



1:15000

Yards

0 200 400 600

Metres

0 200 400 600

*The contours (reproduced from Stoffel's Pl.9 and probably subject to correction) denote intervals in altitude of 5 metres. The least altitude of the Valley of St Martin is from 23m to 24m.50 (See p.416, n.1)*

Position of Port  
of la Joliette  
(Before 1853)

*Camp of  
Trebonius*

St Charles

Terrace

Valley of St. Martin

Butte &  
Carmes  
38

Butte des Moulins  
40.86'

Butte St. Laurent 24

Terrace (agger)

A C Y D O N

3 Mars

DOMINICAN COLLEGE  
LIBRARY  
SAN RAFAEL

temple the treasures which Varro had plundered, and, 49 B. C. developing without regard to precedent the liberal policy which he had adopted towards the Transpadanes, conferred Roman citizenship upon the inhabitants,<sup>1</sup> whose loyalty had been recognized by Pompey many years before. On the eve of his departure he appointed Cassius Governor of the province, assigning him Varro's two legions and promising to send him in addition two newly raised legions from Italy. In making this appointment Caesar may have had misgivings, for Cassius was notoriously disliked by the provincials ;<sup>2</sup> but he had an intimate knowledge of the country,<sup>3</sup> and, moreover, the service which he had rendered in conjunction with Antony and Curio was such that his chief, who never forgot a benefit, could not let him go without reward. Embarking with his two veteran legions in the fleet which Varro had assembled, Caesar sailed to Tarraco, where envoys from most of the tribes of Nearer Spain were awaiting him. After rewarding both officially and in his own name those who had aided him against Afranius, he went by land to rejoin Trebonius at Massilia.

and re-  
turns to  
Massilia.

Late in  
Sept.  
(early in  
Aug.) ?

<sup>1</sup> Dio, xli, 24, 1. Caesar of course took care to have the grant of citizenship confirmed by the Roman people.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 48, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Dio, xli, 24, 2.



## CHAPTER XVII

### THE SIEGE OF MASSILIA

49 B. C.

WHEN Caesar arrived at Massilia, he received a report of the siege, which, perhaps amended by his more skilful pen, is embodied in his *Second Commentary* <sup>1</sup> and, although it leaves certain episodes unnoticed, is the most exact narrative of such operations that has been handed down from antiquity.

Topogra-  
phy of  
Massilia.

Massilia, which, by reason of the commercial energy of its inhabitants, played so notable a part in ancient history, occupied only a small portion of the area covered by the great city of which it was the nucleus. Situated on an undulating peninsula, encompassed by hills, it was washed on its western front, where the quay of La Joliette extends, by the open sea, bounded on the south by a narrow creek, called Lacydon, which served as its harbour, and on the north-west by a smaller inlet,<sup>2</sup> and protected on its landward side by a massive wall of stone, strengthened by bastions. Three hills, the butte St. Laurent, the butte des Moulins, and the butte des Carmes, extending successively north-eastward from a point near the entrance of the old harbour, were included within the limits of the town.<sup>3</sup> The citadel dominated the central hill, which was also the highest, a hundred and thirty-four feet above the level of the sea. Standing upon the deck of an incoming steamer, as it runs between the long range of sunlit heights that descend to the sea on the right and the rocky island of Ratonneau on the left, you may imagine Massilia as it appeared to the Roman admiral when he was waiting to encounter the hostile fleet. Behind the line of the quay towards which the ship is heading, it extended

<sup>1</sup> See p. 409.

<sup>2</sup> This little bay has disappeared. See p. 410.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 410-2.

a few hundred yards inland, the temple of Artemis,<sup>1</sup> 49 B. C. a conspicuous landmark for mariners, rising above the steep slope that abutted on the coast. Except the space, barely a mile and a half in circuit, which the bastioned wall enclosed, the vast extent now hidden by the chief city of the Mediterranean was open land. So disproportionate to its real importance was the mere size of the greatest colony which the Greeks had planted in the West.

The inhabitants of Massilia had always been renowned for their devotion to science, rhetoric, and learning; it was there that, nearly three centuries before, the explorer Pytheas had erected the gnomon by means of which he calculated with almost perfect accuracy the latitude of his native town;<sup>2</sup> and, after many years of peace, the commandant, Apollonides,<sup>3</sup> and his colleagues had prepared with minute diligence to repel the redoubtable army which they had been persuaded by Pompey to defy. Numerous ballistas and catapults, more powerful than any which Roman engineers could show,<sup>4</sup> were taken from the arsenal and mounted upon the wall. Foundries were established for the manufacture of weapons. The fortifications were modernized. The fleet was overhauled. Grain was conveyed from the surrounding country and the outlying forts into the town. The Albici, a warlike Ligurian tribe, who dwelled in the adjacent hills, and who had long acknowledged the overlordship of the Massilians, were summoned as mercenaries to join in the defence. Caesar, who directed the earlier operations, realized that his task would be arduous, and that, although three legions might suffice for fighting, many more men and many draught cattle would be needed for the labours

The  
Massilians  
prepare to  
resist.

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, iv, 1, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, ii, 1, 12; 5, 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Scholia in Lucani Bell. Civ.*, ed. H. Usener, 1869, p. 109, l. 31.

<sup>4</sup> Although, as R. Grosse (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, Sept. 6, 1913, col. 2284) kindly, if superfluously, reminds me, the Romans borrowed the art of constructing artillery from the Greeks, it does not follow that Caesar's weapons were as powerful as those of the Massilians; and it is evident from *B. C.*, ii, 2, 1-2 that they were not.

49 B. C. Trebonius begins the siege. that must be performed before Trebonius could begin to construct the works required for the siege. His agents impressed labourers and commandeered beasts from the Province, by whose aid timber was hewn in the forests that covered the hills, and transported to the outskirts of the town.

The Roman camp stood upon an eminence, now occupied by the principal railway station of Marseilles, which commanded the eastern side of the fortress and was separated from it by a valley, known as the vallon St. Martin.<sup>1</sup> Trebonius of course began by constructing a contravallation, which, starting from the northern inlet, enclosed the town on the east.<sup>2</sup> The object of this work was not only to beleaguer the garrison, but also to prevent supplies from reaching them by land. To blockade the harbour was the business of the fleet, which Decimus Brutus commanded. But to subdue the garrison by famine might be a slow process ; and in order to deliver an assault, it was necessary to erect a terrace, or embankment, at right angles to the wall. Trebonius prepared to construct two terraces, one close to the harbour and the docks, the other opposite the butte des Carmes and about a hundred yards south of the gate by which the town was approached from Gaul and Spain.<sup>3</sup> From the commanding position which the camp occupied Caesar could see the interior of the stronghold ; and we may conjecture the reasons that led him to select these sites. The one near the harbour, being comparatively level, presented no extraordinary obstacles to the workers, who, moreover, would be protected to some extent by the right attack. The other, which was the more important, would entail prolonged labour, for the valley of St. Martin was so deep that it would be necessary in certain places to raise the structure to the height of eighty feet ;<sup>4</sup> but it seemed better to face this difficulty than to choose a site further north, where the terrace

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 410-1.

<sup>2</sup> Lucan, iii, 383-7. Cf. *Le Spectateur mil.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., xxxv, 1874, p. 171.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 414-6.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 1, 4. The estimate of the height of the embankment may have been exaggerated. See p. 416, n. 1.

would be swept by a plunging and more destructive fire 49 B. C. from the enemy's artillery, and the storming party, when they had gained a footing in the town, would find themselves still dominated by the butte des Carmes. Before the terrace could be erected the pioneers were obliged to reduce the ground on which the foundations were to be laid to a plane surface, in order that the structure might stand firm. They were protected against missiles by a sappers' hut. Parallel with the wall and sixty feet long, corresponding exactly with the width that was to be given to the terrace, it was built of the strongest timbers that could be found; and its roof, which sloped, so that stones discharged from catapults might tumble off, was covered with fire-proof materials. Meanwhile sheds were placed, one behind another, to protect the men who had to bring up the materials that were to be used in constructing the terrace. Huts of this kind were usually sixteen feet long, eight feet wide, and seven feet high; they were of course open at both ends,<sup>1</sup> and they were covered with four layers of fascines as a protection against missiles. But hardly had they been placed in position when the engineers were obliged to admit that their calculations had been wrong. They had been accustomed to fight against Gauls, whose only missile weapons were javelins, arrows, and sling-stones, and they had forgotten that they now had to cope with an enemy whose artillery was superior to their own. Huge feathered javelins, twelve feet long, hurled by powerful ballistas, crashed through wattle and planking; and before the work could proceed it was necessary to fetch barks a foot thick, to serve as armour-plates for the huts. The terrace was built mainly of wood; and the builders were protected by movable wooden shields. Rows of logs were laid upon the ground in close contact; similar rows were laid upon them at right angles; and, to give coherence to the structure, the interstices were packed with earth and rubble. When the hinder parts of the terrace were completed, a wooden tower, running upon rollers, was erected upon it, and

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul* <sup>2</sup>, 1911, p. 608.



49 B. C.

furnished with platforms or stories, upon which catapults were mounted.<sup>1</sup> The artillerymen were screened by thick hempen mats, which no missiles could pierce; and ultimately the battering-ram was to be swung against the wall through the open framework of the tower by a crew working in a strong sappers' hut behind. Gradually the terrace approached the wall, but in the face of strenuous resistance. While the Massilians continued to ply their engines the Albici made frequent sallies and endeavoured to set fire to the woodwork and the towers, but were invariably driven back with heavy loss.

But, if we may trust Vitruvius,<sup>2</sup> who was himself a military engineer, Trebonius did not rely only upon terrace and battering-ram, but also resorted, as Sulla had done in the siege of Athens,<sup>3</sup> to mines. More than thirty tunnels are said to have been directed against the town. The Greek engineers, however, suspecting that miners were at work, contrived methods of baffling them. Along the north-western part of the wall there was a depression, which served as a natural moat. Gangs of workers, protected doubtless by the artillerymen and archers who lined the wall, dug a deep ditch in the moat;<sup>4</sup> and thus when the galleries were finished, the sappers, who had expected to find themselves within the town, found that there was nothing but the ditch in front of them. Near the harbour, where there was no moat, another expedient was devised. Inside the wall the engineers excavated a huge oblong pit, like a deep swimming bath, and filled it with water conducted by pipes from the harbour and from wells. The tunnels, as soon as they were opened, were of course deluged; the timbers that propped the roofs were demolished, and the miners themselves were drowned or buried beneath falling earth.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, when the battering-ram on one of the terraces<sup>6</sup> was

<sup>1</sup> In regard to the construction of the terrace see Stoffel, *op. cit.*, i, 290; ii, 358-9; and *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, 1911, pp. 140, 144, 599-607.

<sup>2</sup> x, 16, 11-2. It has been argued that Vitruvius was not referring to the siege of 49 B. C. See p. 416, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> App., *Mithr.*, 36.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 416-7.

<sup>5</sup> Vitruv., *l. c.*

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 419-20.



brought into action, the Massilians, having lowered a noose, 49 B. C. succeeded in seizing the shaft behind the iron head, hauled it upward by means of a windlass, and destroyed the whole engine, as well as the hut which screened the crew, with ballistas and blazing darts.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the Massilian admiral, Parmeno,<sup>2</sup> stimulated by the exhortations of Domitius, had been striving to co-operate with the garrison. Besides a large number of smaller craft, he had seventeen galleys, eleven of which were furnished with screens to protect the oarsmen from missiles. The galleys were much faster than those of the Romans; the rowers were trained men and the commanders understood their business; the combatants comprised numerous archers as well as contingents of the Albici, who had been specially paid to undertake this service and were encouraged by the promise of further rewards if they won the battle. Domitius himself commanded a small squadron, which he manned with the tenant farmers and the herdsmen who had accompanied him from Italy. Before they went on board he promised to emancipate the herdsmen if they acquitted themselves well. When all was ready the fleet stood out of the harbour and steered towards the island of Ratonneau, two miles south-west of Massilia, off which Brutus's twelve ships were stationed. The movements that followed could be clearly discerned from the town.

Naval  
battles.

Although the fleet of Brutus was inferior in numbers to that of his opponents, his fighting men were superior to theirs; for Caesar had placed under his command the best soldiers in the legions,—men of the same class as those whom he selected for attacking the Puig Bordel near Ilerda. Moreover, they were provided with grappling irons and long poles fitted at the ends with iron hooks,

<sup>1</sup> Vitruvius also says that the Massilians set fire to the terrace by discharging white-hot iron bars from ballistas. I have shown elsewhere (p. 413) that the principal terrace could only have been burnt once—after the pretended surrender of the Massilians (*B. C.*, ii, 14, 1-2). According to the official narrative, it was set on fire in the course of a sortie, and the other terrace escaped destruction. If, then, Vitruvius is right, the Massilian artillery must have co-operated with the party which made the sortie.

<sup>2</sup> *Scholia in Lucani B. C.*, ed. H. Usener, p. 115, l. 19.

49 B. C.

to enable them to catch hold of and board the enemy's ships. Thus the manœuvre which Brutus planned was somewhat similar to that by which, seven years before, he had destroyed the fleet of the Veneti. He had then used sickle-shaped blades to cut the halyards, whereas the Massilian ships, when they were cleared for action, were propelled only by oars; but in each case the object was the same—to convert a naval action into the equivalent of a battle on land. For some time the Massilian galleys, rowed by oarsmen who instantly obeyed every command of their officers, easily eluded the Roman vessels, which, having been built hastily of green wood, were comparatively slow, and whose steersmen, as they had hitherto served in merchant ships, were unskilled in managing their craft and did not yet know even the technical terms. The aim of the Massilians was to envelop the little squadron and then to ram the clumsy vessels or to break their oars.<sup>1</sup> But they could not avoid giving chances to the men who handled the grappling tools, and as soon as they came within range the legionaries assailed them with showers of missiles. Several times it happened that the crew of one Roman ship were able to seize and board simultaneously two of the hostile galleys. The Albici and the herdsmen were no match for Caesar's picked soldiers, and many of them were slain. Nine of the enemy's ships were sunk and six captured; the rest managed to run for shelter into the harbour.<sup>2</sup>

But the Massilians knew that unless they could wrest from Brutus the command of the sea, they could not replenish their dwindling stock of food. An officer named Lucius Nasidius had been dispatched by Pompey from Dyrrachium with a fleet of sixteen galleys to assist his allies. Evading the observation of Curio, he touched at Messina and, taking advantage of the panic which his presence caused, removed another galley from the harbour. Resuming his voyage, he dispatched a fast-sailing vessel to apprise the Massilians of his approach.

<sup>1</sup> See *Rev. de l'instr. publ. en Belgique*, 1905, p. 367.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 56-8.

Immediately after their defeat they had selected from the shipping in the docks fifteen old galleys—the number which they had lost in the battle—and equipped them for action, while fishing-smacks were impressed and furnished with screens, in order to protect their rowers against missiles. Each vessel carried a band of archers and pieces of artillery. The unfortunate Parmeno was superseded, and an officer named Hermon was appointed admiral.<sup>1</sup> Nasidius on his arrival anchored in the bay of La Ciotat, about eighteen miles south-east of Lacydon, off a fort, belonging to the Massilians, called Taurois.<sup>2</sup> The townsfolk were greatly encouraged on hearing that he had come; and as the marines were embarking, the non-combatants—fathers, mothers, and daughters—thronged the quays, cheering and weeping, and urged them to save their native land. Besides the Albici the young men of rank and even older men of high standing had responded to the appeal of the magistrates, and took their places with the rest as combatants. The vessels were rowed out of the harbour, and then with all sail set they swung round to port and ran past the hills before a westerly wind. Brutus, perhaps taken by surprise, was unable, if indeed he attempted, to intercept them,<sup>3</sup> but, quitting his anchorage off Ratonneau, steered in the same direction. He also had prepared for a decisive conflict, repairing the six vessels which he had captured in the former action and equipping them with grappling implements. Trebonius and the soldiers who remained in the camp could see clearly what was going on inside the city. Men, women, and children were crowding towards the temples, kneeling before the statues of their gods or standing in prayer with hands

<sup>1</sup> *Scholia in Lucani B. C.*, ed. H. Usener, p. 115, ll. 20–2.

<sup>2</sup> J. B. B. d'Anville, *Notice de l'anc. Gaule*, 1760, pp. 636–7; A. E. E. Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 1876, p. 188. Camille Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 1909, p. 593) tentatively identifies Taurois with Sanary, about 8 miles ESE. of the bay of Ciotat!

<sup>3</sup> How, asks Commandant Rouby (*Spectateur mil.*, xxxv, 1874, p. 184), did the Massilian fleet evade Brutus? Probably, he answers, they started before daybreak [when the Romans were asleep?] and steered adroitly along the coast. We do not know.

49 B. C.

uplifted towards the sky. Every one knew that the coming battle would determine the fate of Massilia.

Approaching Taurois, the ships were cleared for action, masts and rigging being lowered and the oarsmen awaiting the word of command. Hermon reserved for his own squadron the starboard side, allotting the other to Nasidius. Brutus, it would seem, had allowed his galleys to become unduly separated, and Hermon saw his opportunity.<sup>1</sup> The Massilian steersmen took advantage of every opening for their skill ; and whenever the Romans succeeded in grappling a vessel, others sped to the rescue. When the legionaries boarded, the Albici fought stoutly, while the archers in the fishing boats, which flitted here and there outside the press, shot down many of the Romans, who, being engaged in close conflict, were unable to avoid the arrows. Two Massilian galleys, swiftly propelled from opposite sides, endeavoured to ram the admiral's ship ; but by a desperate effort of the rowers it just cleared their bows, the galleys collided, and while one was severely damaged the beak of the other was smashed and the nearest Roman vessels charged and sunk them both. Nasidius and his captains, whose seventeen ships, if they had been handled with moderate skill, could hardly have failed to decide the issue, kept aloof until they saw that Brutus was winning, and then fled. Five of the Massilian galleys were sunk and four captured ; one escaped in company with Nasidius ; the rest ran for Lacydon. The Massilians, seeing the foremost vessel approach, crowded down to the quays to hear the news ; and then followed a scene of hopeless lamentation.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless the defence of the fortress was resolutely maintained.

Further  
operations  
of the be-  
siegiers.

The right attack was slowly making way. Harassed by continued sorties, the officers in charge had contrived a plan by which they might protect the working parties and inflict such punishment as would intimidate the assailants. Close to the wall, on the right of the terrace,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. C. Jullian, *op. cit.*, p. 593.

<sup>2</sup> On the relation of the battle of Taurois to the siege, see pp. 417-8.



they erected a small edifice of sun-dried bricks, to serve as 49 B. C.  
 a place of refuge for men who were hard pressed and also  
 as a lair from which reserves might charge or pursue the  
 enemy. The building was thirty feet square, and the  
 walls were five feet thick. It answered its purpose so well  
 that some one conceived the idea of developing its use-  
 fulness by converting it into a redoubt which should  
 play a decisive part in the siege. The building was to be  
 raised until it commanded the wall; and the chief  
 engineer devised a plan, of which a lucid description has  
 been preserved, for executing the work in safety.

First the four walls were built up until they reached  
 a height at which it would be convenient to lay a floor for  
 the reception of artillery. The beams fitted into the brick-  
 work, but were not allowed to project beyond the walls,  
 lest fire should get a hold upon the wood. Working on  
 either side under sappers' huts of extraordinary height and  
 screened in front by a wooden shield, the men continued to  
 raise the brickwork as high as they could without exposing  
 themselves. When that elevation had been reached, they  
 laid two beams upon the lateral walls, not reaching quite  
 to their outer edges. Upon the beams joists were laid at  
 right angles and made fast by tie-beams. The joists were  
 made long enough to project slightly beyond the outer  
 edges of the walls, so that screens might be hung from  
 them, to protect the workers against missiles. All this  
 woodwork, which was intended to serve as a movable  
 roof, was covered with bricks and earth, as a protection  
 against fire, and above these again mattresses<sup>1</sup> were laid,  
 to prevent javelins hurled by the enemy's ballistas from  
 piercing the timber and stones discharged by their  
 catapults from shattering the bricks. Three mats,  
 each four feet wide, made of anchor-cables, were then  
 hung from the projecting joists on the three exposed sides  
 of the tower; for the engineers had learned by experience  
 that these were the only screens which the most formidable

<sup>1</sup> These *centones* (*B. C.*, ii, 9, 3) were made of pieces of old cloth or other materials which would not burn readily (*Daremberg and Saglio, Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, i, 1013).



49 B. C.

projectiles could not pierce.<sup>1</sup> The wooden shield and the sappers' huts were now withdrawn ; and the roof was elevated by levers just so far as would enable the workers, screened by the hanging mats, to continue building. When they had laid as many bricks as they could, the roof was raised again ; and in due course a second floor was built. So the work went on until the tower had reached the height of six stories. On each floor quick-firing catapults were mounted ; and loopholes were left in the walls, to enable the missiles to be discharged.<sup>2</sup>

Outside the wall of Massilia everything within range of the tower was now secure ; and the engineers prepared to support the attack that was to be directed from the terrace by destroying the nearest bastion. In order to do this it was necessary to construct a sappers' hut of extraordinary strength, which could lie safely at the very foot of the wall.<sup>3</sup> It was called a *musculus* and was to be built close to the tower, the workers being of course protected in the usual way by sheds.<sup>4</sup> The hut was to be sixty feet long, four feet wide inside, and high enough to allow men to stand upright within. Two huge barks, of equal length and each two feet square, were laid upon the ground four feet apart. On each of them a row of posts five feet high was planted ; and each pair of opposite posts was connected at the top by timbers which met one another and formed a gable-like figure, of which the angle was obtuse. These timbers served as the skeleton of the roof. Above them barks two feet square were laid lengthwise and mortised into them by iron plates and bolts ; while the roof thus formed was furnished on either side with a stout parapet about three inches thick, which was to keep in place the materials intended to protect the hut from fire. These consisted of bricks covered by a layer of earth, above which were spread raw hides, to prevent the earth from being dissolved in case water should be

<sup>1</sup> B. C., ii, 9, 4. The experience must have been gained during the siege ; for there is no evidence that any of the Gallic tribes which Caesar encountered had artillery, and he says (B. G., iv, 25, 2) that the Britons had none.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. B. C., ii, 9 with Stoffel, *op. cit.*, i, 295-6.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 418-9.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 419.

discharged upon it ; and the hides were covered with mattresses, thoroughly soaked. The hut, when complete, was moved rapidly on rollers, at a moment when the enemy were not looking out,<sup>1</sup> right up to the bastion, until it lay with its whole length in contact with the masonry ; and the crew within at once fell to work with their crow-bars.<sup>2</sup> 49 B. C.

The sentries soon saw the danger, and huge stones, shoved by levers to the edge of the bastion, toppled over on to the hut. But the massive timbers withstood the crash, and the stones rolled harmlessly off the sloping roof. A few trials convinced the garrison that this method was useless. Casks were then brought up, full of firewood coated with pitch, ignited, and dropped on to the roof. They too rolled off ; but as the flames might catch the sides of the hut, which were unprotected, the workers pushed the casks away with long poles and two-pronged forks, which the engineers had taken care to provide. The artillerymen in the brick tower showered missiles into the ranks of the defenders and drove them from the bastions and the wall. Meanwhile the men inside the hut were prizing out the foundation stones. Gradually block after block was dislodged, and suddenly the lower part of the bastion fell (for the walling was not compacted with mortar)<sup>3</sup> and the upper part was toppling over. Citizens with fillets bound round their heads, the equivalent of our white flag, emerged from the nearest gate and advanced with hands extended towards the officers who were directing the troops.

The news rapidly spread. Immediately the siege stopped and soldiers came thronging from the terraces, the brick tower, the *musculus*, and the camp to see and to hear. The Massilians knelt down and begged for mercy. Would the general compassionately forbear and await the arrival of Caesar ? The city was virtually taken, and

Massilian  
envoys  
beg Tre-  
bonius to  
suspend  
hostilities  
and await  
the arrival  
of Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> *inopinantibus hostibus*. Mr. A. G. Peskett in his first note on *B. C.*, ii, 10, 7 supposes that the *musculus* was moved 'in the dark'.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 419.

<sup>3</sup> See Stuart Jones, *Companion to Rom. Hist.*, 1912, p. 59.

49 B. C.

He con-  
sents.

they would defend it no longer. Manifestly their prayer was sincere, for if they did not instantly obey Caesar's commands, nothing could save them from instant destruction. Would the general remember that if the bastion fell, no discipline could stop the soldiers from breaking into the city to plunder and to destroy? Trebonius had been campaigning for years against rude Gauls; and to him, who had literary tastes, there was something pathetic in the tears of these cultured men, who had found themselves obliged to take up arms and whose pleading was so eloquent. After consulting with his brother officers he decided to suspend hostilities until Caesar returned from Spain. The Massilians departed. The troops were withdrawn from their posts, all except the piquets that were left to guard the terraces, the brick tower, the redoubts, and the other works. Apparently it did not occur to Trebonius that it was his duty to require the garrison to prove their sincerity by surrendering their arms and destroying or dismantling their artillery. An informal truce was observed by mutual consent; and in the Roman army officers and men alike gave themselves up to repose. Caesar had sent a dispatch to Trebonius, warning him not on any account to allow his men to storm the town; for he feared that, exasperated by the contempt which the garrison had shown for their prowess and by the prolonged toil which they had been forced to undergo, they would massacre all the adult males. His fears indeed were well grounded. When the men had nothing to do they were hard to control; they openly threatened to wreak their vengeance, complaining that it was the fault of Trebonius that they had been disappointed; and their officers had great difficulty in preventing them from breaking into the town. Several days passed in inaction, while the Romans became more and more careless. Even the piquets which had been posted to guard the works were neglecting their duty. The weapons had all been stacked and covered up. One day late in August, about noon, when a number of soldiers were lying asleep on the terraces and the others had gone

Early in  
July.

away on various errands, a band of Massilians rushed out of the gates and set fire to all the works which they could reach. Driven by a strong west wind, the flames flew along the timbers ; and the principal terrace, the tower mounted upon it, the hut that had screened the workers who levelled the ground, the wooden shields in front of the sheds, the various pieces of artillery were all ablaze before the dazed Romans fully realized what had happened. They seized the weapons within reach and, supported by their comrades who hurried down from the camp, charged the Massilians : but artillerymen and archers were ranged upon the wall ; and a shower of arrows and other missiles deterred the Romans from pressing home their attack. While they looked helplessly on the Massilians stood coolly near the foot of the wall and finished their work. In a few minutes the *musculus* and the woodwork of the brick tower were aflame. Next day the enemy made another sortie and attempted to fire the southern terrace and its tower ; but this time the Romans were prepared, and the assailants were driven back with heavy loss into the town.

49 B. C.  
The  
Massilians  
fire the  
siege  
works.

The legionaries were themselves again. The labour of months was indeed undone ; but the chief engineer had contrived a novel design, and the men, who were now in a dangerous mood, set to work resolutely to execute it. Although the bastion had been partially destroyed, it would be rash to attempt an assault by the breach alone, for the garrison had had time to obstruct the entrance. A new terrace was to be built on the northern <sup>1</sup> side of the charred smouldering mass which now cumbered the ground ; and thus it would be possible to take the town by escalade. No more timber was available, for all the suitable trees had been cut down ; but bricks in abundance supplied the want. The site selected was one where the ground was tolerably level. Two brick walls were built, six feet thick and forty-eight feet apart, so that the width of the new terrace exactly equalled that of the old one. The walls were roofed with timber, a sufficient

Trebonius  
resumes  
the siege.

<sup>1</sup> *Spectateur mil.*, xxxvi, 1874, p. 50.



49 B. C.

number of the logs having escaped destruction. In certain places, however, where they were comparatively weak or not long enough to span the space between the walls, piles were driven into the ground to support the structure, which was further strengthened by beams laid across the others in a direction parallel with the walls. The timbers were then covered with fascines, over which a layer of earth was spread ; and thus a level roadway was formed. The men worked in perfect security ; for they were not only protected by a movable wooden shield in front, but also by the roof and the walls. Gaps were left in the brickwork at convenient intervals, to enable the workers to sally forth in case of need and repel attack.

The  
Massilians  
submit.

The Massilians saw that their treachery had been vain. They could not hope to ignite bricks and mud : their ballistas were now useless, for they could not be depressed to the required angle ;<sup>1</sup> by sea they were blockaded ; on the landward side their city was hemmed in by impregnable works ; to attempt a sortie would be folly, for if it came to close fighting, they would be no match for the legionaries. Not only had the bastion been demolished, but a considerable part of the wall had been breached by the battering-ram.<sup>2</sup> Prolonged confinement and bad food (for their wheat was all consumed and they had nothing to eat except millet and sour barley) had engendered disease. There was no hope of succour from without, for they knew that Caesar had defeated the armies of Spain. Domitius, on learning that they intended to surrender, determined to escape and boarded a galley. A strong gale was blowing, and he trusted that Brutus would not incur the risk of pursuing him far. His followers, who embarked at the same time in two other vessels, shrank from encountering the Roman squadron and precipitately returned ; but Domitius, running on boldly through the heavy sea, was soon out

<sup>1</sup> B. C., ii, 16, 1-3. Cf. Plut., *Marcell.*, 15, 5, and *Spectateur mil.*, xxxvi, 1874, p. 53, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Probably the breach had been made by a battering-ram mounted either on the brick terrace or on the wooden terrace that had escaped destruction.

of sight.<sup>1</sup> The Massilians, when they offered to surrender, again implored Trebonius to wait for Caesar, who would soon arrive. He consented, but, taught by experience, insisted that, as a guarantee of good faith, they should deliver up their arms and engines, their treasure and their ships.<sup>2</sup> Caesar, finding on his return that the order had been obeyed, announced that, in consideration of the fame and the antiquity of Massilia, he would not inflict the extreme penalty which treachery deserved, but would allow them to retain autonomy. They were deprived, however, of the greater part of their territory and colonies. Thenceforward Massilia, which for centuries had been unswervingly loyal to Rome and had rendered her inestimable services, though it remained a centre of Hellenic culture, ceased politically to exist.<sup>3</sup>

How  
Caesar  
punished  
them.

While Caesar was still in Spain he had written to one of his supporters, the praetor Aemilius Lepidus, requesting him to procure immediately his appointment as dictator. He desired the office to enable him to carry out certain legislative measures, but above all to hold the elections and to obtain the consulship, which would give him a constitutional position, indispensable for the impending struggle in the East. For a praetor to nominate a dictator was unconstitutional, and Cicero<sup>4</sup> was scandalized by the

He pro-  
cures his  
appoint-  
ment as  
dictator.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, ii, 22, 2-4 with Suet., *Nero*, 2, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, ii, 16, 3 (probably part of Trebonius's report) with 22, 1 (written by Caesar) and Dio, xl, 25, 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 22, 6; Cic., *Phil.*, viii, 6, 19; xiii, 15, 32; *Att.*, xiv, 14, 6; Strabo, iv, 1, 5; Flor., ii, 13, 25; Dio, xli, 25, 3; Oros., vi, 15, 7. M. Michel Clerc (*Rev. des études anc.*, xx, 1918, p. 49), citing Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxix [read xxix], 1 (5), 9, argues that Caesar destroyed the walls of Massilia.

How much territory the Massilians retained westward is not known: eastward they were allowed to keep the islands of Hyères (Strabo, iv, 1, 10; Tac., *Hist.*, iii, 43), Athenopolis (Pliny, iii, 4 [5], 35), and Nicaea (Nice) (Strabo, iv, 1, 9). Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iii, 1885, pp. 59-60) apparently thinks that they lost all their colonies! Mommsen (*Röm. Münzw.*, 1860, p. 675, with which cf. E. Herzog, *Gall. Narbon... hist.*, 1864, p. 163, n. 28), referring to Dio, Florus, and Orosius, argued that they were deprived of the right of coining money; but there is not a word in the texts which he cites that proves this, and A. Blanchet (*Rev. belge de numism.*, lxi, 1913, p. 301) shows that they certainly continued to strike bronze coins.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, ix, 15, 2. Cf. Dio, xli, 36, 1.

49 B. C.

procedure ; but Lepidus of course secured himself by carrying a law which authorized him to act. Caesar received the news of his appointment at Massilia ;<sup>1</sup> but he also learned that the troops which had conducted the soldiers of Afranius from Ilerda to the Var were in mutiny at Placentia. Leaving two of the legions that had served under Trebonius to hold Massilia,<sup>2</sup> he dispatched the third to Italy, whither the two that followed him from Spain were also marching, and hastened himself to deal with the mutineers on his way to Rome.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 21, 5. Appian (*B. C.*, ii, 48, 196) incorrectly says that Caesar was appointed by the people, and Plutarch (*Caes.*, 37, 1) by the Senate.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 420-1.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### CURIO'S CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA

WHILE Spain and Massilia were subdued, while Pompey 49 B. C.  
armed the East against his rival, a tragedy was being The  
enacted in Africa. Curio, whose mission was to secure that appoint-  
province for Caesar, had practically no experience of war ; ment of  
and one might wonder why Caesar had not entrusted so Curio to  
important a command to Caninius Rebilus, who had command  
fought with distinction in Gaul, and whom Curio for that in Africa.

But Caesar was not  
entirely free to choose his instruments. Curio had rendered  
him invaluable services ; and Caesar, who was doubtless  
glad to give him an opportunity of gaining military renown,  
may well have hoped that, conscious of his own limita-  
tions, he would follow the advice of Rebilus.

In Sicily Curio encountered no opposition ; for Cato, Cato  
who had done his best to guard against invasion, saw that abandons  
he must yield to superior force, and, wishing to avoid Sicily.  
needless bloodshed, determined to quit the island. Before  
embarking he summoned the leading citizens and told  
them that Pompey, after wantonly plunging into a war  
for which he was totally unprepared, had left him in the  
lurch. Nevertheless for Cato Pompey represented the  
constitutional cause, and he therefore sailed to join him in  
the East.<sup>2</sup> Curio, however, delayed his departure, perhaps  
because he thought it imprudent to commit himself to  
a campaign in Africa until he should learn that all was well  
in Spain.<sup>3</sup>

Apr. 23<sup>1</sup>  
(Mar. 3).

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Att.*, x, 16, 3. Caesar's narrative (*B. C.*, i, 30, 5) shows that Curio had just arrived.

<sup>2</sup> With Caesar's account (*l. c.*) cf. Plut., *Cato min.*, 53, and App., *B. C.*, ii, 40, 162.

<sup>3</sup> Stoffel (*Hist. de J. César*, i, 1887, p. 306) says that when Caesar ordered Curio to sail for Africa as soon as he had secured Sicily (*B. C.*, i, 30, 2) he was ignorant that Massilia would resist ; that when he was obliged to



49 B. C.

Varus  
prepares  
to defend  
Africa.

Curio's force consisted of the thirty-one cohorts—about three legions—which had formed the army of Domitius, and which, after the surrender of Corfinium, Caesar had dispatched to Sicily, one other legion which was sent to join them later, and about a thousand Gallic cavalry. Africa was held by Attius Varus, who, after he fled from Auximum, had made his way to Utica. He found the province without a ruler; for the propraetor, Considius Longus, had returned to Italy, and his designated successor, Aelius Tubero, had not yet arrived. Varus had been Governor of Africa a few years before, and now usurped the vacant office. Taking advantage of his knowledge of the localities and of the leading provincials, he managed to raise two legions; and when Tubero's ships appeared off Utica, he compelled him to leave. His raw troops were of course unfit to resist Curio's four legions; but he relied upon the support of Juba, the King of Numidia, whose father had owed his throne to Pompey, and who himself had a grudge against Curio, because, as tribune, he had proposed a law by which the kingdom was to be annexed to the Roman province.<sup>1</sup>

Curio  
sails.


Curio had absolute confidence in himself and despised his enemies. Instead of utilizing his superiority in force, he left half of his army in Sicily, and early in August sailed from Lilybaeum, now Marsala, with only two

besiege it he doubtless ordered Curio to wait; and that when his communications were restored he ordered him to sail. I will not contradict him: but Sicily was secure on April 23, when Cato left Syracuse; Massilia did not begin to resist, as Stoffel admits, till April 21; and some weeks would have elapsed before a messenger from Caesar could reach Curio. Perhaps Caesar had not expected that Cato would retreat so precipitately, and Curio may have required a considerable time to collect transports.

<sup>1</sup> Suetonius (*Div. Jul.*, 71) says that Caesar in an altercation with Juba at Rome had pulled his beard!

Coins of Juba and of Bogud, King of Mauretania, were minted after the Roman standard and bear Latin legends (C. L. Müller, *Numism. de l'anc. Afrique*, ii, 1862, pp. 42, 95), in which Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.*, v, 1894, p. 625 [Eng. tr., ii, 308]) sees 'the direct recognition of the Roman supremacy, a consequence, it may be presumed, of the new organization of North Africa . . . by Pompey'. Perhaps. But even before the conquest of Gaul and Britain Gallic coins were modelled upon Roman *denarii* (J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéol.*, ii, 3, 1914, p. 1571) and British coins bore Latin legends (Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, 1907, pp. 361, 364).





legions and five hundred cavalry. The fleet, which must have numbered nearly a hundred transports, was convoyed by twelve galleys under the quaestor, Marcus Rufus. Curio steered in the direction of Cape Bon, the lofty promontory which forms the northernmost point of the peninsula that bounds on the east the Gulf of Tunis, and which, being visible at a distance of five and forty miles, serves as a landmark for all vessels approaching Africa from Sicily. He did not intend to land at Utica, but in some bay where he would not be opposed.

The traveller who approaches Tunis from the Sicilian port of Trapani looks upon a landscape that differs little from that which revealed itself to Curio. On the western side of the gulf, indeed, the land has encroached upon the sea; for the river Bagradas, now called the Medjerda, which then discharged its waters about midway between Utica and Carthage, has twice been forced by the silt with which its own flow choked its mouth, to seek an outlet further north;<sup>1</sup> but the southern and the eastern shores remain unchanged. Fifty miles away, beyond the blue waters of the gulf, lay the fortress and the harbour of Utica; behind Carthage and separated from it by the broad lagoon across which steamers now thread their way, stood the city of Tunes; and here and there, all round the coast, were dotted smaller towns. Hills of irregular outline, rolling downs alternating with sharp peaks, encompassed the gulf; and dominating all, some sixty miles to the south-west, sharply defined against the transparent sky, towered the rugged mountain which the Arabs call Djebel Zaghuan. The European who visits Tunisia feels the stimulus of an experience which is startlingly new. White-robed Berbers of pale coffee-coloured complexion, fair sunburnt Kabyles with heavy blonde moustaches, camels moving with stately rhythmical tread at a pace which never changes, pass him on the road. Here and there huge buckets are being uphauled from wells by oxen. Horses and mules are driven or ridden without bits, as they were in the time of Hannibal.

North  
Africa  
and its  
inhabi-  
tants.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 424, n. 7.



49 B. C.

Hedges of cactus, olive groves, palm-trees, ordered rows of vines extend on every side. Vast expanses of salt, lying upon mud, look in the distance like white lakes. Sometimes, when the scirocco blows, the wind-swept clouds of dust are so dense that the traveller cannot see his way. When Curio landed the Arabs had not come, and Phoenician, the language of the Carthaginians, was still spoken in the towns; but then, as now, the Berbers formed the bulk of the population,<sup>1</sup> the aspect of the country and its climate were much the same.<sup>2</sup>

L. Caesar  
fails to  
intercept  
Curio's  
fleet.

The channel which separates Sicily from Africa is less than a hundred miles across; but Curio's voyage lasted two days and three nights;<sup>3</sup> and off the African coast it was necessary to look out for the submerged rocks that lie between Cape Bon and Rass el Ahmar, the western headland of the peninsula.<sup>4</sup> Lucius Caesar, who, though his father had served in the Gallic War, was himself a bitter enemy of his great kinsman, was cruising with ten galleys off Clupea, on the eastern coast, in the hope of intercepting the invaders; but, observing that the fleet was too strong to be attacked, he ran his own trireme ashore and fled. Rufus, who was chasing the squadron, noticed the stranded trireme and, taking it in tow, returned to rejoin his chief, who had landed in Thonara Bay, just south of Rass el Ahmar, behind which a few ruins still mark the site of the ancient town of Anquillaria.<sup>5</sup> Ordering Rufus to sail with the whole fleet to Utica, Curio proceeded to march thither himself around the gulf. The road skirted the coast for about fifteen miles, and then, after passing behind the mountains which descend precipitously to the eastern shore, crossed the level

<sup>1</sup> *Rec. des notices . . . de la Soc. arch. . . de Constantine*, xxx, 1895-6 (1897), p. 211; G. Loth, *Hist. de la Tunisie*, 1898, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. afr.*, lv, 1911, pp. 392-410.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 23, 1. The voyage appears to have been unusually slow. Scipio Africanus sailed from Lilybaeum to within 5 miles of Cape Bon in about 24 hours (Livy, xxix, 27, 6-8), and, if Pliny can be trusted (*Nat. Hist.*, xv, 18 [20], 75, with which cf. Plut., *Cato mai.*, 27, 1), the voyage from Carthage to Rome (Ostia ?) could be performed in 3 days.

<sup>4</sup> See *The Mediterranean Pilot*, i, 1904, pp. 375-7.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 424-7.

ground within sight of the sea and fringed the western outskirts of Tunes. Curio, eager perhaps to emulate the swiftness for which Caesar was renowned, made forced marches and, leaving Tunes behind, moved along the line of the modern road between the hills called Djebel Nahali and Djebel Amar till, at the end of the third day,<sup>1</sup> he reached the southern bank of the Bagradas. There he left Rebilus in charge of the infantry and, crossing the river with the cavalry, rode northward to explore a site near Utica, which was said to be ideally suited for a camp. Ascending a road which branches to the right from the Route Nationale about four miles north-west of the bridge that spans the Medjerda, you may walk in half an hour to the ruins of Utica. Look eastward across a low-lying plain, on which palms and olive-trees now grow, and you will see, two miles off, a long low hill, parallel with the hill on which you stand, and sinking steeply northward towards a white sunlit town, Galaat el Andeless. This hill, which is irregular in contour and narrow, but broadens somewhat in the middle, has scarped flanks, the slope of which is rather gentler on the side that faces Utica than on the east. Two thousand years ago its northern promontory descended into the sea, which, penetrating the plain along a water-course, overflowed and made it a morass. Publius Cornelius Scipio in the last act of the Second Punic War had encamped on the broad expanse; and the place which the conqueror of Hannibal had made famous was ever after known as the Cornelian Camp.<sup>2</sup> This was the site which Curio explored.

The camp of Varus, which he observed from his standpoint on the hill, was protected on its further side by the north-eastern wall of Utica, on the nearer, close to the sea, by a theatre, the outlying structures of which were so extensive that the camp could only be approached by a narrow passage.<sup>3</sup> Looking round towards the south,

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 424, 426.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 427.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 25, 1. Cf. Ch. Tissot, *Géo . . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, ii, 1888, p. 77, and *Atlas archéol. de la Tunisie*, letterpress accompanying Feuille VII.

49 B. C.

His initial  
successes

Curio noticed that the roads were thronged by fugitives, driving cattle and conveying their belongings into Utica. Instantly he sent his cavalry round the marsh to plunder the helpless crowd, and simultaneously six hundred horsemen and four hundred infantry, whom Juba had recently dispatched to reinforce the garrison, moved out to the rescue. The two squadrons clashed: the Numidians, unused to close fighting, could not withstand the shock and, hunted by Curio's troopers, who killed a hundred and twenty, took refuge in the town. Rufus with his galleys had already arrived. About two hundred vessels, laden with supplies for the army of Varus, were lying in the harbour. Curio, swiftly following up his success, ordered their captains to take them to the shore below the Cornelian Camp, threatening that unless they obeyed at once he would put them all to death. Within a few minutes the crews weighed anchor, and the cargoes were discharged for the benefit of Curio.

After these exploits Curio returned to the camp on the Bagradas; <sup>1</sup> and the legions acclaimed him as Imperator. Next day he recrossed the Bagradas and marched towards Utica; but instead of occupying the Cornelian Camp he chose a position on a ridge south-west of the town, with the intention of taking the offensive. The men were still working in the trenches when the patrols reported that large reinforcements, dispatched by Juba, were marching to join Varus: a cloud of dust was already visible; and presently the head of the Numidian column was descried moving across the plain east of the hills called Djebel Menzel Roul. Curio, who had neglected to send out scouts, was somewhat agitated and, sending his cavalry to delay the enemy's advance, withdrew the legionaries from the trenches and began to form them in line of battle. The cavalry charged. The Numidians, who were rambling in disorder, according to their wont, were routed with heavy loss before the legions had time to deploy; but their cavalry contrived to escape, almost unscathed, across the hills and made their way

<sup>1</sup> See p. 428.

along the coast into the town. Varus, it should seem, passively looked on. 49 B. C.

The following night two centurions, accompanied by twenty-two men of their respective companies, deserted from Curio's army, and obtained an interview with Varus. They told him that Curio's troops were disaffected, and that he would do well to show himself and give them an opportunity of conversing with him. Varus took their advice and early in the morning led his legions out of camp. Curio followed his example. The two armies were separated by a valley not more than eighty yards in width, which extended across the space between the town and the morass, and the sides of which, though only seven or eight feet high, were very steep.<sup>1</sup> The right flank of Curio and the left flank of Varus rested on the morass. A senator, named Sextus Quintilius Varus, one of the notables whom Caesar had released after the surrender of Corfinium, stepped out of the ranks and, walking along Curio's array, implored the men to remember that they had sworn fidelity to Domitius, their commander, and to himself, their quaestor, and not to fight against old comrades or for leaders who scorned them as deserters. If they would join him, they might count upon his liberality. The men listened, but said nothing; and the armies were withdrawn to their respective camps.

Q. Varus attempts to undermine the fidelity of Curio's troops.

The senator's impassioned plea, although it had been received in silence, was not without effect. In civil wars men of sensitive temperament are liable to be swayed by doubts and sudden revulsions of feeling; and what they say in such moods influences others. Nor was this merely a civil war: it was a war in which soldiers were for the most part fighting not for a principle, as men fought in

<sup>1</sup> B. C., ii, 27, 4; 34, 1. Cf. C. J. Tissot, *Géogr. . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, ii, 1884, p. 82; Stoffel, *op. cit.*, i, 310; G. Veith, *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, 1912, pp. 735-6. The valley is now less than 200 metres long, a space which would obviously have been much too small to allow the armies to deploy. But, says Veith, when one reflects that the level of the land has been raised about 8 metres since Curio's time, one sees that the eastern part of the ravine must have been overlaid by alluvium and have originally extended even beyond the distance required for the deployment of two legions.



49 B. C.

England for Parliament or King, in America for independence or for union, but for the leader to whom they had sworn fidelity, and to whom they looked for their reward ; and for Italian peasants, even in the decadence of the Republic, an oath was still charged with religious awe. Curio's men had just been reminded that only a few months before they had been the sworn followers of a Pompeian general ; and, as the writer to whom we owe our knowledge of the campaign remarked, whatever gratitude they may have felt for the generosity with which Caesar had treated them was weakened by the very fact that Caesar's generosity had become a matter of course. Though the energy of Curio had captivated them, they were now oppressed by religious scruples and vague fears, which grew when the remarks of the more imaginative were repeated and exaggerated by those who had heard them. Curio learned what was going on, and summoned his officers to a council of war. Every one recognized that the troops in their present frame of mind were not to be depended upon ; but there agreement stopped. Some argued that if the men were allowed to remain inactive, their temper would grow worse : the wisest course would be to show a bold front and assault the enemy's camp. Anything was better than to wait to be attacked by mutineers. Others counselled patience : why should not Curio give orders to retreat to the impregnable Cornelian Camp ? There the men would have time to return to reason ; and if disaster should befall, ships were at hand to take the army safely back to Sicily. Curio disapproved both these counsels ; the former was rash, the latter cowardly. The enemy's camp was too strong to be taken by assault, and failure would be calamitous : on the other hand, by abandoning their own camp they would be throwing unmerited suspicion upon the men who remained staunch, encouraging the mutinous, and revealing their own weakness to the enemy. For his part, he felt sure that the reports of disaffection were exaggerated, and when he had probed them he would be able, with the help of his hearers, to come to a decision.

The council broke up, and the troops were paraded. 49 B. C.  
 Curio began by reminding them that it was they who, Curio  
 by the goodwill which they had shown to Caesar at appeals to  
 Corfinium, had won for him the support of Italy and their  
 forced Pompey to retreat beyond the sea. Caesar had honour.  
 commended him—the friend whom he loved—to their  
 loyalty. Those who were trying to seduce them were not  
 only his enemies but theirs. Were they going to put  
 themselves in the power of men who owed them a grudge  
 for what they had done at Corfinium? Had they not  
 heard of Caesar's victories in Spain? <sup>1</sup> Did they desire  
 to join the losing side? They had never been false to  
 Domitius, he had been false to them; and surely they  
 were not going to violate the solemn oath which they  
 had sworn to Caesar? He would not dwell upon his own  
 services, for he knew that he had not done all that he had  
 hoped to do: still, he had brought the army safe and sound  
 to Africa, scattered the enemy's fleet, routed his cavalry  
 twice, captured his transports, cut off his supplies. Did  
 they mean to forsake him for a lost cause? If so—if they  
 repented of having bestowed upon him the proud title of  
 Imperator—it was theirs to revoke. Deeply moved, the  
 men frequently interrupted their young commander with  
 protests of devotion; and when he was returning to his  
 quarters their shouts bade him to be of good courage and  
 not to hesitate to put their fidelity to the proof.

Next day Curio, with the approbation of all his officers,  
 again formed line of battle, and Varus accepted the  
 challenge. The armies were facing one another on either  
 side of the valley which had separated them before; but,  
 mindful of the steep banks, each waited for the other to  
 cross. At length the Numidian cavalry which Curio had  
 lately routed, interspersed with light-armed foot, began to  
 descend. Curio's cavalry, supported by two cohorts,  
 charged; the Numidians instantly turned tail; their  
 auxiliaries were surrounded and cut down. Rebilus  
 turned to his chief. 'Look, Curio,' he cried; 'the enemy  
 are cowed; seize your opportunity! why hesitate?'

He gains a  
 victory,

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 421-2.

49 B. C.

Curio was not backward. Calling upon the men to remember their pledge, he led the way. The enemy might easily have overwhelmed them as they were struggling to help one another up the bank ; but, unnerved by the slaughter which they had just witnessed, they fled pell-mell before a blow was struck. Many were trampled to death by their own comrades in the openings of their camp ; some were slaughtered by their pursuers ; others never stopped till they reached the town. About six hundred were said to have been killed and a thousand wounded ; while Curio lost only one. Had he been able to follow up his victory, he might perhaps have captured the camp, if not Utica itself ; for the enemy were so utterly demoralized that Varus withdrew almost the entire force into the town, only leaving a trumpeter and a few tents to save appearances. But town and camp were still secure ; for Curio's men had left behind all the appliances that were needed for assault.

but fails to  
follow it  
up.

Next day, however, Curio began to form a contravallation around Utica. The inhabitants had had no previous experience of war. The natives were grateful to Caesar for the relief which he had given them in his consulship by his provincial law ;<sup>1</sup> the Roman residents had various political sympathies ; and all alike were thoroughly alarmed by Curio's unbroken success. Representatives of the various groups therefore approached Varus and begged him not to ruin them by useless resistance. While the interview was still in progress messengers rode into the town, announcing that Juba was coming to the rescue with a strong force and urging Varus to hold on. The non-combatants were now reassured.

Why he  
withdrew  
to the  
Cornelian  
Camp.

The same news reached Curio from some other source ; but he would not believe it. Official reports of Caesar's victory were coming in ; and the young general was confident that Juba would never dare to attack him. Presently, however, he learned from informants whom he

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 36, 1 ; *Bell. Afr.*, 87, 2. E. Meyer (*Caesars Monarchie* <sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 490, n. 2) thinks that the ' Julian law ' which the author of *Bell. Afr.* mentions conferred ' Latin rights ' upon Utica

could not disbelieve, that Juba's army was less than three- 49 B. C.  
and-twenty miles from Utica. To continue the siege was evidently impossible ; and he could not safely remain where he was. Accordingly he withdrew the army to the Cornelian Camp, threw up entrenchments, and sent a dispatch to Sicily, requesting that the two legions and the cavalry which he had left behind should be embarked at once. In his new position he would be able to protract the war indefinitely ; for water and timber were abundant ; the outlying country was thick with corn ; and communication with his base was easy.

Curio had hardly formed his resolve when deserters came in from Utica. Juba, they reported, was nowhere near. War had broken out on his own frontier ; trouble had arisen with the people of Leptis on the eastern coast, a hundred and twenty miles or more away ; and he had been obliged to return. It was true that an army under his lieutenant, Saburra, was approaching ; but its strength was insignificant. Curio accepted this report without question. Soon after sunset he dispatched his cavalry against Saburra, who was encamped about ten miles off on the nearer bank of the Bagradas, opposite the site of the village called Haras de Sidi Tabet.<sup>1</sup> Leaving one fourth of his infantry to guard the camp, he followed with the rest an hour or two before the dawn. Meanwhile the cavalry, approaching the Bagradas, found the advanced guard of the enemy lying on the ground in disordered groups, and attacked them. Staggering to their feet, the drowsy Numidians could not resist : many were butchered<sup>2</sup> and many fled ; the rest surrendered. The cavalry, instead of waiting for Curio, rode back and met him about six miles south of the Cornelian Camp, near the extremity of the low ridge along which he had been

Trusting a false report, he marches against Juba.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 429.

<sup>2</sup> *magnum eorum numerum interficiunt* (B. C., ii, 38, 5). Captain (now Colonel) G. Veith (*op. cit.*, p. 747) imagines that the Numidians were lying about 'with ostentatious carelessness' (*mit ostentativer Sorglosigkeit*) ! Col. G. F. R. Henderson (*The Science of War*, 1913, p. 207) tells us that in the American Civil War 'More than one of the great battles was ushered in by a sudden rush on troops asleep in their tents', &c.



49 B. C.

marching towards the river. Their commander, Gnaeus Domitius, pointed to his prisoners and gave a bombastic account of his exploit. Curio halted his column, and questioned the prisoners. 'Who', he asked, 'is in command of the encampment on the Bagradas?' 'Saburra,' they replied. Curio asked no more. Turning to the nearest company, he said: 'Men, you see these prisoners confirm the report of the deserters. Juba is far away, and the force which he sent against us must be weak, since it could not stand against our few troopers. On then for loot and for glory!' <sup>1</sup> The men were enthusiastic. Marching on, Curio ordered the cavalry to follow, that he might overwhelm the enemy before they could recover from their panic; but the horses, which must have been in poor condition or suffering from lack of water, were tired out, and only two hundred of the troopers were able to obey. 'Even this', wrote the contemporary chronicler, 'could not sober the sanguine spirit of Curio.'<sup>2</sup>

Juba, who had encamped six miles in the rear of Saburra, on the further bank of the Bagradas and below the western slopes of Djebel Amar, was ready to avenge himself on the enemy whom he detested. On receiving news of the surprise of the Numidians, he sent two thousand cavalry—Spanish and Gallic mercenaries who formed his bodyguard—supported by a picked body of infantry, to reinforce Saburra, and, fording the river, followed leisurely himself with the remainder of his force. Saburra, who felt sure that Curio would follow up the success of his cavalry, ordered his troops to retreat gradually as soon as the Romans came in sight, adding that at the right moment he would give the signal for action and make such dispositions as might be needed. When Curio saw the Numidians retreating, his confidence was confirmed; descending from the heights, he moved on over the sandy waterless plain, under the fierce African sun, until he met the army of Saburra. His young soldiers were tired and parched with thirst. Saburra gave the promised signal and, riding along the ranks, encouraged his men.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 39, 2-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, § 6.

Relying entirely upon his numerous cavalry, he posted his infantry at a distance, merely to create a moral effect. The plain, open and level as a bowling-green, was ideally suited for the tactics of Numidian horsemen. The Romans fought bravely and compelled the enemy to give ground ; but they were too weary to pursue, and the few troopers who had followed Curio vainly spurred their jaded horses. The enemy's cavalry gradually enveloped the Roman line and began to harass the rear. Whenever a cohort charged the Numidians cantered away and presently, wheeling, closed round the legionaries and prevented them from rejoining the line. While Juba's troops were continually reinforcing Saburra, Curio's were weakening ; and, as five years before at Atuatuca, Roman soldiers uttered cries of anguish which signified despair. Curio implored them to stand firm ; but, realizing that his words were unheeded or unheard, he ordered the army to retreat to the low hills, called Djebel Chaouat, which formed the northern limit of the plain. Saburra's cavalry forestalled him. Some of the Romans were slaughtered as they tried to run ; some deliberately lay down to await their doom. Gnaeus Domitius rode up to his chief with a few troopers and, promising that he would never leave him, urged him to make an effort to get back to camp. Curio replied that since he had lost the army which Caesar had entrusted to him, he could never again look him in the face, and, fighting to the last, he fell. A few troopers escaped, and the three hundred who had failed to follow Curio returned safely to the camp ; but the legionaries were butchered, to the last man.<sup>1</sup>

49 B. C.  
The fate of  
Curio and  
his army.  
  
About  
Aug. 20  
(June 27).

Marcus Rufus, who had been left in command of the little force that guarded the Cornelian Camp, did his utmost to cheer his men, and ordered the captains of the transports and the other vessels to have all the ships' boats ready on the beach before sunset. But soldiers, captains, and crews were all panic-stricken. Juba's army was close by ; Varus and his legions were advancing to attack ; the dust raised by the column was already visible ; the enemy's

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 422-4 and 428-9.

49 B. C.

fleet would soon be up—such were the idle rumours which paralysed discipline. The galleys hurriedly put to sea ; the captains of the transports prepared to follow their example ; but a few seamen did their duty and rowed their boats towards shore. The terrified soldiers fought with one another to get on board, and as some of the overcrowded and unbalanced boats were sinking the sailors who manned the rest were afraid to come close in. A few soldiers, however—mostly married men with families—appealed to the compassion of their comrades or of the sailors, and were allowed to enter the boats, while others swam out to the ships and were received on board. The rest of the troops sent their centurions as delegates to Varus, who pledged his word to protect them. Next day Juba caught sight of them ; and, despite the timid protests of Varus, all, except a few whom Juba reserved for his own purposes, were put to death. Juba himself rode into Utica with Roman senators in his train, and, after giving his orders to the Roman officials, returned to his dominions. Pompey and the senators who had accompanied him to Macedonia, on hearing of his victory, saluted him as King of Numidia : Caesar and the senators who remained in Rome proclaimed him a public enemy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lucan, v 56-7 ; Dio, xli, 42, 7.

## CHAPTER XIX

### DYRRACHIUM AND PHARSALIA

BEFORE Caesar left Massilia for Italy—perhaps before 49 B. C. he quitted Spain—he had learned the fate of Curio, and, as we have seen, he was summoned to Placentia by the announcement that the troops quartered there were ripe for mutiny. The ringleaders belonged to the 9th legion, which had suffered so severely in the combat by the Puig Bordel and on the hill beneath Ilerda. The men complained that they had been overworked, that the war was being needlessly prolonged, and that bounties which Caesar had promised before he left Brundisium had not been paid. Perhaps also, as Dio relates, they were discontented because they were not allowed to plunder the civil population, and, believing that they were indispensable, expected that Caesar would be compelled to grant their demands. Moreover, they had nothing to do, and inaction engendered discontent. Fortunately the mutiny was not general, and when Caesar reached Placentia he found that some of the troops might be trusted to obey. Parading the legions, he reminded them that he was notoriously swift in all his movements, and was therefore not responsible for the prolongation of the war; as they repaid the liberality with which he had treated them in Gaul by defying their officers, he intended to punish the 9th in the time-honoured Roman way. The men were dismayed: the tribunes, falling upon their knees, interceded for them; and Caesar at last so far relented as to execute twelve only of the most culpable and to forgive the rest.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar  
quells  
mutiny at  
Placentia.

<sup>1</sup> Lucan, v, 237-373 Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 69; App., *B. C.*, ii, 47; Dio, xli, 26-35. Suetonius says that Caesar dismissed the whole of the 9th legion, but ultimately, after he had punished the ringleaders, yielded to entreaty and reinstated it. See vol. i, p. 351, n. 2.

In regard to the nine tedious paragraphs which Dio puts into Caesar's mouth see *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, 1911, p. 216.



49 B. C.

The whole division, followed by the legions which had served in Further Spain, set out in chastened mood for Brundisium, there to embark, when Caesar should be ready to join them, for the next campaign.<sup>1</sup>

Defeat of  
his lieutenants in  
the Adriatic.

But Caesar was not free from anxiety when he was travelling to Rome ; for a disaster had occurred, which it was beyond his power to retrieve. It will be remembered that while he was on his way to Spain, a naval squadron, under Cornelius Dolabella, which had been lately built, was patrolling the Adriatic Sea. It might have been wiser to keep these vessels, which were needed to convoy Caesar's transports, near the harbour of Brundisium ; for they were too few to cope with the fleet of Pompey. Scribonius Libo and Marcus Octavius, commanding one of the Pompeian squadrons, drove Dolabella from the Dalmatian coast, and Gaius Antonius, the brother of Mark Antony, who attempted to succour him, was forced to run for shelter to the island of Coreyra Nigra, where, unable to procure supplies and betrayed by one of his officers, Titus Puleio, he surrendered with fifteen cohorts of recruits.<sup>2</sup> The prisoners were conducted to Pompey, who incorporated them in his own army, while Octavius sailed northward for Salonae, about three miles north-west of the modern Spalato. He succeeded in gaining the inhabitants of the adjacent island of Issa, who had been disposed to side with Caesar ; but the Romans who had settled in Salonae were not to be moved either by cajolery or by threats,

The Caesarians  
defend  
Salonae.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 433.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, *Epit.*, 110 ; Lucan, iv, 401-580 ; Flor., ii, 13, 31 ; App., ii, 47, 191 ; Dio, xli, 40 ; Oros., vi, 15, 8-9. Caesar only alludes to the disaster (*B. C.*, iii, 4, 2 ; 10, 5 ; 67, 5) : his description, which apparently followed 8, 4, is lost.

The island is generally identified with Curieta, near Fiume, at the extreme north of the Adriatic. In the manuscripts of Caesar, however (*B. C.*, iii, 10, 5), it is called Coreyra ; and if Lucan (iv, 404-6) is right in placing the defeat of Antonius near Salonae, Coreyra was evidently Coreyra Nigra (Curzola), and it is unnecessary to follow Mommsen, who substituted *Curictam* for *Coreyram*. In one of the manuscripts of Florus (ii, 13, 31) Antonius is said to have encamped *Curictico litore* ; but Florus also says that Dolabella and Antonius had been ordered to hold the outlet (*fauces*) of the Adriatic, which hardly agrees with the view that they were defeated in the extreme north.

and when Octavius laid siege to the town, prepared to defend themselves to the last. Although their numbers were few and their provisions scanty, they held out week after week, and at last, making a vigorous sally when the besiegers were off their guard, drove them to take refuge in their fleet and sail for Dyrrachium.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless Caesar had lost forty ships of war<sup>2</sup> besides several thousand men.

By this time Caesar had arrived in Rome. His first business was to hold the consular elections, which in the absence of all constituted authorities had necessarily been omitted in July. He had no intention of retaining the dictatorship, which enabled him to achieve this aim, beyond the time necessary for remedial legislation, or of using it, as his opponents feared and his more selfish partisans hoped, for revolutionary ends. To obtain the consulship was all-important; for in view of the relations into which he would be obliged to enter both with provincials and with Roman residents in provincial towns, it was essential that he should be invested with the legitimate authority which would command respect. His colleague, elected doubtless by his influence, was Publius Servilius, a son of the admiral who had defeated the pirates thirty years before, once an aristocrat and a follower of Cato, but now, as always, an opportunist.<sup>3</sup> In virtue of his dictatorial power Caesar proceeded to enact measures for the relief of debtors and the restoration of financial confidence. Credit, as we have seen, had been impaired or destroyed: debts were no longer paid; for debtors could neither obtain fresh loans nor sell their property except at a ruinous loss. Cicero had anticipated, impoverished Caesarians had expected that Caesar, in the spirit of Catiline, would proclaim the abolition of debt.<sup>4</sup> Credit, he knew, could not be completely restored until the issue of the war was sure; but something might be done to mitigate the distress of debtors and to relieve the anxiety

49 B. C.

Early in  
Dec. (Oct.)Caesar  
elected  
consul.He effects  
a com-  
promise  
between  
creditors  
and deb-  
tors.<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 9.<sup>2</sup> *App.*, ii, 49, 200.<sup>3</sup> See *Cic.*, *Att.*, ii, 1, 10; *Q. fr.*, ii, 3, 2.<sup>4</sup> See p. 47.

49 B. C. of creditors. He appointed arbitrators to ascertain the sum which the property of every debtor would have fetched before the war, and to require the creditors to accept it, in discharge of their claims, at that valuation. Thus if a man owed a hundred thousand sesterces, and possessed property which had before been worth that amount, the creditor would be obliged to accept it even if it would not then fetch more than three-fourths of its former value, or even if, for the time being, it were unsaleable.<sup>1</sup> Caesar enacted, further, that any sum which a debtor had already paid as interest was to be deducted from his debt, whereby, says Suetonius,<sup>2</sup> creditors generally lost about twenty-five per cent. This legislation was of course a makeshift ; but nobody has suggested how it might have been improved.<sup>3</sup> But if in this matter the prophecies of Cicero were belied, in another they were fulfilled. Caesar recalled almost all the exiles who had been condemned under Pompey's laws ; for, as he afterwards explained, they had volunteered at the outset of the war to serve him, although he had not then been able to accept the offer.<sup>4</sup> He also reinstated in their civil rights the sons of those whom Sulla had proscribed,<sup>5</sup> an act of justice which Cicero in his consulship had thought it dangerous to perform. But Caesar would not incur the odium of enacting in his dictatorial capacity measures which belonged to the province of the popular assembly ; each exile was restored in virtue of a bill proposed by a praetor or a tribune and passed by the Assembly of the Tribes, and thus the legitimacy of their restoration was assured. Meanwhile the praetors, quaestors, and other magistrates had been duly elected, and governors had been appointed for the provinces which Caesar controlled ;

Recall of  
exiles.

Election  
of magis-  
trates and

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 1, 2. Cf. *Cic.*, *Fam.*, ix, 16, 7 ; *Plut.*, *Caes.*, 37, 1 ; *App.*, ii, 48, 198 ; *Dio*, xli, 37, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 42, 2.


<sup>3</sup> See p. 430.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 1, 4-6 ; *Vell.*, ii, 68, 2 ; *App.*, ii, 48, 198 ; *Dio*, xli, 36, 2. Cf. p. 216. Appian and Dio incorrectly say that Milo alone was not recalled. See *Cic.*, *Att.*, xiv, 13 A, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Plut.*, *Caes.*, 37, 1. According to *Dio*, xli, 18, 2, Caesar restored the sons of the proscribed before he left Rome for Spain.







The ancient courses of the  
rivers Genusus, Apsus & Aous  
as traced by Veith (see p. 437)  
are shown thus  
as nearly as the scale will  
allow

the Latin Festival was celebrated on the Alban Hill ; and after a sojourn of eleven days in Rome Caesar resigned his dictatorship and, without waiting to enter formally upon his consulship, started towards the middle of December for Brundisium.<sup>1</sup> As he was leaving the city the populace followed him, and many voices were heard imploring him to make peace with Pompey.<sup>2</sup> After he had gone bands of urchins, calling themselves Caesarians and Pompeians, paraded the streets and fought mimic battles, which the Caesarians won.<sup>3</sup>

49 B. C.  
appoint-  
ment of  
provincial  
governors.

Caesar was doubtless aware of the preparations which Pompey had made to oppose him ; for Pompey had begun to impress the resources of the East even before he left Italy.<sup>4</sup> From Dyrrachium he marched down the Egnatian Way to Thessalonica, where, surrounded by the consuls and two hundred senators, he completed his arrangements. The kings, the tetrarchs, the petty dynasts, the self-governing communities of Achaia, Asia Minor, and Syria, the tax-farming syndicates of the provinces which obeyed his influence<sup>5</sup> furnished money or bullion ; and a mint was established at Apollonia, where coins were struck to the order of the consuls, Marcellus and Lentulus.<sup>6</sup> Fleets from the province of Asia and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens, Bithynia, Pontus, Cilicia, Syria, Phoenicia, and Egypt thronged the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea.<sup>7</sup> The

Pompey  
in Mace-  
donia pre-  
pares for  
war.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 2, 1. Cf. 6, 2. Plutarch (*Caes.*, 37, 2 ; *Pomp.*, 65, 2) and Appian (ii, 48, 199, 52, 214) confound the old with the new calendar.

<sup>2</sup> App., ii, 48, 199 ; Dio, xli, 39, 1, who adds that Caesar, before he left Rome, abstracted the votive offerings from the Capitol and other places. Perhaps he did, for both he and his opponent were obliged to resort to expedients of every kind in order to defray the expenses of the war.

<sup>3</sup> Dio, xli, 39, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, ix, 9, 2. Cf. viii, 11, 2, and ix, 10, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 3, 2.—*magnam* [pecuniam] *societates earum provinciarum quas ipse obtinebat sibi numerare coegerat*. The provinces which Pompey himself controlled when he began his preparations were Nearer and Further Spain, in which Roman tax-gatherers were comparatively few (vol. i, p. 124). I presume therefore that Caesar referred also to the provinces—Macedonia, Achaia, Asia, Bithynia, Cilicia, Syria, and Crete—which Pompey controlled through the medium of their governors.

<sup>6</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, xiii, 29, 4 ; E. Babelon, *Descr. des monn. de la répub. rom.*, ii, 1886, pp. 253–4. Cf. G. F. Hill, *Hist. Rom. Coins*, 1909, p. 106.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, iii, 3, 1 with *Att.*, ix, 9, 2.

49 B. C. five legions which Pompey had brought from Italy were reinforced by a legion composed of the veterans who had served in Cilicia under Cicero, by another formed of old soldiers who had settled in Crete and Macedonia, and by two which Lentulus, as consul, had raised from the Roman inhabitants of Asia; and all these legions were strengthened by levies from Epirus, Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia,<sup>1</sup> as well as by the cohorts which Gaius Antonius had surrendered. Two more legions, which included the veterans who had survived the disaster at Carrhae, were serving under Scipio in Syria, and would join the army in due course. Caesar had commissioned Aristobulus, the veteran rival of Hyrcanus, to counteract the influence of Pompey in that province; but the project was abortive, for Aristobulus was poisoned by partisans of Pompey.<sup>2</sup> Three thousand archers were enlisted from Crete and Lacedaemon, from Pontus, Syria, and other lands; two cohorts of Thracian slingers, each numbering six hundred men, and a motley host of cavalry, seven thousand strong. Deiotarus, the tetrarch of Eastern Galatia, who, despite his years, was still a skilful horseman,<sup>3</sup> joined Pompey at the head of six hundred troopers; his son-in-law Tarcondarius Castor and a Galatian chief named Domnilius jointly contributed three hundred; Ariobarzanes, King of Cappadocia, and Cotys, King of Thrace, five hundred each; two hundred Macedonians, five hundred Gauls and Germans who had served under Gabinius in Egypt, came with the Egyptian fleet; eight hundred slaves and herdsmen from Pompey's own estates, two hundred mounted archers from Syria, and many troops from Thessaly, Illyricum, and other parts were included in the cavalry brigade.<sup>4</sup> Pompey even stooped to send Lucilius Hirrus to solicit reinforcements from the Parthians; but the King demanded the cession of Syria as his price;

<sup>1</sup> Did these levies (*B. C.*, iii, 4, 2), like the legion raised by Varro in Spain (ii, 20, 4), comprise provincials?

<sup>2</sup> *Jos., Ant.*, xiv, 7, 4; *Bell. Iud.*, i, 9, 1; *Dio*, xli, 18, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Cic., Pro Deiot.*, 10, 28.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, iii, 4 with App. ii, 49, 201-2 and 71, 294-5. See also pp. 431-2.

and when Hirrus demurred he was led away in chains.<sup>1</sup> 49 B. C. The fleet comprised five hundred galleys besides store-vessels and scouts ;<sup>2</sup> the army probably amounted to more than sixty thousand men.<sup>3</sup> The various contingents, as they arrived in Macedonia, concentrated at Berrhoea, near the northern bank of the Aliacmon, some five and forty miles westward of Thessalonica.<sup>4</sup> Merely to raise such multitudes required great powers of organization and much secretarial work ; but the Italian recruits had to be trained and inured to the toil of marching and of entrenching, the foreign contingents to be accustomed to Roman discipline and taught to co-operate with their comrades. Pompey himself, shrinking from no labour, acted as drill-sergeant-in-chief. Notwithstanding his age, he was constantly in the saddle, exercising the mounted recruits ; he instructed novices in swordsmanship and in the use of the javelin ; and by way of example he hurled his own with such vigour that few of the men could compete with him. The commissariat officers procured grain from Thessaly, Asia, Crete, Cyrene, and the Delta of the Nile ; arsenals were established for the manufacture of munitions ; and all the military material that was not immediately required was stored in Dyrrachium.<sup>5</sup> But after all that Pompey had done to make his army efficient it remained in great part what Cicero called it, an army of recruits, hastily collected.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, it had two irremediable defects ; it was a heterogeneous aggregate of units which could not all act in harmony, and it included Oriental levies, armed against the country of his birth. The Italians and the Romans domiciled abroad, whom Pompey desired to conciliate, saw that he was pitting the East against the West ; while he represented what was alien, Caesar stood for the Mother Land.

Pompey intended to canton his troops along the coast at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and other points, and at the

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 82, 5 ; *Dio*, xli, 55, 5 ; xlii, 2, 5 ; xliv, 45, 3.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 432.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 475-6.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 431.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 5, 1-2 ; 41, 3 ; 44, 1 ; *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 64, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Fam.*, vii, 3, 2.



49 B. C.

time when Caesar reached Brundisium he was advancing along the Egnatian Way towards Candavia in Macedonia. In a recent meeting, convened by the consuls, of the senators who accompanied him he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief, so that his authority no longer rested merely upon opinion.<sup>1</sup> Various strongholds near the western coast were held in his interest by native garrisons—Naupactus and Calydon on the north-western shore of the Gulf of Corinth, Coreyra, Oricum at the southern end of the Bay of Avlona, Apollonia between Oricum and Dyrrachium, Lissus near the mouth of the river Drin, and Issa (now called Lissa), off the Dalmatian shore. His fleet, grouped in five squadrons, was distributed at various points along the coast of Epirus and Illyricum; but Bibulus, who was in supreme command, being ill informed about the winds that might be expected at that time of year, felt sure that in the wintry months Caesar would not venture to put out to sea.<sup>2</sup>

Why  
Caesar  
resolved  
to invade  
Epirus by  
sea.

Caesar has not told us whether he thought of invading Epirus through Illyricum; but strategy forbade such a plan. As the march would require several weeks, he would lose the advantage of arriving before Pompey could reach the coast; supplies would be hardly obtainable from an unfriendly population; and the tribes which Octavius had stirred up would hamper the progress of the column. Caesar was therefore justified in accepting the risks of crossing the sea; and, as he doubtless learned from the sailors of Brundisium, those risks were less than Pompey and Bibulus supposed. During short intervals the autumnal wind shifts from south to north, and ships crossing the Adriatic with the wind on the quarter can run safely past the Acroceraunian mountains towards the beach where Caesar meant to land.<sup>3</sup> If only he could evade the hostile squadrons, the voyage would probably be secure.

Caesar on his way towards Brundisium drove past the two legions which had marched from Further Spain,<sup>4</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 432-3.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Dio, xli, 44, 1.

<sup>3</sup> L. Heuzey, *Les opérations mil. de J. César*, 1886, pp. 6-8.

<sup>4</sup> Plut., *Caes.*, 37, 2.

when he reached the harbour, he found only seven awaiting him—the four which had mutinied at Placentia and those which had rested in the neighbourhood since Pompey left Italy<sup>1</sup>—besides a corps of slingers and some troops of cavalry. The army had been seriously weakened, for scores of men were disabled by the long march from Spain, and others by the depressing climate of Brundisium.<sup>2</sup> For some unexplained reason the powerful cavalry which had decided the Spanish campaign was no longer, as a whole, available; perhaps the Gallic volunteers, or most of them, who formed the greater part of it, had only engaged to serve in Spain. Some of the troopers on the spot were German mercenaries, accompanied by the light infantry which always supported them in action;<sup>3</sup> but it is not certain that they were included in the corps which was about to sail. But even for the small army that was ready to embark, the transports which Caesar's agents had been able to collect were not sufficient: room could not be found for more than fifteen thousand legionaries, six hundred cavalry, and the camp followers, even if the vessels were uncomfortably crowded. Caesar's plans were disarranged. He had intended to assemble twelve legions at Brundisium, and to convey them in one voyage to Epirus; for he was confident that he would then be able within a short time to finish both the campaign and the war. But the seven veteran legions and the cavalry must somehow be got on board.<sup>4</sup> Caesar paraded the legions, and, assuring them that their labours would soon be over, explained that in order to find room, they must leave behind all the slaves who could possibly be dispensed with and all the baggage except what was absolutely necessary.<sup>5</sup> They might count upon his rewarding them liberally for this sacrifice of comfort when the victory was won. The men of Placentia were glad to atone for their

<sup>1</sup> See p. 433.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 2, 3.

<sup>3</sup> A probable inference from *B. C.*, iii, 2, 1, compared with 52, 2. Cf. *Flor.*, ii, 13, 5. See *B. G.*, i, 48, 4-7, and *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, 1911, pp. 65, 137, 166, 185-6, &c. Appian's statement (ii, 49, 201) that Caesar had 10,000 cavalry is notoriously absurd. See pp. 472-5.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 434.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 434, n. 6.

49 B. C. recent mutiny ; the 8th, the 12th, and 13th had never faltered. Let the General give his orders, they all shouted : he should be cheerfully obeyed. The whole corps at once proceeded to the quays. But for three or four days the wind was contrary. Only twelve galleys were available to escort the fleet ; for the rest were required for defending Sardinia and Sicily. On the evening of the 4th of January (Jan. 4, 706  
(Nov. 6,  
49 B. C.) the hawsers were cast off, and the transports stood out to sea. Their course was in the direction of Palaeste, now Paliassa, near the southern end of the mountainous promontory which encloses the Bay of Avlona. Here there was a good landing-place, and none of the enemy's ships were likely to molest them. Caesar, who knew the character of Bibulus, was doubtless aware that he was an incompetent admiral, and probably he had learned from merchant skippers or from his own scouts that the coast of Epirus, outside the recognized harbours, was not being vigilantly watched ; but nevertheless there was some reason for anxiety. In the course of the night the wind dropped, and during several hours the fleet was becalmed.<sup>1</sup> If one of the hostile squadrons should attack him, his slender escort might be overpowered, and the transports could hardly escape. It happened that Bibulus was near Corecra, some fifty miles south of Palaeste, with one hundred and ten galleys, while two of his lieutenants, Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus, with eighteen, were at Oricum. But Bibulus, who had neglected to send out scouts, did not know that Caesar had left Brundisium ; his ships were not ready for sea, and his oarsmen were dispersed on shore : Vespillo and Rufus could not summon up courage to hazard an attack. Towards noon the Strada Bianca—that broad white gully which serves as a landmark to the seamen of the Adriatic—became visible : the transports were approaching the Acroceraunian mountains, the rugged spurs of which terminated in gentle slopes, gradually merging into expanses of white sand, separated by low rocky promontories. One such expanse, extending for about two thousand yards below the slopes on which

<sup>1</sup> For details of the voyage see Lucan, v, 424-7, 430-5, 459-60.

stood the village of Palaeste, was marked by Caesar as the landing-place. The helmsmen steered cautiously, for on their left, just north of the little headland which is now called Goimia, isolated rocks were awash, and on the right the coast was indented by black jutting crags. Owing to the suddenness with which the bottom slopes, there was sufficient depth to let the ships run in almost to the water's edge; and men and horses were soon standing on dry land.<sup>1</sup> The transports were to return in the night and fetch the remaining legions; and Caesar charged Calenus, whom he placed in command, to see that no time was lost. His immediate purpose was to seize Oricum, which lay about five and twenty miles to the north-west. The only route was a narrow path, which crossed the mountains. Ascending the slopes till they reached Palaeste, the troops began to thread the tortuous defiles of the Strada Bianca, and, often forced by the narrowness of the paths to move in single file, made their way to the pass of Diapori,<sup>2</sup> three thousand feet above the sea, and thence moved between pine-clad hills along the ravine of Rodina, till towards dawn the head of the column debouched into the plain which extends on the landward side of the mountains towards Oricum. There they were obliged to halt until their comrades could join them and the companies could move on in the normal column.<sup>3</sup> Right in front of them, some five miles distant, lay the blue waters of the gulf, and soon they were tramping past the inner harbour, separated by a long bar of sand, on the western end of which stood the fort of Oricum, from the open sea, and communicating with it by a watercourse, which twenty centuries have transformed into a rill. Caesar's consular authority now proved its worth: Oricum was garrisoned by tribesmen from the district of Dyrrachium, under Manlius Torquatus, who had served as praetor in the previous year. When he was preparing to resist they declared that they would not fight against a Roman

He lands  
at Palaeste,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, iii, 6, 3 with Heuzey, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-8.

<sup>2</sup> Also called Logara (G. Veith, *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, 1920, p. 82).

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 11, 3; App., ii, 54, 223-4.



49 B. C.  
occupies  
Oricum,

sends Vi-  
bullius to  
Pompey  
with over-  
tures for  
peace,

consul, and the townsmen affirmed their intention of supporting them. Torquatus was forced to surrender, while Rufus and Vespillo, after sinking some ships, laden with corn, which were anchored in the bay, fled with their galleys to Dyrrachium.<sup>1</sup> Caesar detached a legion under two of his lieutenants, Marcus Acilius and Statius Murcus, to hold the town and to prevent hostile crews from landing to water or fetch firewood on the adjoining coast. But before advancing towards Apollonia he prepared to renew his overtures for peace. Vibullius Rufus, whom he had released after the fall of Corfinium and who had afterwards been dispatched by Pompey to warn Afranius and Petreius, was with them when they surrendered near Ilerda. Although Caesar pardoned him, he would not set him free again, but kept him in honourable custody and took him in his train to Greece. Believing that he was grateful, and knowing that he had influence with Pompey, he determined to employ him as an envoy. Pompey, he supposed, was still in the east of Macedonia,<sup>2</sup> and if he refused to listen to Vibullius, there would be time to seize Apollonia and Dyrrachium before he could reach the coast. Vibullius was to ask Pompey whether, as he and Caesar had both suffered reverses, they would not both do well to remember the fickleness of fortune and come to terms. Now was the time; for if either gained an advantage over the other he would not be willing to negotiate. In the public interest they ought to submit their differences to the Senate and the popular assembly at Rome. Why should they not both swear openly on parade to disband their armies within three days? Then they would be bound to abide by any decision which the Senate and the Assembly might pronounce. Vibullius engaged a carriage at Oricum<sup>3</sup> and immediately set out; but, whatever gratitude he may have felt to Caesar, he remained a Pompeian, and he determined that before delivering a message which he perhaps considered chimerical, he would put Pompey on his guard.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 7, 1; 11, 3-4; *App.*, ii, 54, 225.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Veith, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 434-6.

Caesar doubtless foresaw that Vibullius would be loyal to his chief, and if he were to forestall Pompey he must require more than ordinary efforts from his men ; but, wearied by the voyage and their long tramp over the pass, they were of course allowed to rest.<sup>1</sup> Next morning the march was resumed. The first stage of the route skirted the mountains which close on the east the Bay of Avlona ; and on the following day the column, after toiling over an expanse of wet holding clay, crossed the Aous and approached the hill of Pojani, on the summit of which they descried the citadel of Apollonia.<sup>2</sup> The Governor had prepared to resist ; but when the inhabitants refused to give hostages for their fidelity and declared that they would not allow the gates to be closed against the consul, he secretly decamped. The authorities sent a deputation to welcome Caesar ; and, influenced by their example, the people of Byllis and Amantia<sup>3</sup> in the valley of the Aous and other Epirot communities hastened to dispatch envoys with offers of support. Supplies were to be obtained from the magazine which Pompey had established at Apollonia.<sup>4</sup>

and takes possession of Apollonia.

While Caesar was pushing on towards Dyrrachium, Pompey and his legions were moving leisurely up the Egnatian Way, and Vibullius, changing horses at every stage, was hurrying night and day to warn him. A few miles east of Scampa,<sup>5</sup> now Elbassan, he met the advancing column and, presenting himself before the General, informed him that Caesar had captured Oricum. In great alarm Pompey pushed on rapidly, hoping to reach

<sup>1</sup> Veith (*op. cit.*, p. 84), differing from Stoffel (*Hist. de J. César*, i, 1887, p. 143), argues convincingly that to move on from Oricum on the afternoon following a night march of some 25 miles would have taxed the strength of the troops unduly. Stoffel interprets Caesar's words 'without delay' (*nulla interposita mora* [*B. C.*, iii, 12, 1]) too literally.

<sup>2</sup> See L. Heuzey, *Mission arch. de Macédoine*, 1876, pp. 394-5.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 436.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 5, 1-2. I do not think that Veith (*op. cit.*, pp. 85-6) is justified in inferring from 12, 4 that the envoys from Byllis and Amantia reached Caesar at Apollonia, and therefore that he must have halted there at least two days.

<sup>5</sup> Veith, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-9.

49 B. C.

Pompey  
by a  
forced  
march se-  
cures Dyrrachium,  
Caesar  
encamps  
on the  
Apsus.

Apollonia in time, but soon heard that it also had fallen. At any cost the chief magazine must be saved. Caesar had nearly seventy miles to march from Apollonia to Dyrrachium, crossing three rivers on the way, and Pompey, if he made a supreme effort, might anticipate him. Urged on by their officers and hearing that Caesar was hastening to intercept them, the men were panic-stricken, and forgot all discipline. Many of the recruits who had been raised in Epirus threw away their arms and deserted. The march became a rout. But the object was gained. Caesar, seeing that it would be impossible to seize Dyrrachium, retired to a position on the southern bank of the Apsus, perhaps near the modern Fieri,<sup>1</sup> where he would be able to cover the communities that supported him and to await the arrival of his reinforcements. Not far from Dyrrachium<sup>2</sup> Pompey halted and ordered a camp to be marked out. Even now the troops had not recovered from their panic, and Labienus saw that something must be done. Stepping forward in full view of all, he swore to be true to his chief, whatever might befall; and his brother generals, the tribunes, the centurions, and finally the privates followed his example. When order was restored Vibullius felt that the time had come to broach the subject of his mission. He deemed it best, however, to obtain the support of Pompey's confidential counsellors, and accordingly induced Libo, Theophanes, and Lucceius, who had stood with Caesar for the consulship eleven years before, to accompany him into the praetorian tent. He had hardly said enough to disclose his purpose when

<sup>1</sup> According to Veith, close to Kuçi, about 15 miles NE. of Fieri. See pp. 436-9.

<sup>2</sup> Veith (*op. cit.*, p. 89) conjectures that Pompey halted near Asparagium (see p. 132, *infra*), where the Egnatian Way forked, and thus barred Caesar's advance. If, as I believe, he is right in holding (p. 86) that Caesar was coming from Apollonia by the southern branch of the road, his conclusion is certain. Stoffel, however (*op. cit.*, p. 145), evidently assuming that Caesar moved by the direct road which connected Apollonia with Dyrrachium, supposes that he advanced to within one march from the latter; but Veith (pp. 59-64) gives reasons for believing that this road, which is mentioned only in the *Table* of Peutinger (Segm. VI), did not then exist, and it seems unlikely that Caesar would have attempted to cross the expanse of Musakia, which is inundated in the winter.

Pompey stopped him, and exclaimed, 'What good is life to me or my standing as a Roman if men see that I hold them by Caesar's favour? And how can they help seeing it if the war now ends and, after leaving Italy, I am supposed to be brought back again?'<sup>1</sup> Pompey knew as well as Caesar that peace would leave Caesar master; and that was what, if military skill availed, he meant to be himself. Next day, secure of his communication with Dyrrachium, he moved southward, and encamped on the high ground north of the Apsus, opposite Caesar, who must have reflected that by prematurely dispatching Vibullius on a futile errand he had lost the chance of ending the war.

49 B. C.  
Pompey  
refuses to  
hear Vi-  
bullius.

By this time Caesar had received dispatches from Brundisium. For some reason which the *Commentaries* have left unexplained, Calenus sailed from Palaeste too late at night, and the wind which should have carried the fleet across died down before it had got far from land. Bibulus, while his squadron was lying at Corcyra, heard that Caesar had arrived. Cursing his own negligence, he ordered his scattered oarsmen to be instantly recalled, and, hoping, despite his bitter chagrin, that he might be in time to intercept some of the ships while they were returning with the reinforcements from Brundisium, he hastened northward. When the transports were descried he saw that they were heading towards Italy; but there they lay becalmed, and his galleys succeeded in rounding off thirty before the reviving breeze enabled the others to escape. Although no troops were on board the captured vessels, he might wreak his vengeance on the crews and strike terror into those who had escaped; and when he gave the signal to return the thirty transports were in flames. Soon after Calenus reached Brundisium the legions from Spain arrived, and were immediately embarked together with the legion called *Alaudae*,<sup>2</sup> the newly raised 27th, and eight hundred horse. Owing to the loss of the vessels which Bibulus had destroyed, there was no room for more. The transports

Bibulus  
burns  
thirty of  
Caesar's  
trans-  
ports.

<sup>1</sup> B. C., iii, 18, 3-4.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 355 n. 3, 433.



49 B. C. had not sailed far when they met one of Caesar's galleys, bearing a dispatch which warned Calenus that all the harbours of Illyricum and Epirus and the whole line of coast were beset by the enemy's ships. While the transports beat back to Brundisium <sup>1</sup> the captain of one vessel, which carried no troops, but had been chartered by private individuals, refused to obey the admiral's signal. Carried out of its course towards Oricum, the ship was captured by Bibulus, who slaughtered every one on board.

Reinforce-  
ments for  
Caesar  
deterred  
from  
sailing.

Bibulus  
blockades  
the har-  
bours, but  
is prevent-  
ed from  
landing  
for sup-  
plies.

He tries  
to gain  
his object  
by a ruse.

But Bibulus was not satisfied with mere revenge. Stimulated by inveterate hate, he strove to make amends for his lack of vigilance, and Caesar, whom he hated above all, testified that he had done his duty. The circumstances in which he and his antagonist now found themselves were probably unique. So long as he could keep his fleet at sea the reinforcements without which Caesar could not undertake an offensive movement must remain idle in Brundisium; on the other hand, Caesar's piquets, which Pompey did not venture to attack, patrolled the coast; and Bibulus could not land to procure wood or water. To obtain them, he was forced to send store ships to Coreyra, and when they were detained by stress of weather the crews of the storm-tossed galleys were fain to appease their thirst by lapping up the dew which fell upon the leathern awnings that screened the oarsmen. <sup>2</sup> If Bibulus were to abandon the coast which the piquets occupied and supply his wants elsewhere, Caesar would promptly send a dispatch-boat to Brundisium, and the reinforcements would be free to cross. But Bibulus would not let go his hold. Although he was seriously ill and his waning strength was sapped by cold and hardship, he stuck to his work doggedly, and his men endured every privation with cheery fortitude. <sup>3</sup> He contrived a plan, however, for extricating himself from his difficulties. Accompanied by Libo, he rowed up the watercourse which separated the harbour of Oricum

<sup>1</sup> See *Class. Quart.*, iii, 1909, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> See Cecil Torr's *Ancient Ships*, 1896, p. 53 and n. 123.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 15, 1-5. Cf. L. Houzey, *Les opérations mil. de J. César*, p. 29.

from the bay ; and, bringing their respective galleys close to the wall of the fortress, the two men addressed the commandant, Acilius, and Murcus, who commanded the piquets. Explaining that they were anxious to confer with Caesar about important matters of state, they hinted that their object was to negotiate for peace. Acilius and Murcus, knowing that peace was what Caesar wanted and supposing that Vibullius had done something to prepare the way for a discussion, agreed to grant a truce. Caesar, however, was at Buthrotum, near Corcyra, whither he had gone with a single legion, partly in order to gain the support of the more distant towns, partly to arrange for a supply of grain. Acilius wrote to inform him of what had passed ; and, leaving his troops behind, he posted back to Oricum. A messenger was dispatched by boat to summon Bibulus and Libo. Libo alone appeared. He begged that the absence of Bibulus might be excused, as, being an old enemy of Caesar and a bad-tempered man, aware of his infirmity, he had remained away for fear the object which he had at heart might be wrecked by his own violence. Bibulus, he added, was and always had been intensely anxious for a peaceful settlement ; but by themselves they could do nothing, for Pompey had been entrusted by the magnates of the party with the supreme command. If, however, Caesar would state his terms, they would let Pompey know, and would, moreover, press him to negotiate in accordance with their views : Caesar, they trusted, would extend the truce to allow time for their messenger to return from Pompey's camp. Caesar replied that he must reserve the right of sending his own envoys, and demanded that Bibulus and Libo should either grant them a safe-conduct or personally conduct them to Pompey's quarters. As for an extension of the truce, that was in their own hands : if they desired permission to land, they must allow his ships to cross the sea. Anyhow negotiations for peace could go forward without prejudice. Libo declined either to make himself responsible for Caesar's envoys or to grant them a safe-conduct ; that, he insisted,

49 B. C.

49-48 B.C. was for Pompey to decide, but he urgently reiterated his request for an extension of the truce. Caesar concluded that he and Bibulus simply wanted to take in supplies, and that their conversations from beginning to end had been a sham.

The galleys sheered off, and Bibulus, disappointed but determined, resumed his blockade. For some time longer his strength held out ; but before the end of winter His death. he succumbed. Caesar in a single sentence wrote the epitaph of his old enemy : ' Debarred for many days from landing, a prey to sore sickness aggravated by cold and toil, unable to obtain medical care, yet resolved not to abandon the duty which he had undertaken, Bibulus could not withstand the stress of his disease.' <sup>1</sup> Pompey, it would seem, had not sufficient trust in any of his officers to appoint a new high admiral. The commander of each squadron was left to act on his own initiative.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout these tedious weeks the army of Pompey and the army of Caesar remained watching one another on the opposite banks of the Apsus. Neither could be dislodged from his fortified position.<sup>3</sup> Caesar was anxiously waiting for the hour when fortune or his own skill might enable him to find some way of forcing Pompey to fight ; but before the arrival of his reinforcements that hour could not come, and his reinforcements dared not leave Brundisium. He was all the more anxious to effect a settlement. Missiles occasionally flew from bank to bank ; but there was no ill-feeling between the armies. Groups of men frequently talked to one another across the narrow river, and while these conversations were going on hostilities were suspended by mutual

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 18, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Dio (xli, 48, 1), implicitly contradicting Caesar (*B. C.*, iii, 18, 2), says that Libo succeeded Bibulus. Evidently he made an erroneous inference from *B. C.*, iii, 23-4.

<sup>3</sup> According to Dio (xli, 47, 2-3 [cf. App., ii, 58, 241]), Pompey attempted to cross the river in order to attack Caesar, but the bridge which he constructed broke down. Caesar says nothing about this, and I do not believe that Pompey, who for good reasons avoided attacking Caesar as long as he could, would have assaulted a fortified camp. Perhaps he intended to cut off Caesar's supplies. See, however, Veith, p. 107.

consent. Caesar took advantage of this understanding to send his old adherent, Vatinius, who was serving on his staff, to propose a formal conference. Vatinius walked down to the edge of the bank and made an impassioned appeal. Every one, he pleaded, was desirous to stop civil war. Might not his own side be allowed to send envoys to confer with their fellow citizens? The men who were standing near him and those on the opposite bank listened in sympathetic silence. Some one answered that Aulus Varro (a friend of Cicero)<sup>1</sup> would come down on the following day and settle with Vatinius the preliminaries of a conference. At the appointed hour Vatinius and Varro appeared, followed by legionaries who waited eagerly to hear what they would say. Suddenly Labienus, who perhaps had planned the meeting, stepped out of the throng and began an inflammatory speech.<sup>2</sup> Vatinius lost his temper, and a violent altercation ensued, in the course of which a shower of missiles fell in the midst of the Caesarians. Vatinius was shielded by the soldiers near him, but several notables as well as centurions and privates were wounded. 'Cease,' roared Labienus, 'cease talking about a settlement; peace we can have none till we have got Caesar's head.'<sup>3</sup>

48 B. C.  
Caesar,  
encamped  
on the Ap-  
sus oppo-  
site Pom-  
pey, again  
attempts  
to nego-  
tiate.

About this time Libo, who with fifty galleys was blockading Oricum, attempted on his own initiative to terminate the war. If only he could close the harbour of Brundisium, Caesar's expected reinforcements would be kept permanently inactive; it would no longer be necessary to watch the coast; and the various squadrons would be available to serve elsewhere. When the galleys hove in sight, Antony, who then commanded at Brundisium, was wholly unprepared. Libo set fire to several store ships in the harbour, captured another laden with grain, landed a detachment of legionaries and archers on the island that commanded the entrance,<sup>4</sup> expelled a cavalry piquet which

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, xvi, 12, 6.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 440.

<sup>3</sup> B. C., iii, 19, 7.

<sup>4</sup> *militibus ac sagittariis in terra expositis* (B. C., iii, 23, 3). Meusel in his note on this passage observes that 'Terra is naturally the mainland near Brundisium, not the little island'. My view, which is apparently shared by Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 151) and Veith (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, 1906,



48 B. C.

Antony  
balks an  
attempt  
to block-  
ade Brun-  
disium.

had been posted there, and, flushed with success, dispatched a vessel with a report addressed to Pompey, assuring him that the squadron could alone prevent Caesar's troops from sailing and recommending him to have the rest of his ships beached and repaired. But he had reckoned without Antony and the veteran soldiers. Selecting some sixty boats which belonged to the ships in the harbour, Antony fitted them with screens of wattle-work as a protection against missiles, manned them with his best troops, and stationed them at various points along the shore; while a couple of triremes, which had just been launched, were sent into the entrance of the port, ostensibly in order to exercise the rowers. Libo detached five quadriremes to cut off their retreat. The triremes instantly swung round and ran for the inner harbour, closely pursued. Suddenly the sixty boats swarmed around the quadriremes, and the legionaries, assailing them from every side with missiles, captured one and put the rest to flight. When the Pompeians tried to land and fill their casks they found the coast patrolled by cavalry; and Libo's vain-glorious dispatch was belied by inglorious retreat.

Still, Antony did not venture to set sail; and Caesar was becoming desperately anxious. After the fate that had overtaken the ships of Calenus, followed by the letter in which Caesar had himself forbidden him to cross, both he and Antony had become very cautious; but Caesar now believed that their caution was excessive. The wind had often blown from the right quarter, and they must make up their minds to incur some risk. Caesar, we are told, became so impatient that he actually engaged a swift vessel to take him across the Adriatic, that he might superintend the voyage himself; but the sea was too rough, and the skipper insisted upon putting back.<sup>1</sup> Pompey for his part was determined that the transports

p. 313), is based upon a careful reading of *B. C.*, iii, 23-4 compared with 100, 1, where we learn that Laelius, who some months later made a second attempt to blockade Brundisium, occupied the island, as Libo had done, and where there is no allusion to the mainland. If Libo could hold the island, he had nothing to gain by disembarking troops elsewhere. Cf. Dio, xli, 48, 3.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 440.

should not escape again, and he wrote frequently to his admirals, urging them to keep vigilant and to remember the failure of Bibulus. The time was approaching when light winds, unfavourable for sailing vessels, would prevail, and when the galleys would be able securely to patrol the open sea. Caesar wrote strongly to his lieutenants, charging them on no account to miss the next favourable wind, but to run for the coast near Apollonia or for that which bordered on the Dalmatian town of Scodra ;<sup>1</sup> at neither of these places were they likely to encounter hostile cruisers, for the enemy were afraid to venture far from their principal stations, Coreyra and Dyrrachium. The troops at Brundisium were as urgent as their chief, and one evening<sup>2</sup> about the end of March Antony and Calenus with the three veteran legions, the newly raised 27th legion, a corps of slingers, and eight hundred cavalry, taking advantage of the first southerly wind, at last put out to sea.<sup>3</sup> About noon on the next day they were off Apollonia, but it was blowing too hard to let them run for the shore. Antony therefore steered northward towards Scodra. Caesar and Pompey saw the fleet pass,<sup>4</sup> but could not tell for what harbour it was bound. Gaius Coponius, who commanded sixteen galleys<sup>5</sup> at Dyrrachium, descrying the transports in the offing, started in pursuit, and the wind became so light that he was rapidly overhauling them. The legionaries formed up on deck, determined to resist as best they could. Man against man, they were superior to the enemy's marines ; but disciplined valour would avail little against the impact of the ram. Now the leading galleys were so close that Antony's slingers were ready to take aim.<sup>6</sup> Suddenly

48 B. C.

About  
Jan. 29.In re-  
sponse to  
Caesar's  
urgent de-  
mands he  
sails with  
reinforce-  
ments,<sup>1</sup> See p. 441.<sup>2</sup> Stoffel, *op. cit.*, p. 354.<sup>3</sup> Veith (*op. cit.*, p. 113), relying apparently upon Appian's blundering narrative (*Ill.*, 12; *B. C.*, ii, 59, 242), says that when Antony left Brundisium Gabinius remained behind with the rest of the troops in order to invade Illyricum by land. But Caesar (*iii*, 29, 2. Cf. 78, 6) says that Antony, after he landed, sent back most of his ships to fetch the rest of the troops [which they failed to do]. Gabinius did not start for Illyricum until long after the battle of Pharsalia. See p. 216, *infra*.<sup>4</sup> See p. 438.<sup>5</sup> See p. 441.<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 26, 2. Cf. App., ii, 59, 244.

48 B. C.

and lands  
after a  
perilous  
voyage at  
Nym-  
phaeum.

with redoubled strength the wind revived ; the transports leaped through the water ; the rowers toiled in pursuit with all their might. Would the wind hold ? Cape Pali was passed, Cape Rodoni ; and now it was blowing half a gale. A few miles northward was the little bay of San Giovanni di Medua, which the Romans called Nymphaeum. It was exposed to the full force of the south wind ; but to run the risk of shipwreck was a lesser evil than to be rammed by the galleys of Coponius. Past Lissus (now Alessio) the transports scudded and ran on with all sail set straight into the port. Just as the last ship cleared the promontory which closed its western side the wind veered to the south-west, and the whole fleet, except two slow sailers, which were many miles astern, came to anchor in the placid waters of the bay. Incredible good fortune, so Caesar called it ;<sup>1</sup> but less than that which was to come. The tired rowers could not contend against the south-westerly gale and the current which was setting towards the land.<sup>2</sup> The galleys were dashed against the rocks, and all the seamen and marines who were not drowned were taken prisoners ; but Caesar of course spared them and sent them to their homes.

Contrast-  
ed for-  
tunes of  
the troops  
in two  
belated  
trans-  
ports.

Meanwhile the skippers of the two belated transports were overtaken by the night, and, not knowing whither their comrades had gone, anchored off Lissus in the Gulf of Drin. The Governor, Otacilius Crassus, immediately sent out a flotilla of small craft, directing the officers in charge to invite the troops on board to surrender under a solemn pledge of safety. One of the transports carried two hundred and twenty raw recruits, the other rather less than two hundred veterans. Recruits and veterans alike had suffered from sea-sickness, and their clothes were drenched by the water which the transports had shipped. The recruits, who surrendered, trusting to the Governor's pledge, were conducted to his presence, and slaughtered by his order and before his eyes. The veterans promised to surrender, but their representatives, prolonging the

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 26, 5.

<sup>2</sup> See *The Mediterranean Pilot*, iii, 1908, pp. 17-8.

discussion about terms, compelled their skipper to run the ship ashore and selected a strong position, where they passed the remainder of the night. At daybreak they were attacked by four hundred horsemen and some soldiers of the garrison, whom Otacilius had sent against them, but beat them off with considerable loss, and went to join their comrades at Nymphaeum. The Roman burgesses in Lissus, encouraged by their example, invited Antony into the town and furnished him with supplies, whereupon Otacilius fled. Antony had already dispatched messengers to inform Caesar of his position and of the number of his troops, and had sent back most of the transports to fetch the remaining corps. He retained, however, thirty Gallic merchantmen, which he transferred to the port of Lissus, so that, if Pompey should resolve to invade Italy, Caesar might have the means of bringing back his army. He knew that Caesar was anxiously awaiting his arrival, and that it would be mere waste of time to ask for orders the purport of which the dullest officer might divine.<sup>1</sup> Doubtless Caesar had already told him by what route he would have to march. To follow the direct road by Dyrrachium would simply expose him to attack. There was only one other, the road that led from Lissus to Bassania on the river Mati, and thence south-eastward to Scampa on the Egnatian Way.

Pompey as well as Caesar was informed of the landing of Antony ; indeed the messenger who warned him was the first to arrive ; for he could safely travel by the shorter road, while the courier dispatched by Antony was obliged, in order to lessen the risk of capture, to take the circuitous route though Tirana and Scampa. The two commanders formed their plans—Caesar to effect a junction with Antony, and Pompey to intercept him. Pompey left his camp stealthily by night, without giving the customary signal ; Caesar, whose informant did not appear till after midnight, started early on the following day.<sup>2</sup> He had

Despite the efforts of Pompey Caesar joins Antony.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 441–2.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Veith (*op. cit.*, p. 123), who confirms my interpretation of Caesar's narrative.



48 B. C.

a much longer march to make than Pompey, for he was obliged to move up the valley of the Apsus until he could find a ford ; but he could trust Antony to take precautions against the risk of an attack. Meanwhile Pompey marched rapidly northward until he learned from his patrols that Antony was near, when he encamped behind cover not far from Scampa<sup>1</sup> and gave orders that no fires should be lighted, hoping that Antony would suspect nothing and expose himself to ambuscade. Some natives, however, informed him that Pompey was lying in wait ; and, sending a messenger to tell Caesar where he was, he remained securely in his camp. When Pompey learned that Caesar was approaching<sup>2</sup> he saw that his plan had failed, and in order to avoid being attacked simultaneously in front and rear, marched down the valley of the Genusus, and encamped on its northern bank,<sup>3</sup> near Asparagium, some ten miles from the sea.<sup>4</sup> As this town, situated at the fork of the Egnatian Way, commanded the branch leading to Dyrrachium, he would be able to protect his dépôt if Caesar should attempt to seize it.

Caesar  
sends  
Domitius  
Calvinus  
to intercept  
Scipio and  
Sabinus  
to procure  
supplies.

Meanwhile Caesar had joined Antony ; and now, being strongly reinforced, he determined to extend his area of operations and establish his influence inland. Scipio with his two legions was marching through Macedonia to join Pompey, and Domitius Calvinus, who had been consul five years before, was sent with two veteran legions, the 11th and 12th, and five hundred horsemen to intercept him. Envoys had come from Thessaly and Aetolia to solicit Caesar's protection and to promise their support. Accordingly Caesar ordered Lucius Cassius, the younger brother of Gaius, to march with the 27th and two hundred horse into Thessaly, and Calvisius Sabinus with five cohorts and a few troopers into Aetolia, instructing both to procure supplies of grain. Sabinus's force was drawn from the legion which had garrisoned Oricum, three cohorts being left to hold that important post while the

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 442-3.

<sup>2</sup> In *B. C.*, iii, 30, 7 *adventu* evidently means not 'arrival', but 'approach'.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 443.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 443-4.

remaining two were incorporated in the main army. 18 B. C.  
The three officers had not long started when Caesar received news of a disaster.

Acilius, who had been in charge of Oricum since Caesar took possession of it, had an anxious duty to fulfil; and his difficulties were not lightened by the withdrawal of the greater part of his force. In order to secure the galleys which had escorted Caesar's transports, he withdrew them into the inner harbour; scuttled and sunk a merchantman in the watercourse which led into the bay; and fastening to it another which rode immediately above, erected a turret for artillery upon the deck and posted troops on board. Pompey's elder son, Gnaeus, who commanded the Egyptian squadron, hearing of the measures which Acilius had taken, sailed to the entrance of the watercourse, and, subduing opposition by a constant discharge of missiles, succeeded in making cables fast to the submerged vessel and, either by a capstan or by merely towing,<sup>1</sup> hauled it away. Having thus cleared the entrance, he brought up galleys, on which he too had set up turrets,<sup>2</sup> and, landing parties on the sand-bank that closed the harbour, who scaled the walls of Oricum and thus prevented Acilius from reinforcing the little band which manned the guard-ship, gradually by an overwhelming discharge of missiles overpowered their resistance. Simultaneously four triremes were transported on rollers over the bank into the harbour, and Gnaeus, being thus enabled to attack Caesar's galleys both in front and rear, removed four of them and set fire to the rest. Then, charging his colleague Laelius, who commanded the Asiatic fleet, to prevent supplies from being conveyed to Oricum by the communities that favoured Caesar, Gnaeus sailed to Lissus and burned the thirty Gallic transports which Antony had left there. Although he was unable to take the fort itself (for Caesar had reinforced the Roman burgesses who held it), Caesar's entire fleet in Grecian waters was now destroyed; the transports that

Pompey's  
elder son  
destroys  
Caesar's  
ships at  
Oricum  
and Lis-  
sus.

<sup>1</sup> B. C., iii. 46. 1 See Meusel's note (p. 219 of his edition) on *remulco*.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 444.

48 B. C.

had been sent back to fetch his remaining forces from Brundisium failed for some unexplained reason to return ; and he could no longer communicate with Italy or obtain supplies by sea.

But Caesar was not the less determined to try for a decision. Marching down the valley of the Genusus and storming on his way a town which Pompey had occupied, he had encamped on the southern bank, opposite Asparagium. One may wonder why he had not come by the northern bank along the Egnatian Way, and can only suppose that Pompey had blocked the road or rendered it impassable.<sup>1</sup> On the day after his arrival he formed his troops in line of battle opposite Pompey's camp, knowing that he would not attempt to force the passage of the river, but wishing to confirm his own men in their sense of superiority.<sup>2</sup> Pompey of course arrayed his troops likewise, to avoid dishonour, but remained on his own ground. The only plan that now seemed practicable was to threaten Pompey's dépôt at Dyrrachium ; if Caesar could not force him thither and blockade him, he might be able to cut him off from access to the town. But how was he to reach Dyrrachium when Pompey barred the way ? He must resort to stratagem and trust to Pompey's lacking the imaginative power to divine his aim. He told the men that he was obliged to ask for a great effort, but they would make it cheerfully. The route which he meant to follow, about five-and-thirty miles, would require some sixteen hours' marching, besides intervals of rest ; the direct route, which Pompey would sooner or later take, was little more than half as long.

Caesar, failing to provoke Pompey to fight at Asparagium, reaches the outskirts of Dyrrachium by a circuitous march.

Early in the morning Caesar struck his camp and moved up the valley of the Genusus. Pompey was of course aware of his departure, but from the direction in which the column was heading he inferred that Caesar was compelled to go in quest of corn. The student, as he ponders Caesar's narrative, wonders whether Pompey had quite lost his wits. Did he not ask himself why Caesar, if at the end of two days his supplies were already

<sup>1</sup> See Veith, *op. cit.*, p. 127.


<sup>2</sup> See p. 443.





The Operations  
near  
**DYRRACHIUM**

1:75,000  
English Miles



failing, had not replenished them before he came to 48 B. C.  
 Asparagium? When the column approached the site of the Albanian town called Pekini, it wheeled to the left, crossed the river, and ascended by a narrow difficult trackway the wooded hills which separate the basin of the Genusus from the basin of the Arzen. In the afternoon the Pompeian scouts reported that Caesar had struck northward. Pompey at last realized his danger. Before dawn he started<sup>1</sup> and pushed on at his utmost speed up the Egnatian Way. Meanwhile Caesar, after allowing his troops a few hours' sleep, descended near the site of Péza into the valley of the Arzen, and followed the left bank along the foot of the hills till, six miles east of Dyrrachium, he approached the source of the Shimmihl, a torrent which rushes down to the sea: then, moving down the valley, he encamped on the end of the ridge which closes its northern side.<sup>2</sup> His object was attained. Looking southward down the coast, he descried Pompey's advanced guard winding along the road which passed between hills and shore. Finding himself cut off from Dyrrachium by land, Pompey encamped upon a rocky plateau in his front called Petra and upon the slopes which descend from it to the valley of Shimmihl, which separated him from the camp of Caesar.

Pompey  
 encamps  
 opposite  
 him.

Dyrrachium, the principal Roman port on the eastern side of the Adriatic and the northern terminus of the great road which connected Italy with Thessalonica, stood upon the site of the Albanian capital, Durazzo; and tourists who have landed there on the voyage from Trieste, or crossed in an Italian steamer from Brindisi, have gazed upon the region where Caesar was about to contend with Pompey for the mastery of the Roman world. From the northern end of the bay along the shore of which Pompey had just marched a narrow mountainous penin-

Topogra-  
 phy of  
 Dyrra-  
 chium.

<sup>1</sup> Veith (*op. cit.*, p. 131) thinks that Pompey could have started in the evening and thus reached the neighbourhood of Dyrrachium before Caesar, but that he supposed it impossible for Caesar to perform his long circuitous march in one heat.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, iii, 41, 3-5 with Veith, pp. 129-31, 136.

48 B. C.

sula, at the southern end of which Dyrrachium was situate, projected some five miles towards the north-west, where a bank of sand connected it with a promontory which, terminating in the point now called Cape Pali, was itself connected by another sand-bank with the continent. Between mainland and peninsula extended a lagoon, communicating at its southern extremity with the bay by a narrow passage spanned by a bridge, which with a ford about half a mile farther north was the sole means of access to the town, except by sea. Looking south-eastward from his camp, Caesar observed a labyrinthine conglomeration of hills, torn by tortuous gorges, through which rushed divers rills coalescing into the three streamlets that find their outlet in the bay, and terminated by the plain of Cavaña, across which meandered a larger river, now known as the Lesnikia. Patches of young corn were visible on the plateaux, woods covered the slopes, and on the open ground between hills and sea, between stream and stream, Pompey discerned meadows, where his mules and horses would find pasturage. Conspicuous among the heights, its hard white surface gleaming against the sombre green background, was the bluff on which Pompey had encamped, and which, since it is the only rock that projects from that land of clay, the Albanians and the Italians, like the ancient Greeks, have named The Crag. But, though at first sight the landscape seemed chaotic, Caesar's patrols soon traced a continuous ridge, forming in its northern part the watershed between the Arzen and the rivulets, in its southern between various affluents of the Lesnikia, and attaining at its highest point an elevation of nine hundred feet. This chain of peaks would serve him when he began to execute the bold design which he had just conceived.

Caesar  
finds it  
difficult to  
feed his  
army.

Expecting that the campaign would be prolonged, Caesar was obliged, first of all, to make arrangements for feeding his army. Even experienced soldiers, who have been accustomed to the regular deliveries of the Army Service Corps, may find it hard to realize the anxiety that he must have felt throughout this campaign. Pompey was

not troubled on this score ; for grain had been accumulated 48 B. C. in Dyrrachium, with which he could communicate by sea ; and his officers had orders to import fresh supplies from the province of Asia and the other districts that lay within his sphere of influence. Ships of war had been built for Caesar in Italy, Sicily, and Southern Gaul ; but there was no prospect that they would soon be ready to convoy merchantmen in the face of Pompey's fleet. He tried to obtain corn from the Parthini, who inhabited the region between Lissus and the Apsus ; but very little could be got, for the country was infertile, and Pompey had plundered the people of nearly all that they possessed. Relying upon the influence which he had acquired among the remoter tribes of Epirus, Caesar sent officers to make requisitions in those parts and to arrange with the local authorities for carting supplies and storing them at stated points. At the best, however, wheat, the staple food of the Roman soldier, would not be forthcoming in sufficient quantities ; and Pompey's numerous cavalry might prevent the little that could be collected from reaching camp. The design which Caesar formed was simply to blockade Pompey's army, and thus at once to secure his own convoys and to confine Pompey's foragers to the meadows near the sea, thereby gradually starving his cavalry horses and his beasts of burden. No operation of such magnitude had ever been attempted. Caesar himself and other commanders had blockaded hostile armies ; but only when they had beaten them in the field or were superior in force. Caesar's troops were far fewer than those of his enemy, who had suffered no defeat, and whose supplies, whatever his cattle might suffer, were inexhaustible. But there was no other expedient which Caesar could adopt ; <sup>1</sup> and his undertaking was not so hazardous as it might appear. The soil could easily be worked, and the nature of the hills, which in many places were themselves impregnable, would enable him to dispense with

He endeavours to hem in Pompey.

<sup>1</sup> Napoleon, who blamed Caesar for rashness (*Précis des guerres de César*, 1836, pp. 149-50), had not seen the ground, and in his time no good map was available.



48 B. C.

such elaborate fortifications as he had been obliged to construct at Alesia. Pompey could neither avoid being surrounded nor stir from his position unless he fought and won ; it was imperative for him, so long as Caesar was unbeaten, to remain in touch with his dépôt at Dyrrachium. If Caesar could succeed, his prestige would be magnified and Pompey's would be gone ; for all the world would know that the general against whose soldiers he was too cautious to match his own, and whose patience he could not wear down, had driven him to bay and held him fast. Caesar began by constructing redoubts on the nearer heights of the watershed, gradually linking them by entrenchments along those parts of the line which were not in themselves impregnable or where it was only necessary to steepen existing slopes and to fortify them by a palisade. Perhaps he had succeeded in occupying the heights before Pompey knew what he intended ;<sup>1</sup> but his movements could not have been long concealed. While his soldiers were at work Pompey's were entrenching likewise, and as Pompey had the advantage of interior lines and his workers were far more numerous, he hoped to force Caesar to extend his contravallation until it should become too extensive for defence.<sup>2</sup> As the works progressed the light troops on either side engaged in desultory fighting, Caesar struggling to confine Pompey, Pompey to push Caesar outward ; and his numerous auxiliaries plied their slings and bows with such effect that many of Caesar's legionaries were wounded and their comrades were compelled to improvise screens of hides or of several thicknesses of cloth. So long indeed as Caesar kept following the ridge his position was so strong that Pompey, who would not expose his inferior troops to the ordeal of close fighting, could not dislodge him ; but after the lapse of a few weeks he saw his opportunity. When Caesar had extended his contravallation to a point about six miles from his main camp he prepared to quit the ridge and advance along the high ground south of the central streamlet towards the sea ; for if he could achieve

<sup>1</sup> See Veith, *op. cit.*, pp. 144, 161.<sup>2</sup> See p. 445.

this aim Pompey would have little water and his foragers 48 B. C. would be so restricted that his cattle must soon starve. The 9th legion on the extreme left took possession of a hill, now called Paliama,<sup>1</sup> about a mile from the sea, and proceeded to entrench it. Pompey instantly occupied another hill on the north-west, and, sending his slingers and archers, followed by other light-armed troops and by artillery, across the gentle slope which gave access to Paliama, attacked the 9th legion with such vigour that many of the workers were wounded, the rest were compelled to desist, and Caesar, who was on the spot, sounded a retreat. As the men began to descend the hill-side towards the adjoining gorge, the enemy with increasing confidence pressed after them, and Pompey remarked in the hearing of his staff that if the legion got off without heavy loss he would no longer call himself a general. Caesar, seeing that unassisted the men would not be able to withdraw, ordered the nearest companies to stand on the defensive, and caused screens of wattle-work, which the engineers had brought with them for fortification, to be planted on the edge of the plateau and buttressed by stout poles, while behind this defence the remaining companies dug a trench in order to impede pursuit, and slingers were posted on commanding points to cover the retreat. When, however, the legion at last moved on, the Pompeians, no longer held in check, pushed down the screens and, laying them like a bridge athwart the trench, began to cross. Caesar, fearing that after all the retreat might become a rout, ordered Antony, who commanded the 9th, to charge. The trumpet sounded : the legionaries faced about ; the foremost hurled their javelins, and all ranks, charging with one consent up the adverse slope, threw themselves upon the opponents whom they despised and beat them back. Trench and wattle-work and poles impeded their retreat ; but Caesar, having gained his object with the loss of but five men, would not suffer the legion to pursue.

Pompey forces him to abandon the hill of Paliama and unduly extend his lines.

Nevertheless Pompey, although he failed to make good

<sup>1</sup> See p. 445.

48 B. C.  
About  
June 19  
(Apr. 17).

his boast, had inflicted a serious check upon his adversary. 'The man at the head of affairs,' wrote Cicero to Atticus, 'is in a most hopeful frame of mind.'<sup>1</sup> Caesar was constrained to fall back upon the line from which he had diverged, and thus ultimately to give his contravallation an extension nearly twice as great as that which he had designed.

Incidents  
of the  
struggle.

While the Caesarians were developing their entrenchments, the Pompeians, still working abreast of them and erecting redoubt after redoubt along the inner line, the former were suffering from a dearth of their accustomed food. The officers whom Caesar sent into Epirus had been able to accomplish little; and when the men had consumed all their wheat they were obliged to content themselves with barley, pulse, roots, and, as they had done at Avaricum, with meat, which in normal circumstances they rarely ate, but which they were now glad to obtain. The roots were those which still grow near Durazzo, and which the Albanians, who call them *kelkâss*, occasionally eat.<sup>2</sup> Mixing them with milk, the men kneaded them into a kind of bread; and when the Pompeian outposts derided their scanty fare, they flung loaves at them to show that they had enough. The veterans who had served at Avaricum, Alesia, and Ilerda, remembering that, notwithstanding what they suffered there, they had come off victorious, made light of their privations: they could see the corn just beginning to yellow;<sup>3</sup> and they retorted the jeers of their opponents by telling them that they would eat the bark off the trees sooner than let them escape. Their health continued good, for they had an abundance of pure water and plenty of everything except wheaten bread, and it was cheering to hear from the

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xi, 4, 2. See pp. 478-80.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 48, 1. Cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xix, 8 (41), 144; Plut., *Caes.*, 39, 1; App., ii, 61, 252; Polyæn., viii, 23, 24; Heuzey, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80; Veith, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-5, who tells us that the troops which he himself commanded in Albania during the late war were obliged by hunger to eat *kelkâss*.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 49, 1—*Iamque frumenta maturescere incipiebant*. When Caesar wrote these words, was he not thinking of the last days—early in May (Julian)—of the operations at Dyrrachium? See pp. 479-80.

Epirot and Aetolian deserters who were almost daily coming in that the Pompeians were worse off than themselves. Pompey's troop-horses, for which the best of the pasturage had been reserved, were being kept alive, though they were losing flesh ; but many of the mules had perished. The stench arising from unburied carcasses and the labour of entrenching, to which the troops were not inured, were telling upon their health ; and above all they were beginning to suffer from thirst. Caesar had blocked the rills which fed the streamlets by driving piles close together into their channels and packing earth around.<sup>1</sup> Running water was now to be obtained from the Lesnikia alone, which was several miles from the main camp ; and Caesar had diverted the upper affluents even of the Lesnikia, which now received only one rivulet, close to the sea.<sup>2</sup> Many soldiers had been withdrawn from the trenches to dig wells in the marshes below the hills ; but the wells soon dried from the growing power of the sun ; and to carry the water up the slopes to the several camps was a long and tedious operation.

Nevertheless Pompey and his officers were quick in adapting themselves to new conditions. The Caesarians who bivouacked behind the lines were obliged to kindle watch-fires ; and the Pompeian archers, noting the position of the bivouacs from the glare, and advancing under cover of the woods, harassed them with showers of arrows and then retreated, but only to return. The Caesarians, however, learned by experience and bivouacked away from the fires in places where they could not easily be observed.<sup>3</sup>

About the end of June Pompey, hoping to save his half-famished horses and also to turn them to account, embarked his cavalry on board the ships which were moored off Petra, and sent them across the bay to the peninsula of Dyrrachium. There and in the adjoining

<sup>1</sup> See Veith, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-5.

<sup>2</sup> Heuzey, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-7. Veith (*op. cit.*, pp. 151, 160), correcting Heuzey, affirms that it was impossible to divert the Lesnikia itself. See p. 146, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 445.



48 B. C. country they would find abundant forage, and when their condition was restored the troopers would be able to harass Caesar's rear. About the same time Caesar received a communication from Dyrrachium, which led him to believe that there were traitors in the garrison who would be willing for a bribe to give him possession of the town. What followed may perhaps suggest that the offer had been inspired by his enemy. Leaving Publius Sulla to command the army in his absence, Caesar marched for Dyrrachium by night with a small force and made his way into the outskirts of the town : but his advance was disputed ; a detachment which Pompey had sent by sea attacked his rear close to the bridge, while another attempted to cut off his retreat by the ford, and before he succeeded in extricating his troops he narrowly escaped with his life.<sup>2</sup> Pompey meanwhile was making a determined effort to overwhelm Sulla and to break the enclosing lines. The point against which he directed his principal attack was a redoubt, situated on what may be called the 159 metre hill, near the centre of the contravallation ;<sup>3</sup> and if he could succeed in storming it he would not only pierce the line but also dominate the entire ridge. Success seemed probable ; for the redoubt was so far from the main camp that the arrival of reinforcements would be long delayed. The redoubt was held by a single cohort—the 8th of the 6th legion—and Pompey hurled four legions against it ; but the assailants had to advance through a shower of missiles up a steep acclivity, and the entrenchments were very strong. Still, the little garrison was sorely pressed. The archers who accompanied the legions shot thirty thousand arrows into the redoubt : every one of the privates was wounded ; and four centurions were struck blind or lost an eye. One of the four, named Cassius Scaeva, who was also wounded in the shoulder and the thigh, defended the gateway with a courage which inspired all. Sulla was now hurrying from the main camp with two legions ; and as soon as they appeared the Pompeians began to run. The legions were

July 11?  
(Apr. 28).

Caesar  
fails to  
seize  
Dyrra-  
chium.

P. Sulla  
repels  
Pompey's  
first at-  
tempt to  
break the  
blockade.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 477–81.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 445–6.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 446–7.

pressing after when Sulla, who lacked self-confidence to 48 B. C. assume the responsibility of completing his success, sounded the recall. Pompey, however, was too wary to withdraw his legions down the slope in the face of a victorious enemy, and, leading them on to an adjoining hill, out of range of the redoubt, constructed a temporary camp. The attacks which he had directed against two other redoubts had likewise failed : from one of them three cohorts repelled the rush of an entire legion ; Caesar's German auxiliaries<sup>1</sup> sallied from another and beat back their assailants with heavy loss. When Caesar returned from Dyrrachium the men who had held the central redoubt pointed proudly to the thirty thousand arrows which they had collected, and showed him the shield of Scaeva, pierced with a hundred and twenty holes. Caesar, who knew that rewards for valour are most inspiring when they are bestowed upon the spot where the brave deed was done and in the presence of those who witnessed it, presented Scaeva there and then with two hundred thousand sesterces—the equivalent of two thousand pounds—promoted him to the rank of chief centurion of the legion, doubled the pay of the 8th cohort, awarded each man a decoration, and ordered new clothing and special rations to be served out to all. Most of the officers thought that Sulla had been too cautious and that he might have inflicted such a blow as would have compelled Pompey to surrender ; but Caesar, notwithstanding his disappointment, shielded him from blame.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Von Goler (*Caesars gall. Krieg*, &c., ii<sup>2</sup>, 1880, p. 115), Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 177), and others fancy that the Germans (*B. C.*, iii, 52, 2) belonged to Pompey's army ! Long (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 1874, p. 170, n. 3) and Meusel, perhaps underrating the intelligence of their readers, have corrected the mistake.

Veith (*op. cit.*, p. 178) says that the Germans must have been cavalry, as there is no mention of German infantry in Caesar's army ; and accordingly he concludes that the combat in question took place in the southern section of the entrenchments, which crossed the plain watered by the Lesnikia. Does he not forget that German cavalry were regularly accompanied by light infantry, and that Caesar employed German light infantry (*B. C.* i, 83, 5) in Spain ?

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 51, 3 ; Val. Max., iii, 2, 23 ; Plut., *Caes.*, 16, 2 ; Suet., *Div. Jul.*, 68, 3-4 ; App., ii, 60, 247-50. Cf. Veith, p. 177.

48 B. C.

Pompey was meantime preparing to withdraw his beaten legions from the hill on which they had taken refuge ; and every soldier will understand how delicate was the operation. Pompey was as resourceful as his antagonist had been on the plateau of Paliuma. The entrenchments which he had begun on the side facing the contravallation were greatly strengthened in the night: turrets for artillery were erected on the rampart and connected by sheds, which served both to protect the men and to expedite their movements ; and thus for the time being the legions were secure. Pompey, however, would not remove them in the face of more seasoned troops until a favourable opportunity should arise. On a dark and clouded night, which followed the fourth day of waiting, the exposed gateways were blocked, while obstacles were set up in front of them ; and soon after midnight the legions were silently withdrawn.

July 6 ?  
(May 3).

Pompey  
declines  
Caesar's  
offer of  
battle.

The Caesarians were now in great heart, for they knew that, man against man, they were superior to their opponents ; and they were as eager as their commander for the general action which would decide the war. Caesar doubtless knew that Pompey was too wary to fight a battle ; but to force him to refuse a second challenge would lower his prestige. Day after day therefore he arrayed the legions of his right wing on the low ground between the two main camps, just beyond the range of Pompey's catapults. Pompey, to escape humiliation, arrayed his own left wing outside his camp, but so close to it that the rearmost line was almost in contact with the rampart. Evidently nothing would decoy him to expose his inferior troops to the chance of a defeat, when even victory would not avail unless he could break out. He intended to reserve them for a decisive stroke.

Successes  
of Sabinus  
and Cas-  
sius.

Meanwhile Caesar had received dispatches from Sabinus and Cassius. Sabinus, having expelled Pompey's garrisons from the strongholds of Aetolia, had been welcomed by the native population ; Cassius, although he had been forced by the advance of Scipio to retreat from Thessaly, had taken possession of Amphilochia and Acarnania.

Thus the entire region between Epirus and the western waters of the Gulf of Corinth was in Caesar's power. He now dispatched Calenus to join Calvisius and Cassius and, advancing with them into Boeotia and thence by the Isthmus into the Peloponnese, to endeavour to wrest those territories from Pompey. About the same time, intending to make a last effort to achieve a settlement by diplomatic means, he sent one of his friends, Aulus Clodius, on a mission to Scipio. Clodius, who knew Scipio well, was to deliver a letter and to support it by oral arguments. The substance of the letter was that every attempt which Caesar had hitherto made to negotiate had failed because his agents were afraid to approach Pompey unless the time were opportune. Scipio was in a different position. He could deal with Pompey as an equal; being an independent commander, he had the means of giving effect to his own views; and the credit of having restored peace and prosperity to Italy would then belong to him. Remembering how Caesar had tried to bribe the consul Lentulus, one may perhaps surmise that Clodius was authorized to offer Scipio something more substantial than the credit of a peacemaker. At first he was cordially received; but Favonius, eager, as ever, to imitate the inflexibility of Cato, remonstrated with Scipio; and Clodius was obliged to report that he had failed.

Caesar's last attempt to effect a peaceable settlement.

Before this time, however, the struggle near Dyrrachium was coming to an end. The cavalry which Pompey had sent across the bay were still in the peninsula. In order to keep them there inactive or else to force Pompey to withdraw them, Caesar fortified the passages which gave access to the town. Pompey was of course compelled to re-embark the whole brigade. The horses were now worse off than before. All the grass, all the young corn had been devoured; no forage was to be procured except from Coreyra and Acarnania by sea; when it arrived the quantity was so small that it had to be eked out by barley, which was soon consumed; and many of the beasts were only kept alive by leaves and the pounded roots of reeds. Even this supply was failing; the

Pompey's cattle threatened with starvation.



48 B. C.

animals were becoming more and more emaciated ; and Pompey saw that he must make a final effort to break the blockade.

Pompey designs to attack the southern section of Caesar's lines.

But how and where ? This time he selected a more vulnerable place, and fortune favoured him. In order to complete the contravallation, Caesar had been compelled to descend from the ridge at its southern extremity and to carry the last section of his entrenchments across the plain south of the Lesnikia. The lines now extended some fifteen miles from the main camp, and the section which crossed the plain was of course extraordinarily strong. Here a trench had been dug fifteen feet wide, the earth thrown up from which was formed into a rampart ten feet high and ten feet wide, surmounted with a palisade ; while, two hundred yards behind, a parallel fortification on a somewhat smaller scale had been constructed, in case Pompey should land troops south of the Lesnikia and attack simultaneously in front and rear. But in order to complete the system of defences it was necessary to join the parallel trenches by a transverse work ; and this was still incomplete. Meanwhile Pompey had prolonged his own entrenchments close to the sea. About three hundred yards from the shore and nearly half a mile north of Caesar's interior parallel was a camp which the 9th legion had fortified after it failed to seize the plateau of Paliama. Soon afterwards this camp was abandoned ; and Pompey, intending to establish a strong force in front of his own lines, took possession of it and, prolonging the northern and the western side respectively eastward and southward, formed a larger camp, which enclosed the old one. From the north-eastern angle of this new camp he drew an entrenchment six or seven hundred paces long to the bank of the Lesnikia, in order to enable the advanced legions to fetch water in security.<sup>1</sup> He now intended to attack

<sup>1</sup> Veith (*op. cit.*, p. 160), remarking that the water of the Lesnikia is brackish, affirms that the Pompeians found it undrinkable. This would imply that they had never fetched water from the river before ; but Caesar's words—*munitionem ad flumen [Pompeius] perduxerat . . . quo liberius ac sine periculo milites aquarentur*—seem to suggest that they had. Has the land sunk, as it has near the Bay of Naples (vol. i, p. 96) ?

Caesar's inner parallel in overwhelming strength before he could complete his works, and to land a force which should simultaneously assault the outer line; and an event had just occurred which led him to expect that this time all would go well.

In Caesar's staff, however, there were men who had predicted that Pompey would be forced either to surrender or to take ship and forsake his army. Among them was Cicero's son-in-law, Cornelius Dolabella. Cicero, who bitterly regretted that he had left Italy, was not popular with Pompey's officers or with his fellow-senators in camp.<sup>1</sup> With a few exceptions he condemned them in unqualified terms. He was disgusted by their greed of plunder and horrified by the cruelty with which they spoke of their opponents; and, feeling sure that victory could not be gained by an army so ill-assorted and so undisciplined, he vainly implored Pompey to make peace.<sup>2</sup> He had lent him a large sum, and had also to provide for the payment of his daughter's dowry; and anxiety was telling upon his health.<sup>3</sup> He sneered at Pompey's generalship, and, while his own countenance was glum, he relieved his feelings by caustic witticisms which, although they amused his hearers, did not promote good fellowship.<sup>4</sup> His ill-humour must have been increased when he opened a letter from his son-in-law. 'You see', wrote Dolabella, 'neither Pompey's great name nor the renown of his achievements nor even the dependent kings and peoples whom he used so often to boast of, can save him now . . . even an honourable retreat is not open to him; driven out of Italy, the Spanish provinces lost, his veteran army forced to surrender, now finally himself blockaded, he cannot even retreat with honour. I doubt whether such a fate has ever befallen a Roman general. Use your judgement then and consider what either of you has to hope for. . . . I do beg of you, if Pompey succeeds in escaping this peril by taking refuge with his fleet, to consult your own interest

Cicero in  
Pompey's  
camp.

Dolabella  
tells him  
that Pom-  
pey is  
doomed.

<sup>1</sup> Plut., *Cic.*, 38, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Fam.*, vii, 3, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, v, 20, 9; *Att.*, xi, 1, 2; 2, 2-3; 3, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Plut., *Cic.*, 38, 2-5; Macrob., ii, 3, 7-8.

48 B. C.

and, be a friend to your own self at last and not to any one else.' <sup>1</sup>

Two Gal-  
lic officers  
desert  
Caesar  
and give  
Pompey  
informa-  
tion.

But Dolabella, though in his short life he had had much experience of men, had reckoned without two officers in Caesar's camp, who were just then consulting *their* own interest. In the Gallic contingent there were two Allobrogians, named Egus and Roucillus, who had served so well throughout the Gallic War that Caesar had rewarded them with high offices, gifts of money, and estates carved out of conquered territory, and had even during his dictatorship raised them to the rank of senators.<sup>2</sup> Their gallantry had endeared them to all ranks; but good fortune perverted their good sense. Not contented with the wealth which they had got, they appropriated all the booty which they obtained and embezzled the pay of their own men. The defrauded troopers approached Caesar, and, complaining of the knavery of their commanders, reported that they actually inserted in their pay-rolls fictitious names in order to enrich themselves. Caesar sent for them, reprimanded them for their misdeeds, and advised them to rely upon his generosity instead of committing peculation; but, as their services were valuable, he forbore to punish them—for the time. It was notorious, however, that their crimes had been revealed, and while they had to submit to the derision of their comrades, they felt 'perhaps', as Caesar remarked with grim humour,<sup>3</sup> that their punishment was merely postponed. They resolved therefore to desert. But it was necessary to do something which should ensure for them a cordial welcome. A plan which they formed for

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, ix, 9, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *atque eos extra ordinem in senatum legendos curaverat* (*B. C.*, iii, 59, 2). Meusel explains *senatum* as 'the Senate of the Allobroges'. Would this appointment have been 'extraordinary' when the father of Roucillus and Egus had been for many years the chief magistrate of the Allobroges (*principatum in civitate multis annis obtinuerat*)? I am not sure that Caesar, who, as Suetonius says (80, 2), made Gauls and other aliens senators, had not already in his first dictatorship conferred the same distinction upon the two Allobrogians. Cf. *Bell. Afr.*, 28, 2; *Cic.*, *Phil.*, xi, 5, 12; *Dio*, xlii, 51, 5; and Mr. Peskett's edition of *Bell. Civ.*, iii, p. 120.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 60, 3.

assassinating Volusenus, the commander of the cavalry 48 B. C. brigade, miscarried. Accordingly they bought a large number of horses, paying for them with borrowed money, and went over with their retainers to the enemy's lines.<sup>1</sup>

Hitherto not a single man had deserted Caesar, and Pompey graciously welcomed the two Gauls, whose high standing and military reputation distinguished them from ordinary renegades. They soon showed that they could contribute something more valuable than a drove of cavalry remounts. They had been careful to inform themselves about all the weak points in Caesar's lines; they were acquainted with the whole topography, the distances from trench to trench and from redoubt to redoubt; they knew that certain officers were incompetent and certain piquets comparatively remiss; and on all these matters they furnished Pompey with minute details.

Pompey now proceeded to formulate his plan, the execution of which would depend in great part upon careful organization. The troops were ordered to provide themselves with material for filling up the enemy's trenches and also with coverings of wicker-work, to be worn over their helmets, which, like the masks used by fencers, would protect their faces without obstructing vision.<sup>2</sup> It was above all important that the attack should be delivered by surprise, and that the force which was to advance by land and that which was to be conveyed by sea should arrive simultaneously and in good time. Every officer received precise instructions. About midnight the detachments began to move. While sixty cohorts, selected from the main camp and from various redoubts, were marching down towards the plain, archers, slingers,

Pompey  
delivers  
his attack

<sup>1</sup> B. C., iii, 59-60. Camille Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 1909, p. 581, n. 1), remarking that Domitius (the hero of Corfinium) had kept up close relations with the Province of Gaul, affirms that this explains why Egus and Roucillus deserted!

<sup>2</sup> B. C., iii, 62, 1. My explanation is conjectural; but if the coverings (*tegimenta*) were merely intended to strengthen the helmets (which were made of metal), the latter were evidently in themselves useless for defence.



48 B. C.

July 9 ?  
(May 6).

and other light-armed troops were embarked in open boats and vessels of small draught, accompanied by ships of war ; and before daybreak they began to land a little southward from Caesar's exterior trench.<sup>1</sup> Two cohorts of the 9th legion were in the act of relieving the guard at the seaward extremity of the lines : the remaining eight under the quaestor, Lentulus Marcellinus, were encamped about two miles inland. Taken completely unawares, the guard lined up to defend the entrenchment, while a messenger made haste to warn the quaestor ; but the numbers of the assailants were irresistible. While the light troops were pitching their fascines into the trench and the legionaries, backed by artillery, archers, and slingers, were rearing their ladders against the rampart of the inner parallel, arrows were flying in from either side, and the stones—their only missiles—which the defenders desperately hurled fell harmlessly on the wicker masks. Presently more Pompeians, who had just disembarked, crowding through the gap, which Roucillus and Egus had indicated, in the unfinished transverse trench, and passing into the space between the parallel lines, attacked the Caesarians in the rear and drove them from their posts. The fresh cohorts sent by Marcellinus could not stem the enemy's rush, and only augmented the panic of the fugitives, who, finding their retreat hindered by their own comrades, became utterly demoralized. Of the six centurions who belonged to the 1st cohort five were killed ; but the standard of the legion was preserved. When the officer who guarded it felt that he was dying, he called some troopers who were riding by, and bade them restore it to the General.

The Pompeians were pressing on to storm the camp of Marcellinus, now held by only a few hundred men, when twelve cohorts, commanded by Mark Antony, were seen descending from the southern extremity of the ridge. The Pompeians stopped ; and the fugitive Caesarians had

<sup>1</sup> Veith (*op. cit.*, pp. 180-1) gives reasons for thinking it unlikely that the 60 cohorts advanced simultaneously : probably, he conjectures, 20 acted first, while the rest were posted behind, ready to follow up any success.

already rallied when Caesar himself, warned by the clouds of smoke that signalled a mishap, arrived with thirteen cohorts,<sup>1</sup> taken from various redoubts. The Pompeians who had not yet come into action were constructing a camp just outside Caesar's parallel lines, hard by the sea, with the two-fold object of enabling their ships to approach the coast at any time in safety and their cavalry to forage securely in the plain. Caesar saw that, for the time being, his original design had failed. Pompey had broken the blockade; and all that could be done was to prevent him from penetrating further within the parallel lines. Caesar therefore set his men to dig a second transverse trench a little to the east of Pompey's projected camp. For some time fighting was suspended, the two groups of workers being of course protected by their respective comrades. Just after the new transverse trench had been completed and while the Pompeian camp, which was on a far larger scale, was still unfinished, Caesar's scouts reported that a legion was moving behind a wood into the camp which Pompey had several days before abandoned, and within which, as I have shown, the old camp of the 9th legion was enclosed. The report being confirmed by messengers coming from the ridge, Caesar conceived the plan of surprising and overwhelming the intrusive legion before Pompey could succour it, thereby severing him from his own lines and from the rest of his army and repairing the disaster which the 9th had suffered in the early dawn. He had thirty-five cohorts—equivalent to three legions and a half—on the spot, besides some troops of cavalry. It would seem that his scouts had not observed the earthwork by which Pompey had linked the camp to the Lesnikia: at all events the officers who commanded his right wing were not warned that it was there.

<sup>1</sup> The manuscript reading (*B. C.*, iii, 65, 3) is *quibusdam cohortibus* (certain cohorts), which, following the precise statement in § 2 of the number of Antony's cohorts, is surprising. W. Paul supposes that Caesar wrote *quindecim* (15); Veith (*op. cit.*, p. 183), who ignores the two cohorts of the 9th legion (63, 6), thinking apparently that they were put out of action, concludes that Caesar brought only thirteen, and his view is justified by comparison of 65. 3 with 62. 4, 64. 1, and 67. 2-3.

48 B. C.

Leaving two cohorts in the transverse trench, who, to prevent suspicion, were to continue working, he moved off with the rest in two columns by a circuitous route, concealing them as far as the nature of the ground allowed,<sup>1</sup> attacked the camp with the left wing, which he himself commanded, drove the Pompeians from the rampart and, although Puleio, who had betrayed Gaius Antonius, desperately resisted, destroyed a *cheval-de-frise* which barred the gate, forced the entrance, and finally stormed the inner camp, within which the defenders had sought refuge. Meanwhile the men of the right wing, approaching the earthwork which led to the Lesnikia,<sup>2</sup> fancied that it was the rampart of the camp itself, and moved along it, looking for the gate, till they saw that it ended at the stream, when, breaking it down at sundry points, they shot the earth into the trench, and, crossing over, followed by the cavalry, found themselves in the broad expanse between rampart, river, sea, and camp.

and  
breaks  
the block-  
ade.

Pompey, who had not observed the movement of Caesar's column, had already been informed by messengers that the camp was taken. Instantly he withdrew his infantry from the trenches in which they were at work, and, leaving his light troops to hold the unfinished camp, marched to succour the beleaguered legion. His cavalry, riding in advance, threatened Caesar's troopers, who endeavoured to escape by recrossing the narrow causeways which the men of the right wing had made in the long trench. Some, unable to find room, dismounted, and, turning their horses loose, escaped on foot. The right wing, isolated and infected by the panic of the troopers, hurried after them; and many, seeing that the causeways were already thronged, jumped down from the rampart into the ditch and before they could scramble out were trampled to death by their comrades from behind. Meanwhile the beleaguered Pompeians, who had been

<sup>1</sup> Veith remarks (pp. 185-6), supporting a conjecture of my own and quoting *B. C.*, iii, 66, 1 (*post silvam*), that Caesar's movement must have been concealed by woods. The ground is flat. No doubt woods had also hidden the earthwork that connected Pompey's camp with the Lesnikia.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 146.

driven back to the rear gate, but were now heartened 48 B. C.  
 by the sight of the legions about to succour them, charged  
 Caesar's left wing, who, seeing that cavalry and right  
 wing were fleeing and fearing that they might themselves  
 be shut in and overwhelmed by the united forces of the  
 enemy, rushed for the gate through which they had  
 entered. Observing the tumult, the panic, and the rout,  
 Caesar gripped flying standard-bearers with his own hands  
 and commanded them to halt; and when one in his terror  
 threatened to strike him with his staff the life-guards  
 interposed and seized the man. Caesar might well marvel  
 that Pompey did not press on to destroy the beaten mob  
 and to cut off the retreat of the army.<sup>1</sup> At roll-call it  
 was found that thirty-two centurions, nine hundred and  
 sixty privates, and two hundred horsemen had fallen,  
 besides military tribunes and notable members of the  
 equestrian order, and that thirty-two standards had  
 fallen into the enemy's hands. An accident alone, so  
 Caesar thought, had saved the force which he commanded  
 from annihilation: Pompey, having seen his own men  
 retreating from the camp, fancied that Caesar had set  
 a trap for him and feared at first to penetrate the camp  
 and make the most of his success, while his cavalry, who  
 had already entered, were delayed at the narrow causeways  
 preoccupied by Caesar's troops. As Caesar said, that  
 earthwork which had baffled his own right wing and  
 robbed them of their victory, baffled their pursuers also  
 and saved them from destruction.<sup>2</sup>

Pompey was saluted by his troops as Imperator; but,  
 as Caesar, who appreciated his good taste, observed, since  
 he had gained the honour at the cost of Roman lives, he  
 would not allow the bays which were its emblem to be  
 entwined around his *fascēs*, nor in his correspondence  
 would he use the title. Labienus, for his part, seized the  
 opportunity of showing that a renegade could be true.  
 He persuaded Pompey to commit the prisoners to his  
 charge, and, after parading them before the army and

Labienus  
 butchers  
 the  
 prisoners.

<sup>1</sup> Plut., *Pomp.*, 65, 3; *Caes.*, 39, 3; Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 36; App., ii, 62, 260.  
 See Veith, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

<sup>2</sup> B. C., iii, 70.



48 B. C. asking them with bitter taunts whether it was usual for veterans to run away, he put them all to death. Pompey was too busy and too triumphant to heed such incidents. Messages from soothsayers in Rome assured him of ultimate success.<sup>1</sup> He wrote to client kings, dynasts, and urban authorities to let them know that he had gained the victory,<sup>2</sup> and either from vainglory or because he knew the advantage which calculated mendacity confers in war, he represented that Caesar had lost nearly all his force and was in full retreat.<sup>3</sup> His officers and the illustrious personages who had followed him from Italy were bursting with exultation : as Caesar said, they gave no thought to military problems, for they were quite sure that they had already won.<sup>4</sup>

Exulta-  
tion of the  
Pom-  
peians.

Caesar  
forms new  
plans

Caesar of course saw that he must begin again and transfer the campaign to another theatre. He was confident that he would be able to frustrate pursuit. Pompey, it was evident, must do one of three things,—march against Domitius, invade Italy, or attempt to recover Apollonia and Oricum and thus to exclude Caesar from the coast. If he chose the first course he would be forced to leave behind the stores which he had collected at Dyrrachium and to forgo the advantage which he derived from his command of the sea, while sooner or later he would have to encounter Caesar in the open field : if he invaded Italy, Caesar, after he had rejoined Domitius, would march to the rescue through Illyricum ; if he should try to cut off Caesar from the coast, Caesar would attack Scipio, and Pompey would be compelled to succour him. Such were the contingencies for which Caesar provided. His first care was to withdraw the piquets from the redoubts, to concentrate all the troops in a position from which they could begin their march, and to restore their self-respect. As it would be necessary to leave the wounded at Apollonia, he constructed a temporary camp in the plain of Cavaia, close to the road and

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *De div.*, ii, 24, 53.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 72, 4 ; Plut., *Pomp.*, 66, 1 ; App., ii, 63, 261.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 79, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 72, 1. Cf. Cic., *Fam.*, vii, 3, 2.

not far from the position which had been held by Marcellinus.<sup>1</sup> Parading the troops, he told them that they must not lose heart because of one reverse, which, after all, was not really serious. Had they not carried all before them in Italy and Spain, gained possession of Sardinia and Sicily, and crossed a sea swarming with the enemy's squadrons without losing a single man? They could not blame him, for he had done all that a general could to ensure victory. Either they had lost their presence of mind or, when they had all but won, the luck had turned against them; but at all events their duty now was to repair the disaster like brave men. That done, good would come out of evil, just as Gergovia had been followed by Alesia. Caesar understood the temper of the army, and, though he would not condone cowardice, he judged that the mildest punishment would suffice. Calling out the guilty standard-bearers, he branded them as cowards and formally degraded them. The men who had given way to panic were so ashamed, all ranks were so grieved at the disgrace which Caesar's army had incurred and so passionately eager to make amends, that they needed no command and even desired to punish themselves by added toil. Some of the officers, observing their repentant zeal, were anxious to stay where they were and fight again. But Caesar knew that time must elapse and the whole scene be changed before the self-confidence which had been so rudely shaken could be thoroughly restored; and, moreover, the enemy's cavalry, being now free to act, might be able to intercept his supplies.

Soon after sunset the baggage-train with the sick and wounded, for whose comfort Caesar carefully provided, was sent ahead, escorted by a legion, with orders to push on as fast as possible for Apollonia. Four legions followed before dawn, emerging, in order to save time, through the rearmost and the two lateral gates.<sup>2</sup> As soon as they were

48 B. C.  
and heart-  
ens his  
troops.

July 10?  
(May 7).

<sup>1</sup> Stoffel is probably right in supposing that, in order to save unnecessary labour, Caesar merely connected the parallel trenches which crossed the plain by two transverse works. See pp. 447-9.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Veith, *op. cit.*, p. 195 with B. C., iii, 75, 2 (*compluribus*, not *omnibus* [portis]).

48 B. C.

Pompey  
fails to  
prevent  
Caesar  
from re-  
treating  
to Apol-  
lonia.

well on their way Caesar, who had remained with the other two, ordered the customary signal, which, in order to conceal his departure, he had deferred until the latest moment, to be sounded for moral effect, and marched rapidly to overtake them. Pompey, whose scouts were apparently asleep,<sup>1</sup> knew nothing of these movements until the retreating column had got a long start, when, sending his cavalry to harass the rear-guard, he precipitately followed; but Caesar's legions, unhampered by their baggage, marched so fast that the horsemen could not catch them until the leading cohorts had forded the Genusus. While those behind were delayed by the precipitous banks, the rearmost were attacked; but Caesar's cavalry, supported by four hundred picked legionaries, beat off the assailants, inflicting considerable loss, and the army was soon resting in the camp which it had occupied three months before, opposite Asparagium. The Pompeians, as they approached the river, entered their own former camp; but while some dispersed to collect fuel or to obtain fodder for their cattle, many, defying discipline, returned to the encampment which they had quitted in the morning, in order to recover the belongings which in their hurry they had left behind. Caesar, who intended to make a further march before nightfall, took advantage of their absence. He had already sent out his cavalry on the pretence of foraging, in order to lull Pompey into the belief that he intended to pass the night where he was; and the troopers, to avoid observation, re-entered the camp through the southern gate. About noon Caesar moved on and, as Pompey was unable to pursue, advanced eight miles. Although his retreat was now secure (for Pompey could not stir until his truant troops rejoined him), the Pompeian cavalry might perhaps harass his rear-guard during the passage of the Apsus. At nightfall therefore and on

<sup>1</sup> As Gen. Sir F. Maurice observes (*Forty Days in 1914*, 1919, p. 137 [cf. pp. 115-16]), of all the opportunities which war can present 'the retreat of an enemy from a battle-field is the most favourable if it is promptly seized and the most pregnant of unpleasant consequences if it is neglected'.

the following night he again sent his baggage in advance, and on the fourth day of the retreat arrived at Apollonia.<sup>1</sup> Pompey, abandoning the pursuit, retraced his steps, and encamped by the Egnatian Way.<sup>2</sup>

48 B. C.  
July 14 ?  
(May 11).

Caesar's intentions were still uncertain ; and although Pompey saw what courses were open to him and was prepared to oppose which ever he might adopt, he thought it best nevertheless to consult his colleagues.<sup>3</sup> A council of war was therefore convened. Afranius, who had taken advantage of Caesar's clemency to join Pompey with a part of the troops which he had been forced to disband in Spain,<sup>4</sup> urged him to invade Italy at once. The country was defenceless ; the people were for the most part well disposed ; it would be easy to recover Sardinia and Sicily, the provinces of Gaul, and Spain ; and then there would be time enough to return and dispose of Caesar. The other officers retorted that to invade Italy would be tantamount to fleeing from a beaten enemy, who, indeed, would be deserted by his own troops when they could get no food. Pompey did not hesitate. Apart from the contempt which he would incur throughout the East if he turned his back upon his adversary, he could not abandon Scipio ; and if Caesar should decide to await the reinforcements which his newly built fleet might bring, he would himself attack Domitius.<sup>5</sup> When Caesar was once vanquished, Italy and the western provinces would be soon regained. Pompey therefore detached fifteen native cohorts under Cato, to hold Dyrrachium,<sup>6</sup> and marched rapidly down the Egnatian Way to rescue Scipio.<sup>7</sup>

Pompey  
decides  
to join  
Scipio.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 481.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 449.

<sup>3</sup> Stoffel (*op. cit.*, ii, 238), apparently relying on the narrative of Plutarch (*Pomp.*, 66, 2), holds that although Pompey had made up his mind while Caesar's intentions were still uncertain, he held the council of war after he heard that Caesar had marched towards Thessaly. But why should he have postponed his march until he learned what Caesar meant to do when he himself intended in any case (*B. C.*, iii, 78, 6) to move into Macedonia and had no time to lose ?

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 73-4 and 469.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 78, 6 ; *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 66, 3-4 ; *App.*, ii, 65.

<sup>6</sup> *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 67, 2 ; *Cato min.*, 55, 1 ; *Cic.*, 39, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Had Pompey bought transport cattle to replace those which had died of starvation (p. 141 and *B. C.*, iii, 49, 3) ? Caesar does not inform us.



48 B. C.

Caesar meanwhile had completed his preparations. The sick and the wounded were consigned to hospital, the troops duly paid ; agents were dispatched to persuade the communities which had declared for Caesar that they would do well to remain faithful ; arrangements were made for holding the maritime towns which he had occupied. One cohort was already quartered at Lissus and three at Oricum ; four were now left to defend Apollonia : and Caesar, having sent couriers to let Domitius know that he was coming and to inform him where the meeting was to take place, marched up the valley of the Dryno, intending to make his way over the mountains into Thessaly by the pass of Metzovo.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar  
marches  
to join  
Domitius.  
July 15 ?  
(May 12).

Reflexions  
on his  
strategy.

Caesar never enlightened his readers by self-criticism ; but some may perhaps have wondered whether he did not regret that he had so weakened the force which he had needed for the campaign of Dyrrachium. Four years before by dividing his army he had laid himself open to the blow which Vercingetorix dealt him at Gergovia. Had he repeated that mistake ? Domitius had only been able to prevent Scipio from joining Pompey ; and if his two legions had been retained for the blockade, Scipio might never have been able to penetrate, nor Pompey to break the lines. But Caesar could probably have rebutted such arguments. An Austrian officer, who has done much to elucidate his operations, suggests that his strategy was inevitably perverted by the requirements of his commissariat, and that he sent Domitius and the others into Macedonia simply because it was all that he could do to feed the troops whom he retained.<sup>2</sup> If the suggestion is justified, Pompey's command of the sea, though it could not enable him to win the war, prevented Caesar from winning it in the upland by Dyrrachium.

Caesar had not yet received a full report from his lieutenant. When Domitius first entered Macedonia deputations from various communities came to welcome him, but soon it was reported that Scipio with his two legions was advancing along the Egnatian Way. Scipio

<sup>1</sup> See p. 449.

<sup>2</sup> G. Veith, *loc. cit.*, pp. 242, 245-6.

had left Asia earlier than he intended. On assuming the government of Syria, he found that the mountaineers of the Cilician frontier who had troubled Cicero were harrying the province; and he was obliged to march against them. He suffered more than one reverse; but as his troops omitted to hail him Imperator, he conferred the title upon himself.<sup>1</sup> If, however, he failed as a general, he succeeded as an extortioner. Enormous contributions were exacted from petty dynasts and self-governing communities, while the tax-farmers were compelled to advance the sums which would not legally fall due until the following year. In the autumn of 49 B.C. Scipio, having raised a corps of cavalry in Syria, left that country exposed to a Parthian invasion and marched for the province of Asia. His troops were discontented. Men were overheard to say that they were willing to fight the Parthians, but not their fellow citizens and the legitimate consul. Scipio tried to regain their loyalty by bribes, and, quartering them for the winter in Pergamum and other wealthy towns, encouraged them to plunder the inhabitants. Meanwhile, doubtless in collusion with the Governor of Asia, he plundered on his own account.<sup>2</sup> The tax-farmers were treated like their colleagues in Syria. Income tax, taxes on pillars, taxes on doors, taxes on anything and everything were assessed, and officials, who took care to fill their own pockets, were commissioned to collect the money; recruits, rowers, ballistic engines, weapons, corn, wagons, beasts of burden were impressed; Roman citizens were treated with no less rigour than provincials. Many individuals were compelled to apply to Italian usurers in order to pay; the rate of interest rose by leaps and bounds, and the indebtedness of the whole province was enormously increased. One source of gain, indeed, was still untouched, but Scipio had not forgotten it. The temple of Diana of the Ephesians contained treasure. Scipio with the senators whom he could induce to accompany him

49-48 B.  
Scipio's  
conduct  
in Syria  
and Asia.

<sup>1</sup> The statement of Caesar, made with characteristic irony (*B. C.*, iii, 31, 1), is confirmed by coins which Scipio struck in Africa. See E. Babelon, *Descrn. . . . des monn. de la république rom.*, 1, 1885, pp. 277-80.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 449-50.

48 B. C.

determined to abstract it, and a day was fixed for its removal. Suddenly a dispatch from Pompey was put into his hands. It announced that Caesar had invaded Epirus, and summoned him to advance without a moment's delay.

About  
Feb. 14.  
Domitius's  
campaign  
against  
Scipio.

About the middle of April, when Domitius had moved down the Egnatian Way to a point near Heraclia,<sup>1</sup> Scipio, who was only a day's march distant, learned that Cassius had invaded Thessaly.<sup>2</sup> Resolving to overpower him before attacking Domitius, he instantly pushed southward by forced marches and, to rid himself of all encumbrance, left Favonius with eight cohorts in charge of his heavy baggage near the great bend of the Aliacmon,<sup>3</sup> directing him to construct a redoubt. Cassius, hearing that Scipio was approaching and threatened by the cavalry of King Cotys, retreated towards Ambracia. Scipio was pressing on in pursuit when he received a dispatch from Favonius, who reported that he was himself menaced by Domitius and could not hold the redoubt alone. Scipio immediately hurried back, and his advanced guard was descried by Favonius as the dust raised by the column of Domitius became visible. Domitius encamped on the left bank of the Aliacmon, perhaps in front of the pass of Siátista, which gave access to the fertile plain of Lyncestis on the north. Scipio remained on the right bank for two days and at dawn on the third forded the river, encamped about six miles from Domitius, behind a rivulet, and ranged his troops in line of battle immediately in front of his rampart. Promptly accepting the challenge, Domitius marched across the plain and formed his line close to Scipio, who, however, would not stir from the protection afforded by his camp. The troops of Domitius, encouraged by Scipio's timidity, could hardly be restrained from advancing although the rivulet with its steep banks separated them from their opponents. Scipio saw that if he remained where he was he must either fight or forfeit his prestige :

<sup>1</sup> Heraclia was near the site of Monastir.

<sup>2</sup> In regard to the operations of Scipio and Domitius see pp. 450-2.

<sup>3</sup> Now called Vistrizza.

accordingly he quitted his position in the night without the usual signal, recrossed the river, and encamped on rising ground hard by. After the lapse of a few days he laid an ambush for the cavalry of Domitius near the meadows where they habitually foraged ; but the troopers speedily recovered their formation and beat off the attack. Domitius now gave out that he was obliged to retreat in quest of grain, and, breaking up his camp, moved to a wooded spot three miles off and there stationed his whole force in ambush. Scipio sent a detachment of his cavalry to reconnoitre, and as the horses of the leading troop, on approaching the ambuscade, began to neigh, their riders suspected mischief and retired : the rest drew rein, but two troops were intercepted and, though a few men broke away, nearly all were either captured or killed. For some weeks the two generals remained watching one another, when Domitius was constrained by shortage of supplies to return towards Heraclia.

By this time Pompey was marching rapidly down the Egnatian Way. The letters in which he had announced his victory produced their due effect : communities which had declared for Caesar now favoured Pompey, and the messengers by whom Caesar and Domitius endeavoured to communicate, although they travelled by several roads, were unable to get through. But when Domitius was only a few miles from Heraclia his Gaulish patrols fell in with those of Pompey, among whom were friends of Egus and Roucillus. Either from vainglory or remembering old comradeship, the Allobrogian troopers blurted out that Caesar had been driven from Dyrrachium and that Pompey was close by. Galloping back, the patrols warned Domitius, who instantly returned by the pass of Pisodori and the valley of the Aliacmon to join his chief. Caesar, not yet knowing where or whether he should find him, was leading his column over the pass of Metzovo, below which extended the vast Thessalian plain, covered with yellowing corn <sup>1</sup> and bounded seaward by the mountains,

July 27 ?  
(May 24).

Caesar  
joins  
Domitius,

<sup>1</sup> On May 29, 1904, says M. Kiessling (*W. Drumann's Gesch. Roms*, iii <sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 743), the corn in the Pharsalian plain was nearly ripe. Leake



48 B. C.

Olympus, Pelion, and Ossa. Near Aeginium, now Kalabaka, beneath the red crags of Meteora, the two armies met.

July 29 ?

(May 26).

[Palaea  
Episcopi].

Advancing southward between the range of Pindus and the river Peneus, Caesar approached Gomphi, one of the Thessalian towns which, a few months before, had sent envoys to offer him their services and to solicit his support. But times had changed. From the outset the Thessalians had been divided into two factions, one of which favoured Caesar, the other Pompey. As Pompey was now apparently victorious, Androsthene, whom the Pompeian faction had chosen as their leader, summoned the inhabitants of the outlying districts to take refuge in the town, and dispatched couriers to appeal to Pompey and Scipio for aid, explaining that if they came quickly he could hold out, but that the defences were not strong enough to sustain a siege. Scipio, on hearing that Pompey had quitted Dyrrachium, had moved southward to the neighbourhood of Larisa, while Pompey, knowing that Scipio was safe, had not yet crossed the Aliacmon. Caesar, however, as time was wanting for a siege, resolved to take the town by storm. Ordering fascines, ladders, and sappers' huts to be prepared, he let his soldiers know that Gomphi was full of stores, which would supply their wants, and that if they could take it quickly the other communities in Thessaly would be terrorized. About four o'clock in the afternoon the huts were run up close to the moat, the fascines were thrown in at various points, and the ladders planted : before sunset all resistance had been overborne. Caesar was still the same man who had spared his fellow-citizens near Monmaneu and near Ilerda ; but he was also the same man who had slaughtered German women and children and had cut off the hands of the defenders of Uxellodunum. The soldiers were let loose ; they breached the wine-casks and drank themselves drunk ; and pillage was followed by massacre.<sup>1</sup> Next morning, when they had slept off debauch, Caesar pushed

sacks  
Gomphi,

July 31 ?

(May 28).

(*Trans. Roy. Soc. Lit.*, 2nd ser., iv, 1853, p. 78, n. 1) says that the harvest there is in June.

<sup>1</sup> B. C., iii, 80 ; Plut., *Caes.*, 41, 3 ; App., ii, 64, 267-9 ; Dio, xli, 51, 4-5.





on, still skirting the mountains, towards Metropolis, and reached it in a single march. The gates were barred and armed men lined the walls, for the dispatches of Pompey had been received and the fate of Gomphi was unknown; but when the prisoners were displayed the Governor recognized the inevitable. Caesar took stringent measures to prevent his troops from plundering or molesting the inhabitants; and the clemency that followed ruthlessness was not misunderstood. Larisa, overawed by Scipio, was still Pompeian; but in the western basin of the Peneus Caesar was obeyed. Moving eastward along the hills he crossed the Enipeus near Pharsalus, and encamped in the plain on its northern bank,<sup>1</sup> to await the arrival of his enemy. On the opposite bank, not far from the south-western angle of his camp, was the stronghold Palaepharsalus, crowning the hill now called Mount Koutouri: Pharsalus itself was six miles to the south-east; and the position which Caesar had chosen would enable him to command the approaches to those points and to dominate the fertile Pharsalian plain. On his right hills extended towards the plateau of Larisa; on his left rear, beyond Pharsalus, a vast conglomerate of heights; the broad channel of the Enipeus, in which, bordered by high steep banks, flowed a thin streamlet, bisected the intervening plain, covered by ripening corn.

A few days later Pompey reached Larisa and joined forces with Scipio. The two generals occupied one camp, but Pompey recognized the status of his father-in-law by assigning him a separate praetorian tent and according to him the honours due to an independent commander. Haranguing Scipio's soldiers on parade, he invited them to accept their share of the booty to be won in the victory which was already assured. But the authority of Pompey was being undermined. Officers and senators sneered at his caution and complained that he was deliberately prolonging the war, because he was loth to surrender power and liked to treat his equals as if they were his slaves.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 452-67.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 82, 2-3. Cf. *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 67, 4-5; *Caes.*, 41, 1-2; *App.*, ii, 67, 278.

48 B. C.  
[Palaeo-  
kastro.]

receives  
the sub-  
mission of  
Metro-  
polis,

Aug. 1 ?  
(May 29).  
and en-  
camps by  
Palae-  
pharsalus.

Pompey  
joins  
Scipio :  
personal  
ambitions  
of his  
followers.



48 B. C.

Discontent, moreover, was accompanied by dissension. Who were to be elected consuls for the next few years? What right had Afranius to stand again after his disgraceful surrender at Ilerda? Who were to have the estates and the mansions of Caesar's followers? What punishment should be inflicted upon those senators who had remained in Rome and upon those who, though they had joined Pompey, had shirked military service? Domitius Ahenobarbus proposed that as soon as Caesar had been beaten a ballot should be taken to decide whether they should be pardoned, or deprived of all civil rights, or merely fined. Scipio, Lentulus Spinther, and Ahenobarbus all wanted to succeed Caesar as chief pontiff, and violently abused one another as they insisted upon their respective claims. 'In short', wrote Caesar,<sup>1</sup> whose testimony was confirmed by Cicero,<sup>2</sup> 'they were all scheming for honours, pecuniary gains, or the gratification of personal animosities: what they thought of was not how to organize victory, but how to profit by it.'

Preliminary operations in the Pharsalian plain.

The day was approaching which would decide all. Pompey had encamped some three miles north-west of Caesar on the slopes of Mount Dogandzis, behind the road by which he had come from Larisa. Despite many difficulties, Caesar's commissariat was now working smoothly. The impression left by the disaster at Dyrrachium was fading, and the morale of the soldiers was nearly as good as ever. Accordingly Caesar formed his army in line of battle immediately in front of his camp. This was of course a mere demonstration, intended to prepare the men for what was to come. It was repeated daily; but on each successive day the legionaries found themselves nearer to Pompey's camp, and as his army never moved from the lower slopes of the hill which it occupied into the plain, the Caesarians became more and more confident. There were some skirmishes, however, between the mounted troops, and in one Caesar's little brigade, supported, as before, by picked legionaries, charged so vigorously that their opponents fled, one of the

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 83, 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, xi, 6, 2. 6. Cf. *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 67, 6; *Caes.*, 42, 1.

Allobrogian traitors being among the slain. Pompey persistently waited, hoping that Caesar would be emboldened to attack him even on unfavourable ground. But Caesar could not afford to accept risks ; and the granaries of Pharsalia were becoming depleted. Concluding that Pompey was not to be enticed, he resolved to quit his encampment and to move from place to place, replenishing his stores as he went ; for he expected that Pompey's unseasoned soldiers would be exhausted by hard marching and that, sooner or later, an opportunity would arise of forcing them to fight. He did not know that his enemy, yielding to the exhortations of his impatient colleagues, had resolved to delay no more.<sup>1</sup>

A few days before, Pompey had convened a council of war. He assured his officers that victory was absolutely certain—that it would be won before the infantry were fairly engaged. ‘ I know ’, he added, ‘ that what I am promising sounds hardly credible ; but listen to my plans, and you will go into action with increased confidence. I have persuaded our cavalry, who have promised compliance, when the armies approach one another, to attack Caesar's right wing on their exposed flank and, enveloping his line, to throw his force into confusion and rout it before our infantry have time to launch their javelins. We shall end the war without exposing our legions and practically without loss. There is no difficulty, our cavalry being so strong.’ Labienus chimed in, remarking that the plan was excellent and that Caesar's little force was contemptible : ‘ Do not imagine, Pompey, that this is the army that conquered Gaul and Germany. I was present in every battle, and I know what I am talking about. A mere fraction of that army survives. Many have fallen, as was inevitable in a long series of battles ; many perished from malaria in Italy ; many have gone home ; many were left behind in the peninsula. No doubt you have all heard that units were made up at Brundisium out of men who remained there on the plea of sickness ? The troops which

Pompey  
assures  
his offi-  
cers of  
victory.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 86, 1 ; *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 67 4-5 ; 68, 1 ; *Caes.*, 42, 1 ; *App.*, ii, 66, 275-67, 279.

48 B. C.

you see had their gaps filled up by recent levies in Cisalpine Gaul, most of the recruits coming from colonies beyond the Po ; and the few seasoned men fell in the two combats at Dyrrachium.' Labienus then swore, urging his colleagues to do likewise, not to leave the battle-field unless victorious. Pompey may have smiled when he listened to the renegade's exaggerations ; but the speech served its purpose. Every officer who was present took the oath ; and they dispersed in high spirits, feeling sure that an experienced commander like Pompey would not have spoken so confidently without good grounds.<sup>1</sup>

Battle of  
Pharsalia.

June 6.

Caesar intended to march, in the first instance, north-eastward to Scotussa, beyond the main road that connected Pharsalus with Larisa.<sup>2</sup> On the morning of the 9th of August,<sup>3</sup> when the tents had been struck and the head of the column was already passing through the gate, he noticed that Pompey's army was formed up at a considerable distance from his camp, almost at the foot of the hill. Had Pompey suspected that Caesar designed to cut his communication with Larisa ? At last the opportunity for which Caesar had so long waited had come. Turning to his staff, he said, ' We must postpone our march for the present, and fix our minds upon the battle that we have always desired. Let us brace ourselves for the struggle ; we shall not easily get another chance.'<sup>4</sup> The column halted : the men were ordered to lay aside their packs and prepare for action. Meanwhile gangs of pioneers were cutting gaps in the rampart and making causeways over the trench, to expedite the movement of the force.<sup>5</sup> Seven cohorts—about two thousand men—were left to hold the camp.<sup>6</sup> As the columns emerged, the officers wheeled them into line. The regular infantry comprised eight legions ; but they numbered only twenty-two thousand men. The 10th legion was posted, as usual, on the right wing ; the 9th on the left, flanked so closely by the 8th (for the 9th had lost heavily at Dyrrachium) that

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 86-7. See pp. 467-8.<sup>2</sup> See p. 467.<sup>3</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, pp. 324, 328. <sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 85, 4. <sup>5</sup> See p. 468.<sup>6</sup> See H. Meusel's note (p. 272 of his edition) on *B. C.* iii, 89, 2.

the two formed practically one and were ordered to give <sup>48 B. C.</sup> each other mutual support. Antony commanded the left wing; Publius Sulla the right; Domitius Calvinus the centre. Caesar himself took post upon the right. As the line approached the enemy, he was able to discern the dispositions which Pompey had made. He had left seven cohorts to guard his camp and the redoubts which he had constructed near it. His left wing, which he commanded in person,<sup>1</sup> was composed of the two legions which Caesar had sent back to him before the war began. The centre consisted of the legions which Scipio had brought from Syria. The right wing comprised, besides the cohorts which had followed Afranius from Spain,<sup>2</sup> the veteran legion formed out of the two that had served under Cicero in Cilicia. The six remaining legions, comprehending the veterans from Crete and Macedonia, the levies which Pompey had transported from Italy, and those which Lentulus had raised in Asia, were placed between the centre and the wings. The whole of the regular infantry, including two thousand old soldiers, who had volunteered in answer to Pompey's appeal, and whom he had distributed throughout the ranks, that their example might inspire the less experienced, amounted, if Caesar was not misinformed, to forty-seven thousand men;<sup>3</sup> but five of the legions had served only one year, and two could hardly have forgotten that in Gaul they had followed Caesar to victory and had received from him a parting gift. The ranks in each of the three lines stood ten deep!<sup>4</sup> As the right wing was protected by the Enipeus, Pompey had placed his redoubtable cavalry, supported by his slingers, archers, and mounted archers, on his extreme left.<sup>5</sup> Caesar, who divined the purpose of his adversary,

<sup>1</sup> Lucan (vii, 218) says that Lentulus commanded Pompey's left wing. R. Pichon (*Les sources de Lucain*, 1912, p. 116) suggests that he may have commanded under Pompey. Similarly Sulla commanded Caesar's right wing, but Caesar himself took post there (*B. C.*, iii, 89, 2).

<sup>2</sup> See p. 469.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 472-6.

<sup>4</sup> Frontin., *Strat.*, ii, 3, 22.

<sup>5</sup> According to Frontinus (*l. c.*), Pompey kept 600 cavalry, according to Eutropius (vi, 20) and Orosius (vi, 15, 23), 500 on his right. Perhaps Caesar ignored them as negligible.



48 B. C.

saw that the stress of the battle would be there. He therefore detached eight cohorts from the third line—one from each legion—<sup>1</sup> and, posting them obliquely <sup>2</sup> as a fourth line, concealed by the right wing, directed their commander to watch for Pompey's cavalry: the men were not to hurl their javelins, but to use them as spears, stabbing the troopers in the face; and, above all, they were to bear in mind that victory depended upon *their* valour. At the same time Caesar warned the tribunes who commanded the cohorts of the third line on no account to engage before he gave the signal: until they saw the red ensign raised they were to remain still.

For a brief space the two armies stood, confronting one another, less than two hundred yards apart. It was a sultry midsummer day, and the sun had already risen high. The generals harangued their troops. Caesar reminded his men that, as he was unwilling to see their blood flow in vain or to deprive the fatherland of good soldiers, he had striven, as long as hope remained, to secure an honourable peace; but Vatinius, Clodius, and Libo had appealed to Pompey and to Scipio in vain. The legionaries were waiting eagerly for the signal. Gaius Crastinus, formerly the chief centurion of the 10th legion, who had left his retirement to serve his old commander, turned to the soldiers whom he had once led: 'Follow me,' he cried, 'you men who belonged to my company, and do your duty to your general, as of yore. This is our last fight; when it is won, he will recover his position and we our liberty.' Then, looking at Caesar, 'General,' he said, 'to-day you shall have cause to thank me, alive or dead.' So saying, Crastinus, followed by a hundred and twenty men, led the way; <sup>3</sup> and, as the blasts of many trumpets rang along the line the cohorts with one universal shout moved on.

But no answering shout came from the Pompeian line. The enemy stood still. Pompey, acting, as it was said, upon the advice of one of his officers, had forbidden them

<sup>1</sup> See p. 469.

<sup>2</sup> Lucan, vii, 522.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 469–70.

to stir.<sup>1</sup> When their opponents charged, they were to wait and let them exhaust themselves : thus the javelins would fall with lessened force, and when the onset came they would easily worst a disordered and panting line. Charging with their javelins poised, the Caesarians noticed with amazement the silence and inaction of their opponents : about half way they stopped : when they had recovered breath they charged again, the first two ranks paused to hurl their javelins, then drew their swords and closed. But the Pompeian line stood unbroken and unshaken : catching the javelins on their bucklers and launching their own, they bore the shock without flinching ; and then began a struggle, long-drawn-out, Roman against Roman, short sword against short sword. Crastinus was stabbed through the mouth, and fell. Thrusting and parrying thrusts, the front ranks swayed and bent, encouraged by the presence of the reserves, and sustained by the pressure of their comrades in the rear, who, when the men in the fighting line began to tire, stepped through the intervals to take their places.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile Labienus<sup>3</sup> directed the manœuvre by which his chief intended to win the battle. Seven thousand strong, supported by the archers and the slingers, his cavalry rode forward, and, as Caesar's brigade deliberately gave way, they deployed, squadron by squadron, and began to envelop the Roman right. Caesar, intently watching their movement, ordered his fourth line to advance. Instantly the eight cohorts, grasping their javelins like spears,<sup>4</sup> charged at the double. The motley host—Gauls and Germans, Italian slaves and shepherds, Thracians, Thessalians, Macedonians, Cappadocians, Syrians—who were sweeping onward as to an assured victory, panic-stricken by this unexpected onslaught, pulled up, swung their horses

<sup>1</sup> Compare with Caesar's well-known condemnation of Pompey's order (*B. C.*, iii, 92, 3) the words of Lord Wolseley (*The Soldier's Pocket-Book*<sup>5</sup>, 1886, p. 380)—'A ringing cheer is inseparable from charging—I do not believe it possible to get a line in action to charge in silence—and, were it possible, the general who would deprive himself of the moral assistance it gives the assailants must be ignorant of human nature'.

<sup>2</sup> See *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 597–8.

<sup>3</sup> *Plut., Pomp.*, 68, 1.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 470.

48 B. C.

round, and galloped northward for the hills, while the archers and the slingers, abandoned and defenceless, for they carried no shields, were hunted down and slaughtered by Caesar's cavalry,<sup>1</sup> and the eight cohorts, continuing their charge, lapped round Pompey's left wing and attacked his struggling infantry from behind. Now was the moment for Caesar to throw in the third line. He gave the signal; and the four thousand men of this reserve advanced to support their comrades of the first two lines, which in the stress of conflict had become one. Then at last, distracted and disheartened, the eleven legions broke and fled, pursued by the Caesarians, to their camp. Pompey was already there. When he saw his cavalry, in whom he had put his trust, give way, he realized that all was lost, and riding back, addressed the centurions as he passed through the gate: 'Guard the camp and, if anything goes wrong, defend it resolutely. I am going round to inspect the other gates myself and encourage the guard.'<sup>2</sup> He then retired to his tent, to await the inevitable end.

It was noon, and Caesar's men were tired and suffering from the sweltering heat; but when he urged them to follow up their victory and storm the camp, they cheerfully obeyed. The fugitives, most of them throwing away their shields and standards, hurried out. The cohorts left on guard, backed by the Thracian contingent and the other auxiliaries, resisted stoutly, but could not long stand fast under the missiles that were showered upon them, and, following their officers, who were the first to leave their posts, ascended the adjoining heights. Domitius and others who fled with him were hunted down by the cavalry under Antony and slain.<sup>3</sup> Pompey remained in his tent until the Caesarians, having stormed the rampart, streamed into the camp and began to plunder. Then, divesting himself of his scarlet cloak and the other badges of his rank, he mounted the first horse that he could find, rode through the rear gate, and, accompanied by three

Flight of  
Pompey.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 471.

<sup>2</sup> B. C., iii, 94, 6.

<sup>3</sup> Seneca, *De benef.*, iii, 24; Suet., *Nero*, 2, 3.

senators, Favonius and the two Lentuli,<sup>1</sup> made his way 48 B. C. to Larisa. Caesar noticed with astonishment that the Pompeian magnates, not satisfied with tents, had had pavilions built of wood or freshly cut turf, on some of which ivy had been trained to keep out the rays of the sun; and entering, he found tables loaded with silver plate and flagons of wine. 'One could easily see', he wrote, thinking of the hardships which his own men had patiently endured, 'that they had felt no fear of the result, or they would not have sought needless luxuries.'<sup>2</sup> Going among the men, he made them understand that there was no time to spare for plunder; the enemy must be prevented from escaping, and that could only be done by throwing up an earthwork round the hill. Entrenching tools were sent for, but it was not yet necessary to use them, for the Pompeians could get no water on the hill and moved off along the ridge towards Larisa. Caesar left a detachment in the camp, sent back another to his own, and marched with four legions to intercept the fugitives. Finding their retreat cut off, they halted on a hill, beneath which flowed a stream. It was now dusk, and the legions had been fighting, looting, marching since the dawn; but Caesar called upon them to make one more effort and construct an entrenchment between stream and hill. A few senators, who had accompanied the troops, stole away by night. Towards daybreak, when the entrenchment was completed, the fugitives sent envoys to propose surrender. Caesar replied that the whole force must come down and give up their arms. They obeyed, and their officers, kneeling, begged piteously for mercy. Caesar spoke to them kindly, reminding them that his clemency was notorious, and appealed to his men to do them no violence and to respect their property.<sup>3</sup> Including the piquets which had guarded Pompey's redoubts, and which had surrendered to Sulla, the prisoners amounted to twenty-four thousand; and many fugitives escaped into the

His troops  
surrender.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 102, 7; *Vell.*, ii, 53, 1; *App.*, ii, 81, 343.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 96, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 98, 2. Cf. *Flor.*, ii, 13, 50; *Suet.*, 75, 2; *App.*, ii, 80, 336.



48 B. C. surrounding country. Caesar reported that fifteen thousand were believed to have fallen in the battle; but he evidently distrusted an estimate that rested upon hearsay. On the lowest computation, however, the number was six thousand, and, as often happened in ancient warfare, when a beaten and shattered army was at the mercy of its pursuers, the loss of the vanquished was far greater than that of the victors: in Caesar's army not more than two hundred men and about thirty centurions were slain.<sup>1</sup>

Aug. 10  
(June 7).  
Caesar at  
Larisa. The legions, which had earned repose, were sent back to their camp. The prisoners, for the most part, took service under Caesar. Three new legions were formed, while the rest of the men were drafted into the ranks of the existing army.<sup>2</sup> Caesar remained where he was until four fresh legions came from camp to join him, and on the same day marched to Larisa. He found that Pompey had gone. Following the example which Pompey had set when he refused to read the letters with which Perperna had tried to purchase life,<sup>3</sup> he burned unopened the correspondence of Pompey and of Scipio.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 472-6.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 476-7.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. i, p. 153.

<sup>4</sup> Pliny, vii, 25 (26), 94; Seneca, *De ira*, ii, 23, 4; Dio, xli, 63, 5. Appian (ii, 88, 368) wrongly says that Caesar remained two days at Pharsalus.

## CHAPTER XX

### END OF THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE CIVIL WAR. — ALEXANDRIA. — BRUNDISIUM AND VIBO. — NICOPOLIS. — ZELA. — ILLYRICUM

POMPEY with his companions had reached Larisa before the troops whom he abandoned laid down their arms. There he was joined by thirty horsemen who had escaped from Pharsalia. In the night they rode through the deep vale of Tempe to the mouth of the Peneus, where, while it was still dark, Pompey rested in a fisherman's hut.<sup>1</sup> At dawn he bade most of his followers depart, and putting off with the rest in a pinnace, boarded a passing merchantman. Presently the aged Deiotarus was sighted in another boat and received on board. Pompey was possessed by one thought, to which he repeatedly gave utterance:—his judgement had failed; the men on whom he had counted to win the battle had been the first to flee.<sup>2</sup> Favonius, one of the three senators, who had derided him at the outset of the war, was now full of sympathy, and insisted on performing for him the menial duties of a slave.<sup>3</sup> The ship touched at Amphipolis; and Pompey, sending for some of the residents, whom he knew personally, borrowed money from them to defray the expenses of his journey. A proclamation had been issued in his name, requiring all the inhabitants of the province who were liable to military service to assemble; but Caesar was doubtful whether its object was to prevent people from suspecting that Pompey intended flight or to make a serious attempt to hold Macedonia.<sup>4</sup> Next morning, as it was rumoured that

48 B. C.

Aug. 9  
(June 6),  
Pompey's  
journey  
from La-  
risa to  
Egypt.

<sup>1</sup> Caes., *B. C.*, iii, 96, 4; Lucan, viii, 1-5; Plut., *Pomp.*, 73, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 3-4; Caes., *l. c.*

<sup>3</sup> Plut., 73, 5.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 102, 2-4.

48 B. C.

Caesar and his cavalry were approaching, the ship sailed on to Mytilene,<sup>1</sup> where Pompey's wife Cornelia and his younger son Sextus had been staying since the war began.<sup>2</sup> Pompey sent a messenger to fetch them. Letters which Cornelia had received from her husband had led her to believe that his victory at Dyrrachium was decisive and that the expected capture of Caesar would end the war. The messenger, forgetting all ceremony in his agitation, told her that she must come on board at once if she wished to see Pompey again. She fainted, but, presently recovering, suffered herself to be led to the harbour.<sup>3</sup> The ship was detained for two days by stress of weather, and then, reinforced by four smaller craft, Pompey sailed on past Chios, touched at a port near Ephesus, where Deiotarus left him, and, calling at Rhodes, the authorities of which refused to receive him, proceeded to Attalia in Pamphylia. There he was joined by other vessels containing some troops and about sixty

<sup>1</sup> *cognito Caesaris adventu ex eo loco discessit* (B. C., iii, 102, 4). Dr. J. P. Postgate, who in his masterly edition of Lucan's Eighth Book (1917, p. lxxii) accepts my suggestion that *adventu* means 'approach', remarks that the words which I have quoted 'would be satisfied if Caesar were then say 20 miles from the town'. Yes, or even more: cf. B. C., i, 15, 3. Stoffel's estimate (*Hist. de J. César*, ii, 1887, p. 254, n. 1)—7 days—of the duration of Caesar's ride from Larisa to Amphipolis (about 160 English miles) is too high: W. Judeich's (*Caesar im Orient*, 1885, p. 58)—3 days—too low. But the state of the roads, the condition of the horses, the facilities for obtaining forage are all unknown.

I have not thought it necessary to compute the dates of the successive stages of Pompey's voyage; but there is an excellent discussion on pp. lxxi-lxxvii of Postgate's volume. The few alterations which I might tentatively make in his Chronological Table are too slight to be worth mentioning; but in my first volume (pp. 339-41) I have given reasons for believing that Groebe's synchronisms, which he accepts, should be antedated by one day. Judeich's computation (*op. cit.*, pp. 52-7) depends partly upon the time-tables of modern steamers (!), partly upon the evidence of the geographer known as Pseudo-Scylax, who doubtless gave an average estimate. A young friend of mine crossed the North Sea in a ketch of his own in 1914: on one day he made 180 knots, on another 40. Everything depends upon the weather which Pompey met with, and after all accuracy in these matters is not only unattainable, but unimportant.

<sup>2</sup> Velleius (ii, 53, 1) implies that Sextus accompanied his father in his flight from Larisa: my statement is supported by Lucan (viii, 204-5), Plutarch (*Pomp.*, 74, 1), and Dio (xlii, 2, 3).

<sup>3</sup> Lucan, v, 723-7; Plut., 66, 2; 74.

fugitive senators.<sup>1</sup> Hearing that his fleet was still in being,<sup>2</sup> he lamented that he had allowed himself to be persuaded to follow Caesar instead of relying upon his naval superiority.<sup>3</sup> From Attalia the little squadron sailed along the coast to Syedra in Cilicia, where Pompey succeeded in raising money and enlisting some recruits.<sup>4</sup> He was inclined to go on to Parthia and try to raise an army there ; but some of his companions, reminding him that Juba was his friend, advised him to go to Africa ; and his secretary Theophanes strongly dissuaded him from carrying out his plan. The Parthians were not to be trusted, and it would be criminal folly to expose his young wife, the widow of Crassus, to barbarian lust. His best course would be to make for Egypt ; for many of his old soldiers were living there and would gladly join him, and, moreover, by reinstating the late King he had established a claim to the gratitude of his successor. Pompey accepted this advice ;<sup>5</sup> and if he saw that the one province in which his colleagues might hope to renew the war was Africa, he must have decided that such an enterprise was not for him. From Syedra therefore the party sailed for Cyprus. There Pompey received information which must have convinced him, if he still wavered, that to enter Syria would be useless. The inhabitants of Antioch and the Roman financiers who resided there had unanimously determined to exclude him, if necessary by force of arms. Pharsalia had annihi-

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 102, 5, 7 ; *Cic.*, *Fam.*, xii, 14, 3 ; *De div.*, ii, 37, 79 ; Lucan, viii, 159-255 (cf. Postgate, *op cit.*, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv) ; *Plut.*, 76, 1. Lucan (251) is probably right in saying that Pompey touched at Phaselis before he reached Attalia.

<sup>2</sup> The Rhodian and the Egyptian squadron had already left it.

<sup>3</sup> *Plut.*, 76, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Lucan, viii, 259 ; *Plut.*, 76, 3. Plutarch (§ 2) says that Pompey heard at Attalia that Cato was crossing with troops to Africa.

<sup>5</sup> *Plut.*, 76, 4 ; Lucan, viii, 259-455 ; *Flor.*, ii, 13, 51 ; *App.*, *B. C.*, ii, 83, 349-51. Meusel (in a note on *Caes.*, *B. C.*, iii, 103, 1) and others say that, according to Plutarch (77, 1), Pompey broached the question of going to Parthia in Cyprus ; but whoever reads Plutarch's narrative carefully will see that he does not indicate the place, which is mentioned by the other authorities. Dio (xlii, 2, 5) gives a bad reason for disbelieving that Pompey ever thought of going to the Parthians. Cf. *Vell.*, ii, 53, 1.



48 B. C. lated his influence even in the eastern lands where, a year before, he had been omnipotent. Nevertheless he still dreamed of recovering his position by the sword. He raised money from the syndicates of tax-gatherers and from private individuals, collected two thousand armed men—partly slaves employed by the syndicates, partly recruits whom the Roman money-lenders enlisted for him—and shipped a large quantity of copper for military use. About the 24th of September he sailed from Cyprus, and, failing to make the harbour of Alexandria, anchored three days later off Pelusium, near the eastern mouth of the Nile.<sup>1</sup>

Ptolemy  
and Cleo-  
patra.

Ptolemy, the King of Egypt, a boy of thirteen, accompanied by his tutor, a eunuch named Pothinus, was then encamped at the head of his army on the promontory of Casius, north-east of Pelusium.<sup>2</sup> Under the will of his father his sister Cleopatra, who by Egyptian custom was also his wife, was associated with him in sovereignty; but, influenced by Pothinus, he had expelled her from Alexandria. She fled to Syria, which was then without a governor, raised an army there, and, returning to recover her inheritance, encamped not far from the position which her brother held.<sup>3</sup> Pompey, sailing on from Pelusium, sent messengers to request the King, in return for the benefits which he had conferred upon his father,<sup>4</sup> to grant him an asylum and to befriend him in his distress. It was the 28th of September, the anniversary of the day on which he had entered Rome in triumph for his victories in Spain, his subjection of the pirates,

Pompey  
seeks an  
asylum  
with Pto-  
lemy,

July 24.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 102, 5-6; 103, 1; *Cic.*, *Phil.*, ii, 15, 39; *Val. Max.*, i, 5, 6; *Lucan.*, viii, 456-69; *Plut.*, 77, 1; *Eutrop.*, vi, 21. Some of the 'two thousand armed men' whom Caesar (103, 1) mentions may have been raised in Cilicia. Cf. *Plut.*, 76, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 103, 2; *App.*, ii, 84, 352.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*; *B. C.*, 103, 2; 108, 3; *Strabo*, xvii, 1, 11; *Dio*, xlii, 3, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Postgate (*op. cit.*, pp. xlvi-xlvii) infers from *Lucan.*, viii, 448 (*sceptra puer Ptolemaeus habet tibi debita, Magne*), 518-9 (*quod nobis sceptrum senatus, te suadente dedit*), 560 (*qui tibi regna dedit*), and 572-3 that the quarrel between Cleopatra and Ptolemy was referred to the arbitration of the 'senate' which surrounded Pompey in Macedonia, and that, on his advice, they decided in favour of the King. I hesitate to believe on the unsupported evidence of *Lucan* that Pompey was so unjust.

and his conquest of the East. During the absence of the 48 B. C.  
messengers he wrote down in Greek what he intended to say to the King. The messengers, having fulfilled their mission, accosted the soldiers who were standing by, among them being veterans whom Pompey had once led, and urged them not to spurn him in his reverse of fortune, but to aid him, as they were in honour bound to do. The conversation was overheard. Pothinus and the other advisers of the King were consulting together. What weighed most with them was the fear that Pompey might take advantage of his influence with his old soldiers to make himself master of Egypt. Theodotus of Chios, the King's teacher, argued, further, that to receive him would make him their master and Caesar their enemy ; to dismiss him would provoke his anger and exasperate Caesar by balking him of his prey. When they had decided what to do they gave an amicable reply to the messengers and sent Achilles, an officer of the King's army, along with a centurion named Salvius and Septimius, a military tribune, who, as a centurion, had served under Pompey, in an open boat to fetch him. Cornelia, suspecting danger, begged him to put out to sea ; but he noticed that the royal galleys were being manned. As the boat came alongside, Septimius respectfully stood up, while Achilles apologized for not having provided a galley befitting Pompey's rank, explaining that sand-banks made it dangerous to bring a vessel of deep draught. Pompey bade his wife farewell and entered the boat, accompanied by one of his freedmen, Philippus, and three other attendants. As the boatmen pulled off he turned towards Cornelia and repeated a couplet from Sophocles<sup>1</sup> :—

‘ He that once enters at a tyrant's door

Becomes a slave though he were free before.’

Presently, looking at Septimius, who remained standing at attention, he exclaimed, ‘ Surely I recognize an old comrade ? ’ Septimius nodded, but did not answer. As nobody spoke, Pompey coned his written speech.

<sup>1</sup> Fr. 789 (A. Nauck, *Trag. Græc. fr.*<sup>2</sup>, 1889, p. 316) :

ὅστις γὰρ ὡς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται  
κείνου 'στι δοῦλος κὰν ἐλεύθερος μόλη.

48 B. C. Crowds were seen lining the shore ; the army was drawn up, as if to welcome the illustrious refugee ; and in their midst was the King, conspicuous in his purple robe. As the boat touched the beach, Philippus took his patron's hand, helping him to mount the prow. Instantly Septimius stabbed Pompey in the back ; Achilles and Salvius drew their swords ; and Pompey, pulling his cloak over his face, groaned as he received their thrusts and fell down dead.<sup>1</sup>

but is  
murdered.

Sept. 28<sup>2</sup>  
(July 24).

His  
funeral.

Septimius cut off Pompey's head and carried it to the King, leaving the trunk upon the shore. An order was given that the head should be embalmed and preserved as an offering for Caesar. Philippus stood by the corpse until the crowd had dispersed ; then washed it in the sea and, wrapping it in one of his own garments, prepared to cremate it on the broken timbers of a derelict boat which lay hard by. While he was raising the pyre an old soldier, who in early life had fought under the General, joined him, and together they burned the body, remaining by the fire throughout the night. Then they collected and interred the ashes ; and many years later the geographer Strabo pointed to the Casian promontory as the spot ' where lies the body of Pompey the Great '.<sup>3</sup>

Caesar in  
Asia.

While these events were in progress Caesar was crossing the Mediterranean Sea. He had remained a few hours at Larisa,<sup>4</sup> making arrangements for sending all the

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 103, 3-5 ; 104 ; Strabo, xvii, 1, 11 ; Livy, *Epit.*, 112 ; Vell., ii, 53, 1-2 ; Lucan, viii, 470-636 ; Plut., 77, 2-3 ; 78-9 ; Flor., ii, 13, 52 ; App., ii, 84-5 ; Dio, xlii, 3, 2-4 ; 4 ; Oros., vi, 15, 28. Cf. Postgate, *op. cit.*, pp. xlviii-lix.

<sup>2</sup> Vell., ii, 53, 3. Cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxvii, 2 (6), 13 ; Dio, xlii, 5, 5. Plutarch (*Pomp.*, 79, 2), making two blunders in one sentence, says that Pompey died on the day following his birthday and that he was 59 years old. He was born on Sept. 29, 106 B. C.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, xvi, 2, 33 ; Pliny, v, 12 (14), 68 ; Val. Max., i, 8, 9 ; v, 1, 10 ; Vell., ii, 53, 3 ; Lucan, viii, 663-793 ; Plut., 80, 2-3 ; App., ii, 86, 361 ; Ps. Victor, *De vir. ill.*, 77, 9.

<sup>4</sup> The statement in the *Epitome* of Livy (112) *Caesar post tertium diem [Pompeium] insecutus* probably means that Caesar began his pursuit on the third day (reckoning of course inclusively) after the battle of Pharsalia ;

legions which he could spare to Italy <sup>1</sup> and giving instructions to Mark Antony, who was to command them. The three legions which had been formed out of the troops that surrendered were dispatched under Domitius to the province of Asia. Caesar resolved first of all to pursue Pompey, lest he should be able to raise fresh troops and renew the war. On the 11th or the 12th of August he left Larisa with eight hundred cavalry, ordering the 6th legion to follow, and marched rapidly through the Vale of Tempe, then along the road that skirted the Aegean to Amphipolis, and thence to Sestus on the Hellespont. While he was crossing the strait, ten galleys hove in sight, coming from the Aegean Sea. They were commanded by one Lucius Cassius, otherwise unknown, who was on his way to support Pharnaces, the son of Mithradates, in the interest of Pompey. Cassius could easily have sunk the trading vessels that were conveying Caesar's little force; but, if our authorities can be trusted, he was so impressed by Caesar's recent victory that he surrendered. The story sounds so improbable that one is tempted to suggest that Cassius may have received a bribe; but at all events the galleys passed into Caesar's power.<sup>2</sup> Envoys from the Ionians, Aeolians, and other peoples came to make submission; and Caesar learned that one of his bitterest enemies, Titus Ampius Balbus, had heard of his approach while he was preparing to rifle the treasures contained in the temple of Diana at Ephesus, and had forthwith fled. From the Hellespont Caesar sailed to Ephesus, where he made arrangements for the settlement of the province. As a conqueror, he could afford to win loyalty by conciliation, though he was forced, in order to defray the growing charges of the war, to levy contributions in return. He confirmed a grant of self-government which Sulla had made to Ilium, bestowed the same favour upon Cnidus, and, abolishing the farming of the taxes, from which the

His settlement of the province.

in other words, that having reached Larisa on August 10, the day after the battle, he left on August 11.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 24, 59.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 482.



48 B. C.

About  
Sept. 28  
(July 24).  
He sails  
with an in-  
adequate  
force to  
Alexan-  
dria.

July 27.

provincials had suffered for many years, commuted them for a fixed tribute, which the several communities were to raise themselves.<sup>1</sup> The Ephesians manifested their gratitude by an inscription in which they hailed him as divine, a form of adulation which less illustrious Romans had accepted before.<sup>2</sup> Learning that Pompey had been in Cyprus and concluding that he intended to go to Egypt, Caesar coasted from Ephesus to Rhodes and sailed thence for Alexandria. His force comprised, besides the eight hundred horsemen who had accompanied him from Larisa and the 6th legion, which had overtaken him, another, commanded by Fufius Calenus, which he had summoned from Achaia; but he embarked with the 6th and a part of his cavalry alone, leaving the rest of the cavalry and the legion of Calenus to follow.<sup>3</sup> The two legions had suffered so heavily in successive campaigns that they could muster only three thousand two hundred men; but Caesar relied so confidently upon the prestige of his victory that, as he himself said, he 'had not hesitated to advance, believing that he would be equally safe everywhere'.<sup>4</sup> On the 2nd of October the squadron was approaching the Egyptian coast;<sup>5</sup> soon every feature of the great lighthouse, one of the Seven Wonders of the World, which for hours had guided the steersmen—the square white tower, the octagon that rose above it, the round turret that carried the colossal statue of Zeus which surmounted all<sup>6</sup>—was plainly visible; and as Caesar's galley glided past it through the entrance of the harbour, he could see the noble buildings of Alexandria,—the Palace, the Museum, the Theatre, the Temple of the Sea God, the Exchange, the Gymnasium, and the two obelisks of red sandstone, of which one now stands on

<sup>1</sup> See p. 482.

<sup>2</sup> *C. I. G.*, 2957. See also 2215, 2369, and *Mitt. d. Kaiserl. deutschen arch. Inst.*, Athen. Abt., xxxiii, 1908, p. 410, No. 44; xxxiv, 1909, p. 335.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 484–5.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 106, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Judeich, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–9. According to Appian (ii, 89, 375), Caesar's voyage (from Rhodes) lasted three days: Lucan (ix, 1004–5), who says that he arrived on the seventh day, probably meant from Ephesus.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 485.

the Thames Embankment, and the other has crossed the Atlantic Ocean.<sup>1</sup> Theodotus put off in a boat to meet him and showed him the embalmed head of Pompey and his signet ring : Caesar averted his eyes and wept, ordering that the head should be reverently interred.<sup>2</sup> 48 B. C.

The civil war in which Caesar and Pompey were the protagonists was over ; and although the two sons of Pompey and the other leaders of his party were already preparing to renew the struggle, more than a year was to elapse before the second period of the war began. When Caesar learned that Pompey was dead, the avowed purpose for which he had come to Egypt was accomplished. Yet he decided—doubtless he had already decided—to remain. He must have known that the disaster which had befallen Curio on the Bagradas was likely to beget further trouble in Africa ; and, unless he misunderstood the character of the officer whom he had appointed Governor of Further Spain, he could hardly have expected that the Peninsula would long remain at peace. He must have reflected that the sons of Pompey, that Scipio, Labienus, Afranius, and Petreius would never acquiesce in the defeat at Pharsalia or neglect to take advantage of the enmity which Juba bore to Caesar or of the prestige that still belonged to Pompey in Spain. In Egypt, on the other hand, there was nothing to be done except to settle the dispute between Ptolemy and Cleopatra and to arrange for the payment of the money which the late King had promised, as the price of his restoration, to the triumvirs ; and if the wind that had carried Caesar to Alexandria prevented him from leaving it,<sup>3</sup> was it not in his power to remain at anchor until the wind should change ? But he who judges after the event should consider what information was available before. No doubt Caesar over-

Why he decided to remain.

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, xvii, 1, 9 ; Philo, *Leg. ad Gaium*, 22, 150-1.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 102, 1 ; 105, 1 ; 106, 1-4 ; 107, 1 ; Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 24, 59 ; Strabo, xiii, 1, 27 (cf. App., *Mithr.*, 61) ; Seneca (the elder), *Controv.*, x, 3, 1, 5 ; Val. Max., v, 1, 10 ; Lucan, ix, 950-1108 ; Plut., *Caes.*, 48, 1-2 ; *Ant.*, 8 ; App., ii, 89, 373-5 ; Dio, xlii, 6 ; 7, 1-2 ; 8, 1 ; Ps. Victor, *De vir. ill.*, 77, 9 ; 78, 6 ; Eutrop., vi, 21 ; Oros., vi, 15, 29.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 107, 1.

48 B. C.

estimated the effect which his victory would produce ; and probably he expected to settle the affairs of Alexandria without serious difficulty or loss of time. But the blame that has been heaped upon him for having allowed himself to be entangled in the quarrel between Ptolemy and Cleopatra seems hardly warranted. It is doubtful whether, if he had decided to wait for a favourable wind, he could have fed his army ; the money which Ptolemy owed was indispensable for defraying the expenses of the war ; Syria, left without a governor, demanded care ; Deiotarus and Pharnaces might give trouble ; above all it was essential to secure Egypt with its great resources against an enemy who might use it as a base. These things considered, it would be rash to find fault with Caesar for having resolved to tranquillize the East.<sup>1</sup> He determined to land ; and the Alexandrians were of course suspicious of his motive. Let us see what was the political situation with which he had to deal and survey the region that was to be the theatre of the Alexandrian War.

It will be remembered that eleven years before, in the first consulship of Caesar, Ptolemy Auletes had been recognized as a Friend and Ally of the Roman People ; and in his will he had appointed the Roman People guardians of his children.<sup>2</sup> The position of the young King and of his sister was therefore one which justified Caesar, as a consul, in interfering to settle their dispute. They were still with their respective armies near Pelusium ; but a younger sister, Arsinoe, remained in Alexandria.

Topogra-  
phy of  
Alexan-  
dria.

Caesar, before he landed, could already observe the harbour, which was destined to play an important part in the events of the next few months. Its main features were not very different from those which a traveller sees to-day, when he is approaching Alexandria from Brindisi.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Hist. Zeitschr.*, cxv, 1916, p. 483.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 108, 3-4 ; *Bell. Alex.*, 33, 1 ; Dio, xlii, 35, 4. According to Livy (*Epit.*, 112, with which cf. Seneca, *Ep.*, 4, 7, and Eutropius, vi, 21), the Senate appointed Pompey guardian of Ptolemy. Did they make a wrong inference from Caesar's statement (108, 4) that the will was deposited with Pompey ?







Nearly parallel with the coast was a long low island, 48 B. C. covered by buildings which formed a suburb of considerable size, terminating eastward in the foundations of the lighthouse, and separated by a narrow space—the entrance of the Great Harbour—from a series of rocks and a pier which projected from Cape Lochias. The island was connected with the city by a mole, called the Heptastadium, or Seven Furlongs, which formed the western side of the Great Harbour and severed it from a smaller port, the harbour of Eunostus ; but ships could pass from harbour to harbour through two arches, one at either end of the mole. The city, containing a population of about three hundred thousand, whose turbulence was notorious throughout the Roman world—Greeks, Macedonians, Persians, Egyptians, Italians, Jews—besides a multitude of slaves,<sup>1</sup> was in form an irregular parallelogram, more than three miles in length from west to east, and over a mile wide, but narrowed at one point by a marshy depression, which stretched northward from Lake Mareotis towards Cape Lochias, and of which the southern portion was periodically inundated by the overflow of the Nile.<sup>2</sup> The streets were planned with the rectangular precision of an American town. Along the southern side, dividing the city from the lake, was a canal, fed by the Nile, from which water was supplied by means of conduits to every private house. The palace with its annexes, situated at the southern end of Cape Lochias, was connected with the theatre, which was near the sea. The great library, containing four hundred thousand volumes, and the Museum—the meeting-place of many illustrious scholars—were in one building, not far east of the Heptastadium.<sup>3</sup> Such was the panorama on which Caesar gazed as he and his little army entered the town.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Polyb., xxxiv, 14, 1-5 ; Diod. Sic., 1, 83, 6 ; xvii, 52, 6 ; Jos., *Ant.*, xiv, 9, 2 ; Dio, xxxix, 58, 2 ; *Eph. epigr.*, v, 1884, pp. 600-2 ; *Archiv f. Papyrusforschung*, v, 1913, pp. 36, 81-2, 104-5, 107, 111-12, 120-1, 124-5.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 489-91.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 488.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 112, 1-3, 8 ; *Bell. Alex.*, 1, 4-5 ; 5, 1-2 ; Strabo, xvii, 1, 6. 8. 9 ; Diod. Sic., xvii, 52, 3 ; Pliny, v, 10, 62. Jos., *Bell. Iud.*, iv, 10, 5. Cf. *Ency. Brit.*, i<sup>11</sup>, pp. 569-70, and D. G. Hogarth, *Report on Prospects of Research in Alexandria*, 1895, pp. 4, 6 n. 1, 8-10, 12, 22, 25.

48 B. C.

Hostile  
reception  
of Caesar :  
he sends  
for rein-  
force-  
ments.

If the Alexandrians had expected that Caesar would depart when he learned that Pompey was dead, they were soon undeceived. When he stepped ashore he was preceded by his lictors—a sign that he was entering Alexandria as a Roman commander.<sup>1</sup> The first sound that he heard was a roar of indignation. Soldiers, whom the young King had left behind to garrison the city, were thronging the quays and the streets. When they saw the lictors they felt that the majesty of Ptolemy was flouted, and advanced shouting and gesticulating, towards the intruders. But they were not yet prepared to fight. Caesar took up his quarters in the palace, and billeted his troops in the adjoining houses near the sea. The clamour died away ; but in the course of the next few days there were frequent riots and several Roman soldiers were murdered as they sauntered through the streets. The King's army was within a few marches from Alexandria, and Caesar saw that he might soon have to defend himself. Accordingly he dispatched a courier to Domitius, requesting him to send two of the three legions that had been recently formed to his assistance, and at the same time summoned Ptolemy to Alexandria, that he might adjudicate upon his quarrel. Such mandates were not usually issued except to dependants ; and Pothinus, who had returned to Alexandria, spoke indignantly to other courtiers of Caesar's insolence. Assured of their support, he dispatched messengers to recall the King's army, offered the chief command to Achilles, and promised to reward him if he succeeded in destroying Caesar's force. Meanwhile Ptolemy arrived in the palace. Cleopatra, who had captivated Pompey's elder son when he came to Egypt to raise a squadron,<sup>2</sup> knew that Caesar was amorous, and determined to secure his influence. He requested her to visit him and talk over the will ; she had herself sent messengers to ask him to receive her.

Cleopatra  
visits him.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. J. P. Mahaffy (*Hist. of Egypt*², 1914, p. 239) 'cannot find whether Caesar entered with 12 lictors as consul, or 24 as dictator'. If he had consulted O. E. Schmidt's *D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, pp. 210-13, he would have found that Caesar entered as consul.

<sup>2</sup> Plut., *Ant.*, 25, 3.

She was in some danger of being kidnapped by the agents of Pothinus, but contrived to make her way to the outskirts of the city and, aided by a friend, found a boatman to take her to the palace. She was in her twenty-second year, graceful, luxurious, exquisitely dressed and voluptuously adorned, accomplished and witty, capricious, yet relentless as Caesar himself in pursuing her aim, the woman who could hold to lifelong devotion the inconstant Antony, exasperate Cicero, and stimulate the imagination of Shakespeare, who could not but appeal to desire and to intellect, but who could also, when she would, awaken love.<sup>1</sup> Caesar saw her and listened to her melodious voice. He discussed of course with official gravity the matters which had caused a breach between her and her consort; but she had come to stay, and he was glad to keep her. Still if Caesar was in love, he remained a statesman; and as a statesman he was bound to execute the will with due impartiality. He decided that Cleopatra should be acknowledged as joint sovereign; and his decision was simply just. He made every effort to conciliate her opponents and to appease the populace, reading the will in public and explaining that Cleopatra demanded no more than was her due. But his efforts were in vain. Pothinus and the other enemies of Cleopatra cared nothing for the will. They saw that she was installed as Caesar's mistress, and, doubtless expecting

He decides that she should be associated with Ptolemy in sovereignty.

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, ix, 35 (58), 119; Plut., *Ant.*, 27, 2; Dio, xlii, 34, 3-6; Ps. Victor, *De vir. ill.*, 86, 2; Philostratus, *Vitae soph.*, i, 5. If there is an authentic portrait of Cleopatra (her coins are untrustworthy), it is, as M. Maspero says (*Comptes-rendus . . . de l'Acad. des Inscr. &c.*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., xxvii, 1899, pp. 132-3), a fragment of one of two colossal statues, found about 1870 at Alexandria, which most probably represent Antony and Cleopatra as Osiris and Isis. The nose of the bust (of which Maspero gives a photograph) is mutilated; so 'ce n'est pas encore ce monument qui nous permettra de savoir si le nez de Cléopâtre était ou non de la longueur qu'il eût fallu pour changer la face du monde'. The bas-relief found at Dendérah, of which V. Gardthausen (*Augustus u. seine Zeit*, ii, 1891, p. 227) gives an illustration, has been, as Maspero shows, wrongly attributed to Cleopatra.

Mahaffy (*Journ. Egypt. Archaeol.*, ii, 1915, p. 1) points out that 'over and over again' Cleopatra 'was derived from full brother and sister marriages—a condition which modern eugenists . . . would have thought certain to produce physical and moral decadence'.



48 B. C. that her triumph would involve their downfall, they determined that Ptolemy should reign alone.<sup>1</sup> While Achilles with Ptolemy's army marches on Alexandria, Caesar's business now was to save himself, his mistress, and his little garrison from destruction. Could he retain that part of the city which he occupied until the reinforcements which he had sent for should arrive? The force which Achilles commanded was not to be despised. It was, indeed, composed largely of Italian outlaws and exiles who had found an asylum in Egypt, and of brigands from Syria, Cilicia, and other lands; but its nucleus consisted of old soldiers, who had served, years before, under Pompey, had been drafted from his army into that of Gabinius, and, after the departure of the latter, had settled in Alexandria. These men had for the most part forgotten their nationality and had become Orientalized. They had married native women and adopted native customs. They formed a kind of military corporation, and runaway slaves or criminals who joined them were sure of welcome. Discipline they had none, in time of peace; and when they desired higher pay they blockaded the palace until their demands were satisfied. Still, they had not forgotten how to fight: they had served against the Egyptians in more than one campaign; and under a leader who understood them they were likely to be formidable.<sup>2</sup>

Warning his officers to prepare for action, Caesar induced Ptolemy to send two of his courtiers, Serapion and Dioscorides, as envoys to Achilles, and to forbid him in the King's name to break the peace. Achilles refused to listen and ordered them to be put to death: Dioscorides escaped with a wound; Serapion was killed. Thereupon

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<sup>1</sup> Mahaffy (*Hist. of Egypt* <sup>2</sup>, p. 241) says that 'when Cleopatra reappeared at Alexandria under Caesar's protection, her brother soon saw that the Roman was no umpire, but a hostile partisan'. Surely Ptolemy wished Caesar to be not an umpire but *his* partisan.

<sup>2</sup> Caes., *B. C.*, iii, 110. Cf. P. M. Meyer, *Das Heerwesen d. Ptolemäer u. Römer in Ägypten*, 1900, pp. 82, 95-7.

Caesar resolved to keep the King near him in the palace, 48 B. C. hoping to make the populace believe that Achillas was acting without royal sanction.

Achillas, who expected an easy victory, attempted to storm the building in which Caesar was domiciled; but piquets posted in the streets at commanding points beat off the attack. Achillas, however, saw that his best chance of success was to get possession of the Great Harbour and the shipping which it contained. More than a hundred galleys were at anchor or lying in the docks. Caesar had brought thirty-four; twenty-two were regularly stationed at Alexandria; fifty, quinqueremes and quadriremes, which had been dispatched in the preceding year to join Pompey's fleet, had recently returned. If Achillas won, Caesar's supplies would be cut off; and he and his army would be forced to surrender. A desperate struggle ensued. Achillas made a supreme effort to block the streets that led down to the quays; but discipline and tactical skill prevailed over numbers; and by Caesar's order the Alexandrian ships were immediately fired. Swept by the north wind, the flames fastened on the sheds along the quays; and many valuable books, which had been stored in them, besides much corn, were destroyed.<sup>1</sup> But it was not enough to burn the Alexandrian fleet. Caesar had noticed that the entrance of the Great Harbour was so narrow that whoever held the rock on which the lighthouse stood would be able to prevent ships from entering or passing out. While in his own quarter of the town a combat was raging in which, owing to lack of room, neither side could prevail over the other, he sent a detachment in his vessels, which landed on the island. A load of anxiety was taken off his mind. Thenceforward the arrival of reinforcements and of supplies was reasonably secure. But reinforcements were urgently required. As the expected legions had not yet come, Caesar wrote again to Domitius, ordering him to dispatch them as soon as possible and to advance through Syria himself towards

but fails  
to get  
possession  
of the  
Great  
Harbour.

Caesar  
lands  
troops on  
Pharus,

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 487-9.

48 B. C.  
sends  
again for  
reinforce-  
ments,

and forti-  
fies his  
position.

Egypt.<sup>1</sup> Another messenger carried a letter to Mithradates of Pergamum, a reputed son of Mithradates the Great, urging him to hasten to Alexandria with all the troops that he could raise. More ships were sent for from Syria, Cilicia, and Rhodes; archers from Crete; horsemen from Malchus, King of the Nabataeans, who had an old grudge against Pompey; artillery and supplies from every place where they could be procured. The theatre, which served Caesar as a citadel, gave access both to the harbour and to the royal docks. In the night after the battle he proceeded to fortify the entire quarter of the town which his troops occupied;<sup>2</sup> and the works were completed during the next few days. Wherever the houses were not solid enough to afford protection sappers' huts were constructed to shelter the troops, and buildings which obstructed the work of fortification were demolished by battering-rams. The eastern part of the city, where it was narrowed by the intrusion of the marsh, was cut off from the rest by earthworks, Caesar's object being to secure free access to the marsh for water and for forage, and also to facilitate the dispatch of reinforcements from one side to the other. It is doubtful, however, whether this enterprise, if, indeed, it was completed, achieved its aim.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile Arsinoe, not less ambitious than her sister, determined to gain the throne herself. Escaping from the palace, she joined Achilles and proposed to carry on the war in conjunction with him. But Achilles had no intention of giving up the chief command. The two began to quarrel, and each expended large sums in bribing the rapacious soldiery. Pothinus became anxious and sent messengers to Achilles, urging him to prosecute the war in the interest of the King. The messengers were pointed out to Caesar and arrested: Pothinus by his order was immediately put to death.<sup>4</sup> Achilles, however,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, iii, 112, 6 with *Bell. Alex.*, 38, 1, and see Judeich, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 489-92.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 490-1.

<sup>4</sup> The authorities for the narrative of Caesar's earlier operations at Alexandria are examined on pp. 486-7.

and Arsinoe continued to intrigue against each other ; and Arsinoe won. Enlisting the aid of her tutor, Gany-  
medes, who, like Pothinus, was of course a eunuch, she  
contrived to have her rival executed, and appointed  
Ganymedes commander-in-chief.

48 B. C.  
Arsinoe  
has  
Achillas  
executed  
and  
instals  
Gany-  
medes  
in his  
place.

The Alexandrians were preparing for a prolonged  
struggle. Recruiting officers were dispatched in all  
directions. Even slaves were armed ; and wealthy  
citizens fed and paid them at their own expense. Artillery  
and missiles were brought into the town ; foundries were  
established for the manufacture of weapons. The new  
levies were posted at outlying places, while the veterans  
were retained for fighting in the streets. Stone walls were  
built across the streets which the Romans occupied ;  
wooden towers, ten stories high, with artillery mounted  
on each platform were erected to command the lower  
parts of the city ; towers which could be moved on  
rollers to any threatened point were set up in the main  
thoroughfares. The Alexandrians did not forget that  
only a few years before Gabinius had occupied their  
country ; evidently Caesar intended to make it a Roman  
province, and unless they bestirred themselves, their  
independence would be lost. Although most of their  
ships had been destroyed and Caesar commanded the  
entrance of the Great Harbour, they expected that the  
autumnal gales would prevent reinforcements from  
reaching him.

Military  
prepara-  
tions of  
the Alex-  
andrians.

Ganymedes was not without initiative. He shut off  
the conduits by which water was conveyed from the  
canal into the region which he occupied himself, and then  
by means of wheels and other contrivances raised water  
from the sea into the higher part of the town, from which  
it flowed through the other conduits into the Roman  
cisterns. Finding their water undrinkable, the soldiers  
became desperate. Of course they must re-embark at  
once ; but how could Caesar conceal his intention from  
the enemy, and how would it be possible to get on board  
in the face of an attack ? Caesar went from group to  
group and reassured them. There was no reason, he

Gany-  
medes  
tries to  
deprive  
the Ro-  
mans of  
water.



48 B. C. explained, for alarm. Fresh water could certainly be obtained by sinking wells, for in low-lying lands near the sea there was always water close to the surface; and even if Egypt differed in this respect from other countries, the ships could easily convey a supply from places on the coast, east or west of Alexandria.<sup>1</sup> The centurions were directed to suspend all other operations and set their men to dig wells. Work was kept up throughout the night, and water in abundance was forthcoming before sunrise.

The 37th  
legion  
arrives.

Next day a fleet of transports conveying the 37th legion—one of the two which Caesar had sent for—anchored off the coast a few miles west of Alexandria; for a south-easterly wind had prevented them from making the Great Harbour. They remained some days at anchor, waiting for the wind to change; but as their water was running short, the officers dispatched an oared vessel to inform Caesar of their plight. Being anxious to see for himself what ought to be done, he embarked in one of the galleys and left the entire fleet to follow him; but as his troops were barely numerous enough to man the fortifications, he ordered the captains to sail without them. On reaching the promontory called Chersonesus, seven or eight miles from Alexandria, the fleet anchored, and Caesar sent the oarsmen ashore to fetch water for the legion. Some of them went a considerable distance inland to plunder and were captured by a squadron of the Alexandrian cavalry, who questioned them. Learning that Caesar was with the fleet and that no legionaries, but only Asiatic marines, were on board, they hastened back to Alexandria to report the news. Ganymedes promptly manned all the galleys which lay ready in the harbour of Eunostus, and sailed to intercept the Roman fleet. When Caesar descried the enemy's ships he determined to avoid a battle, not only because he had no regular troops, but also because it was late in the afternoon and he feared that when darkness fell the enemy, from their local knowledge, would outmanœuvre him. He

<sup>1</sup> See p. 492.

therefore ordered all the ships whose draught was sufficiently small to be rowed close inshore, thinking it unlikely that the enemy would incur the hazard of attacking them. One Rhodian vessel, however, had been carelessly stationed by its commander at a considerable distance from the rest of the fleet, and four of the Alexandrian galleys, accompanied by several smaller craft, bore down to attack it. Caesar of course felt bound to go to the rescue, and the vessels which had run for shelter put out to sea. The Rhodians, whose galleys were skilfully handled, fought with the utmost resolution; and the enemy were completely defeated. One of their ships was sunk and one captured: many of the marines belonging to the others were killed, and only darkness prevented Caesar from capturing the entire fleet. As the wind, although it had moderated, was still blowing from the east, his galleys took the transports in tow and brought them safely into the Great Harbour.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar  
gains two  
successive  
naval vic-  
tories.

But Ganymedes was undismayed. Seeing that the Romans were not to be dislodged unless he could prevent supplies from reaching them, he resolved to make a final effort to destroy their fleet. No doubt they commanded the entrance of the Great Harbour; but if he could establish supremacy at sea, he would be able to deter transports or store-ships from approaching. A considerable number of galleys were still available and could soon be equipped; several had escaped from the recent action; guard-ships were always stationed off the mouths of the Nile, to collect tolls; old vessels, which had not been used for many years, but were not past repair, were lying in the royal harbour. Oars, indeed, were scarce; but the Gymnasium and other public buildings were ransacked for all the suitable timbers that they contained, and a sufficient supply was manufactured. Within a few days five quinquereemes, twenty-two quadriremes, and a large number of smaller craft were ready for sea. The ships taken from the royal harbour somehow eluded the vigilance of Caesar's officers and passed through one of

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 492-3.

48 B. C.

the archways in the Heptastadium into the harbour of Eunostus, where they joined the others. Caesar's fleet consisted of nine Rhodian galleys, eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from the province of Asia.<sup>1</sup> There were six quinqueremes and ten quadriremes : the other vessels were for the most part small and had no screens to protect the rowers. This time of course legionaries were included in the combatant crews, every man having been embarked who could be spared for one day from the fortifications in the town. The fleet rowed out of the Great Harbour, the Rhodian galleys forming the starboard squadron, the Pontic galleys the port, and, running past the island, entered the harbour of Eunostus, where the enemy were awaiting them. Six or seven hundred yards—a space which was deemed sufficient for manœuvring—divided the Rhodian from the Pontic squadron. The remaining vessels followed in reserve, each captain having been instructed which of the leading ships he was to support in case of need. In the Alexandrian fleet the twenty-two quadriremes formed the front line ; the quinqueremes followed ; while the smaller craft hovered on the flanks, their crews being prepared to throw blazing darts in order to distract the attention of the Romans. During some time the two fleets remained motionless ; for they were separated by shoals, the passage between which was so narrow that whoever took the initiative would find it difficult to deploy his line and might find his retreat cut off. Caesar was on board the Rhodian flagship. The captain, Euphranor, an experienced seaman, who had been elected by his colleagues as their admiral, noticed that he hesitated to give the signal for action, and accosted him. ' Caesar ', he said, ' I suppose you are afraid to pass the shoals with your leading ship, for fear you should be forced to fight before you can deploy the rest. Leave the operation to me : we shall hold out, I promise you, while the rest follow. It is ignominious for us to have these fellows swaggering any longer, while we look on '. Caesar appreciated

<sup>1</sup> See p. 484, n. 7.

Euphranor's self-reliance, and gave the signal. Four of the Rhodian galleys, shooting through the passage, were immediately surrounded and attacked; but they were so coolly and skilfully handled that the Alexandrian ships, despite their superior numbers, could never get a chance of ramming any of them or even of smashing their oars. The five other Rhodians had by this time come into action; but there was no longer room to manœuvre: the battle resolved itself into a *mêlée*, in which the discipline, courage, and training of the Roman soldiers had free play. Meantime in the city hostilities were suspended, as if by mutual consent: Romans and Alexandrians—soldiers and citizens alike—hurried up to the roofs of the houses to get a view of the combat, and prayed, and shouted to encourage their friends. The Romans were fighting for existence; for they knew that for them defeat would mean destruction. At length their valour and the skill of their allies prevailed. An Alexandrian quinquereme and a trireme were forced to surrender, while three vessels were rammed and sunk; the rest turned and, driven at their utmost speed by the rowers, ran for the shore, but the Romans were too wary to pursue them under the missiles that were hurled from the Heptastadium and from the buildings that commanded the port.

Caesar determined to deprive them thenceforward of this protection. His fortifications being now almost complete, he intended to seize the Heptastadium and also the whole island, of which he already occupied the eastern end. For this purpose he selected ten cohorts from the three legions, which were to be supported by the slingers and archers and by a picked body of the Gallic cavalry, who were of course to fight on foot. The force was embarked in open boats and other small vessels, which could approach the shore through shallow water; and, in order to create a diversion, several galleys were sent to attack the northern side of the island. Caesar promised a handsome reward to the crew that should be the first to land. The islanders resisted stoutly. Some of

He seizes  
Pharus  
and the  
northern  
end of the  
Hepta-  
stadium,



48 B. C.

them discharged missiles from the houses ; others lined the shore, ready to repel their assailants when they struggled to clamber up the rocks ; while five galleys, supported by open boats, the crews of which were familiar with all the intricacies of the coast, endeavoured to prevent the Roman vessels from threading the shoals. At length some of the Romans, after cautiously feeling their way, contrived to find a passage, and wading ashore, threw themselves upon the defenders : others followed in support ; and the townsmen, who on level ground could make no stand against veteran soldiers, instantly fled. Seeing the rout of their countrymen, the Alexandrian seamen in the harbour of Eunostus rowed round the western end of the island, ran their vessels ashore, and swarmed into the deserted houses to defend them. The Romans had neglected to bring scaling ladders or other appliances for assault ; but the seamen were so unnerved by the loss of a few of their number, following the flight of the townsmen, that they abandoned their strong position and rushed on to the mole.<sup>1</sup> Many were intercepted and butchered ; many were taken prisoners ; the rest plunged into the sea and struck out for the shore. The main result of the day's fighting was that the whole island and the northern end of the mole were in Caesar's power. To secure his hold upon the mole, he strengthened the defences of a redoubt which commanded the northern arch and posted a piquet to guard it. The troops were allowed to keep all the loot which they had found in the houses ; and Caesar subsequently ordered the whole suburb to be destroyed.<sup>2</sup>

but is defeated in attempting to secure the southern redoubt.

But another redoubt, which commanded the southern arch, was still occupied by the Alexandrians ; and so long as they retained it their ships could pass in and out of the Great Harbour. Caesar prepared to attack it on the following day. Artillerymen and archers opened fire from his galleys and speedily dislodged the garrison, who fled into the city. Three cohorts, probably about a thousand men—as many as could manœuvre in the

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 493-4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Bell. Alex.*, 19, 1, with Strabo, xvii. 1, 6.

narrow space—were then detailed to seize the mole, 48 B. C. while the rest remained on board the galleys, ready for emergencies. The cohorts, ascending by means of scaling ladders, at once proceeded, in obedience to Caesar's order, to barricade the landward side of the bridge and to block the archway by shooting large stones into the sea. But the barricade was still unfinished when the troops of Ganymedes, emerging from the city, massed themselves on the open space opposite the workers; and simultaneously vessels were brought close up to the mole, to assail the cohorts from the harbour of Eunostus. While Caesar was directing the defence and urging his men to repel these counter attacks the marines and oarsmen who remained in the Roman galleys were becoming more and more excited, eager to get a nearer view or to join in the fray; and their officers, if they did not share their ardour, could not restrain them. Suddenly the galleys were driven up to the mole; many rowers and many marines jumped ashore, planted their ladders, swarmed up on to the roadway, and began to hurl stones or to sling bullets into the Alexandrian crews. Distracted by this unexpected onslaught, the enemy nearest to the arch were beginning to row back when some of their comrades at the northern end of the line boldly clambered on to the mole, and menaced the disordered oarsmen and marines on their unprotected flank. Crowding pell mell to the edge of the mole, they fought for access to the ladders: the foremost let themselves down and swarmed on to the galleys, while the men who had remained on board rushed to remove the ladders or hastened to pull the galleys out of danger. More and more Alexandrians plucked up courage to disembark, made their way on to the mole, and attacked the panic-stricken marines who had not had time to escape. The three cohorts, fighting against heavy odds to hold the bridge, heard the uproar and, looking round, saw their comrades running for their lives; it was all that they could do to stand fast under the missiles that were falling among them; and, fearing that they would soon be attacked from the rear and that

48 B. C.

the ships would be gone before they could retreat, they began to abandon their posts. Caesar, who shared their peril, exhorted, implored them to fight on; but his example and his words were unheeded. Some rushed recklessly into the nearest boats, which heeled over and sank under the load; some, who hesitated, were struck down; some few contrived to reach the vessels that were anchored close to the mole; others plunged into the water and swam towards the nearest ships. Missiles splashed around them, but, swimming on their sides, they held their shields with their left arms over their vital parts. Caesar meanwhile had walked back to his own pinnace, followed by a throng, who, forgetting his rank in their terror, jostled, struggled, fought at his heels for standing room on the sinking vessel until he, foreseeing what was going to happen, dived and swam to a ship that was riding at a distance from the mole.<sup>1</sup> Mounting the ladder, he immediately dispatched all the cutters within hail, which rescued some of his men; but when his pinnace sank many perished with her. So ended this disastrous day, on which four hundred legionaries, besides oarsmen and marines, were slain or drowned.

He deals  
a counter-  
blow.

The natives followed up their success by strengthening the southern redoubt and removing the stones that blocked the archway; but Caesar, who never suffered a check without dealing a counterstroke, was in no mood to let them rest. He published a general order, calling upon all ranks to vindicate the Roman arms; but they needed no spur. Fiercely assaulting the enemy's works, resolutely repelling every sortie, they made the Alexandrians feel that, as Hirtius said, while Romans were heartened by success, failure stimulated them to redoubled effort.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless Caesar was still in danger. Owing to the rashness and the panic of the undisciplined auxiliaries

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 21, 2. W. Drumann (*Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 487, n. 3) unnecessarily—for fools are not likely to study the writers whom he corrects—demonstrates the absurdity of the story told by Suetonius (*Div. Jul.*, 64), Plutarch (*Caes.*, 49, 3), Dio, xlii, 40, 5, &c., that Caesar carried important papers (which imaginative moderns have transmuted into the *Commentaries*) in his left hand while he swam.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 23, 1.

who manned his fleet, the great stroke which he had planned had failed ; one of the two legions which he had summoned from Asia had not arrived ; and with his slender force he could no longer hope to seize the Heptastadium. The Alexandrians desired to get the King into their power, so that they might have the credit of waging a national war in defence of the Ptolemaic dynasty against foreign aggression. Accordingly they requested Caesar to allow the King to join the officers who commanded his army. The envoys explained that the people of Alexandria were only anxious to obey their rightful ruler : if they could have him as an accredited mediator between themselves and Caesar, they would be relieved from all anxiety and would gladly submit, for they were sick of being under the nominal sovereignty of Arsinoe, in whose name Ganymedes was oppressing them most cruelly. Caesar was not impressed by these arguments, but he thought it best to let the young King go : if, which was most unlikely, the envoys were sincere, the boy would give no trouble ; if they only wanted the prestige of having a legitimate sovereign at their head, he would be powerless for mischief, and the Roman army would have the credit of waging war against a royal rebel rather than against a horde of aliens and runaway slaves.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly he sent for Ptolemy, and, urging him to spare his capital, which had already suffered enough, the horrors of continued war, bade him farewell. The lad tearfully protested that he would far rather stay with Caesar than exercise authority. ' Well,' said Caesar, soothingly, ' if that is so, you will soon be back again'.<sup>2</sup> Ptolemy doubtless chuckled inwardly, for he expected to

48 B. C.

He allows  
Ptolemy  
to join the  
Alexan-  
drian  
army.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 23 ; 24, 1-2. Cf. Dio, xlii, 42. Judeich (*op. cit.*, p. 8) observes that the motive assigned by Hirtius for the release of Ptolemy is inconsistent with the motive avowed by Caesar himself (*B. C.*, iii, 109, 6) for having kept him prisoner. Caesar says that he acted in the belief that the royal title gave Ptolemy great prestige with the Alexandrians and that, once Ptolemy was in his power, their resistance would appear to be the work of an irresponsible coterie, and not authorized by the King. I do not see any inconsistency : circumstances had changed, and Caesar may have felt that by detaining Ptolemy he had gained nothing.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 24, 5.



48 B. C.

return to his palace as a conqueror ; and officers who did not understand Caesar's character remarked behind his back that from excessive good nature he had allowed this cunning boy to make a fool of him. But the young King could contribute nothing towards the cause except childish hate ; and the coterie which had obtained his release found that their intrigues were unavailing. It was rumoured that reinforcements were advancing to join Caesar from Syria and Cilicia. The King or Ganymedes (if, indeed, Ganymedes was still commander-in-chief) determined that their best course would be to starve the Romans into surrender before the reinforcements could arrive. Supplies were known to be on their way ; and the Alexandrian fleet was sent to cruise off the western mouth of the Nile and intercept them. Caesar immediately dispatched his own fleet thither under Tiberius Nero, the father of the emperor Tiberius. In the battle which ensued the Rhodian admiral, Euphranor, who had never been defeated, took his galley into action with his usual dash and skill, but Nero failed to justify Caesar's choice : Euphranor was left unsupported ; after he had rammed one of the Alexandrian quadriremes, he was surrounded, and his galley with all on board was sunk.<sup>1</sup>

His fleet  
suffers  
a reverse.

Mithradates of Pergamum marches to reinforce him,

The rumour that had occasioned this reverse was true. Mithradates of Pergamum, who had responded energetically to Caesar's summons, was approaching the Egyptian frontier at the head of an army composed of Jewish, Arabian, and Syrian levies. He was accompanied by Antipater, who, sixteen years before, had pleaded with Pompey on behalf of Hyrcanus against Aristobulus, and who not only raised the greater part of the troops but also supported his chief throughout the campaign.<sup>2</sup> The army was marching by the caravan route, which skirted

<sup>1</sup> If Dio (xlii, 40, 6) can be trusted, Nero was victorious. Hirtius (*Bell. Alex.*, 25, 6) leaves us in doubt, merely remarking that Euphranor was the only officer who behaved well in the battle (*unus ex omnibus eo proelio bene rem gessit*). Stoffel, however (*op. cit.*, p. 63), of course, knows all about it—'La bataille . . . assura pour l'avenir l'arrivée des convois de troupes et de vivres'.

<sup>2</sup> Jos., *Ant.*, xiv, 8, 1-2 ; *Bell. Jud.*, i, 9, 3-4. The evidence for the campaign of Mithradates is examined on pp. 496-7.

the Syrian coast.<sup>1</sup> When Mithradates reached Pelusium, 47 B. C. which protected the Egyptian frontier, he found it held by a strong garrison; but his troops were so numerous that he was able to invest it closely and, after one day's hard fighting, overcame all resistance. In order to join Caesar he was obliged to turn the Delta, for to bring an army across its numerous watercourses was obviously impossible. Leaving a force to hold Pelusium, he marched southward along the eastern branch of the Nile, and, thanks to his victory and to the influence which Antipater exercised over the Jewish inhabitants, he secured for Caesar the friendship of the population. The King, hearing of his advance, dispatched a force to intercept him. The leading division crossed the Nile considerably in advance of the rest and attacked Mithradates before their comrades had time to support them. Mithradates awaited the attack in his camp, which he had fortified in the Roman fashion, at Tal-el-Jahoudieh <sup>2</sup>—'The Encampment of the Jews'—some seventeen miles north of Cairo; and when the Alexandrians rashly advanced, he sallied forth and routed them with heavy loss. The fugitives managed to recross the Nile in the boats which they had used before and, after they had regained communication with the rear-guard, prepared to attack again. Mithradates sent a messenger to report to Caesar; and at the same time Ptolemy received a dispatch from the commander of the expeditionary force. He immediately embarked all his available troops in galleys on the western branch of the Nile, while Caesar, who preferred to avoid a naval battle, started on the same day to join his ally. As he was unwilling to incur needless loss by fighting his way through the southern part of the city, and also wished to conceal his purpose, he sailed eastward by night as if in pursuit of Ptolemy, then, ordering all lights to be extinguished, reversed his course, landed at Cape Chersonesus, and thence marched south-eastward,

and de-  
feats the  
Egyptians  
near the  
apex of  
the Delta.

<sup>1</sup> See *Journ. Egypt. Arch.*, vi, 1920, p. 114.

<sup>2</sup> See Mahmud Bey, *Mém. sur l'ant. Alexandrie*, 1872, p. 116, and p. 496 n. 3, *infra*.

47 B. C. leaving Lake Mareotis on his left, towards the river. So leisurely was the King's progress that Caesar succeeded in joining Mithradates before the Alexandrian army could attack. The King disembarked the whole of his force, except his archers and slingers, and selected the strongest position which he could find,—a low isolated eminence, perhaps near the modern Teiriya,<sup>1</sup> about half-way between Alexandria and Cairo. Its eastern side was separated by a narrow space from the river: another was protected by a morass; a third, along which one side of the camp was traced, rose above the plain. One side only was easily assailable. Not far off was a village, which the King fortified and connected by an earthwork with his camp; and about seven miles north of his position a canal with steep banks joined the Nile. When the Roman column reached the northern bank, the Egyptian cavalry, supported by light infantry, attempted to bar the passage. For some time the opposed forces discharged missiles at each other without a decisive result; but at length Caesar's German cavalry rode off to search for a ford. Some of them swam their horses across where the banks were comparatively low, while the legionaries, felling a number of trees, large enough to span the canal, and covering them with earth and lumber, formed a causeway by which they succeeded in getting over. As far as we can gather from the account which Hirtius has given of the battle, the Alexandrians did not attempt to interfere with the construction of the bridge or to prevent the Romans from crossing: they were attacked, apparently in flank, and were nearly all slaughtered in their flight. Caesar instantly marched on; but when he observed the strength of the King's position and the dense masses that lined the rampart, he thought it rash with tired troops to hazard an assault, and accordingly encamped close by. On the next day he stormed the village with his entire force, expelled the piquet that occupied it, and, following hard upon the fugitives, attacked the camp simultaneously on the side where it

Battle of  
the Nile.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 498–503.

was easy of access and on the side that faced the Nile. 47 B. C.  
 The Alexandrian commander had massed his best troops to defend the former : the legionaries who assailed the latter were caught between two fires, archers and slingers harassing them from the galleys while the main body hurled missiles from the rampart. The legionaries fought with resolution ; but to storm this fortified camp was more than they could do. Caesar, however, noticed that the strongest side had been practically deserted ; for, believing it to be impregnable, the commander had posted comparatively few men there, and most of them had gone to watch the fighting on the other side. Caesar therefore detached three cohorts to assault this flank. Hearing the yells of the combatants and fearing that they were themselves about to be attacked from the rear, the rest of the Alexandrians lost heart and began to desert their posts and to run aimlessly from point to point of the camp. The three cohorts swarmed over the rampart, seized the commanding position, and charged the panic-stricken throng. Most of them rushed over the rampart on the eastern side and leaped into the ditch, the foremost being crushed before they could clamber out by those behind, who used their prostrate bodies as a bridge. Many plunged into the Nile and struck out for the nearest ships ; the royal barge, in which Ptolemy had taken refuge, beset by a multitude of the fugitives, went down.

Caesar, leaving his infantry to follow, rode straight from the battle-field with his cavalry to Alexandria, and, knowing that the report of his victory would paralyse opposition, he did not hesitate to enter the southern part of the city, which was garrisoned by the enemy. The people thronged in the garb of suppliants to welcome him, ' offering ', as Hirtius said, ' all the sacrifices by which they were wont to appease the wrath of their Kings '.<sup>2</sup> But Caesar was in no wrathful mood : he had conquered, and he was, as ever, merciful. It only remained for him to give effect to the late King's will and, as we may suppose, to take security for the payment of the

The Alexandrians submit.

Mar. 27<sup>1</sup>  
 (Jan. 14).

<sup>1</sup> See p. 499, n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 32, 3.



47 B. C.

money that was due.<sup>1</sup> Ptolemy's younger brother and Cleopatra were recognized as joint sovereigns, the former being merely a figure-head : Arsinoe was removed from the city, lest her supporters might disturb the peace.<sup>2</sup>

So ended the campaign of Alexandria, during which Scipio, Labienus, and the sons of Pompey were left free to prepare for the renewal of the civil war. There were moments when it seemed probable that Caesar's career would end in Egypt ; and although in every crisis he showed all his old coolness and resource, he owed much to the initiative and skill of Euphranor, much to the staunchness of Mithradates and Antipater, most of all to the incompetence of his enemies. Once he had destroyed the bulk of the Alexandrian fleet the worst was over : if he had failed then, nothing could have saved him, and ordinary foresight would have placed those ships beyond his reach.

Caesar  
tours on  
the Nile  
with Cleo-  
patra.

And now that fortune and his own energy had saved him, he was in no great hurry to complete his work. He was the acknowledged master of the Roman world. Learning soon after he entered Egypt that he had been appointed Dictator, for the second time and for an indefinite period, he had nominated Antony as his Master of the Horse<sup>3</sup> and ordered him to carry on the government of Italy until he should himself return. The whole of Greece was in his power ; for Athens had surrendered to Calenus after the battle of Pharsalia, Megara was captured by the same general a few weeks

<sup>1</sup> According to Plutarch (*Caes.*, 48, 5), 17,500,000 drachmae (£700,000) were due, but Caesar demanded only 10,000,000, for the maintenance of his army. Suetonius (*Div. Iul.*, 54, 3) says that he took 6,000 talents (£1,440,000) 'on his own account and that of Pompey' (*suo Pompeiique nomine*), but does not say when. Are we to conclude, as Meusel apparently does (in a note on *B. C.*, iii, 107, 1) from a comparison of Plutarch with Suetonius that about half the sum mentioned by Suetonius had been paid in or after Caesar's first consulship ? See vol. i, p. 327.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 33, 1-3 ; Strabo, xvii, 1, 11 ; Suet. (35, 1), who says that Caesar forbore to annex Egypt, lest an ambitious governor might use it for the furtherance of revolutionary designs. No doubt he saw that annexation would be premature ; but, apart from consideration for Cleopatra, he could not set aside the will, upon the validity of which he had himself insisted.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 565, n. 2, and p. 566.

later, and soon afterwards Patrae, the last stronghold that held out, was recovered without a blow.<sup>1</sup> Domitius, indeed, had suffered a defeat ; but it should be avenged in due course : nothing was to be gained by haste, for it would be useless to take the field in Asia Minor before the roads became passable and fodder could be procured for the cattle.<sup>2</sup> Thirty years and more Caesar had toiled incessantly, studying the art of oratory and the art of war, intriguing, haranguing assemblies, travelling through many lands and across many seas, canvassing, legislating, administering civil affairs, campaigning in Spain and Gaul and Britain, in Italy and Greece and Africa, writing the record of his deeds ; now he wanted rest and desired to enjoy without distraction the companionship of Cleopatra. He desired also to explore a land which must eventually become Roman, to see the wonders of that civilization which had grown old before the founding of the Eternal City, perhaps to learn something of the administration ; and this purpose gave decorum to the tour of the Nile on which the Queen invited her lover to accompany her. Stories were told of banquets in her saloon, prolonged till daybreak ; but, if they were true, it was not wine but a woman's playful wit that captivated Caesar.<sup>3</sup> At the end of two months they were again in Alexandria, and the Dictator could no longer postpone his preparations for repairing the failure of Domitius ; but in the midst of business he made time to write to Cicero, urging him to keep up his spirits and assuring him that he need have no anxiety.<sup>4</sup> He left three legions<sup>5</sup> to protect the Queen against any attempt which the disaffected Alexandrians might make to subvert the dynasty ; and perhaps it was then that he granted to the

He writes kindly to Cicero.

<sup>1</sup> Dio, xlii, 14.

<sup>2</sup> See E. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie* <sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 521, n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> App., ii, 90, 379. Suetonius (52, 1) apparently means that Caesar would have gone nearly as far as Ethiopia if his army had not refused to follow him ! Conceivably the source of this absurdity may have been that Caesar heard during his trip that the legions were impatient to leave Egypt.

<sup>4</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, xiv, 23 ; *Pro Ligario*, 3, 7 ; *Pro Deiot.*, 14, 38. Cf. O. E. Schmidt, *Briefwechsel, &c.*, p. 228.

<sup>5</sup> The 27th, the 37th, and another. See p. 503.

47 B. C. Jews of the city equal rights with the Macedonians.<sup>1</sup>  
 The 6th legion alone was to accompany him, and it was  
 now barely a thousand strong ;<sup>2</sup> but he knew that he  
 March 26. would find reinforcements in Asia. About the 7th of  
 June<sup>3</sup> he sailed for Syria. His mistress, when for a time  
 he bade her farewell, was great with child ;<sup>4</sup> but no man  
 whom Cleopatra wished to please could feel love's satiety  
 with her.

Abortive  
 efforts of  
 Laelius  
 and C.  
 Cassius to  
 blockade  
 Brundisi-  
 um and  
 destroy  
 Caesar's  
 Adriatic  
 fleet.  
 Aug., 706  
 (June, 48  
 B. C.).

Some months before an attempt had been made to  
 reconquer Brundisium and Sicily and to annihilate the  
 Caesarian fleet. During the campaign of Dyrrachium  
 Pompey's admirals accomplished little though they were  
 strong enough to inflict serious damage upon the maritime  
 towns of Italy and Sicily and to destroy all the ships  
 which Caesar then possessed. But after Caesar retired  
 into Thessaly Decimus Laelius, who commanded the  
 Asiatic squadron, did make an attempt against Brun-  
 disium. Following the example of his colleague, Libo,<sup>5</sup>  
 he took possession of the island opposite the harbour.  
 Fortunately Brundisium was then in charge of Vatinius,  
 who was a man of action. Adopting the tactics which  
 Antony had successfully practised against Libo, he sent  
 out a flotilla of boats, the crews of which were protected  
 by improvised bulwarks against missiles, to decoy the  
 hostile fleet. A quinquereme and two smaller vessels,  
 which chased the boats, were captured as they were  
 trying to thread the narrow entrance of the harbour, and  
 Vatinius endeavoured to prevent the crews of the other  
 galleys from getting water. As, however, the weather  
 was now fine, Laelius found no difficulty in procuring  
 a supply from Coreyra and Dyrrachium ; and he con-  
 tinued to blockade the harbour until he heard of the  
 disaster at Pharsalia.<sup>6</sup>

While Vatinius guarded Brundisium Caesar maintained  
 some seventy galleys in Sicilian waters. One squadron,  
 commanded by the praetor Sulpicius Rufus, was

<sup>1</sup> Jos., *Ant.*, xiv, 10, 1 ; *In Apion.*, ii, 4. Cf. Philo, *In Flac.*, § 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 69, 1.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 509.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 504-6.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 127.

<sup>6</sup> *Caes.*, *B. C.*, iii, 100.

stationed off Vibo, now Bivona, on the western coast of the Bruttian peninsula; the other, under Marcus Pomponius, at Messana. Pomponius sent out no cruisers to reconnoitre, and his ships were not ready for action. Suddenly Gaius Cassius approached the island and let loose a number of fire-ships. Running before a strong wind, they dashed against the vessels of Pomponius before the latter could elude them, and the whole squadron, numbering thirty-five galleys, was destroyed. The inhabitants of Messana were panic-stricken, and, although that important town was garrisoned by one of Caesar's newly raised legions, it might have been captured if news of the victory of Pharsalia had not opportunely arrived. Cassius immediately sailed for Vibo, accompanied by trading-vessels, laden, as before, with combustible materials. He found the fleet of Sulpicius, who was as careless as his colleague, moored to the shore, and assailed it on both flanks with his fire-ships. Five galleys were destroyed; but before the flames could spread further the invalided veterans whom Caesar had left to support Sulpicius embarked without waiting for orders, attacked the hostile fleet, sunk two triremes and captured two quinqueremes, one of which was the admiral's flagship. Cassius escaped in the ship's boat. Soon afterwards official news of the victory of Pharsalia, the first announcement of which had been regarded as a fiction spread by Caesar's partisans, was received at Vibo; and Cassius with the rest of his fleet sailed away,<sup>1</sup> to make his peace with Caesar.

It is now time to describe the events that compelled Caesar to undertake a further campaign before he could return to Italy.<sup>2</sup> When Deiotarus quitted Pompey's ship near Ephesus, he was not disposed to ruin himself by supporting a lost cause. He lost no time in making overtures to Caesar, who required him, as the price of pardon, to make a substantial contribution towards defraying the expenses of the war. Deiotarus found that in his absence the Lesser Armenia, the sovereignty of

Domitius  
Calvinus  
defeated  
by Pharnaces.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 101.

<sup>2</sup> These events are described in *Bell. Alex.*, 34-41.



48 B. C. which had been conferred upon him by the Senate,<sup>1</sup> and Cappadocia, the domain of Ariobarzanes, had been overrun by Pharnaces, the son of Mithradates the Great, who, although he had murdered his father, shared his hatred of the alien Galatians, and was bent upon enlarging the dominions which Pompey had bestowed upon him as the reward of parricide. Deiotarus presented himself before Domitius and begged for assistance against Pharnaces, explaining that unless he could recover Armenia, it would be impossible for him to raise the money which he had promised to pay.<sup>2</sup> Domitius, who appreciated this argument, required Pharnaces to evacuate Armenia and Cappadocia without delay, and, in order to enforce this ultimatum, took steps to mobilize all his available troops. Having dispatched two of his legions to reinforce Caesar, [The 36th] he had one only left, formed, like the others, from Pompeians who surrendered after the battle of Pharsalia. Deiotarus, however, lent him two Galatian legions, armed and drilled in the Roman fashion : he and Ariobarzanes each contributed a small quota of horse ;<sup>3</sup> while Domitius sent one of his officers to fetch a legion which had been hastily raised in Pontus, and another to summon auxiliaries from Cilicia. All these contingents concentrated as speedily as possible at Comana in Pontus. Meanwhile envoys came to Domitius and delivered a dispatch from Pharnaces, who, remarking that he had already evacuated Cappadocia, but that he had a right to retain the Lesser Armenia, which had belonged to his father, asked Domitius to leave the question open until Caesar could decide it. As it was evident that he had evacuated Cappadocia merely in order to defend Armenia, which was nearer to his own territory, and because he had not then become aware that there was only one Roman legion to oppose him, Domitius told the envoys that he must adhere to his ultimatum : the question could not be

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 67, 1 ; *Cic., Phil.*, ii, 37, 94. Eutropius (vi, 14) incorrectly says that Deiotarus had received the Lesser Armenia from Pompey.

<sup>2</sup> Dio (xlii, 46, 1) says that Caesar sent Domitius from Egypt to Asia !

<sup>3</sup> See p. 506.

considered open, for Pharnaces had no more right to 48 B. C.  
Armenia than to Cappadocia. Dismissing the envoys, Domitius marched rapidly eastward by a woodland track along the ridge between the valleys of the Lycus and the Iris,<sup>1</sup> where he was not only secure from attack but could also draw supplies from the Cappadocian plain. While he was advancing envoys arrived in rapid succession, bearing presents from Pharnaces and proposing to negotiate for peace. Domitius refused to parley with them and pushed on by forced marches till he approached Nicopolis, which Pompey had founded to commemorate his decisive victory over Mithradates. Here Pharnaces was established.<sup>2</sup> Nicopolis was situated on level ground, flanked on either side by mountains. Domitius encamped seven miles off, behind a defile through which he would have to pass in order to reach the town, and determined to wait in the hope of coming to some agreement with the King. Pharnaces, posting his forces in ambush, directed the people of the country to drive their cattle into the pass and to show themselves there, just as if there were no prospect of war : for he calculated that if Domitius were to advance through the defile, his troops would scatter in order to drive off the cattle ; if he were to approach the town in a pacific sense, he would infer from the presence of the cattle and the peasants that no resistance was intended, and would therefore fall a victim to the ambushade. Meanwhile Pharnaces continued to make overtures for peace with the aim of lulling Domitius into a sense of security, while Domitius, hoping that it might still be possible to arrive at some accommodation, remained in his camp. Pharnaces, who was beginning to fear that the suspicions of Domitius would be aroused and that the ambushade would be discovered, ordered the peasants to drive off the herd. On the following day Domitius marched through the defile and encamped on the outskirts of the town. Thereupon Pharnaces formed his army in battle array. His front consisted of one

<sup>1</sup> See the remarks of Mr. J. A. R. Munro (*Roy. Geogr. Soc. Suppl. Papers*, iii, 1893, p. 728).

<sup>2</sup> See p. 506.

48 B. C.

unbroken line : behind the centre and the wings reserves, separated by considerable intervals, were ranged in three lines. Domitius, having alined a part of his troops in front of the rampart to protect the workers, completed the entrenchment of his camp. In the course of the night messengers, bearing dispatches from Caesar to Domitius, were intercepted by the outposts of Pharnaces. If Caesar had not neglected his usual precaution of writing in cipher,<sup>1</sup> the secret was unravelled : Pharnaces learned that he was hard pressed and required Domitius to send him reinforcements without delay and to advance himself towards Alexandria. The contents of the dispatch were somehow communicated to Domitius : indeed one may perhaps suspect that Pharnaces sent it to him, in the belief that he would obey Caesar's order at once and expose himself to the risk of a hazardous retreat.<sup>2</sup> Domitius, however, decided that it would be fatal either to retreat without having achieved his aim or to accept terms which he had rejected, and accordingly determined to fight.<sup>3</sup> Meantime Pharnaces constructed two parallel trenches, each five feet deep, from the walls of the town,<sup>4</sup> confining the ground over which, as he expected, Domitius would advance to attack him ; and within them he disposed his infantry in the same order as before, stationing his cavalry, which was much more numerous than that of Domitius, on either flank outside. Domitius placed the Roman legion on his right wing and the Pontic on his left, outside or extending beyond the trenches : the two Galatian legions, which, in order to give them greater confidence, were massed in extraordinarily deep

<sup>1</sup> Suet., 56, 6.

<sup>2</sup> See Stoffel, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-6. Long (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 1874, p. 276, n. 3) suggests that 'perhaps some [of the messengers] escaped'.

<sup>3</sup> According to Dio (xlii, 46, 3), who regularly used the old calendar, but without taking account of its wide difference from the new (cf. xli, 44, 2 and xlii, 56, 1), the battle of Nicopolis was fought shortly before winter. Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 432) dates it on Dec. 28 ; Judeich (*op. cit.*, p. 63) more logically about the beginning of December (end of September).

<sup>4</sup> Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 276) wrongly takes *fossas directas* (*Bell. Alex.*, 38, 3) in the same sense as *fossam directis lateribus* (*B. G.*, vii, 72, 1)—trenches with perpendicular, not V-shaped, sides,

formation, occupied the centre, some of the cohorts being posted in reserve behind.<sup>1</sup> The 36th routed the King's cavalry, pressed on, and, crossing the trench, close to the town, attacked the enemy in the rear. The Pontic legion, to which Domitius had assigned a task beyond its strength, after withstanding the enemy's right for a short time, attempted to pass round it with the object of crossing the trench and attacking the infantry on their unshielded flank; but in the act of crossing they were themselves overwhelmed. The Galatian legions incontinently fled. The victorious infantry of Pharnaces then turned upon the 36th. Pompey's old soldiers struggled gallantly against superior numbers until, finding that they were being enveloped, they fell back to the lower slopes of the adjacent hills and, forming square, prepared to defend themselves to the last. Pharnaces shrank from attacking them in their strong position, and they gradually ascended to an impregnable height. The legions of Deiotarus had lost heavily, about two hundred and fifty of the 36th had fallen, and the Pontic legion was shattered; but Domitius succeeded in collecting the remnants of his army, and returned through Cappadocia to his province. Pharnaces meanwhile was using his victory as became a parricide. Invading Pontus, he stormed many of the towns, plundered impartially the Roman and the native residents, and castrated all the Roman youths whose beauty recommended them to his lust.<sup>2</sup>

But these poor victims were presently to be avenged. About the 11th of June<sup>3</sup> Caesar reached Ace Ptolemais,<sup>4</sup> March 30. on the Syrian coast. He found dispatches awaiting him,

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 39, 2. G. Veith (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, 1906, p. 386 and Beilage 38) holds that Domitius posted the 36th and the Pontic legion entirely outside the trenches: Stoffel (*op. cit.*, Pl. 14 *bis*) places them half inside, half outside. I am inclined to agree with him because as Hirtius says that the Galatian legions were drawn up on an extraordinarily narrow front, it seems probable that they did not occupy the whole space between the trenches.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 41. Cf. Strabo, xii, 3, 14; App., *Mithr.*, 120; *B. C.*, ii, 91, 381; Dio, xlii, 46, 3.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 509.

<sup>4</sup> See B. V. Head, *Hist. num.*, 1911, p. 793, and cf. Judeich, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-1.



48 B. C.

Caesar  
settles  
affairs in  
Judaea  
and Syria,

from which and from friends who had come to meet him he learned that disturbances had broken out in Italy and that the discipline of the legions which he had sent back had become dangerously relaxed.<sup>1</sup> But he did not suffer his attention to be distracted. He remained some days in Syria, touching at the principal ports, rewarding all who had helped him, composing disputes, giving audience to native potentates, making arrangements for the security of the province, and pardoning every Pompeian who had come to ask for pardon.<sup>2</sup> The settlement which Gabinius had made for the government of Judaea was now annulled, if it had not been before.<sup>3</sup> From Ace Caesar sent a dispatch to the authorities of Sidon, in which, acknowledging the aid that he had received from Antipater, he decreed that Hyrcanus and his descendants were to be ethnarchs and high priests of the Jews, and authorized Hyrcanus to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem, which Pompey had destroyed: before he quitted Syria he granted Roman citizenship to Antipater, appointed him administrator of Judaea, freed the Jews from military service and from the obligation of paying tribute to Rome, and restored Joppa, which Pompey had annexed.<sup>4</sup>

April.

pardons  
C. Cassius,

Early in July,<sup>5</sup> leaving Sextus Caesar, who had served under him in Spain, in charge of Syria, the Dictator resumed his voyage, sailing from Seleucia, the harbour of Antioch, to Tarsus, where Gaius Cassius was awaiting him.<sup>6</sup> Marcus Brutus, who had been present at Pharsalia, and whom he had pardoned at Larisa, was with him; and on his intercession he pardoned Cassius also.<sup>7</sup> After summoning the notables of Cilicia to meet him, he made

<sup>1</sup> For Caesar's operations in Syria and Asia Minor the principal authority is *Bell. Alex.*, 65-78.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 65, 4-5; *Cic., Att.*, xi, 20; *Fam.*, xv, 15, 2.

<sup>3</sup> See *Acta soc. philol. Lips.*, v, 1875, p. 163.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 507-9.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 509.

<sup>6</sup> If we may believe Cicero (*Phil.*, ii, 11, 26), Cassius intended to assassinate Caesar at the mouth of the Cydnus, on which Tarsus stands; but the plan miscarried. Although E. Meyer (*Caesars Monarchie*<sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 536, n. 3) affirms the truth of the story, it seems to me rash to accept it on Cicero's sole authority. He may have been misled by rumour.

<sup>7</sup> *Plut., Brut.*, 6, 1-2; *Dio*, xlii, 13, 5.

arrangements for concentrating the various legions whose 47 B. C.  
 services he could command at a point near the common  
 frontier of Cappadocia and Pontus. These troops com-  
 prised, besides the attenuated 6th legion, one legion to be  
 furnished by Deiotarus and two which had fought under  
 Domitius,—the Pontic legion and the 36th. As soon as  
 Caesar had settled the affairs of Cilicia he advanced and marches  
 rapidly northward by way of Mazaca,<sup>1</sup> the capital of against  
 Cappadocia. When he was approaching Pontus Deiotarus Pharnaces.  
 appeared in his camp and solicited an interview. Laying  
 aside the insignia of his rank, he presented himself in the  
 garb of a suppliant and besought forgiveness, pleading  
 that if he had aided Pompey, he had only done so because  
 no force of Caesar's had been at hand to protect him :  
 it was not for him to constitute himself a judge of the  
 disputes of the Roman People, and he had therefore felt  
 constrained to obey the authority that was at hand.  
 Caesar doubtless recognized that Deiotarus had acted as  
 any other man in like circumstances would have done ;  
 but it was not the time for philosophic candour. He  
 replied that he had himself deserved the gratitude of  
 Deiotarus by confirming in his consulate, twelve years  
 before, the grant of territory with which Pompey had  
 rewarded him. The excuses of Deiotarus were idle ;  
 for a man of his intelligence could easily have informed  
 himself that, at the very time when he was assisting  
 Pompey, Caesar was a consul and the master of Italy.  
 Established authority belonged not to Pompey but to  
 Caesar. However, having shown favour to Deiotarus in  
 the past, he would continue to do so. Deiotarus was an  
 old friend of Rome and an old man ; therefore he should  
 be pardoned. But he must contribute one of his legions  
 and all his cavalry for the campaign against Pharnaces.

Entering Pontus at the head of his army, Caesar was July 29<sup>2</sup>  
 met by envoys from Pharnaces, who assured him that (May 16).  
 their master would comply with his demands and ex- *Veni, vidi,*  
 pressed the hope that his intentions were not hostile. *vici.*

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 510-1.

<sup>2</sup> Suet., 35, 2, compared with the known date of the battle of Zela,—  
 Aug. 2.

47 B. C.

Pharnaces, they reminded him, had refused to assist Pompey ; Deiotarus, who had assisted him, had just been pardoned. Caesar replied that if Pharnaces was sincere, he might rely upon equitable treatment : but the envoys would do well to leave Deiotarus out of the question and not to make too much of the fact that their master had not helped Pompey ; for he had refrained from doing so in his own interest. Nothing, he added, gave him greater pleasure than to pardon those who submitted ; but he could not condone wrongs done to those who had served him well. The outrages which Pharnaces had committed against Roman citizens in Pontus could not, indeed, be undone :—the dead could not be brought to life again ; the unhappy boys who had suffered mutilations worse than death—their manhood could not be restored. But Pharnaces must evacuate Pontus instantly, send back the servants of the tax-gatherers, whom he had kidnapped, and restore the property which he had plundered. Then perhaps he would be good enough to send the complimentary presents by which it was customary to conciliate victorious commanders. The envoys departed. Pharnaces, who knew that Caesar's presence was urgently required at Rome, endeavoured in Oriental fashion to gain time by making fair promises and proposing new terms ; but Caesar of course disregarded these attempts and marched on till he came within sight of Zela, near which the army of Pharnaces was encamped.<sup>1</sup>

Zela was built upon a knoll, which resembled an artificial embankment, situated in a small plain encompassed by hills. On one of these, rather less than three miles north of the town, Mithradates had defeated Triarius, the lieutenant of Lucullus ; and Pharnaces had strengthened the defences of the camp which his father had then occupied.<sup>2</sup> In this position he hoped to cover the country of which he had regained possession. Caesar encamped about two miles south of the town, and sent

<sup>1</sup> A photograph of Zela, taken from the south and showing the long line of hills in the background, is in the first volume (by Mr. J. G. C. Anderson) of *Studia Pontica*, p. 42.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 511–4.

scouts to reconnoitre. He gathered from their report that the valley, one slope of which protected the King's army, would equally protect his own; but it was essential to seize the height before the King could anticipate him. He therefore ordered a supply of wood, suitable for fortification, to be brought into his camp. About two o'clock on the following night the legions marched out, leaving their packs behind, crossed the plain, and, moving up the road that led through a ravine towards Amasia, ascended the hill at dawn. A site was at once marked out for the new camp; and, while the cohorts of the first line stood ready to protect the workers, and the camp-followers were bringing up the wood, the rest of the soldiers fell to work with pick and shovel.<sup>1</sup> It was necessary to bring Pharnaces speedily to action, and Caesar doubtless hoped to lure him some way up the hill and there to punish his temerity. The sun had not yet risen when Pharnaces, who was barely a mile off, noticed what was going on and formed his line of battle in front of his own camp. Evidently, Caesar thought, this was either a mere demonstration, intended to show that the enemy were prepared to fight, or the object was to compel him to withdraw troops from the work of entrenching and so to delay the construction of the camp. He therefore kept his men at work. But he had failed to comprehend the King's intention. Pharnaces had easily beaten Domitius, and the force that now confronted him was considerably weaker than that which Domitius had commanded; moreover he was standing on the spot where his father had gained a notable victory, and this may have influenced his superstitious mind. He began to descend into the valley and then, disregarding the first maxim of ancient warfare, to press right up the hill against his enemy. Caesar, we are told, could hardly believe his eyes; but he called off the men from the half-dug trenches and, as they hurriedly armed, proceeded to deploy them. Startled by the suddenness of the unexpected order, they fell into some confusion, and the

47 B. C.

Aug. 2<sup>1</sup>  
(May 20).<sup>1</sup> See p. 514.<sup>2</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, p. 324 (=i<sup>2</sup>, p. 244).



47 B. C.

lines were not yet dressed when the King's war-chariots, armed with scythes, dashed into them. But the charioteers were checked and driven off by a shower of missiles, and the King's infantry, who were following in support, soon realized what it meant to fight upon an adverse slope. The veterans of the 6th legion, who formed Caesar's right wing, reduced to a fragment of their normal strength, drove back the Asiatics, and though the inferior troops of the centre and the left had a much harder struggle, they too finally prevailed. The beaten enemy rushed down the hill, and, flinging away their shields as they scampered across the valley, strove to rally on the opposite slope, but could not withstand the onslaught of men who had gathered confidence from victory. The troops which had been left to hold the royal camp tried to do their duty ; but the rampart was speedily stormed ; and Pharnaces, taking advantage of the confusion, escaped with a few horsemen.

'Caesar', wrote Hirtius, 'was overjoyed at this crowning triumph ; for he had ended an important campaign with startling rapidity.'<sup>1</sup> *Veni, vidi, vici* :<sup>2</sup> what words are more familiar ? And well he might rejoice ; for his luck was as great as his skill. Hirtius remarked, with conventional piety, that while the ground helped Caesar much, the gods helped him more ;<sup>3</sup> and he might have added as truly that before the battle the gods deprived Pharnaces of his wits. Perhaps when Caesar saw his enemy ascend the fatal hill, he was not quite so astonished as Hirtius thought ; for unless he expected that Pharnaces would attack him, it is not easy to understand why he encamped where he did ; and if Pharnaces had declined to attack him, he might have been compelled, though his presence in Italy was urgently required, to resort to the tedious process of blockade.

Immediately after the victory Caesar disbanded his army. The 6th legion was directed to return to Italy,

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 77, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Plut., Caes.*, 50 ; *Suet.*, 37, 2 ; *App.*, ii, 91, 384 (inaccurate). The words were not a vainglorious dispatch, but were displayed (on a picture ?) at Caesar's triumph.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 75, 4.

there to receive the prize-money which it well deserved : 47 B. C.  
 the Galatian legion was sent home ; the other two were After sett-  
 left under Coelius Vinicianus, who had once been an ling af-  
 ardent supporter of Pompey,<sup>1</sup> to hold Pontus. Caesar fairs in  
 himself, escorted by the cavalry, made his way through Asia Mi-  
 Galatia and Bithynia into the province of Asia. If Dio<sup>2</sup> nor Caesar  
 tells the truth, he exacted payment of moneys which had starts for  
 been due to Pompey, inflicted fines on various pretexts, Italy.  
 and accepted presents in recognition of his victories from  
 dynasts. As Dio sagely remarked, money had somehow  
 to be found to defray the expenses of the war. Brutus  
 pleaded earnestly for Deiotarus, but Caesar was not to  
 be mollified.<sup>3</sup> Amisus, which had resisted Pharnaces,  
 received in recognition of Caesar's gratitude the gift of  
 autonomy.<sup>4</sup> Mithradates of Pergamum was rewarded  
 for his services at the expense of Pharnaces and of  
 Deiotarus, receiving the title of King of Bosporus, which  
 belonged to Pharnaces, and also the tetrarchy of the  
 Trocmi in Galatia, which Deiotarus had usurped ; while  
 Deiotarus was also forced to cede the Lesser Armenia  
 to Ariobarzanes.<sup>5</sup> But Caesar could not undertake to  
 establish Mithradates upon his throne. Bosporus was  
 at that time held by a satrap, Asander, whom Pharnaces  
 had left in charge. Asander, taking advantage of the  
 overthrow of his master, attacked him on his return and  
 had him put to death ; Mithradates, who attempted to  
 dispossess the murderer, was himself defeated and  
 slain.<sup>6</sup>

About the beginning of September Caesar embarked About  
 for Italy. Touching at Mytilene, he charged Brutus to June 17.  
 invite Marcus Marcellus, who was living there in voluntary  
 exile, to return to Rome, and thence he travelled to  
 Patrae.<sup>7</sup> Before we can follow his later movements we  
 must see how, by the energy of one of his lieutenants and

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Cic., *Q. fr.*, iii, 8, 4 with *Fam.*, viii, 4, 3.

<sup>2</sup> xlii, 49.

<sup>3</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xiv, 1, 2 ; *Brut.*, 5, 21 ; *Tac.*, *Dial.*, 21.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo, xii, 3, 14 ; Dio, xlii, 48, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 37, 94 ; *De div.*, ii, 37, 79 ; Dio, xli, 63, 3 ; xlii, 48, 3.

<sup>6</sup> Strabo, xiii, 4, 3 ; App., *Mithr.*, 120 ; Dio, xlii, 48, 4.

<sup>7</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xi, 21, 2 ; *Brut.*, 71, 250 ; Seneca, *Cons. ad Helv.*, 9, 4-6.

48 B. C. in consequence of the victory of Pharsalia, the waters which he had to cross were cleared of the enemy.

How  
Cornifi-  
cius and  
Vatinius  
mastered  
Illyricum  
and clear-  
ed the  
Adriatic.

The fame of Pharsalia was less potent in Illyricum than in Italy and Sicily. Throughout the war, while the Roman residents unanimously supported Caesar and defended themselves resolutely against every attack, the native tribes, though Caesar had ruled them during his proconsulship, adhered to Pompey.<sup>1</sup> In the spring of 48 Caesar directed his quaestor, Quintus Cornificius, to march with two legions of recruits<sup>2</sup> and regain possession of the province. Cornificius found it difficult to feed his army, for the country, which was not productive, had suffered much both from the war and from internecine strife; but he overcame every obstacle, stormed many of the tribal forts, checked predatory raids, and with the aid of vessels supplied by the loyal inhabitants of Iadera (the modern Zara), captured some galleys belonging to the squadron of Octavius, who, after the battle of Pharsalia, had made an incursion into the Adriatic. After this success Cornificius felt himself a match for his opponent; but Caesar, learning that many of the Pompeian fugitives had gone to Illyricum, thought it advisable to reinforce him. Accordingly he sent an order to Gabinius, whom he had recalled from exile, to proceed to Illyricum with some of the new levies, directing him, however, in case he should find that Cornificius could hold his ground unaided, to march into Macedonia; for, so long as Pompey was alive, he believed that in that region war was likely to break out again. Gabinius, fearing that if he attempted to cross the Adriatic, the Pompeian fleet might intercept him, marched by land with fifteen cohorts and three thousand cavalry; and in the course of his long journey his troops suffered much from cold and scarcity of food. It was near the end of December when he reached the theatre of war.<sup>3</sup> Supplies were difficult to procure; owing to stormy weather none

Oct.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. App., *Ill.*, 13 with Cic., *Fam.*, v, 10 A; 10, 3.

<sup>2</sup> This is evident, for Caesar could not spare any of the troops under his personal command. See also pp. 476-7.

<sup>3</sup> Judeich, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

could be obtained by sea ; and Gabinius was forced to 48 B. C.  
 assail towns and forts in the hope of finding enough to  
 keep his men alive. He suffered, however, so many  
 reverses that their morale became seriously impaired,  
 and ultimately he was obliged to retreat to the strong-  
 hold of Salonae, where there was a large Roman  
 population, well affected towards Caesar. On the march  
 he encountered opposition, losing forty-one officers  
 and over two thousand men ; and although he man-  
 aged to reach his asylum, he had still to contend with  
 difficulties of supply and soon himself fell a victim to  
 disease.<sup>1</sup> Octavius, who now confidently expected to  
 establish his authority in Illyricum, secured the alliance  
 of several tribes and successfully attacked several posts  
 occupied by the Caesarians ; whereupon Cornificius  
 wrote urgently to Vatinius, who was still at Brundisium,  
 for aid.

Vatinius was in weak health ; but he applied himself  
 resolutely to his task. Having only a few galleys in the  
 harbour, he wrote to Calenus, who remained in Achaia,  
 requesting him to send his ships to Brundisium. The  
 fleet did not appear in time ; but there was a considerable  
 number of small craft at Brundisium, which, though they  
 had been designed for trade, were adapted for rowing  
 as well as sailing. Vatinius had them fitted, like the  
 galleys, with bronze beaks, and manned his whole fleet  
 with the veteran legionaries whom, as they were on the  
 sick list, Caesar had been obliged to leave behind when  
 he sailed for Epirus. Arriving in Illyricum, he regained  
 control over the tribes which had joined Octavius, and  
 sailed to relieve Epidaurus, which Octavius was besieging.  
 Confounded by his boldness, Octavius abandoned the  
 siege and moved northward along the Dalmatian coast ;  
 but learning how weak his enemy really was, he resolved

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 42, 5-6 ; 43, 1-4 ; *App., Ill.*, 12 ; *B. C.*, ii, 59, 242 ; *C. I. L.*  
 iii, 3200. Cf. G. Veith (*Schrift. d. Balkankomm.*, Ant. Abt., 1914, col. 83-9),  
 Appian, whose chronology is here, as often, confused, says that Gabinius  
 quitted Brundisium at the time when Mark Antony sailed thence to join  
 Caesar !



47 B. C.  
May ?  
(March )

to fight, and anchored off the island Tauris, now called Torcola. Vatinius, who only knew that Octavius had fled, immediately started in pursuit. The weather was stormy, and his fleet became dispersed. Approaching Tauris, he saw one of the enemy's ships with marines crowded on her deck running towards him under short canvas. Ordering his own ship to be cleared for action, he hoisted the red ensign to warn those that were behind. Masts and rigging were lowered, and the veterans donned their armour. Meanwhile Octavius's ships were coming out of port in the order in which they were to fight ; but those of Vatinius were too far apart to follow their example. Vatinius himself headed straight for the enemy's flagship. Both crews pulled their hardest and the ships crashed into one another. The ram of the Octavian galley was broken off, and that of her adversary piercing her timbers, the two vessels remained locked together. The Pompeian captains, instead of utilizing their initial advantage to manœuvre, abandoned their prescribed formation, crowded up to support their admiral, and thus played into the hands of their enemy. The Vatinian vessels, as fast as they came into action, rammed or, when they failed to ram, glided alongside the Octavians ; and the veterans, springing on to their decks, soon proved their superiority as fighting men. Octavius, seeing that his ship was foundering, attempted to escape in the cutter ; but she too began to sink under the fugitives who crowded into her, and Octavius, wounded though he was, plunged into the rough sea and swam to his attendant pinnace. Several of his ships were sunk ; eleven were captured ; and men who had leaped overboard or had been flung over the bulwarks by the ruthless veterans were struggling in the waves. When night stopped the combat the pinnace, followed by those galleys which had escaped the press, ran for shelter under such sail as the tempest let her carry. Vatinius, who had not lost a single vessel, put into the harbour of Tauris with his prizes to refit. Two days later, when the repairs were finished, he sailed for the adjacent island of

Issa, believing that Octavius, who had captured it in 47 B. C. the previous year, would have taken refuge under its lee. The islanders submitted ; but Octavius and his remaining vessels had disappeared. Thus the Adriatic was cleared of the Pompeians ; Cornificius was master of the rebellious province ; and Vatinius with his victorious squadron returned to Italy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 43, 5—47.

## CHAPTER XXI

### THE POMPEIANS PREPARE TO RENEW CIVIL WAR.—TROUBLES IN ITALY

47 B. C. WHEN Caesar was crossing the Ionian Sea he knew that he would have much to do before he could begin the work of political reconstruction. Order had to be restored in Italy, the mutinous legions brought back to discipline, money raised for impending expenditure; and when these things were done he must set out to confront the Pompeian leaders who were preparing in Africa to renew the war. Let us see how they had organized the various forces that were inimical to Caesar.

About Aug. 16<sup>1</sup> (June 13, 48 B. C.). After the battle of Pharsalia Scipio, Labienus, and Cato join Juba in Africa. A few days after the battle of Pharsalia Labienus rode into Dyrrachium with Pompey's Gallic and German cavalry,<sup>2</sup> bringing the news of the disaster. Cicero, who had remained there with Cato, Varro, and other notables, described the ensuing scene.<sup>3</sup> Cato resolved to sail with the fifteen cohorts that had been placed under him to Coreyra, where the bulk of the Pompeian fleet was stationed. The crews who manned the store-ships refused to follow, whereupon the exasperated soldiers rifled the magazines, strewed the grain over the streets, and set fire to the ships. The Rhodian squadron forthwith deserted. But Cato, unmoved, pursued his aim. Scipio and Afranius, who had escaped from Pharsalia, joined him at Coreyra. but presently, accompanied by Labienus, embarked with a part of the fleet for Utica, intending to raise a new army in Africa in concert with Juba and Attius Varus.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile at Coreyra a council was

<sup>1</sup> The battle of Pharsalia was fought on Aug. 9. Labienus probably took seven or eight days to ride to Dyrrachium—230 miles. Judeich (*Caesar in Orient*, 1885, p. 164), who apparently consulted a merciless or ignorant horsemaster, allows 3½ days for the journey!

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 431–2.

<sup>3</sup> *De div.*, i, 32, 68.

<sup>4</sup> Plut., *Cato min.*, 55, 2; App., *B. C.*, ii, 87, 364–5; Dio, xlii, 10, 1–2.

convened. Cato proposed to transfer his command to Cicero, who, as an ex-consul, was in rank his superior; but Cicero had resolved to take no further part, even as a spectator, in the war.<sup>1</sup> He afterwards explained that he had decided from impulse rather than from deliberation, and that what impelled him was a feeling that it would not be right to defend the republican constitution, especially against a leader who had proved his military superiority, by the aid of Africans, whom he deemed 'a most treacherous race'.<sup>2</sup> Pompey's elder son, enraged at his defection, threatened to kill him, and might have fulfilled his threat if Cato had not interposed.<sup>3</sup> Cicero then returned to Brundisium, where, it would seem, Caesar had indirectly given him permission to reside.<sup>4</sup> Cato moved on to the Peloponnese in the hope of recovering Achaia, but, learning that Calenus was marching against him, retreated, and, conjecturing that Pompey had fled to Egypt, sailed to join him. Hearing on the way that his leader had been murdered, he turned back, and learning at Cyrene that Scipio had been received by Juba, determined to go on to Africa; but some of the senators who had accompanied him so far now left him and went to Asia to make their peace with Caesar.<sup>5</sup> Off the coast of Cyrenaica some of Cato's ships were wrecked and others driven ashore. Landing at Berenice with his cohorts, he marched round the Great Syrtis, tramping like a common soldier, until he reached Leptis Magna in Tripoli. A few weeks later he rejoined his colleagues.<sup>6</sup>

His moderating influence was needed. Scipio was

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, vii, 3, 3; *Pro Deiot.*, 10, 29; *Plut.*, *Cato min.*, 55, 2; *Cic.*, 39, 1

<sup>2</sup> *Cf. Att.*, xi, 5, 1 with 7, 3.

*Plut.*, *Cic.*, 39, 1; *Cato min.*, 55, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, xi, 7, 2; *Phil.*, ii, 3, 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Plut.*, *Cato min.*, 56, 1-2; *Dio*, xlii, 13, 2-5. *Dio*, differing from *Plutarch*, says that Cato heard of Pompey's death at Cyrene.

<sup>5</sup> *Strabo*, xvii, 3, 20; *Livy*, *Epit.*, 112; *Vell.*, ii, 54, 3; *Lucan*, ix, 319-47, 948-9; *Plut.*, 56, 3. *Lucan* (ix, 550) is, I think, wrong in making Labienus accompany Cato through the desert; but *Judeich* (*op. cit.*, p. 174) infers from *Dio* (xlii, 10, 3) that he did. According to *Plutarch* (56, 2), Labienus was refused admission at Cyrene shortly before Cato landed there.



48 B. C.

quarrelling with Varus, while both were flattering Juba, who, having defeated Curio, was inflated by a sense of his own importance. Cato was strong enough to humble him, and succeeded in reconciling Scipio with Varus. He refused to accept the command, which was pressed upon him, for the same reason that had led him to defer to Cicero, but doubtless also because he felt that he had no qualifications for the post. Scipio accordingly became Commander-in-Chief.<sup>1</sup> Three hundred Italian financiers, who were engaged in business at Utica, supplied him with funds.<sup>2</sup> While he was raising troops his squadrons harried Sicily and Sardinia, plundered towns, seized vessels, and carried off weapons, iron, and other material of war. Juba was eager to destroy Utica, which, if it fell into Caesar's hands, would be a standing menace to his kingdom, and to massacre the inhabitants, who favoured Caesar; and Scipio, we are told, wishing to gratify the King, was hardly prevented from doing what he wished by the indignant protests of Cato. Scipio, to judge from his later conduct, would have been ready enough to perpetrate a massacre: but we may doubt whether he consented to the destruction of a city which was not only the capital of the province, but also his principal stronghold, his chief magazine, and the harbour of his fleet. At all events it was settled that Cato should act as governor of Utica; and he immediately began to provision the town and to surround it with new fortifications.<sup>3</sup>

Nov. 10,  
48 B. C.

The preparations of Scipio and Juba had begun before Cato joined them. On the 19th of January, two months

<sup>1</sup> Livy, *Epit.*, 113; Vell., ii, 54, 3; Plut., *Cato min.*, 57, 58. 1; App., ii, 87, 367; Dio, xlii, 57, 1-3. Long (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 1874, p. 312) thinks it improbable that Cato was invited to command, and it is certainly incredible that, as Plutarch says, Scipio was ready to give place to him; but Velleius may be right in saying that the troops wished to have him as their leader.

<sup>2</sup> A. Schulten (*De conventibus civ. Rom.*, 1892, p. 25) corrects Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>e</sup>, 1889, p. 408, note [Eng. tr., v, 1908, p. 238, n. 1]), who says that Plutarch (*Cato min.*, 59. 2, 61. 1) in representing the three hundred as Italian dealers (*negotiatores*) misunderstood *Bell. Afr.*, 90, 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, *Epit.*, 113; Plut., *Cato min.*, 58, 1-2; Dio, xlii, 56. 3, 57. 4.

before Caesar won the battle of the Nile, Cicero wrote to Atticus, 'As to affairs in Africa, my information is widely different from your letter. They say that nothing could be sounder or better organized. Besides, there is Spain, Italy alienated, a falling off in the strength and the loyalty of the legions, utter disorder in the capital'.<sup>1</sup> Reflecting upon these things, he began to fear that Caesar, from whom alone he could expect mercy, might after all be beaten, and that his own party, which he had exasperated by his desertion, would make him feel their vengeance. A few weeks later he confessed what was weighing upon his mind :—'For myself, while the whole position is intolerably painful, the sorest trial is that what I have always deprecated now appears the only thing that will serve my interests'.<sup>2</sup>

48 B. C.  
Cicero  
anxious  
for his own  
safety.

About  
March 10  
(Dec. 28,  
48 B. C.).

The disorder that required the presence of Caesar in Italy originated while he was still confronting Pompey on the banks of the Apsus. Caelius, who had joined Caesar at the outset of the war because, as he frankly avowed,<sup>3</sup> Caesar was the stronger, had accompanied him to Spain<sup>4</sup> and had afterwards, as a reward for his services, been appointed Foreign Praetor, whose special duty was to decide suits between aliens or between aliens and Roman citizens. He was offended because Caesar had not bestowed upon him the more dignified office of Urban Praetor, but had given it to Trebonius, whom he could trust to administer fairly the recent law relating to debt.<sup>5</sup> This law had bitterly disappointed Caelius, who expected that Caesar would pursue a policy of confiscation, and already repented having adhered to a cause out of which he saw no prospect of making money. He determined to obstruct the administration of the law and to court popularity by siding with the debtors.

Caelius  
attempts  
to nullify  
Caesar's  
law relat-  
ing to  
debt.

Feb., 706  
(Dec., 49  
B. C.).

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xi, 10, 2. Judeich (*op. cit.*, p. 177) conjectures that Atticus's letter related to the quarrels of Scipio and Varus, and that Cicero credulously accepted misleading reports. Atticus himself a few weeks later (xi, 12, 3) told Cicero that the Republicans in Africa were growing daily stronger.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 13, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Fam.*, viii, 14, 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 16, 3; 17, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, § 3; *B. C.*, iii, 20, 1-2; Dio, xlii, 22, 2.

48 B. C.

Accordingly he had his judicial chair placed next to that of Trebonius, and announced that if any one chose to appeal against the official valuation of property or against the decisions of the arbitrator, he would give a favourable hearing to the appellant. Not a single appeal was lodged : the fairness of the law was generally recognized, and Trebonius was administering it in a judicial spirit. As Caesar remarked in his account of the episode, no one is so audacious or so brazen as to cling to the whole of his assets while admitting that he is in debt. Caelius, smarting under this tacit rebuff and reluctant to appear a fool, felt that he must do something to restore his credit and gave notice of a bill authorizing debtors to defer payment, without interest, for six years. But this law, as the debtors had the wit to see, offered them no better terms than those of Caesar's compromise. The announcement fell flat ; the other magistrates expressed their disapproval ; and Caelius, resolving in desperation to make a last bid for popular support, gave notice of two other bills instead,—one making a present of a year's rent to all tenants of flats or other dwellings, the other abolishing all claims for debt. At the same time he hounded on the mob to attack Trebonius and, after an affray in which several were wounded, drove him from his tribunal. This was more than the other magistrates could endure. Servilius, Caesar's colleague in the consulship, brought the conduct of Caelius before the notice of the Senate, who decided that he must be expelled from office,<sup>1</sup> and passed the ultimate decree. The consul accordingly forbade him to enter the Senate House, and when he attempted to harangue the people in the Forum sent his officers to remove him from the Rostra. Humiliated and exasperated, Caelius gave out that he intended to leave Rome and go to Caesar's camp : his real intention was to join Milo, whom he had recalled from exile and sent to incite the herdsmen in Southern Italy to revolt.<sup>2</sup> Before his departure he wrote his last

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 20, 2-4 ; 21, 1-2 ; *Livy, Epit.*, 111 ; *Vell.*, ii, 68, 2 ; *Dio*, xlii, 22, 3-4 ; 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 24, 1-2 ; *B. C.*, iii, 21, 3-4.

letter to Cicero. Bitterly lamenting that he had attached himself to Caesar, he reproached Cicero for not having given him timely counsel. 'It was my friendship for Curio', he wrote, 'that insensibly brought me into this cursed faction . . . I don't say this from lack of confidence in the cause, but, believe me, death would be better than the sight of these creatures. Why if people weren't afraid of the cruelty of your party, we should long ago have been kicked out of Rome.<sup>1</sup> Except a few usurers, there is not a man, not a class here that is not Pompeian. I myself have made the lower orders in particular and the mass of the citizens, who were before on our side, go over to yours. "Why?" you will say. Stop: wait and see what's coming; I'll make you conquer in spite of yourselves . . . And this I shall do, not from hope of reward, but from what is ever my strongest motive, indignation and the sense of wrong.'<sup>2</sup>

In this temper Caelius set out for Campania, hoping to injure his absent leader, who would not reward him better than he deserved. But the people of Southern Italy saw nothing to be gained by supporting a disappointed adventurer or a turbulent criminal. Caelius, finding that his schemes were notorious and that the Roman residents of Capua were prepared to treat him as a public enemy, made his way into the Bruttian peninsula. Milo, who pretended that he was acting under orders from Pompey, tried to rouse all who were in debt, and, meeting with no encouragement, broke open some of the barracks in which slaves were lodged and attacked the town of Cosa, but was killed by a stone hurled from the wall. Caelius attempted to bribe some troopers whom Caesar had sent to garrison Thurii; but they spurned his overtures and killed him.<sup>3</sup>

But the example of Caelius was not forgotten. During several months, indeed, Italy remained comparatively

49 B. C.  
Expelled from office, he writes his last letter to Cicero.

He and Milo attempt to stir up revolt in Southern Italy, but are slain.

Effects of the news from Pharsalia.

<sup>1</sup> As Tyrrell and Purser explain in a note on Caelius's letter (§ 2), 'The violent threatenings of the Pompeian party tended . . . to keep the Italians from opposing Caesar'. Cf. *Att.*, viii, 11, 4; 16, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Fam.*, viii, 17.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 21, 5; 22; *Vell.*, ii, 68, 2-3; *Dio*, xlii, 24-5.



48 B. C.

tranquil. While the result of the campaign in Greece was still uncertain trade was of course affected : people who wished to dispose of their estates offered them for sale in vain,<sup>1</sup> for nobody could tell that they would not soon be confiscated. Those who sympathized with Pompey, knowing that the consul's spies were ubiquitous, pretended to hope for Caesar's success. The announcement of the victory was at first disbelieved, for while Cato's fleet remained at Corcyra no official dispatch could arrive,<sup>2</sup> and few were aware that Pompey's superiority in numbers was illusory. When, however, the news was confirmed everybody posed as a Caesarian. The Senate decreed many honours to the absent conqueror. Various powers were conferred upon him which he already exercised : he was appointed consul for five successive years and dictator for an unlimited time ;<sup>3</sup> if Dio was not mistaken, the tribunician authority, perhaps without the title, was granted to him for life ;<sup>4</sup> he was empowered to nominate the governors of praetorian provinces, though the consular provinces were to be assigned by the people ; and he was authorized to triumph over Juba for a victory which he had not yet won.<sup>5</sup> Antony, whom he chose as his Master of the Horse, having never served as praetor, was not constitutionally eligible ; but it was enough for Caesar that he was the fittest man. The consul of course gave way to the dictator's representative ; but the augurs solemnly protested, on the ground that no Master of the Horse could legally hold office for more than six months. Society laughed at this futile objection ; for had not the constitution been already flouted when Caesar was made dictator ?<sup>6</sup> As Dolabella had lately reminded Cicero, ' It remains to fall in with the existing constitution rather than, while hankering after the old one, to find ourselves with none at all ' .<sup>7</sup>

Antony. Antony, as was his wont, combined business with

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, xiv, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Judeich, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-9. Probably the announcement came through trading vessels or fishing smacks.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 566.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 514-6.

<sup>5</sup> Dio, xlii, 17-20.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 21.

<sup>7</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, ix, 9, 3.

pleasure. He was welcomed on arriving at Brundisium by his mistress, the actress Cytheris, and Cicero afterwards described in a famous invective his drunkenness, his violence, his intimacy with low companions.<sup>1</sup> Much bitterness was provoked by the excesses of the idle soldiery, whom he billeted upon the towns; and Cicero perhaps had this in mind when he spoke of the 'alienation' of Italy. But Antony had his orders to execute, and he executed them not only with diligence but also, as even Cicero could not deny, with perfect courtesy. Caesar wrote to warn him that prominent Pompeians must not be allowed to come to Rome, lest their presence might provoke disturbances, and that none but those whose cases he had himself investigated might land in Italy. Accordingly Antony wrote to Cicero, enclosing a copy of Caesar's letter and adding that, as he had no choice but to obey it, Cicero must excuse him for insisting that he should leave the country. Cicero pleaded that he had come to Brundisium because Caesar had himself told Dolabella to invite him to do so. Thereupon Antony, who accepted this assurance, published a general order in the sense of Caesar's instructions, expressly exempting Cicero. For Cicero this only made matters worse. What if the Pompeians should, after all, prevail? They would note that Caesar had favoured him and would mark him down for punishment. 'The exception', he complained to Atticus, 'could have been made without mentioning names'.<sup>2</sup>

48 B. C.  
as Caesar's  
Master of  
the Horse,  
adminis-  
ters affairs  
in Italy.

But Antony had soon more serious difficulties to contend with; and Caesar's return could not be expected for months to come. Dolabella, who had returned to Italy from Pharsalia, was heavily in debt before the war began, and apparently attached himself to Caesar in the hope of escaping from the burden.<sup>3</sup> He had long been known as a dissolute man about town;<sup>4</sup> and much

Dolabella  
attempts  
revolu-  
tionary  
legisla-  
tion;  
anarchy in  
Rome.

<sup>1</sup> *Phil.*, ii, 24-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, xi, 7, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Fam.*, ii, 16, 5.

<sup>4</sup> If we may trust a passage in (Appian *B. C.*, ii, 129, 539), Dolabella had not yet completed his twenty-second year! To my mind the statement, as it appears in the MSS., is incredible. I believe that he was 31. See p. 516.

48 B. C.

intimacy with women had given such polish to his naturally attractive manners that he captivated not only Tullia but also her austere mother.<sup>1</sup> Caesar must have thought that he had some capacity or he would not have entrusted him with the command of a fleet ; <sup>2</sup> but his political acumen was not greater than that of Caelius. With the object of legislating in his own interest he determined to stand for the tribuneship ; and as he was a patrician he followed the example of Clodius and had himself adopted by a plebeian. Thanks perhaps to his winning personality he was elected, and immediately stepped forward as the champion of the lower orders. The Senate had passed a resolution that nobody should propose any new law before Caesar returned, and Antony had forbidden private individuals to carry arms in the streets. Both the Senate and the Master of the Horse were ignored. Dolabella proposed to repeal Caesar's enactment about debts and to release all tenants of dwellings from the obligation of paying rent : his colleague Trebellius supported the creditors ; and as a matter of course riots, murders, and robberies were rife. The Senate in the hope of restoring order authorized Antony to keep his troops inside the city ; but Antony was distracted by a report that all the legions which he had brought back from Thessaly, except one which he kept with him, were mutinous. They complained that they had not received prize-money which Caesar had promised them and that they ought to have been already discharged. Their temper soon became so dangerous that Antony felt it necessary to go to Campania, where they were quartered, and endeavour to pacify them. He irregularly appointed his uncle, Lucius Caesar, to act in his absence as Governor of Rome. But the authority of the Governor, who was an old man, was disregarded ; the tribunes, hearing that Caesar had gone from Egypt to Asia, were as seditious as ever ; and Antony, finding himself powerless to manage the legions, returned to

Jan.(?)707  
(Nov., 48  
B. C.).

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, viii, 6, 1 ; 13, 1 ; *Att.*, vi, 6, 1 ; vii, 3, 12 ; ix, 16, 2 ; xi, 23, 3.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 45.

Rome. Perceiving that the populace resented his attempts to coerce Dolabella, he tentatively favoured him ; but when he saw that they cared for nobody except their favourite and that the Senate blamed him for stooping to court popular sentiment, he changed his tactics. Pretending to be neutral, he secretly supported Trebellius, allowed him to employ armed men, and looked on while he and Dolabella continued their faction fights. Bloodshed and incendiarism went on unchecked, and at last the situation became so alarming that the Vestal virgins removed the treasures from their temple to a place of safety. The Senate called upon Antony to keep order ; and his one loyal legion was sufficient for the purpose. Dolabella nevertheless gave notice that he intended to submit his proposals to the suffrages of the people ; and on the appointed day his followers, who had barricaded the approaches to the Forum, threatened to expel any one who opposed the bill. Antony at last acted. At daybreak he came down from the Capitol with his troops, forced his way into the Forum, destroyed the tablets on which the bill was engraved, and hurled the most prominent of the rioters from the Tarpeian rock. He had delayed so long that even these drastic measures failed to cow Dolabella's partisans ; but the master of the Roman world was now about to arrive.<sup>1</sup>

Antony at length restores order.

The only contemporary notices of this period come from the pen of Cicero ; and they enable us to realize the anxieties which those who, like him, thought of the war mainly as it affected their own interests, had to endure. Among the friends who would have been glad to assist him was Vatinius, from whom he could hardly have expected anything but enmity, whose physical deformities he had derided, and whose character he had assailed with a virulence which was not rooted only in righteous indignation. But Vatinius had a sense of humour too robust to leave room for vanity ; he made fun of his own deformities, and he bore no malice. ' I

Cicero's fears and lamentations.

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xi, 12, 4 ; 23, 3 ; *Livy, Epit.*, 113 ; *Dio*, xlii, 29-33.



48-47 B.C. should not want for his kind offices', said Cicero, 'or  
 Nov. 4, those of any one else, if they could find any way to be  
 706 (Aug. of use to me'.<sup>1</sup> Only Atticus could minister to his needs.  
 29, 48 B.C.).

Not even the letters which he wrote from exile, not even those with which he inundated Atticus when he was hesitating whether he should join Pompey or remain in Italy have more awakened the sympathy of his friends and the contempt of his enemies than those which he indited from Brundisium. From the moment of his arrival he tortured himself with regrets that he had come at all. 'You say', he wrote to his wife, 'that you are glad of my safe arrival in Italy. I hope you may continue to be glad. But I am afraid that, unsettled as I was by distress of mind and the grievous wrongs which I received, I have taken a step which it is not easy to find a way out of.'<sup>2</sup> As months passed away and no news arrived from Caesar, he became increasingly fearful lest his own party should win, and implored Atticus to tell him how he could best provide for his own safety.<sup>3</sup> After Cato had stopped the quarrels of Scipio and Varus he was alarmed by a rumour that the confederates or Cato might invade Italy.<sup>4</sup> Nor, although Oppius and Balbus assured him that Caesar would not only pardon him but treat him with distinction, was he yet convinced that even Caesar, if he should be victorious, would always retain his kind disposition.<sup>5</sup> He begged Atticus to urge Caesar's friends to intercede for him.<sup>6</sup> He was intensely anxious about the health of his beloved daughter<sup>7</sup> and about her financial prospects;<sup>8</sup> he was afraid that his own health as well as hers would suffer from the climate of Brundisium;<sup>9</sup> and, as many curt letters show, his relations with his wife were becoming more and more strained. She told him plainly that he had been backward in joining the Pompeian cause:<sup>10</sup> he complained to Atticus

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xi, 5, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Fam.*, xiv, 12. Cf. *Att.*, xi, 5, 1, 3; 11, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 15, 1. Cf. 25, 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 18, 1. Cf. *Plut.*, *Cato min.*, 58, 3, and Judeich, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

<sup>5</sup> *Att.*, xi, 6, 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 7, 5; 8, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 4; *Fam.*, xiv, 9.

<sup>8</sup> *Att.*, xi, 9, 3; 24, 3.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.* 21, 2; 22, 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, ix, 6, 4.

that she had defrauded him by petty embezzlements.<sup>1</sup> 48-47 B.C.  
 He was scandalized not only by the political vagaries of his son-in-law, but also by the notorious amours with which he beguiled the intervals of business.<sup>2</sup> Worse than all, his brother Quintus, for whom nevertheless he pleaded earnestly with Caesar,<sup>3</sup> had turned against him with 'more than fraternal hate'. He may have been exasperated with Marcus for having led him to join the losing side:<sup>4</sup> it is not inconceivable that he had long secretly resented the occasionally paternal and lecturing tone of Marcus's letters: anyhow he had quarrelled with him at Patrae,<sup>5</sup> and had thence gone to Asia, to make his peace with Caesar.<sup>6</sup> 'Wherever he is', wrote Marcus to Atticus,<sup>7</sup> 'he never stops heaping every kind of abuse upon me. Nothing so monstrous has ever befallen me, nothing in these troubles that has given me so much pain'. 'There is absolutely nothing wanting', he complained later, 'to make me the most miserable of men'.<sup>8</sup>

Dec. 25,  
 706 (Oct.  
 8, 48 B.C.)

But he was soon to learn that one at least of his anxieties was groundless. On the 12th of August, 47, he told his wife that at last he had received a letter from Caesar; 'and', he added, 'generous enough it is'.<sup>9</sup> The reader will remember the friendly assurance which it contained.<sup>10</sup> May 30.  
 Caesar meets and reassures him.  
 A few weeks later it was announced that Caesar had landed at Tarentum and was coming to Brundisium. Somewhat uneasily Cicero set out to meet him. 'But', says Plutarch,<sup>12</sup> 'he had no need to do or to say anything that compromised his dignity. For when Caesar saw him coming to meet him far in front of the rest, he

About  
 Sept. 24<sup>11</sup>  
 (July 10).

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, xi, 24, 3. O. E. Schmidt (*Neue Jahrb.*, &c., i, 1898, p. 183) admits that we do not know Terentia's side of the question, and Dr. Luise Neubauer (*Wiener Studien*, xxxi, 1909, p. 229) urges that she may have required the money—2,000 sesterces (£20)—of which Cicero insisted that she had robbed him, for necessities. Cf. Purser's comments (*The Correspondence of Cicero*, iv<sup>2</sup>, 1918, p. li, note).

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, xi, 12, 4; 23, 3. <sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 12, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Tyrrell (*The Correspondence of Cicero*, iv, 1894, p. xliii), citing *Att.*, xi, 13, 4, says, 'there is good evidence that one cause was that Quintus considered that Marcus had not 'given him his share of the money he had made in Cilicia'. Cf. O. E. Schmidt, *Briefwechsel*, &c., p. 198.

<sup>5</sup> *Att.*, xi, 5, 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 7.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 8, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 15, 3.

<sup>9</sup> *Fam.*, xiv, 23.

<sup>10</sup> See p. 203.

<sup>11</sup> Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

<sup>12</sup> *Cic.*, 39, 3.

47 B. C.

July 16.  
Cicero's  
last letter  
to Teren-  
tia.

Caesar's  
dealings  
with An-  
tony and  
Dolabella.

dismounted and embraced him and walked several furlongs conversing with him alone. Thenceforward he treated him consistently with respect and good will.' The statesman and the orator parted, the former to restore law and order, the latter to resume in peace his literary life. On the 1st of October he wrote his last letter to Terentia :—' I shall probably arrive at our house at Tusculum on the 17th or the day after. See that everything is ready there ; for perhaps there will be several others with me, and I expect we shall stay there a considerable time. If there is no basin in the bath, have one put in ; also everything else necessary for a place where one wants to live and enjoy health. Good-bye.' <sup>1</sup>

So soon as Caesar appeared in Rome the tribunes ceased from troubling. That was enough for him : he asked no questions and punished nobody.<sup>2</sup> Antony might have done better ; but he was a serviceable officer and Caesar needed him. Dolabella had not shown himself indispensable ; but it is probable that Caesar liked the adventurous young libertine, who was not without a heart,<sup>3</sup> and he could afford to smile at his Caelian escapade. In one respect, however, both Antony and Dolabella were disappointed. Like other followers of Caesar they bid large sums at auction for the confiscated estates of fallen or irreconcilable Pompeians, hoping that, in consideration of their services, they would not be called upon to pay. Caesar required them to discharge the debt ; but it would seem that he found great difficulty in enforcing his demand.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile the mutinous legions had met their master. Caesar saw that, in view of the African campaign, they must be pacified at any cost, and, since he was prevented from exerting personal influence, he sent Milo's old opponent, Sallust, to assure them that he intended to give

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, xiv, 20.

<sup>2</sup> *App.*, ii, 92, 386 ; *Dio*, xlii, 33.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, xiii, 9, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, xii, 18 A, 1 ; *Phil.*, ii, 29, 71 ; xiii, 5, 10-1 ; *Plut.*, *Ant.*, 10, 1 ; *App.*, iii, 4, 11 ; *Dio*, xlii, 50, 5. Cf. E. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie* <sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 380, n. 1.

every man a thousand *denarii*—more than four years' pay—after the coming campaign. The men returned the answer that might have been expected,—they did not want promises, but cash ; and the 12th actually stoned Sallust, who was obliged to fly for his life. The legions followed, intending to behead the General himself, and encamped in the Field of Mars. He immediately posted Antony's legion in detachments to guard his own house and the exits of the city, and then, disregarding the entreaties of his friends, went down into the Field and ascended the tribunal. Startled, perhaps abashed, by the unexpected sight of their commander, the men thronged towards the tribunal and saluted. Caesar asked them what they wanted. Expecting that, as they were indispensable, Caesar would offer of his own accord to pay the promised prize-money, they replied that they wished to be disbanded. 'I dismiss you', said Caesar ; and as his hearers were too amazed to utter, he added 'I will give you what I promised when I have conquered with the aid of others.' Then they were not to share in the booty that was to be expected from the African campaign ! They said nothing : perhaps even now the General would make some concession. Friends who were standing by urged him not to be too stern, but to say something to console his old soldiers. 'Quirites', he began. Stung by a designation which implied that they were no longer soldiers, they cried that they were sorry and begged to be allowed to remain in his command ; and as he turned and began to descend the steps, they appealed to him to punish the ringleaders, only not to go. For a few moments he stood still. Then, returning, he said that he would punish no one, but that it had grieved him to learn that the 10th, which he had always honoured, was foremost in the mutiny. 'I will disband the 10th only', he said ; 'but when I return from Africa I will fulfil all the promises which I made to them, and I will also bestow lands upon you all when the war is at an end'. The men cheered loudly ; but the 10th asked Caesar to decimate them, if only he would let them stay. Seeing that it

Caesar  
quells  
mutinous  
legions.

47 B. C.



47 B. C.

would be folly to irritate men who were repentant and ashamed, he forgave them too.<sup>1</sup>

But Caesar, as he said himself,<sup>2</sup> was always Caesar; and those who have read this history and the history of the Gallic War know that it was Caesar's wont to bear in mind offences which he could not punish when they were committed and to punish them when the offender thought that they had been forgotten. The day of reckoning for the ringleaders of the 10th had not yet come.

He makes concessions to debtors, prepares for the African campaign, and rewards his supporters.

While the troops were successively marching to the port of embarkation Caesar was raising money for the expenses of the campaign, and he found himself obliged to make concessions in order to appease the discontent which Dolabella had aroused. The populace were still clamouring for the abolition of debt. This Caesar of course refused to grant, explaining that he owed money himself and had no intention of repudiating his debts;<sup>3</sup> but in pursuance of his original law he took account of the depreciation which had followed the confiscations of Pompeian estates and permitted debtors in making payments to rate their property at the value which it had borne at the outset of the war. As further measures of relief, he remitted all interest that had accrued since he first took the field against Pompey, and even cautiously followed the lead of Caelius and Dolabella by releasing tenants from payment of one year's rent for their dwellings up to five hundred *denarii* or about twenty pounds. That Caesar should have descended to such a revolutionary expedient shows that he had reason to fear that serious disturbances would otherwise break out in the capital during the campaign which could not be postponed.<sup>4</sup> Touching the ways and means by which

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xi, 21, 2; 22, 2; *Livy, Epit.*, 113; *Plut., Caes.*, 51, 1; *Frontin., Strat.*, i, 9, 4; *Tac., Ann.*, i, 42; *Suet., Div. Iul.*, 70; *App.*, ii, 92-4; *Dio*, xlii, 52-5. Plutarch and Dio (54, 1) wrongly say that Caesar rewarded the mutineers before he went to Africa. According to Cicero, P. Sulla was obliged to flee for his life, according to Appian and Dio Sallust. Perhaps both statements are true.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 19, 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Dio*, xlii, 50, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 51, 1-2. Cf. *Cic., De off.*, ii, 23, 83. This measure is commonly referred to 46 B. C. because Suetonius (38, 2) seems to mean that it was

money was provided our information is deplorably vague. 47 B. C. It appears that loans, which may have been forced, were obtained both from individuals and from towns, and that the wealthy made contributions like the so-called benevolences that were collected by Edward the Fourth. Caesar's supporters were rewarded with various honours,—provincial governorships, priesthoods, superfluous magistracies : senatorial vacancies were filled by centurions ;<sup>1</sup> Calenus and Vatinius, whose services had been pre-eminent, were elected consuls for the last few weeks of the year,<sup>2</sup> for the office was in abeyance and Caesar had waived his right. The enfeebled republican constitution was beginning to dissolve.

enacted after Caesar's triumph in that year ; but Suetonius often groups events without regard to chronological order—he mentions (42, 2) the compromise by which Caesar endeavoured to re-establish financial credit in 706 (49 B. C.) among the reforms which he carried out or projected in 45—and Dio's precise statement deserves preference.

<sup>1</sup> Dio, xlii, 50, 2-3 ; 51, 3-5. L. Gelzer (*D. Nobilität d. röm. Republik*, 1912, pp. 100-1) compares the loans of which Dio speaks with those which Caesar had contracted in Spain (see p. 52) and holds that he thus counter-acted the agitation for abolishing debt and enlisted the support of his creditors for his own autocracy.

<sup>2</sup> An inscription (*C. I. L.*, i, No. 735, with which cf. pp. 440, 449) shows that Calenus and Vatinius were in office on November 16.

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

47 B. C.  
Sept. 30,  
Caesar  
embarks  
six legions  
for Africa.

TOWARDS the end of November Caesar left Rome and on the 17th of December reached Lilybaeum. For some reason, which our authorities neglected to explain, the mobilization had been slow, and only one legion with six hundred cavalry had arrived. No time, however, was actually lost ; for during several days contrary winds prevailed. Caesar had his tent pitched close to the water's edge in order to impress upon all that they must be ready to start at a moment's notice. The few troops who were present were embarked, and the sailors were not allowed to go ashore. From day to day more galleys and transports entered the harbour and took up their positions alongside the wharves, while cohort after cohort, troop after troop marched into the town. Caesar gave stringent orders that no baggage which could possibly be dispensed with was to be taken and that on no pretence were any of the slaves who usually accompanied armies in the field to be embarked. Partly perhaps his motive was that which had impelled him to give a similar order at Brundisium,—the necessity of finding room in ships which were comparatively few ; but probably he also reflected that it would be as much as he could do to provide food and water in Africa for the troops alone. Just a week after his arrival the 5th legion, *Alaudae*, which had already served in Greece, five newly raised legions, two thousand cavalry—Germans with their attendant light infantry, Gauls, and Spaniards—archers from Syria and Crete, were all on board. Reinforcements were to follow in due course. Caesar was obliged to employ a large proportion of raw troops because many of the veterans needed rest after their numerous campaigns ; and garrisons of course remained in the provinces, in Egypt






Monastir



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Zeta (Beni H



Scipi

87



and in Italy. According to the reports furnished by Sicilians, the forces of the enemy were numerous and formidable. In fact they had fourteen legions, of which four were commanded by Juba, about eighteen thousand horsemen, of whom sixteen hundred were Gauls and Germans whom Labienus had brought from Greece,<sup>1</sup> swarms of light-armed Numidians who were associated with the Numidian horse, slingers, archers, mounted archers, and sixty-four elephants; but the infantry, who for the most part had been raised in Africa, were far inferior to Caesar's men. Most of the fortified towns had been strongly garrisoned by Scipio; and he had squadrons of war ships at Utica and at various points along the coast. Juba had not yet stirred beyond his own dominions; Scipio with the greater part of his army was encamped at Utica; Labienus had a powerful division of cavalry and auxiliaries not far from Leptis.

47 B. C.

The forces  
of Scipio  
and Juba.

Caesar sent on ahead the bulk of his fleet with orders to call at the island of Aponiana, about nine miles south of Lilybaeum, and there await his arrival. Remaining at Lilybaeum, he confiscated and sold the property of the Pompeian residents, gave various instructions to Allienus, the Governor of Sicily, and ordered him to dispatch the rest of the troops as speedily as possible. On the 25th of December he joined the fleet and steered for Cape Bon.<sup>2</sup>

[Favignana.]

Oct. 8.

The theatre of the campaign upon which Caesar was about to enter extends southward some thirty-five miles from the sea-port of Sousse, embraces Monastir, Lemta, Cape Dimasse, Mahedia, and El Aalia and reaches its southernmost point at El Djem, where the noblest ruin in the world, an amphitheatre, not much smaller and less mutilated than the Colosseum, still bears lonely witness to the wealth and the majesty of the Roman Empire. The reader of these pages will be concerned chiefly with the northern part of this country,—the triangular tract

Theatre  
of the cam-  
paign.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 431-2.

<sup>2</sup> According to *Bell. Afr.*, 2, 1, Caesar embarked his six legions on board galleys and his cavalry in transports. This statement, which, as far as it relates to the legions, is obviously incorrect (for the galleys were too few to carry them), is inconsistent with 8, 2 and 11, 3-4.

47 B. C.

whose apex is Sousse and whose base is formed by a line drawn westward from Mahedia to the vast salt marsh called Sebkha de Sidi el Hani. The hills which relieve the monotony of vineyards, olive-groves, corn-fields, and sandy wastes are far less imposing than those which Curio saw. From Sousse a low range trends south-eastward towards Mennzel Harb and then south-westward past Mesdour, leaving a narrow strip of coast along which the road runs towards Monastir, and which broadens southward into the plain, formed by the valley of the Oued el Melah, that stretches past Mesdour and Djemmal to Zramedine. Eastward of this valley the low plateau of Monastir gradually rises into a well-defined range which, bounded on the east by the little plain of Moknine, extends far southward from Sidi Masaoud, and projecting from which a strip of gently rising ground winds south-eastward and southward past Lemta, Teboulba, Thapsus, and Cape Dimasse and forms the isthmus that separates the salt marsh of Moknine from the Mediterranean Sea.

Like Curio, Caesar of course intended to avoid Utica, which was so strongly garrisoned and protected by such a powerful fleet that it would be impossible to effect a landing. On the other hand, the coast south of Cape Bon was said to be inadequately guarded, and Caesar perhaps expected that his enemies would not divine his intentions and send a sufficient force to oppose him. But the voyage was unfortunate. Only a few galleys had been able to keep touch with Caesar's ship, and the transports, which of course had no oars, were nearly all dispersed by unfavourable winds.<sup>1</sup> Caesar with the sister ships sailed along the coast until he reached Hadrumetum, now Sousse, which possessed a good artificial harbour.<sup>2</sup>

Dec. 28  
(Oct. 11).  
Caesar  
with a few  
ships lands  
at Hadru-  
metum,

<sup>1</sup> The writer of *Bell. Afr.* (2, 5) says that Caesar came in sight of Africa on the fourth day of the voyage, and that he had a fast-sailing vessel and a favourable wind. The coast which he first descried must have been Cape Bon, and if he did not see it until the fourth day, the voyage was extraordinarily slow (see p. 98). Surely by (in conspectum) *Africae* the writer meant Hadrumetum?

<sup>2</sup> See *Rev. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., xxxvi, 1900, pp. 195-6.

The town was garrisoned by two legions under the ex-propraetor Considius Longus, and three thousand Numidian cavalry were about to reinforce him. Caesar anchored for a few hours outside the harbour, waiting for the rest of his ships; but as they did not appear, he landed without opposition and encamped close to the town.<sup>1</sup> The troops which he had with him were only three thousand legionaries and one hundred and fifty Gallic cavalry. For the present therefore all that he could do was to safeguard his little force and to conciliate the natives by preventing his men from plundering or committing outrages. Accepting a suggestion from one of his lieutenants, Lucius Plancus, he wrote to Considius, urging him to abandon the cause of the Pompeians, and directed a prisoner to convey the letter into the town. Without allowing the man to explain Considius ordered that he should be executed on the spot, and sent the letter with the seal unbroken to Scipio. As Caesar received no answer and his army was in danger of being surrounded, he determined to secure the ports of Ruspina and Leptis, which Scipio had neglected to occupy, in order that his ships of war might have a convenient base and that the reinforcements for which he was waiting might be able to land in safety. Ruspina stood upon the plateau, about two miles south of the site of Monastir;<sup>2</sup> Leptis was situated six miles further south, nearly a mile northward of the modern Lemta. The column had hardly begun to

47 B. C.

occupies  
Ruspina  
and Lep-  
tis, and  
takes  
steps to  
obtain  
supplies.

<sup>1</sup> Our original authority (*Bell. Afr.*, 3, 4-5), remarking that Caesar, contrary to the usual practice, had not given sealed orders to the skippers, containing directions about the port for which they were to steer, explains that he refrained from doing so because he was not sure that any one port would be secure from the enemy. Stoffel (*Hist. de J. César*, ii, 283) derides this explanation as absurd: Col. G. Veith (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, 1912, pp. 859, 903) says that it was merely conjectural, the writer being ignorant that Caesar intended to surprise Hadrumetum, and therefore would not let the captains know where they were going. But if Caesar could count upon surprising Hadrumetum, what would he lose by informing his captains of his design? No doubt he intended to surprise Hadrumetum; but he could not foresee that he would be able to effect a landing there, and our authority may be right in believing that he hoped to keep his fleet together and to land, if not at Hadrumetum, somewhere else.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 516-7.



47 B. C.  
Dec. 29  
(Oct. 12).

Jan. 1, 708  
(Oct. 13,  
47 B. C.).

move when the garrison of Hadrumetum, supported by two thousand of Juba's cavalry, which had come to draw their pay, attacked the rear-guard before it had cleared the gate. The legionaries halted, ready to defend themselves, while the Gallic troopers, outnumbered though they were by more than ten to one, charged the Numidian horse and drove them back into the town. But Numidians did not pretend to practise what are called shock tactics. To retreat when they were charged in order that they might attack in their own fashion was their guiding principle. Emerging from the streets, they soon overtook the column, and tried again by launching javelins to impede the march ; but their attempts, repulsed by the veteran cohorts which composed the rear-guard, became gradually feebler ; and before nightfall Caesar encamped outside Ruspina. Next day he pushed on, still skirting the coast, to Leptis. The consideration with which he had treated the natives was beginning to bear fruit ; for envoys from various towns had already met him on the march, promising to furnish grain, and the inhabitants of Leptis were equally complaisant. In the course of the day some of the missing ships arrived ; and, augmented by the troops which disembarked from them, Caesar's force amounted to twenty-three cohorts, perhaps about ten thousand men. The army was, however, still too weak to venture into the interior ; and the oarsmen belonging to the galleys, who went to fetch water, were attacked from ambush by a body of Moorish cavalry, and suffered considerable loss. Caesar sent back to Lilybaeum the ships which had just arrived, to fetch additional reinforcements, and directed Vatinius <sup>1</sup> to sail with a squadron of ten galleys, search for the transports that were still missing, and attack any of the enemies' vessels which might be trying to intercept them. But the question of supply was uppermost in his mind. Accordingly he sent a dispatch to Sardinia, requesting that grain and other foodstuffs should be forwarded at once, and commissioned

<sup>1</sup> *Vatinius* (*Bell. Afr.*, 8, 2) is an emendation for the meaningless *interim*. See R. Schneider's critical note.

Sallust to sail to the island of Cercina, off the Lesser Syrtis, where there were abundant stores of corn. On the following day, leaving six cohorts to garrison Leptis, he returned to Ruspina, and spent the afternoon in collecting supplies from the neighbouring farms. He was still intensely anxious for the safety of the missing ships, for it was rumoured that they were somewhere near Utica, and if they were lost or captured, the outlook would be desperate. Accordingly he resolved to go in quest of them himself with seven veteran cohorts. Publius Saserna, an officer whose brother commanded the garrison of Leptis, was to hold Ruspina with one legion. Towards evening Caesar left the town and embarked. His purpose was unknown to the troops whom he left behind, for he was unwilling to disturb their minds. During the night the galleys destined for the expedition remained in the harbour. At daybreak, just as they were putting out to sea, the long-looked-for transports appeared. Caesar's vessels immediately returned to the quays, followed by the new-comers ; and when the troops had been landed he was master of six legions <sup>1</sup> and about two thousand cavalry.

Even now, however, the army was not sufficiently strong to undertake offensive operations, and the grain which had been collected was not nearly enough. Accordingly, after directing that a new camp should be constructed just north of Ruspina, Caesar started on a foraging expedition with thirty legionary cohorts, mostly new levies, one hundred and fifty archers, and four hundred horse, and marched, preceded by mounted scouts and a screen of cavalry, towards the plain which extends westward and southward from the plateau. He had advanced about three miles when the patrols reported that the enemy were visible, and just as the news was delivered a cloud of dust confirmed it. Directly after Caesar's landing was announced at Utica a strong force

47 B. C.  
[Karke-  
nah.]  
Jan. 2,  
708 (Oct.  
14, 47).

After the  
arrival of  
the miss-  
ing trans-  
ports he  
starts on a  
foraging  
expedi-  
tion,  
Jan. 4, 708  
(Oct. 16,  
47).

<sup>1</sup> Strictly speaking, Caesar had now six legions less certain companies (for it turned out that a few transports had not yet arrived) plus seven cohorts (see p. 534).

47 B. C. had set out to overwhelm him. He immediately sent back a galloper to fetch the rest of his cavalry and archers, for though the troop-horses after their long voyage were in poor condition, he could not now dispense with them. As soon as the enemy came in sight the legionaries put on their helmets, which they never wore on the march, and prepared for action.

and narrowly escaped defeat from Labienus near Rus-pina.

Labienus, who led the advancing host, was confident that he would now at last be able to revenge himself upon his old commander. He knew that Caesar's infantry consisted for the most part of raw boys: he intended to adopt against them the tactics by which the Parthians had won the battle of Carrhae and Juba had won the battle of the Bagradas; and he never doubted but that, unnerved by the recollection of Curio's fate, they would quail at the sight of his multitudinous cavalry. His army comprised the sixteen hundred Gallic and German troopers, a motley force of half-castes, freedmen, and slaves, whom he had armed and trained in the Gallic fashion, eight thousand Numidian horsemen, numerous archers, slingers, and mounted archers, and an immense number of light-armed Numidian footmen. The cavalry, interspersed with light infantry and archers, were already extending in a long line, so closely formed that from Caesar's standpoint they looked like infantry; and dense masses of cavalry strengthened their flanks. Caesar saw that if he were to adopt the usual formation of three lines, he would be outflanked; accordingly he drew up the thirty cohorts in one long line, disposed his archers in front, and posted his cavalry on the wings, warning the officers to do their utmost to prevent the enemy from working round to the rear. For some time the armies remained watching one another. Suddenly the enemy's cavalry began to lengthen out, and ascended the lower slopes of the hills on their left in order to surround Caesar's line. The Gallic cavalry strove in vain to check them. Meanwhile at various points along the centre horsemen, accompanied by light-armed foot, kept riding forward and throwing javelins: whenever

a cohort charged the horsemen trotted away while the supporting infantry, moving nimbly on the unshielded flank of the isolated cohort, hurled missiles into its ranks until the horsemen returned to the attack.<sup>1</sup> Caesar, anxiously watching the struggle, ordered the subordinate commanders to forbid their men to stir more than four feet beyond the line of the first rank.<sup>2</sup> But the cavalry on the wings were steadily completing their enveloping movement : Caesar's cavalry, who were many times outnumbered and many of whose horses were wounded, were gradually falling back ; and soon the cohorts found themselves huddled into a helpless mass. All that they could do was to endeavour to parry the missiles that were showered upon them. Labienus was jubilant. Riding from point to point with bared head, so that his features might not be concealed by his visor, he jeered at the legionaries. Some of them were old soldiers—time-expired volunteers who served to stiffen the ranks of the recruits. Labienus fixed his gaze on one of them. ' What are you doing there, you recruit ? Such a dare-devil fellow, aren't you ? And all you men—that general of yours has been humbugging you, has he ? A nice mess he's brought you into, upon my word ! I'm sorry for you ! ' ' I'm no recruit, Labienus,' said the veteran : ' I'm an old soldier of the 10th.' ' Oh,' answered Labienus : ' I don't see the badge of the 10th.'<sup>3</sup> ' I'll soon show you who I am,' shouted the infuriated veteran, and, pulling off his helmet, he hurled his javelin with all his might at Labienus. The blade pierced the horse's chest, and Labienus was thrown. Nevertheless Labienus was winning the battle. The legionaries looked to Caesar in mute appeal. Caesar had never found himself in such straits since he had fought in the ranks against the Nervii on the heights above the Sambre. The crisis was exactly the same as that which had proved fatal to the army of Curio. But Caesar saw that it was still possible to extricate

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 517-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 15, 1. See pp. 394, 396-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 16, 2. The 10th, as a whole, had not yet arrived. Presumably the veteran belonged to one of the seven veteran cohorts mentioned in 10, 2.



47 B. C.

his army from the vice in which it was caught. First he ordered that the crumpled line should extend itself by an offensive movement as far as possible. Then the men of every alternate cohort were directed to face about and take up their position in the rear of the cohort next to them, back to back. Gradually this simple manœuvre justified itself. The Numidians, suddenly forced to weaken their own formation, could not stand in close combat against heavy-armed troops. While the central cohorts kept the surrounding host at bay the veteran cohorts on the wings, supported by the cavalry, which had been forced to take refuge along with them, attacked with such fierce energy the two ends of the ellipse that hemmed them in that they speedily ruptured them,<sup>1</sup> and the severed parts were put to flight. But it would have been dangerous to pursue; and Caesar therefore proceeded to withdraw in order of battle towards his camp. Suddenly his old enemy, Petreius, who had broken the parole which he had given when he surrendered near Ilerda, rode on to the field with sixteen hundred picked Numidian horsemen and their attendant infantry; and Labienus's force, encouraged by this support, again attacked Caesar's cavalry, drove them off, and began to harass the rear-guard. The army was compelled to face about and renew the action; for the enemy, adopting the same tactics as before, threw their missiles from a safe distance, and again endeavoured to envelop the line. The situation was extremely serious, and the only course was to seize a coign of vantage where the troops could hold out until night should enable them to make good their retreat.<sup>2</sup> Riding along the ranks, Caesar exhorted officers and men to make one vigorous onset and force the fighting to an end. For a few moments he held them back. Suddenly the cohorts and the cavalry, though their horses, weakened by the voyage, were beginning to flag, charged, drove

<sup>1</sup> R. Schneider in his note on *Bell. Afr.*, 17, 2 takes *telis* (the missiles which Caesar's soldiers used) as equivalent to *pilis*. But each soldier had only one javelin! Evidently *telis* includes sling-stones or bullets. See p. 57, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 518.

the enemy from the plain, gained a footing on the hills, 47 B. C. and returned safely under cover of darkness to their camp.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar had so narrowly escaped disaster that he resolved to incur no more risks, but to remain on the defensive near Ruspina until reinforcements should arrive and to make his position impregnable. Accordingly he proceeded to construct earthworks from the town and from his camp to the sea,<sup>2</sup> in order to enable his troops to communicate securely with the port and to facilitate the arrival of his reinforcements. Outside the camp, sharp stakes were planted in the ground with their points just protruding, so as to check any sudden assault. Two days after the battle it was announced that Scipio was marching from Utica at the head of eight legions and three thousand cavalry to join Labienus. Caesar redoubled his exertions. Missiles of all kinds and pieces of artillery were landed and stored within the entrenchments. Archers, marines, and even oarsmen were transferred from the ships to the camp, Caesar's intention being to train them to fight alongside his cavalry and thus to counterbalance the enemy's light-armed foot. Every day he visited the works to see that all was in order, and doubled the number of the cohorts which usually guarded the gates of the camp. Workshops were established; arrows, javelins and leaden bullets were manufactured; while messengers were dispatched to Allienus, conveying a request that he would forward fresh supplies of iron and lead, as well as timber suitable for the construction of battering-rams. Notwithstanding all Caesar's efforts, grain was still scarce; for in the previous year so many labourers had been summoned to join Scipio's standard that there had been no harvest, and nearly all the available stocks had been seized and stored by the allies. As some days must elapse before the expected supplies could arrive from Cercina and Sardinia, Caesar visited the farmers in the

He entrenches himself near Ruspina pending the arrival of reinforcements.

<sup>1</sup> In regard to the last phase of the combat cf. *Bell. Afr.*, 18, 19. 7 with App., ii, 95, 399-400 and Dio, xliii, 2, 1-2. See also Veith, *op. cit.*, pp. 785, 863.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 518.

47 B. C. neighbourhood and tactfully persuaded them to send him as much corn as they could spare. Meanwhile he detached war-ships to patrol the seas ; for some of his transports were still missing, and he had heard that the enemy's vessels were lying in wait to intercept them.

Scipio  
joins La-  
bienus  
and en-  
camps  
hard by.

Scipio, marching from Utica, where Cato remained in command of the garrison, halted for a few days at Hadrumetum, and moving thence to join Labienus and Petreius, encamped along with them about three miles south of Caesar's position.<sup>1</sup> Caesar's difficulties were of course increased. Labienus and Petreius, thanks to their enormous superiority in cavalry, had compelled him to exercise great caution : he was now unable to move without imminent peril, except behind his own entrenchments. The hostile cavalry were ubiquitous ; and parties who ventured out in quest of forage or water were surrounded and captured. Though the men had enough grain left for their immediate wants, the price was rising, while the horses and mules were half starved. Fortunately the veteran legionaries and the seasoned troopers, who had experienced similar privations before, were able to find a tolerable substitute for the ordinary provender. Seaweed of a kind which is still used as fodder by the natives of Tunisia was abundant on the shore, and after drinkable water had been distilled from it the horses, which for the present had little or no work to do, were kept alive on the dry stalks. Moreover, fortune, which, as Caesar often remarked, is a great power in war, now befriended him. Juba was marching to join Scipio, and the army which he commanded was not to be despised. But since the days of Catiline a Roman adventurer, Publius Sittius, had been pursuing the career of a soldier of fortune in Africa at the head of a band of free-lances whom he had raised in Spain ; <sup>2</sup> and he now saw a chance of enriching himself at Juba's expense and establishing a claim to the gratitude of Caesar. Allying himself with Bocchus, the King of Eastern Mauretania, one of Caesar's

Sittius  
and Boc-  
chus pre-  
vent Juba  
from rein-  
forcing  
Scipio.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 519-20.

<sup>2</sup> Cic., *Pro Sulla*, 20, 56 ; App., iv, 54, 230-1 ; Dio, xliii, 3, 1.

partisans, he stormed the rich town of Cirta (now Constantine), and proceeded to plunder the villages and homesteads in the surrounding country. Juba heard of these raids when he was approaching the camp of his allies, and turned back in alarm to protect his own dominions. Not only was Scipio deprived of the reinforcements upon which he had counted: he was obliged to lend Juba some of his own troops and to content himself with the thirty elephants which Juba sent in exchange. But in other respects the situation of the invading army was grave. Except in the narrow strip of coast which extended from Ruspina to Leptis the natives refused to believe that Caesar was in Africa. One of his lieutenants, they supposed, might have landed; but if Caesar had really come, he would have made his presence felt. He would not have looked on while homesteads were being burned, estates pillaged, herdsmen robbed of their cattle, chieftains imprisoned or murdered, children of noble birth torn as hostages from their parents and enslaved. Caesar wrote to the leading men in the various towns, assuring them that he had really arrived. Envoys made their way to his camp and implored him to save them from their oppressors; but he could only promise to commence active operations at the earliest possible moment. His troops were constantly at work, strengthening the fortifications, building redoubts, erecting wooden towers and mounting catapults on their platforms, constructing moles on which they would be able to repel any attack that the hostile fleets might attempt. He wrote urgently to Allienus, describing the desperate condition of the province and commanding him to dispatch the remaining legions, no matter how stormy the weather might be, without further delay. Notwithstanding his habitual calm, he was becoming most anxiously impatient; and the officer who wrote the narrative known as *The African Campaign* tells us that he kept complaining of Allienus's inaction and was continually looking seaward for a glimpse of the laggard fleet.

47 B. C.

But  
Caesar has  
grounds  
for  
anxiety.

Meanwhile, although he was obliged to remain on the

Desultory  
operations.



47 B. C.

defensive, hostilities were not entirely suspended. Cavalry outposts were still patrolling in front of his camp, and every day there were skirmishes between them and the enemy. Labienus attempted to surprise Leptis : but the fortifications were too strong to be carried except by a siege ; and Saserna made such good use of his artillery that the assailants hastily withdrew. Scipio on each of the first few days that followed his arrival formed his army in order of battle some five hundred yards in front of his camp ; but Caesar ignored these ostentatious challenges, which could have had no serious meaning except perhaps to inspire inferior troops with a belief in their own superiority. At length Scipio ventured to advance comparatively close to Caesar's camp, with his thirty elephants posted in front of his line and his cavalry extended in an imposing array. Caesar, who was watching his movements from the open space in front of his tent, sent gallopers with orders to his lieutenants and their subordinate officers. Foragers, who had been constrained to venture out again, and fatigue parties, which had gone to cut wood, were directed to return quietly in small groups to camp. The outposts were ordered to remain where they were unless the enemy's cavalry came within range, and then to retire without undue haste. The author of *The African Campaign*, whose ardent admiration of his chief was somewhat uncritical, stoutly declared that he declined Scipio's challenge, not because he had any fear of defeat, but because he did not choose to sully his career by a victory which could only be bought by a prodigal sacrifice of life. Caesar never underrated an enemy, and, having barely escaped defeat from Labienus's cavalry, he was not disposed to encounter the combined hosts of Labienus and Scipio. But his admirer said no more than the truth when he affirmed that the moral force of Caesar wrought upon his opponents. He had beaten the Pompeians repeatedly, and there were men in Scipio's army who had humbly besought his compassion and who were demoralized by the consciousness that in bearing arms against him again they were violating

a solemn pledge.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, though Caesar's army was manifestly the weaker, Numidians were deserting to him in large numbers, accompanied by Gaetulians, whose ancestors had been befriended by Marius after the Jugurthine War and who had learned that the family of Caesar was connected with that of their patron. Caesar immediately sent the more influential Gaetulians with letters to their tribal leaders, whom he urged to defend themselves vigorously against the Numidian king. Soon afterwards a considerable number of Roman citizens, belonging to two of Scipio's legions, who were in accord with the Gaetulians, likewise went over to Caesar's camp. It was beginning to be evident that the native population sympathized with the general who was known to respect the rights of non-combatants and whose prestige, notwithstanding his temporary weakness, seemed to make his ultimate victory certain. Envoys from Acylla,<sup>2</sup> a town to which the Senate had conceded the privilege of self-government, presented themselves in Caesar's camp, and, promising that their fellow-citizens would gladly supply him with grain, begged him to detach a force sufficient to protect them. Caesar immediately sent one of his officers, Gaius Messius, with several cohorts to safeguard the town. Considius, detaching eight cohorts from the garrison which he commanded at Hadrumetum, instantly marched against Acylla, but retreated when he found that Messius had forestalled him; and although Labienus sent reinforcements which encouraged him to undertake a siege, he was soon compelled to abandon his attempt.

Before this result was achieved the long period of anxious strain came to an end. Towards the end of January a fleet of merchant ships from Cercina, freighted with corn, sailed into the harbour of Ruspina, while transports conveying two veteran legions, eight hundred Gallic troopers, and a thousand archers and slingers arrived from Lilybaeum. Prices fell to their normal level; envoys from Thisdra (El Djem) announced that

About  
Nov. 3,  
47 B. C.

[The 13th  
and 14th.]

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 31, 3.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 518-9.

47 B. C. seventy thousand bushels<sup>1</sup> of corn, stored in their magazines, were at Caesar's disposal; it was reported that Sittius had gained a further success against Juba; and although Cato was sending new levies to reinforce Scipio, Caesar now felt strong enough to take the offensive. The first period of the campaign was closed.

Reinforce-  
ments en-  
able Cae-  
sar to take  
the offen-  
sive.

Story of  
a devoted  
centurion.

[Dja-  
mour.]

The army with which Caesar was about to take the field, though it comprised eight legions, three of which consisted of veteran soldiers, besides seven seasoned cohorts, was still very weak in cavalry and auxiliary troops; but the devotion that had been evoked in the men by their commander is illustrated by a story told by the author of *The African Campaign*.<sup>2</sup> Two vessels belonging to the fleet that conveyed Caesar's reinforcements from Sicily had failed to make the harbour of Ruspina. One of them was carried by a storm to the island of Aegimurus, in the Gulf of Tunis, and was captured by Varus, who commanded Scipio's fleet. Among the passengers was a centurion of the 14th legion, whose name has unfortunately not been preserved. He and the privates of whom he was in charge were kindly treated by Varus, the most humane of the Pompeian officers, and sent to Scipio's camp. Scipio told them that he had no doubt that it was Caesar, their vile leader, who had made them disloyal to the Republic, and that if they would now do their duty and take service under him, he would not only pardon but also reward them. The centurion took it upon himself to reply.—'I thank you, Scipio—I will not call you Imperator—for your great kindness in offering life and immunity to a prisoner of war, and perhaps I might avail myself of it if it were not associated with the lowest depth of villainy. I to bear arms against my general, Caesar, under whom I have commanded a company, and against his army, for whose honour I have fought victoriously thirty-six times or more! No! That I will never do, and seriously I counsel you to desist from your enterprise; for if you

<sup>1</sup> 300,000 *modii* (*Bell. Afr.*, 36, 2) = 71,100 bushels.

<sup>2</sup> 44-6. Cf. *Val. Max.*, iii, 8, 7.

have not yet realized the character of the man whose force you have to encounter, you may learn it now. Choose one of your cohorts—the one you deem the bravest—and array it against me, while I take just ten of my comrades, now in your power. Then shall you learn from our valour what you may expect from your own men.’ Trembling with rage, Scipio signed to his attendant officers; and while he looked on the centurion was killed. The veteran legionaries were then segregated from the recruits:<sup>1</sup> the former were led away and tortured to death; the latter were enrolled in Scipio’s army. When Caesar heard what had happened, he cashiered the commanders of certain galleys which had been detailed to protect incoming transports from attack, and issued a general order in which their neglect of duty was censured in the strongest terms.

Scipio was encamped on the eastern bank of the Oued el Melah, about a mile and a half westward of the modern village Bembla.<sup>2</sup> On an isolated eminence just east of the valley there was a fortified town, called Uzita, from which he obtained supplies, and which he had garrisoned with a strong Numidian force. Caesar, who intended to attack him from the eastern side of the valley, thought out a plan by which he would be able to conceal his approach. Soon after midnight on the 26th of January he rode out of the camp at the head of his army towards Ruspina; then, leaving the town on his right, descended into the plain and moved along the coast, screened from observation by the rising ground near Knaïs, till he reached the foot of the heights that extend southward from Sidi Masaoud and close the plain on the east. The range was marked by successive hills, reaching an elevation of nearly three hundred feet, and on each of the first four stood a tower built in days long past both as a fort and as a post of observation. In the furthest of these towers Scipio had stationed a piquet.<sup>3</sup> While it was still dark

Opera-  
tions near  
Uzita.

Nov. 7,  
47 B. C.

<sup>1</sup> Losses suffered by veteran legions were of course made good from time to time by drafting recruits into their ranks.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 519–20.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 520–1.



47 B. C. sappers ascended the first three hills and speedily erected on each a wooden tower and a redoubt. Not far from the hill on which Scipio's outlying piquet was posted, Caesar halted to reconnoitre. The column was now strung out below the ridge; and Caesar saw that the western slope, which faced Scipio's camp, might easily be ascended by the enemy's cavalry. He therefore ordered that an earthwork should be constructed along the slope, about midway between the summit and the plain, while cavalry were ranged to protect the workers. Scipio and Labienus had been taken by surprise; but they were now on the alert. Observing the legionaries at work, they deployed their cavalry about a mile in front of their camp, while their infantry remained in support a few hundred yards behind. The legionaries continued to ply their tools; but as the hostile cavalry came gradually nearer, Caesar sent some troops of Spanish horse, supported by a few auxiliaries, to attack the piquet and seize the hill on which it was posted. The Numidians were quickly dislodged, and Labienus rashly led the cavalry of his right wing, composed of Germans and Gauls, to rescue them. Caesar instantly observed his error and dispatched the cavalry that formed his own left wing to cut off their retreat. A large farm-house, surmounted by four turrets,<sup>1</sup> stood between Labienus and the combatants; and he did not see that Caesar's troops were in action till he became aware that his own men were being attacked in the rear. The Numidians belonging to his division were panic-stricken and galloped for their lives: the Gauls and Germans, who fought desperately, were surrounded and annihilated. The legions which formed Scipio's second line were so terrified that they fled back helter-skelter into their camp; and, scattered over the plain which had been the field of battle, the fair-haired giants of the North, whose courage had enabled their comrades to escape, lay stark and still.

Caesar was quick to profit by his victory. On the next

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 40, 1. Cf. C. Tissot, *Géogr. . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, ii, 1888, p. 738, and Veith, *op. cit.*, p. 799.

day he withdrew his infantry from their entrenched position and formed them in line of battle along the foot of the hills ; and as Scipio kept his demoralized forces within their camp, he gradually moved closer to Uzita. Scipio, who derived his water from cisterns in the town, anxiously watched the movement. When the infantry had come within less than a mile from the wall, he became alarmed and, emerging from his camp, formed his army in four lines immediately in rear of the Oued el Melah and of the town, his cavalry, which, as usual, formed his first line, being screened on the right and the left by the thirty elephants. Caesar's centre also was covered by the town. Throughout the day the two armies remained where they were. Scipio, relying upon the strength of his position, was determined not to fight unless he were attacked : Caesar knew that it was as yet impossible to capture the town, and he would not fight upon unfavourable ground. Accordingly at sunset he returned to his camp.

Next day he began to prolong the lateral earthwork towards the south. Scipio had written to Juba, urging him to come to his assistance ; and Juba, distracted though he was by the activity of Sittius, had resolved, on hearing of the reverse which Scipio had suffered, to support him. During a fortnight or more there was little or no fighting. The weather was unsettled : the Caesarians, as we have already seen, had been obliged to undertake the expedition with a minimum of baggage ; and, to shelter themselves from heavy rain and pelting hail, they were forced to rig up tents made of old clothes or plaited reeds, which were soon soaked or destroyed. On one stormy night the camp-fires were extinguished, a quantity of stores were rain-sodden, and men were seen wandering about with their shields over their heads, trying vainly to avoid being drenched. Added to these hardships was dread of the unknown. Remembering the fate of Curio, the legionaries imagined that Juba was a formidable foe, and the prospect of his arrival filled them with dismay. Caesar's method of allaying their

47 B. C.

About

Feb. 17(?),  
708 (Nov.  
27, 47).Juba  
joins  
Scipio.

fears was at least original. He paraded the men and addressed them. 'Understand', he said, 'that in a few days the King will be here with ten legions, thirty thousand cavalry, one hundred thousand light infantry, and three hundred elephants. Some of you had better stop asking questions or guessing, and believe what I say, for I know; otherwise I'll have them put on board an old worn-out vessel and sent—anywhere.'<sup>1</sup> About the middle of February the approaching column was descried—three legions, eight hundred Gallic and Spanish cavalry, a considerable number of Numidian horsemen and light-armed troops, with thirty elephants—and encamped not far from Scipio's position.<sup>2</sup> Caesar's men were not much impressed by the spectacle, and their fears were dispelled. Scipio, however, was greatly encouraged by the presence of his ally; and on the following day the combined armies were ostentatiously arrayed behind the secure barrier of the Oued el Melah. Juba, indeed, noticing that Scipio, like himself, wore a scarlet cloak, the uniform by which Roman commanders-in-chief habitually marked their identity in the field, told him that he could not permit a mere general to assume a dignity which properly belonged only to kings; but Scipio, while he obediently took off the obnoxious garment, doubtless consoled himself with the reflexion that submitting to the insolence of a barbarian was no great price to pay for substantial aid.

Meanwhile Caesar steadily pursued his aim. Before he could proceed to attack Uzita it was necessary to secure his left flank, for it was now threatened by Labienus, who had constructed a separate camp some distance to the south.<sup>3</sup> It will be remembered that Caesar had dislodged the piquet which Scipio had posted on the fourth of the successive hills that marked the ridge. Prolonging his unfinished earthwork, he occupied the fifth. Beyond it there was another, now known as Sidi

Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 66.

<sup>2</sup> Dio (xliii, 4, 6) says that Juba refused to join Scipio until the latter promised him the sovereignty of the province of Africa.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 521–2.

Jeha, which might form the lock of his position. But 47 B. C.  
Labienus determined to forestall him and established a piquet on this height. The hill which Caesar had just occupied was separated from Sidi Jeha by a deep depression, the sides of which were broken by cavern-like recesses,<sup>1</sup> and by a dense grove of olive-trees. Labienus, who knew every foot of the ground, saw that Caesar would be forced to cross the depression and to make his way through the grove before he could reach the hill. Accordingly he posted cavalry and light infantry in the grove, in a lateral ravine, and behind the crest of the ridge, being confident that Caesar, suddenly and simultaneously attacked in front and rear, would find himself fast in a trap. Caesar's cavalry rode securely into the valley; but the enemy, unnerved by the sight of the veteran squadrons, forgot their orders, stole out of their lair in groups, and hastened to ascend the hill. Many were killed and many captured. Labienus himself had barely time to escape; and Caesar's troops, chasing away the piquet, took possession of Sidi Jeha. A strong detachment of infantry presently arrived and secured the position by constructing an entrenched camp. Caesar was now free to approach Uzita. His principal camp was on the lower slopes of the ridge, north of Sidi Jeha, between two parallel ravines which made it unnecessary to construct lateral entrenchments.<sup>2</sup> The legions were divided into two groups, one of which proceeded to construct two earthworks from the right and the left angle of the camp towards the left and the right corner of the town, while the cohorts of the other were ranged in front to protect the workers. Thus when the time came to besiege the town, the besiegers would be secure from attack; deserters would be able to cross over to Caesar's camp in comparative safety; and water, which had hitherto been necessarily fetched from a distance in small quantities, would be easily procured by sinking wells in the low ground near the town. Towards nightfall,

<sup>1</sup> See Veith's photographs—55 and 56, facing p. 802—and his text pp. 801–2, 868.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 522–3.



47 B. C.

when the legions were being withdrawn after a long day's work into camp, the enemy's myriad cavalry and auxiliaries suddenly fell upon Caesar's cavalry,<sup>1</sup> who were in the rear of their comrades, and threw them into some disorder : but the retiring legions instantly faced about ; the Gallic and German troopers, speedily recovering their self-possession, rallied, and drove back Juba's Numidians with considerable loss to their camp ; while Juba and Labienus only just escaped under cover of one of the dust-storms that are common in North Africa.<sup>2</sup> Many of Scipio's legionaries and some of Curio's old troopers took advantage of the storm to desert. The allied forces were still further diminished when Juba, learning that the Gaetulians had followed Caesar's advice and were preparing to attack him, reluctantly sent back six cohorts to protect his frontier. As soon as Caesar's flanking earthworks had reached a line just out of range of the missiles of the garrison, a new camp was pitched within the enclosed space ; its front was strongly fortified ; and ballistas were ranged side by side with quick-firing catapults in advance of the rampart. Some of Scipio's more distinguished followers took advantage of the protection which the presence of Caesar's troops afforded to enter the camp and converse with old acquaintances ; and just as the watch-fires were being lighted some of Juba's cavalry officers, followed by their troopers and servants, rode in to join Caesar.

Caesar's  
second  
reinforce-  
ment  
arrives.

Meanwhile Caesar's second reinforcement had had various adventures on their voyage. Varus somehow got information that the transports were approaching Africa, and immediately putting to sea with fifty-five galleys, sailed across the Gulf of Tunis, and coasted to Hadrumetum, where he intended to lie in wait for them. Caesar, who was ignorant of his arrival, dispatched one of his naval officers, Lucius Cispus, with twenty-seven galleys from Leptis, ordering him to look out for the transports off Thapsus, and sent another officer, Quintus Aquila,

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 52, 1. See *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*, 1911, pp. 580-1.

<sup>2</sup> I was caught in such a storm on May 9, 1914, between Utica and Tunis.

with thirteen galleys on a like errand towards Hadrumetum. Cispus reached his destination; but Aquila, encountering a gale, failed to round the promontory of Monastir, and sought shelter under its lee. The rest of Caesar's galleys remained at anchor off Leptis. Varus, learning from a deserter that their crews had landed and that the vessels would be an easy prey, left Hadrumetum towards midnight and, arriving off Leptis at dawn, burned some transports which were anchored in the open sea and captured two of the galleys. While Caesar was superintending the construction of his earthworks messengers from the coast came into the main camp and informed him of the raid. Leptis was six miles off. Caesar immediately galloped to the town, ordered the crews to man the galleys, boarded a small vessel, and sailing northward along the coast, took over Aquila's squadron and pursued Varus, who, cowed by his audacity, fled for Hadrumetum. After a chase of four miles Caesar overtook the rear division of the fleet, recovered one of the two galleys, which had one hundred and thirty of the enemy's marines on board, and captured one of their triremes. Stress of weather prevented him from rounding the promontory and compelled him to anchor; but, the wind dropping in the night, he reached Hadrumetum at dawn. The enemy's fleet was safe inside the moles, but Caesar burned some store-ships that were anchored in the offing, sunk others, drove the rest into the harbour, and, after waiting a short time to give Varus an opportunity of coming out to fight, sailed back to Leptis, and thence returned to his camp.

Soon afterwards the transports arrived. The troops which disembarked consisted of two veteran legions, the 9th and the 10th, which had served throughout the Gallic and the Civil War. Caesar had not forgotten the mutiny of the 10th, and he now seized an opportunity of inflicting upon the ringleaders the punishment which he had been obliged to defer. One of the tribunes, Gaius Avienus, disregarding the order that no superfluous baggage and no slaves were to be taken, had reserved

He  
punishes  
insub-  
ordinate  
officers.

46 B. C.

one of the vessels for his slaves and horses, and had not allowed any troops to enter it. On the day after the reinforcements reached the camp Caesar summoned all the tribunes and centurions in the army to parade outside his tent. Complaining that his forbearance had been grossly abused, he announced his intention of making an example. 'Gaius Avienus,' he said, 'you instigated troops in the service of the Roman People to mutiny: you plundered municipalities; you have been of no use to me or to your country; instead of taking troops on board you took your slaves and horses; and, owing to your misconduct, the state in this critical conjuncture is short of soldiers. You are therefore dismissed with ignominy from my army, and I order you to leave Africa to-day at the earliest possible moment. You too, Aulus Fonteius, are dismissed from the service: you have been an insubordinate officer and a bad citizen. You, Titus Salienus,<sup>1</sup> Marcus Tiro, and Gaius Clusinas, have reached the rank of centurions in my army not by merit but by favour; you have not been distinguished for valour in war or for good conduct or good service in peace, and instead of practising obedience and self-control you have been active in sedition and in inciting your men to mutiny against your General. I therefore deem you unworthy to command companies in my army. You are dismissed, and I order you to quit Africa with all speed.' The disgraced men were forthwith placed under arrest and taken on board a vessel, where they were not allowed to communicate with one another.

Repeated desertions must have shaken the morale of the allied armies; for they implied that, notwithstanding superior numbers, there was a wide-spread belief that Scipio and Juba were doomed to fail. Perhaps it was in the hope of restoring confidence that on the day after

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 54, 5. The reading of *F*, which R. Schneider obelizes, is *tite isaliene*; while  $\pi$  *S* have *tites aliene*. Schneider says that the latter represents a deliberate alteration of the corrupt tradition of the archetype and remarks that 'the editor forgot that T. Salienus had been already executed by Scipio (28, 3).' No doubt he had; but is it not conceivable that there were two centurions called T. Salienus? Kübler reads *T. Saliene*.

so many of Juba's cavalry officers forsook him the allies 46 B. C.  
 resolved to make another demonstration. They alined  
 their troops on gently rising ground, whose elevation,  
 owing to tillage, is now hardly perceptible, extending  
 southward of Uzita and protected by the marshy channel  
 of the Oued el Melah. About a mile beyond the right  
 wing and close to the foot of the ridge Scipio posted  
 a strong force of Numidian cavalry and light infantry,  
 intending that after the action began they should work  
 round and envelop Caesar's rear. Caesar of course  
 answered the challenge. His extreme right, resting upon  
 his advanced camp, was separated by the town from the  
 enemy's left. Recognizing the danger that threatened  
 him from Scipio's outlying force, he stationed the whole  
 of his own cavalry beyond his left wing and, as its strength  
 was inadequate, placed the 5th legion on its left in support.  
 Riding along the ranks to encourage his young soldiers,  
 he awaited attack. But the enemy was equally deter-  
 mined to remain on the defensive, and since neither side  
 would be the first to cross the marsh, the elaborate  
 preparations came to nothing. The two armies remained  
 motionless for several hours. About two o'clock in the  
 afternoon, just as Caesar was beginning to withdraw his  
 troops, the Numidian and Gaetulian cavalry on the  
 enemy's extreme right began to move towards Caesar's  
 main camp, while Labienus's veteran cavalry remained  
 to contain the legions: almost simultaneously a part  
 of Caesar's cavalry and auxiliaries, observing the move-  
 ment of the Gaetulians, crossed a marsh<sup>1</sup> without orders  
 to attack them, but, overborne by superior numbers, were  
 forced to retreat. Many of their horses were wounded  
 by javelins, but the loss in men was slight. Scipio was  
 satisfied with this success; but Caesar on the following  
 day avenged it. Some of his cavalry, who had been sent

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 61, 3. Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 133) and R. Schneider identify this marsh (*paludem*) with the Oued el Melah, which, as the map shows, is impossible. Veith (p. 871) apparently means that Caesar's cavalry attacked Labienus, in which case they must have crossed the stream; but our authority says that they attacked the Gaetulians, who were distinct from the force under Labienus.



46 B. C.

to Leptis to fetch supplies, encountered a party of Numidian horsemen, who were engaged in plundering, killed several, and captured the rest. For some days there was no fighting except insignificant cavalry skirmishes; but while Caesar was pushing forward fresh entrenchments to enclose Uzita and prevent the enemy from foraging, Scipio constructed works athwart to stop his advance.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile Caesar's magazines were being gradually emptied. Learning that grain was to be found in subterranean caves, in which the natives stored their food in troublous times, he dispatched a couple of legions, accompanied by cavalry, to the fertile country near Moknine.<sup>2</sup> They returned with a large supply. Labienus's scouts reported this movement; and, concluding that Caesar would send a detachment again in the same direction, he ordered two legions to encamp close to the route, and took post hard by with a powerful body of cavalry and auxiliaries. Caesar, who was informed of the scheme by deserters, knew Labienus better than Labienus knew him, and he felt sure that if he allowed some days to elapse without returning, the troops that were lying in wait for him would gradually become careless. As soon as he thought that his time had come he marched with some squadrons of cavalry, ordering the rest to follow with three of the veteran legions. The leading squadrons caught the auxiliaries off their guard, and put them to flight with the loss of about five hundred. Encountering Labienus, who hurried with all his cavalry to the rescue, the squadrons were forced to retire; but when Caesar's legions came in sight Labienus prudently withdrew. Juba, infuriated by the failure of the scheme or concluding that the runaways were not worth their rations, crucified them all.

Having failed to force a decision, he moves to Aggar.

But the operations near Uzita, which had lasted some six weeks, were yielding no decisive result, and it would seem that no more grain was to be got from the caves.

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 61, 8. Cf. Veith, *op. cit.*, p. 805.

<sup>2</sup> See Stoffel, *op. cit.*, p. 135, and Veith, p. 806.

It was time to shift the scene again. About twenty miles 46 B. C. to the south-east, not far from the sea, was a town called Aggar,<sup>1</sup> situated in a fertile tract, where corn, olives, vines, and figs were abundant, and the inhabitants were hostile to the Numidian king. Thither Caesar determined to transfer the army. He strengthened the garrisons of Leptis, Ruspina, and Acylla, which would no longer be screened by his force, charged Cispus and Aquila to blockade with their fleets the harbours of Hadrumetum and Thapsus, and, after setting fire to the woodwork of his camps in order to conceal the direction of his march and so to prevent the enemy from molesting him,<sup>2</sup> departed shortly before dawn. To guard against the danger that Labienus might attack his right, he formed his legions in parallel columns, prepared at any moment to face into line of battle, while the baggage was screened behind them on the left. The second period of the campaign was at an end.

The allies soon saw that the two camps were deserted, and, learning whither Caesar had gone, crossed the valley, followed his track across the eastern ridge, and entrenched themselves in three camps, occupied respectively by Scipio, Afranius, and Juba, about eight miles west of Aggar. The camp of Afranius was shared by Labienus. Caesar was encamped in the plain just west of Aggar. A day or two later Scipio sent two of his legions to fetch grain from a town called Zeta, now Beni Hassan, some eight or nine miles north-west of his camp.<sup>3</sup> Caesar, who was informed of this movement by a deserter, had enough food for immediate necessities : but fresh stores of wheat would be acceptable ; and, having so far failed to bring Scipio to action, he thought that he might find some opportunity of doing so by attacking his sources of supply.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly he resolved to take the risk of making a flank march against Zeta. Having constructed a new camp on a strong position about two miles south-west of Aggar, and left a detachment to hold it, he marched safely past

The allies follow him and encamp above Tegea.

Caesar's perilous flank march.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 524-5.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 523-4.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 525.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Veith, *op. cit.*, p. 873, who confirms my view.

46 B. C.

Scipio's camp, took Zeta without opposition, and moved on in the hope of surprising some of Scipio's cohorts, which were rifling the granaries in the surrounding country. His attempt was frustrated by the approach of Scipio's main body ; and, since his infantry was superior to that of the allies, we may suppose that he deemed it imprudent to incur again the risk of being surrounded by their multitudinous cavalry. He succeeded in capturing twenty-two of Juba's camels, but, after leaving a detachment under Oppius, to garrison Zeta, he returned towards Aggar. For the first few miles his march was not molested ; but when the column was about to pass Scipio's camp, Labienus and Afranius, who had concealed the cavalry and auxiliaries behind the crest of the adjoining hills, suddenly emerged and began to harass the rear-guard. Caesar's cavalry immediately engaged, while the legionaries, after divesting themselves of their packs and piling them, faced about and charged. The enemy of course fell back : the legionaries resumed their march ; and the Numidians instantly returned to the attack. It seemed that the experience of Ruspina was to be repeated. Those swarthy troopers, whose horses carried no superfluous weight, those lithe auxiliaries, every one of them a trained athlete, whose long springy strides easily kept pace with their mounted comrades, never charged, but never rested ; they hovered behind and around the column, moving away as often as the exasperated legionaries assailed them, returning as often as they attempted to move on, throwing javelins with steady aim and continually wounding the horses. Four hours passed, and the column had barely advanced a hundred and fifty yards. Men and horses were hungry and parched with thirst ; the sun was sinking behind the western hills ; and it was evident that the enemy purposed to compel Caesar to encamp where he was and where no water was to be obtained. As a last resource, Caesar transferred the cavalry, which, owing to the loss of horses, was becoming useless, from the rear to the centre of the column, and succeeded in moving slowly forward. Many of the Numidians, hoping to head

the column off, ascended the hills on either side of the plain ; but this attempt was perhaps a tactical mistake, for it somewhat relieved the pressure under which the rear-guard was labouring. Scipio's legions, which had by this time returned to their camp, were drawn up in front of it as Caesar's troops passed by ; but this demonstration was unheeded, and early in the night the weary army at last made its way into camp.<sup>1</sup> If the writer of *The African Campaign* is to be believed, the only serious loss had been of horses : not a man had been killed and only ten wounded, whereas about three hundred of the assailants had died upon the field. 46 B. C.

Still, Caesar had narrowly escaped disaster, and, as before, his peril was due to the weakness of his cavalry. We are told that, besides the constant restriction which this weakness placed upon his movements, he was even anxious when he contemplated the event of a pitched battle, because, not having yet encountered the enemy's legionaries, he could not tell whether he would be able to make head against their cavalry and auxiliaries when they were supported by regular infantry. He instructed his own with the meticulous care of a trainer of gladiators, telling them how far they were to retreat when they were threatened by the enemy's light troops before they turned to resist, how far they might charge, how long they should fight, where and how they were to sling their bullets. His men, however, had outgrown their fear of Juba's elephants ; for he had imported some of those that were exhibited in the amphitheatres of Italy ; and the soldiers had not only become accustomed to the animals and learned that they were not as dangerous as they looked, but had found out their vulnerable parts and acquired skill in marksmanship by aiming at them javelins the blades of which were tipped with cork or leather.

A day or two after Caesar returned from his flank march envoys arrived from a town called Vaga,<sup>2</sup> who begged him

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 525-6.

<sup>2</sup> The geographical position of Vaga is uncertain (cf. Veith, *op. cit.*, p. 822). We only know that it was near Zeta (*Bell. Afr.*, 74, 1).



46 B. C. to protect them against Juba and placed their resources at his disposal ; but before he could do anything to help them Juba pounced upon the town and butchered every man, woman, and child whom it contained. The incident furnished an additional proof that the allies by their insensate cruelties had made enemies of the African people.

Jan 21. On the 21st of March Caesar, who appreciated the utility of religious rites as a solace for superstitious minds, performed the ceremony of purifying the army ; and on the following day he approached Scipio's camp and again offered battle without result. What more could he do ? Nothing, apparently, except to try again the expedient to which he had resorted against Zeta. Success seemed now more probable ; for, to remedy in some measure his lack of suitable auxiliaries, he had selected three hundred active men from each of his ten legions and formed them into a separate corps, destined to co-operate with his cavalry. About a day's march west of Aggar, was a town

[Henchir  
el Ksour.]

March 23  
(Jan. 23).

Caesar  
captures  
Sarsura  
and suc-  
cours

Thabena :  
his final  
reinforce-  
ments  
arrive.

March 24  
(Jan. 24).

called Sarsura, where Scipio had a magazine, guarded by a small force. As soon as Labienus was informed of Caesar's object he resorted to his usual tactics, surrounding the wagons of the traders who were following the rear-guard, and, emboldened by this success, began to harass the infantry. Caesar's cavalry, supported by the new corps, immediately charged the enemy's squadrons, which, panic-stricken by this unexpected onset, fled with considerable loss. The rest of the march was accomplished without hindrance, although Labienus continued to move along the heights which extended on the right of the road. Sarsura was captured ; its defenders were massacred while Labienus passively looked on ; and the stores which it contained were plundered. Next day Caesar moved on southward to Thisdra, which was in the possession of Considius ; but, finding that it was too strong to be taken without a regular siege and that there was no water at a less distance than four miles, he returned to his camp near Aggar.<sup>1</sup> The inaction of the allies was perhaps as effective as their barbarity in alienating the

<sup>1</sup> See p. 526.

sympathy of the natives; for a day or two later the inhabitants of Thabena,<sup>1</sup> a town in Juba's dominions, sent envoys to solicit Caesar's protection, whereupon he dispatched a force of infantry, archers, and artillery to support them. At the same time he was reinforced by a convoy which had just arrived from Sicily,—four hundred cavalry, a thousand archers and slingers, and all the legionaries, numbering about four thousand, who had been prevented by illness or other causes from accompanying their respective units. Apart from the detachments with which he had garrisoned various towns,<sup>2</sup> he could now muster perhaps thirty-five thousand regular infantry, four thousand cavalry with their auxiliaries, and two thousand archers and slingers. Arraying them in order of battle, he again advanced to a point two miles from Scipio's camp and made a last attempt to force him to action.

Scipio was not unwilling to fight—on ground of his own choosing, the lower slopes of the hill on which he had encamped. In the plain, two miles from his camp, on the side facing Aggar, there was a town called Tegea,<sup>3</sup> garrisoned by about two thousand of his cavalry. These troops were now withdrawn and stationed on either side of the town, while Scipio's legions were formed in line of battle about a mile in front of his camp. As had so often happened before, the two armies watched each other during the greater part of the day. At length Caesar sent about four hundred of his cavalry, accompanied by light infantry, archers, and slingers, to attack the cavalry outposts.<sup>4</sup> As soon as Caesar's cavalry charged, Pacideius, who commanded the outposts, began to deploy his cavalry with the object of surrounding Caesar's squadrons. Caesar immediately sent the three hundred light infantry belonging to the nearest legion to support the squadrons, while Labienus reinforced Pacideius and sent fresh horses to replace those which had been wounded. As Caesar's troopers, harassed by the Numidian

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 526-7.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 527.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 527.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 527-8.

46 B. C.

light infantry, were gradually giving way, he sent the whole right wing of his cavalry into action. This movement was decisive. The enemy fled, leaving many killed and wounded on the plain, and the squadrons chased them up to the hill; but even then the allies would not advance from their strong position. So ended the third period of the campaign; for Caesar now discerned a way by which he might compel the enemy to fight the battle which would terminate the struggle.

Feb. 4.  
Failing to  
bring his  
enemies to  
action, he  
marches  
to block-  
ade Thap-  
sus.

On the 4th of April he quitted his camp, marched northward along the eastern fringe of the salt marsh of Moknine, and, encamping on the south-western side of Thapsus, proceeded to construct a contravallation round the town from sea to sea,<sup>1</sup> at the same time posting piquets on various strong positions.<sup>2</sup> Not only the Governor Vergilius and the garrison which he commanded but also the inhabitants of Thapsus had been unswervingly true to the allies; and Scipio saw that, to save his credit, he must instantly march to their relief.<sup>3</sup> Unless he was prepared to fight a battle, only one plan offered a chance of success. He and Juba must divide their forces, move simultaneously with all speed to the southern and the northern side of Thapsus, and hem in Caesar's army. But Caesar would not remain passive while they were entrenching to bar his exit, unless they could do so unobserved. The obvious course, itself unpromising, was not adopted. Scipio and Juba followed Caesar, moving cautiously over high ground, and encamped separately, six miles south of Thapsus, near the south-eastern corner of the marsh.<sup>4</sup> Scipio had hoped to reinforce Vergilius before Caesar could complete the blockade, but he found the road barred by a strongly garrisoned redoubt.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See p. 528.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 528.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 529-30.

<sup>4</sup> *Scipio . . . milia passuum VIII a Thapso binis castris consedit* (*Bell. Afr.*, 79, 3). R. Schneider thinks that Scipio and Juba encamped near Sidi Ben Nour, on the south-western side of the marsh; but in order to bolster up this guess he is obliged to substitute *XIII* for *VIII*, and his only reason is that he thinks it unlikely that Scipio's army, after the battle of Thapsus, fled as far as Sidi Jabeur (see pp. 529-30 and *Bell. Afr.*, 85, 3-5).

See p. 529, and n. 6.

On the following day he turned back, marched round the western side of the marsh, and, after allowing his troops a few hours' rest, halted at daybreak on the northern isthmus, not far west of Caesar's works.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile Juba remained in his own camp, and Afranius in that of Scipio.<sup>2</sup> Evidently the purpose of the two leaders was to imprison Caesar in the isthmus and to starve him into surrender, and probably Scipio timed his march so as to arrive by night, in order to begin constructing his entrenchment<sup>3</sup> before Caesar became aware of his presence; but Juba's army was too weak to prevent him from breaking out, and without the aid of Juba Scipio would hardly be able to withstand the onset of Caesar's veterans. Moreover, the northern isthmus was so narrow that in the event of a battle the Numidian cavalry and light infantry would have no room to act.<sup>4</sup>

46 B. C.

Apr. 5  
(Feb. 5).Apr. 6  
(Feb. 6).Scipio and  
Juba de-  
sign, too  
late, to  
hem him  
in.

Caesar, on hearing of Scipio's arrival, withdrew the troops who were at work in the trenches, sent a part of his fleet through the channel between the isthmus and the island of El Djezira with orders to anchor close inshore and, as soon as the signal was given for battle, to threaten Scipio's rear, and, leaving two of the newly raised legions to hold his camp in case it should be attacked from the south,<sup>5</sup> marched against the enemy. He found them in line of battle in front of their camp, with sixty-four elephants in two groups covering the wings and cavalry on either flank; but a part of the army was still fortifying with feverish haste the unfinished camp. Caesar arrayed his own army, as usual in three lines. The 10th legion and the 9th formed the right wing, the 13th and 14th the left; the centre was composed of recruits; five cohorts of the 5th, covered by archers and slingers, were posted as a fourth line, obliquely on the right flank, the other five on the left, to encounter the elephants. The cavalry,

Victory.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 530-1.<sup>2</sup> Plut., *Caes.*, 53, 1, compared with *Bell. Afr.*, 79, 3, 85, 4-5.<sup>3</sup> It may be inferred from Dio, xliii, 7, 3, 8, 1 (though his chronology is wrong) that Scipio intended to make an entrenchment right across the isthmus.<sup>4</sup> See Veith, *op. cit.*, p. 839.<sup>5</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 80, 4. Veith (*op. cit.*, pp. 829-30) supports my explanation.



46 B. C. supported by the light infantry which regularly accompanied them, were drawn up on the extreme right and the extreme left.<sup>1</sup> Caesar walked along the ranks, talking to the veterans and reminding them of the victories which their valour had won : then, turning to the recruits, who had never taken part in a pitched battle, he urged them to emulate the heroism of their comrades. As he passed from company to company, he noticed signs of uneasiness in Scipio's army. Men were nervously hurrying from place to place, falling back from the line of battle through the gates of the camp, then streaming out of it in disorder. Evidently they were distracted because the entrenchments were still incomplete. The brigadiers and the privileged veterans of Caesar's body-guard, who had also been watching these movements, thronged round him and urged him to give the signal for action. He refused to accept their advice, emphatically declaring that it was no part of his plan to make a disorderly advance.<sup>2</sup> It would seem that his left wing, on ground which presented certain obstacles, was not yet completely deployed, and that he was resolved to wait until the whole line could advance simultaneously in orderly array. Suddenly a trumpeter on the right wing, yielding to the clamour of the men, sounded the advance without orders. Instantly the cohorts of the first line, despite the efforts of their centurions, who confronted them and strove to force them back, began to press forward ; and Caesar, seeing that he must follow fortune, mounted and rode to the front.

Meanwhile the auxiliaries on the right wing were showering arrows and sling-bullets upon the elephants. The maddened beasts swung round, shrilly trumpeting, trampled down the soldiers in their rear, and rushed through the half-finished apertures into the camp, while the Numidian cavalry on their left, finding themselves isolated, galloped away. There was no battle ; only terror and butchery. Scipio's infantry were already rushing back into their camp. Caesar's legionaries, edging their way past the elephants that were crowding in the

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 531-2.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 532-3.

gateway, swarmed over the ditch and up the rampart, <sup>46 B. C.</sup> and though a few of the enemy resisted till they were cut down, the rest fled and made for the camp which they had quitted on the previous day. The troops which garrisoned Thapsus sallied forth from the marine gate, waded into the shallow sea till the water was above their waists, and, entering the strait between the isthmus and the island, tried to land beyond Caesar's circumvallation; but the slaves<sup>1</sup> in the camp assailed them with stones and javelins, and they were obliged to return. Meanwhile the scattered fugitives, hunted by the victorious legions and the cavalry,<sup>2</sup> were hastening round the marsh, while Caesar led the troops whom he had left to hold his camp along the coast to cut off their retreat.<sup>3</sup> When the fugitives reached their camp and saw that the garrison had fled,<sup>4</sup> they dropped their shields and tried to escape into Juba's camp hard by; but finding it in possession of the force which Caesar commanded, they scrambled in despair up a knoll near the sea, and made signs of submission. The veterans, exasperated by the long weariness of the war, slew them without mercy; many senators and members of the equestrian order, though Caesar, whose protection they implored, besought his men to spare them, were slaughtered under his eyes; and the legionaries actually murdered some of their own officers, whom they accused of complicity with the enemy. They were now completely out of hand; for even Caesar, who had quelled the mutiny of the Tenth Legion, could no longer stem the demoralizing influence of civil war.

Ten thousand men of the beaten army had fallen;<sup>5</sup> runaways were scattered over the country-side, and Caesar's loss was insignificant: but Thapsus was still defiant. Caesar moved northward again and grouped Juba's elephants outside the wall in view of the garrison,

<sup>1</sup> See p. 533 (3).

<sup>2</sup> See p. 533 (4).

<sup>3</sup> See p. 533 (5).

<sup>4</sup> *postquam animadverterunt neminem ibi esse praesidio* (Bell. Afr., 85, 5). One may infer from Plutarch (*Caes.*, 53, 2) that Afranius had been entrusted by Scipio with the defence of the camp, and that he had fled.

<sup>5</sup> Bell. Afr., 86, 1. Plutarch (*Caes.*, 53, 2) absurdly exaggerates the number.

46 B. C. hoping that such evidence of the fate that had overtaken Scipio might induce Vergilius to yield. As he made no sign, Caesar invited him to surrender, reminding him that Caesar's clemency was acknowledged by all. Vergilius made no reply. Next day Caesar paraded the army in full view of the townspeople, offered due sacrifice to the gods, bestowed rewards upon each of the veteran soldiers and decorations upon those who were recommended for signal valour; and then, leaving Caninius Rebilus with three legions to blockade the town and sending Domitius Calvinus with two others to reduce Thisdra, he set out for Utica, whither the cavalry had already been dispatched.

Cato's final measures at Utica. The remnant of Scipio's horsemen had already reached the capital, having on their way stormed a town <sup>1</sup> whose gates had been closed against them, made a bonfire of the property which they found, and flung the inhabitants alive into the flames. Outside Utica they found the poorer townfolk clustered behind a weak entrenchment, where Cato, knowing that they favoured Caesar and would be useless in the defence of the town, had compelled them to take up their abode. The horsemen attempted to rush the entrenchment; but the occupants, encouraged by the news of Caesar's victory, beat them off with sticks and stones. Baffled and exasperated, they trooped into the town, broke open the houses, plundered and murdered the inmates.<sup>2</sup> Cato endeavoured to persuade them to desist from wanton outrages and to aid him in defending the fortress; but as they would not listen to reason and clamoured for money, he bribed them to keep quiet; and, led or accompanied by Afranius and Faustus Sulla, they rode away.

Meanwhile Cato, who felt that he had lived long enough, for he now despaired of the Republic, and scorned to solicit the pardon which Caesar wished to grant, was preparing to set his house and the town for which he was responsible in order. Assembling various fugitives from

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 533-4 (6).

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 87, 4. By whose negligence the troopers were enabled to enter a strongly fortified town is not clear.

Scipio's army and the three hundred wealthy Romans who had subscribed money for the campaign, he urged them to free and arm their slaves and to defend the town. Those who thought only of their own safety were provided with ships and permitted to depart. Then, having arranged his private affairs and commended his children and dependants to the care of Lucius Caesar, Cato went into his bedroom and, after reading Plato's dialogue on the immortality of the soul, committed suicide.<sup>1</sup> 'The people of Utica', wrote the chronicler from whom we derive our knowledge of the war, 'detested his politics; nevertheless, in consideration of his singular integrity and because he was very different from the other leaders of the party, they honoured him with a public funeral.'<sup>2</sup> Impracticable pedant though he was, he had lived in a corrupt society for conscience' sake; and antiquity approved the manner of his death.<sup>3</sup>

His suicide.

Meanwhile Caesar, marching rapidly northward, occupied Uzita<sup>4</sup> and Hadrumetum, and pardoned all the Pompeians who appealed to his compassion.<sup>5</sup> Among them were the

Caesar pardons suppliants, but fines enemy capitalists.

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 88, 1-4; *Plut.*, *Cato min.*, 59-70; *App.*, ii, 98-9; *Dio*, xliii, 10-1.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 88, 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Cic.*, *Fam.*, ix, 18, 2; *Tusc.*, i, 30, 74; *De off.*, i, 31, 112; *Virg.*, *Aen.*, viii, 670; *Hor.*, *Carm.*, i, 12, 35-6; *Val. Max.*, iii, 2, 14; *Seneca*, *Ep.*, 13, 14; 24, 6-7; 67, 7, 13; 71, 17; 104, 29; *Plut.*, *Cato min.*, 73, 2; *Flor.*, ii, 13, 71; *Dio*, xliii, 11, 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 89, 1. The writer, if the MSS. are not at fault, calls this town Usseta. Probably, as Stoffel supposes (*op. cit.*, p. 282), it was identical with Uzita.

<sup>5</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 89, 3-4; *Cic.*, *Fam.*, ix, 7, 1; *Suet.*, *Div. Iul.*, 75, 3; *Dio*, xliii, 12, 1. Nobody who knows *Dio* will be surprised to find that he accuses Caesar (xliii, 12, 3) of having privily dispatched L. Caesar, whose pardon is attested by Cicero, because he was afraid to condemn him openly. Other calumnies by the malignant historian are to be found in xliii, 9, 1, 13, 1-2. [In the first edition of *The Correspondence of Cicero*, iv, 1894, p. 295, Tyrrell and Purser, commenting on Cicero's quotation from Terence—*Nam ut audivi de L. Caesare F., mecum ipse*; 'Quid hic mihi faciet patri?' say, 'The sense is, if Caesar has shown indulgence in the case of such a resolute enemy, he will be more likely to look favourably on me.' In the second edition (p. 376) Purser changes his mind: 'Cicero', he says, 'regards Caesar as having actually ordered the execution', &c. The context seems to me to show that the earlier explanation was right. Purser, however, exonerates Caesar from blame. Remarking that L. Caesar 'was murdered, probably by the soldiers, because . . . he had massacred certain freedmen



46 B. C.

Fate of  
Juba,  
Scipio,  
and other  
Pompeian  
leaders.

[Bona.]

younger Cato, whom, despite his father's inveterate and rancorous enmity, he allowed to retain his inheritance, and Lucius Caesar, who had caught and tortured to death some of Caesar's slaves.<sup>1</sup> When he arrived at Utica, he found his cavalry in possession of the gates. The three hundred capitalists, who turned pale with terror when they were summoned to his presence, were likewise spared, but were ordered to pay conjointly in six half-yearly instalments a sum equivalent to two million pounds.<sup>2</sup> Juba, accompanied by Petreius, had fled to Zama,<sup>3</sup> where his treasure was deposited and where, it was said, he intended to slay all the inhabitants, his concubines, and children, and finally himself; but as neither threats nor entreaties could prevail upon the townsfolk to admit him, he went off to one of his estates. There he and his companion agreed to seek death honourably in mutual combat. Juba was slain; and Petreius, who could expect no mercy even from Caesar, chose to perish by the sword of his slave.<sup>4</sup> Afranius and Faustus Sulla, with the cavalry which had followed them from Utica, fell into the hands of Sittius, who delivered them to Caesar; and the veterans, enraged by their perfidy, insisted that they should be put to death.<sup>5</sup> Scipio, who attempted to escape by sea, was driven by adverse winds to the port of Hippo on the Algerian coast; his ships were sunk by the squadron of Sittius; and he

and slaves of the dictator', he concludes that 'If Caesar actually sanctioned the execution . . . it was under this grievous provocation'.]

<sup>1</sup> See Mr. J. D. Duff's article in *Journ. of Philol.*, xxxiii, 1914, pp. 162-4.

<sup>2</sup> A. Schulten (*De conventibus civ. Rom.*, 1892, pp. 23-5), who reasonably infers from *Bell. Afr.*, 90, 1 (*cives autem Romanos negotiatores et eos qui inter CCC pecunias contulerant . . . Scipioni multis verbis [Caesar] incusat*) and from Appian, ii, 95, 397 (. . . τῶν τριακοσίων, οὓς ἀπὸ σφῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ προβούλους ἐπεποίητο τοῦ πολέμου καὶ σύγκλητον ἐκάλουν) that the 300 were the elected representatives of the Italian men of business, concludes that Caesar made them responsible for paying the fine which he imposed upon the men of business as a whole. Appian (ii, 100, 416) absurdly says that Caesar put to death all of them whom he could find.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 536-9.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 539.

<sup>5</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 95, 3; Dio, xliii, 12, 2. Suetonius (*Div. Iul.*, 75, 3) says that Sulla as well as Afranius had been pardoned by Caesar before; but there is no other evidence. Florus (ii, 13, 90) and Orosius (vi, 16, 5) incorrectly say that Caesar put Pompeia, the daughter of Pompey, and her children to death.

died by his own hand.<sup>1</sup> Considius, who had abandoned Thisdra, was murdered by his own followers; Vergilius, finding that it was hopeless to resist, surrendered to Rebilus; and thus all the fortresses were in Caesar's power. The people of Zama, fearing the vengeance of Juba, had sent an embassy to Utica, begging Caesar to protect them and promising to hold their town at his disposal. He immediately marched thither with his cavalry, rewarded the inhabitants, confiscated the property of the Roman residents who had borne arms against him, incorporated the kingdom of Juba in the province of Africa, and then, leaving Sallust as proconsul in charge of the new territory, returned to Utica. There his final arrangements were made. Bocchus and Sittius were recompensed for their services by the grant of Western Numidia, which had belonged to a friend of Juba; and Sittius founded at Cirta a Roman colony, in which his followers were settled.<sup>2</sup> The centurions who had commanded under Juba and Petreius were deprived of their property, which was sold. The people of Hadrumetum, Leptis, Thapsus, and Thisdra were required to pay contributions in money or in kind. On the 13th of June Caesar set sail from Utica, landed two days later in Sardinia, whence he dispatched troops to reinforce his lieutenants in Spain, who were threatened by the sons of Pompey,<sup>3</sup> and, having inflicted various fines upon individuals who had assisted his enemies, re-embarked and reached Rome on the 25th of July.

Final  
arrange-  
ments of  
Caesar.

March 22.

May 2.

The narrative of the African campaign, however tedious it may be, has an interest for students of military history; for in it the greatest of Roman generals encountered the ablest of his pupils, and perhaps the two were less unevenly matched than might at first sight appear. *The African Campaign*, which has been more than once mentioned in this chapter, is rather akin to a diary than to a history; but it was written by an officer who saw

Remarks  
on the  
campaign.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, *Epit.*, 114; *Bell. Afr.*, 96, 2; App., ii, 100, 417; Dio, xliii, 9, 5; Eutrop., vi, 23; Oros., vi, 16, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, v, 3 (2), 22; Mela, i, 6, 30; App., iv, 54, 233; *C. I. L.*, viii, p. 618.

<sup>3</sup> Dio, xliii, 14, 2.

46 B. C.

most of the operations which he describes, and any one qualified to judge would perceive that it has the great merit of being generally trustworthy. The writer was not, perhaps, in Caesar's confidence : certainly he did not always understand the motives or the significance of his movements ; but he was an excellent observer. Readers who have explored the theatre of the campaign will endorse the verdict of Tissot,—that he faithfully described the features of the country ; and we may reasonably infer that his description of the moves was not less true.<sup>1</sup> One closes his book with the conviction that on the side of the allies the strongest mind was that of Labienus. Labienus was in command on the two occasions when Caesar was reduced to the extremity of peril ; and, although Caesar, by twice foiling and once surprising him, proved that he was still the master, it may perhaps be suspected that a truthful record, written from the standpoint of the allies, would show that the genius of Labienus rarely had free play.<sup>2</sup> Renegades are seldom respected by those whom they join ; and though Labienus was exultantly welcomed by the Pompeians, he apparently never attained the position which his talents deserved. Friction between

<sup>1</sup> G. Landgraf (*Untersuch. zu Caesar u. seinen Fortsetzern*, 1888) endeavoured to prove that the author was Asinius Pollio ; but how any one with a feeling for style who had read Pollio's letters (Cic., *Fam.*, x, 31, 33, 32), to which Landgraf appeals, could maintain such a thesis, I am unable to conceive. Cf. H. Mölken, *In comm. de bell. Afr. quaest. crit.*, 1892, pp. 8–35, especially 11–19. Th. Widmann (*Philol.*, l, 1891, pp. 553–5, 565) argues that the writer belonged to the 5th legion, the exploits of which he often celebrates. Veith, however (*op. cit.*, p. 907, n. 1) would ask Widmann these questions : if the 5th legion took part in the combat near Ruspina, why did not the writer say so ? If it did not and he belonged to it, how came he to be present in the action ? The only possible answer—but it would not be unreasonable—is that it was quite possible for an intelligent man to write the account which we find in *Bell. Afr.* without having seen the battle. [Widmann (pp. 554–5) holds that the well-known episode of the standard-bearer mentioned by Valerius Maximus (iii, 2, 19), Plutarch (*Caes.*, 52, 3), Suetonius (*Div. Iul.*, 62), and Appian (*B. C.*, ii, 95, 400) took place in the combat near Ruspina, and that the Martian legion, to which, according to Valerius, the standard-bearer belonged, was identical with the 5th legion. See, however, p. 355, n. 3.]

<sup>2</sup> Veith (*op. cit.*, pp. 899–901), who, I find, in great measure agrees with me, holds, as I do, that, except perhaps Vercingetorix, Labienus was the ablest general whom Caesar ever encountered.

allies is notoriously unavoidable ; and between Scipio and Labienus, between Scipio and the insolent barbarian whose support could be purchased only by abasement, we may well suppose that friction sometimes came near to rupture. Perhaps it was fortunate for Caesar that not Labienus but Scipio was Commander-in-Chief. Nevertheless Caesar was greater than the greatest of his antagonists. His presence of mind, his tactical skill, his fertility of resource, the insight that discerned the working of his opponent's mind were never more remarkable than in this campaign ; and his well-known humanity, combined with the restraint which he kept upon the predatory instincts of his soldiers, enabled him to obtain supplies which an enemy who knew how to win the confidence of the civil population might have prevented from being offered to him. The moderating influence of Cato was sorely needed in the allied army. He was wise in counselling Scipio to fight Caesar with famine rather than with the sword ; <sup>1</sup> but Scipio failed to use the more effective weapon. Throughout the campaign Caesar was fettered, twice he was gravely imperilled, by his weakness in the arm which, during the Spanish campaign, had been his strength. Perhaps the Gallic chiefs, who, in the first year of the war, had generously responded to his appeal, shrank from leading their retainers oversea into another continent ; perhaps funds sufficient to defray the cost were not forthcoming : at all events, although we are not informed of the circumstances that prevented Caesar from organizing an adequate force of cavalry, we may believe that he did all that was possible ; and doubtless he was not responsible for the delay in mobilizing the legions or for the lack of ships to transport them in one voyage. On the other hand, the regular infantry of the allies were not on a par with their cavalry and auxiliaries ; and, owing to want of judgement, to mutual jealousy, or to the folly of the barbarian king, they committed a fatal error when, on the eve of Thapsus, they weakened their forces at the decisive point.

Plut., *Cato min.*, 58, 3-4.



## CHAPTER XXIII

### ITALY IN THE ABSENCE OF CAESAR—CAESAR'S TRIUMPH AND HIS WORK IN ROME.—ATTITUDE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS

46 B. C.

Feb. 20.

The Senate bestows honours upon Caesar.

THE result of the battle of Thapsus was known in the capital about the 20th of April ; <sup>1</sup> and the Senate of course proceeded to vote further honours to the conqueror. The victory was to be celebrated by a thanksgiving service of forty days, twice as many as had been set apart for the defeat of Vercingetorix.<sup>2</sup> Seventy-two lictors, representing three dictatorships, were to attend the dictator in his triumph. He was appointed Prefect of Morals <sup>3</sup>—a title more sonorous and more ironical than that of Censor—for three years, and his dictatorship was prolonged for ten. In the Senate he was to sit with the consuls and to state his opinion before all other senators. His triumphal car was to be placed on the Capitol, opposite the car of Jupiter ; his statue, cast in bronze, was to be set up on a figure symbolical of the Earth, and to bear the inscription, CAESAR IS A DEMIGOD. We may believe Dio <sup>4</sup> when he tells us at the close of his tedious list that yet more honours were decreed, but that Caesar would not accept them.

Caesar was engaged meanwhile in dealing with realities ;

<sup>1</sup> O. E. Schmidt, *D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, p. 233.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii, 90, 8.

<sup>3</sup> Mommsen (*Röm. Staatsr.*, ii<sup>3</sup>, 1887, p. 705) holds that Caesar's appointment as *praefectus moribus* 'is neither sufficiently attested (!) nor intrinsically probable', for, as he was dictator, the office was superfluous. When, he adds, Cicero (*Fam.*, ix, 15, 5) calls Caesar *praefectus moribus*, the expression proves nothing, for (*Pro Cluent.*, 46, 129) he used the same words loosely. But there is no analogy between the two passages, and E. Meyer (*Caesars Monarchie*<sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 420, n. 2) agrees with me that the evidence of Cicero, Suetonius (*Div. Iul.* 76, 1), and Dio (xliii, 14, 4) is enough.

<sup>4</sup> xliii, 14.

and those who have lived through a war more terrible, if not fraught with graver issues, than the Civil War will understand that outside the Senate the life of Italy in his absence was little changed. It was not only that the workers who recked nothing whether Caesar was to remain their master or the sons of Pompey were to supplant him, still toiled patiently in the workshops and in the fields; those who could afford to live for pleasure were untroubled, for all that serious observers could discern, by anxiety as to the event of the impending battle or by the thought that the constitution under which their country had grown great was perishing. Cicero marvelled at the indifference of his countrymen. While he was waiting anxiously at Rome for news from Africa he told Atticus how Praeneste was thronged by visitors who had come to see the games: 'Hirtius and all his set are there. The games have actually lasted eight days. Picture the dinner-parties, and the gaiety! Meanwhile perhaps the issue has been decided.'<sup>1</sup> Baiae was crowded, as in happier days, by bathers and gamblers, women of pleasure and women of the world; and Cicero was somewhat scandalized when the grave Varro, with whom he was not sympathetic, proposed that they should stay there together: 'Consider, I ask you, is it quite right for us to be in a place like that while this terrible political conflagration is still raging? We shall be giving those people, who don't know that, wherever we are, we live the same simple life in the same plain surroundings, an excuse for talking.'<sup>2</sup> Still, Cicero was more cheerful than during those months of suspense at Brundisium; and though we may detect in his correspondence an undertone of melancholy, he was following his son-in-law's advice and making the best of the situation. 'I still dine out', he wrote, 'with members of the party who are now in power. What else should I do? One must move with the times.'<sup>3</sup> Gradually he was beginning to feel that there was still a place for him in public life: 'I receive such attentions,' he told Papirius Paetus, 'such marks of respect from all

46 B. C.  
Pleasure-  
seeking in  
Italy.

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xii, 2, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Fam.*, ix, 3, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 7, 1.

46 B. C.  
Cicero  
at a gay  
dinner-  
party.

Caesar's favourites that I think they must be really fond of me.' <sup>1</sup> At one of these gatherings he found himself in the company of the actress whose intimacy with Antony he had denounced. The host was a wealthy knight, Volumnius Eutrapelus, the patron of Cytheris and another of her lovers. 'I have just taken my place at table', wrote Cicero, 'at three o'clock, and am scribbling a copy of this letter in my note-book. You will say "Where?" With Volumnius Eutrapelus. Just above me is Atticus, below Verrius, both friends of yours. Do you wonder that our slavery has become so gay? Well, what am I to do? I ask you as the pupil of a philosopher. Am I to be miserable, to torment myself? What should I gain by that? . . . Now listen to the rest. Below Eutrapelus lies Cytheris. At such a party, say you, was the famous Cicero,

"To whom men looked with reverence, on whose face Greeks turned their eyes with wonder."

Upon my honour I had no suspicion that she would be there . . . That sort of thing never attracted me when I was young, much less now I am old. I enjoy a dinner-party. I talk freely there, whatever comes upon the *tapis*, as the saying is, and turn sighs into peals of laughter.' <sup>2</sup> Though he confided to a sympathetic friend that he had mourned for his country 'more deeply and longer than any mother for her only son', <sup>3</sup> he admitted that at Tusculum he was still quite cheerful, and gleefully related that Caesar, who was amusing himself in odd moments by making a collection of *bons mots*, knew his style so well that if any spurious witticism were repeated to him as Ciceronian he summarily rejected it. <sup>4</sup> He had the unfailing solace of reading and writing, and he intended to

He in-  
tends to  
console  
himself  
with  
literature.

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, ix., 16, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 26. This letter was written after Caesar returned to Rome—perhaps in November (O. E. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 259–60), certainly after he enacted his sumptuary law.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 20, 3. Cf. vii, 28, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, ix, 16, 4. Cf. xv, 15, 2; Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 56, 7; and Macrobi., ii, 1, 12.

give up his practice at the bar and to devote himself exclusively to literature.<sup>1</sup> 46 B. C.

Such was the state of society when Caesar returned to Rome. He addressed the Senate and afterwards the people, of course outside the city, assuring them that they need have no fear that he would use his victory like Marius or Sulla, and promising to do his utmost for the well-being of the State.<sup>2</sup> Although Pompey's sons were raising troops in Spain, he had some reason to believe that the war was virtually over; and Decimus Brutus had lately suppressed a revolt of the Bellovaci,<sup>3</sup> the one disturbance that during many years broke the peace of Transalpine Gaul. Now, after fifteen campaigns, he was about to celebrate his triumph, the distinction which he had unhesitatingly relinquished when it barred the way to political advancement, the distinction for which all Roman commanders hoped and which 'Rome's least mortal mind' strove vainly to obtain.<sup>4</sup> No such display had ever been seen in the city, not even when Pompey, returning from the East, rode in his jewelled car up the slope of the Capitol. Four triumphs, to be separated by brief intervals, were announced, Gallic, Egyptian, Pontic, African: the victory of Pharsalia, gained over a fellow citizen, was of course ignored. The procession defiled through the Triumphal Gate, the Flaminian Circus and the Circus Maximus, along the Sacred Way and through the Forum, then up the hill which led to the Capitol. In front came senators and magistrates; next the trumpeters, the spoils of war, images of the Rhine, the Rhône, the Ocean, and the city of Massilia; the captives, who followed, among them Vercingetorix, aged and worn by six years of waiting in the Roman prison, were led away when they reached the foot of the Capitoline hill, to await their doom: Caesar, attended by his seventy-two lictors, followed in

Caesar tries to reassure the Roman populace.

He celebrates his triumph.

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, ix, 20, 3; vii, 28, 2; 33, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Plut.*, *Caes.*, 55, 1; *Dio*, xliii, 15-8. The speech reported by Dio was certainly his own composition (cf. *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, 1911, p. 216), though we may believe that he had authentic material to work upon.

<sup>3</sup> *Livy*, *Epit.*, 114.

<sup>4</sup> *Cic.*, *Fam.*, xv, 6, 2; *Att.*, vi, 8, 5; vii, 1, 7; 2, 6; 3, 2; 4, 2; 5, 5.



46 B. C.

his triumphal car, drawn by four white horses ; last of all, headed by their officers, marched the survivors of the veteran legions.<sup>1</sup> The day of a triumph was a day of licence for the soldiers ; and in rude verses they ridiculed the weaknesses of their great commander.—‘Take care of your wives, good people : we have a bald-headed rake in our train.’ They made game of his amour with Cleopatra and of the less reputable connexion with Nicomedes which scandal-mongers invented or on which they loved to dwell.<sup>2</sup> Hard by the temple of Good Fortune, which Lucullus had erected, the chariot broke down : Caesar was nearly thrown to the ground ; and while people shuddered at the evil omen he was obliged to mount another car. Having ascended the Capitol, he crept on his knees up the steps of the Temple of Jupiter, and there offered sacrifice in conformity with ritual. On the next triumphal day a statue symbolical of the Nile and a model of the famous lighthouse were exhibited to the crowd : paintings represented Achillas and Pothinus dying ; Arsinoe walked in chains ; and the people, already offended by the number of Caesar’s lictors, were moved to pity by the humiliation of a woman who had claimed to be a queen. A picture which showed Pharnaces flying from the battle-field evoked shouts of laughter ;<sup>3</sup> but most welcome was the spectacle of wagons loaded with treasure from which the legions were at last to receive their reward, gold worth fifteen millions of our money, besides two thousand eight hundred and twenty-two

<sup>1</sup> In regard to the order of the procession and the route see Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, v, 488–90.

<sup>2</sup> Suet., 49, 4 ; 51. E. Meyer (*op. cit.*, p. 400) accepts the statement of Dio (xliii, 20, 4) that Caesar declared on oath—apparently before a popular gathering—that his relations with Nicomedes were innocent, but was received with derision !

<sup>3</sup> If Appian (*B. C.*, ii, 101, 420) tells the truth, the spectators, when they recognized the pictures of Scipio plunging from his ship into the sea, of Petreius committing suicide, and of Cato tearing out his own bowels, groaned aloud ; but, as G. Long says (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 1874, p. 371), ‘It is difficult to believe that Caesar allowed such pictures to appear . . . and Appian’s statement is not confirmed,’ &c. Moreover, according to Florus, ii, 13, 89, there was no allusion in the triumph to Pharsalia or Thapsus.

golden crowns, weighing more than twenty thousand pounds.<sup>1</sup> Though the ringleaders of the recent mutiny were deprived of one-third of what Caesar had promised, the rest got actually more. Every private received the equivalent of two hundred pounds, every centurion twice, every tribune and every commander of cavalry four times as much. Even the rabble were not forgotten : a hundred *denarii*, or about four pounds sterling, were bestowed upon every man, and in addition ten pecks of wheat, and ten pounds of olive oil.<sup>2</sup> But the soldiers were not all satisfied. Grumbling at the cost of the shows that followed, for they wanted all the money for themselves, they raised an uproar ; but the Dictator seized one of the rioters and sent him to execution.<sup>3</sup>

One incident of the triumph has been a stumbling-block to many whose hearts had been touched by Caesar's clemency. In conformity with custom Vercingetorix and other prisoners were put to death.<sup>4</sup> Did any who had watched the great Arvernian pass remember that when Pompey triumphed he spared the lives of all ?

When the last triumph had been celebrated and the prize-money duly paid the populace were entertained at dinner. Twenty-two thousand tables were laid and the choicest wines flowed freely :<sup>5</sup> at night, when all had dined, Caesar was escorted by the people to his house while twenty elephants, carrying torch-bearers, tramped on either side.<sup>7</sup> Then followed shows of many kinds in

Festivities in Rome.

Sept. 21—  
Oct. 2<sup>5</sup>  
(July 20—30).

<sup>1</sup> Equivalent to about 15,000 lb.

<sup>2</sup> The authorities for the details of the triumphs are Cic., *De off.*, ii, 8, 28 ; *Phil.*, ii, 45, 116 ; Livy, *Epit.*, 115 ; Plut., *Caes.*, 55, 2 ; Flor., ii, 13, 88-9 ; Suet., 37 ; 38, 1 ; App., ii, 101-2, §§ 418-22 ; Dio, xliii, 19-21. Cf. A. Blanchet, *Mém. et notes de numism.*, 1909, pp. 127-30.

<sup>3</sup> Dio, xliii, 24, 3. Dio adds (§ 4) that ' two other men ' (mutinous soldiers?) were sacrificed in the Campus Martius by the pontiffs and the priest of Mars. Whereon R. Wünsch (J. Hastings's *Ency. of Religion*, &c., vi, 1913, p. 861) remarks that Caesar ' believed that that God who had been roused to anger by the mutiny would be propitiated by the oblation '. Caesar was not quite so credulous ; but he may have wished the populace so to believe.

<sup>4</sup> Dio, xliii, 19, 4.

<sup>5</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, p. 397.

<sup>6</sup> Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xiv, 15, 97.

<sup>7</sup> Dio, xliii, 22, 1. W. Drumann (*Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 554, n. 2) corrects Suetonius (37, 2).

46 B. C.

memory of Caesar's daughter, whose death he had mourned in Britain eight years before. A wooden amphitheatre had been erected in the Forum, and an awning was stretched to protect the sightseers from the sun. Gladiators fought in pairs, among them the son of a praetor and a former senator. Plays were acted in various quarters of the city. Decimus Laberius, a Roman knight, whose pungent pen and bitter tongue had attracted the notice of Caesar, received a quasi-royal command to act in a mime of his own composition ; and the fee, equivalent to five thousand pounds, which he received increased rather than compensated for his humiliation. But when he declaimed a line in his prologue, ' He whom many fear must needs fear many,' the eyes of all were turned towards Caesar.<sup>1</sup> A naval action was represented in an artificial lake, formed for the occasion on the right bank of the river ;<sup>2</sup> while in the Circus Maximus two miniature armies composed of prisoners and condemned criminals—a thousand foot, two hundred horse, and twenty elephants on either side—fought a mimic battle. Four hundred lions and many giraffes, which Romans had never seen before, were hunted by shikarees, the spectators being secured by a trench with which Caesar had surrounded the arena. So great were the crowds that flocked from all parts of Italy that many persons were obliged to lodge in tents and many were crushed to death.<sup>3</sup>

Caesar's  
architectural im-  
prove-  
ments.

By this time the architectural designs which Caesar had projected amid the distractions of the Gallic War,<sup>4</sup> were so far realized that he resolved to inaugurate the new buildings by a public ceremony. The hall known as Basilica Julia, in which judicial trials were thenceforth to be held, was rising on the south side of the Forum ; opposite to it a new Senate House, the Curia Julia, was about to be

<sup>1</sup> Seneca (the elder), *Controv.*, vii, 3, 9 ; Suet., 39, 2 ; Macrob., ii, 7, 4-5. See p. 541.

<sup>2</sup> Dio (xliii, 23, 4) wrongly says that the lake was in the Field of Mars.

<sup>3</sup> The games are described by Pliny, viii, 16 (20), 53 ; 18 (27), 69 ; 45 (70), 182 ; xix, 1 (6), 23 ; Plut., *Caes.*, 55, 3 ; Suet., 39 ; App., ii, 102, 423 ; Dio, xliii, 22, 3-4 ; 23, 24, 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. ii, pp. 107-8.

erected ; the extension of the Forum, intended to accommodate the growing population and to facilitate access to the Field of Mars, was being gradually advanced. On the 26th of September,<sup>1</sup> while the games were going on, the Basilica and the Forum Julium, both destined to be completed by Augustus, and with them the temple of Venus Genetrix,<sup>2</sup> which Caesar had vowed before the battle of Pharsalia, were formally dedicated.<sup>3</sup>

46 B. C.

July 25.

Meanwhile Caesar was applying himself to the work of legislation. Having disbursed such enormous sums, he was obliged to practise economy ; and the first step was to reduce the number of the paupers who since the time of Clodius had received gratuitous allowances of grain.<sup>4</sup> But to save money was not the only object : it has been truly said that Caesar intended ' to transform a political bribe into a means of poor-relief '.<sup>5</sup> Returns were furnished by the landlords of the flats in which the recipients lived ; and the number was found to be three hundred and twenty thousand. The names of one hundred and seventy thousand, who presumably had no sufficient claim, were struck off the list ; and it was arranged that vacancies caused by death should be filled up annually by the praetor.<sup>6</sup> Although the veterans had received such liberal gratuities, it was necessary to provide for their subsistence ; and this was done by making them assignments of confiscated land. A few weeks after Caesar's return surveyors were already measuring in the

He enacts various laws.

<sup>1</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, p. 298 (*Fast. Pinc.*). According to *Fast. Vall.* (*ib.*, p. 320), the date was Sept. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar, it will be remembered, had told the people many years before that Venus was an ancestress of his family (vol. i, p. 224).

<sup>3</sup> *Res gestae divi Aug.* (*Mon. Ancy.*), 4, 1, 12-4 ; Pliny, xxxvi, 15 (24), 103 ; Plut., *Caes.*, 29, 2 ; Dio, xlv, 5, 1 ; *C. I. L.*, i, pp. 298, 320 ; Ch. Huel- sen, *Forum Rom.*, 1905, pp. 14-6, 56, 105 (Eng. tr. by J. B. Carter, pp. 16-8, 61, 116) ; *Paulys Real-Ency.*, Zweite Reihe, i, 1037-8.

<sup>4</sup> In consequence of the Clodian law many [? old or worn-out] slaves had been manumitted to save the cost of their keep (Dio, xxxix, 24, 1).

<sup>5</sup> Dr. Hardy in *Journ. Rom. Studies*, iv, 1914, p. 71.

<sup>6</sup> Suet., 41, 3. Cf. Plut., *Caes.*, 55, 3 (inaccurate) ; App., ii, 102, 425 ; Dio, xliii, 21, 4. See p. 554. The effects of Caesar's reform were transient, for Augustus 42 years later reduced the number of recipients to 200,000, apparently following Caesar's method (Suet., *Aug.*, 40, 2 ; Dio, lv, 10).



46 B. C.

district of Veii and near Cicero's Tusculan property ;<sup>1</sup> and Caesar took care to avoid evicting legitimate occupants.<sup>2</sup> The right of serving on juries was restricted to men of senatorial and equestrian rank,<sup>3</sup> for Caesar could not have forgotten that Clodius had been acquitted by needy jurors ;<sup>4</sup> and thus the Aurelian law of Pompey's first consulship was partially abrogated. Unmindful of the failures of his predecessors, Caesar attempted to check excessive luxury by a sumptuary law. Certain individuals and special occasions excepted, it was forbidden to ride in a palanquin, to wear purple garments, or to display pearls ; the cost of sepulchral monuments was limited ; and various dainties, in which epicures had hitherto revelled, were no longer to be sold. Caesar exerted all his powers to enforce the observance of the law. Inspectors were posted round the markets to confiscate all interdicted edibles, and as the vendors sometimes contrived to elude their vigilance, lictors and even soldiers invaded dining-rooms and removed the forbidden dishes under the eyes of the guests.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, as Caesar himself acknowledged,<sup>6</sup> so soon as he quitted Rome the law was disregarded. Another measure which he is said to have devised may not have been more successful than similar measures in our own time : the population had diminished in consequence of war, and, in order to encourage married couples to face the responsibilities of parenthood, rewards were offered to all citizens who should beget large families.<sup>7</sup> Other laws were passed the utility of which was less questionable. Persons convicted of having organized sedition or of treasonable practices were

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, ix, 17, 2.      <sup>2</sup> Suet., 38, 1. Cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 413-4.

<sup>3</sup> Suet., 41, 2 ; Dio, xliii, 25, 1. Cf. Cic., *Phil.*, i, 8, 19.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. i, pp. 296-7.

<sup>5</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, ix, 26, 4 ; 15, 5 ; Suet., 43 ; Dio, xliii, 25, 2 ; Hieron., *Chron.*, anno 46.

<sup>6</sup> Cic. *Att.*, xiii, 7, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Dio, xliii, 25, 2. Prof. J. S. Reid (*Journ. Rom. Studies*, v, 1915, p. 215) regards this statement of Dio, which is unsupported, as untrustworthy, and thinks that he ' falls into an anachronism when he attributes to Caesar something like the " ius trium liberorum ", which was established by Augustus ', and that he was probably misled by the fact that the principle was embodied in Caesar's lex agraria of 59 B. C.' (Dio, xxxviii, 7, 3).

to be punished by outlawry.<sup>1</sup> All guilds and associations, 46 B. C. except those of ancient origin, were again abolished, and thus the political clubs which under the direction of Clodius had led to rioting ceased to exist. An exception was, however, made in favour of the Jews, whom Caesar from motives of gratitude and policy treated with extraordinary indulgence, and whose time-honoured meetings and festivals might be safely recognized.<sup>2</sup> Another enactment may, as Dio remarked, have been suggested to Caesar by the recollection of his own career. During nine years he had been Governor of Gaul, and the army which he had more than doubled there had made him the master of the Roman world : he now enacted that no governor of a consular province should hold office more than two years, of a prætorian province more than one.<sup>3</sup> Two years later, when Cicero was rejoicing over the assassination of Caesar, he avowed that no better law had ever been passed.<sup>4</sup> But more durable than any of these measures was that which we all associate with the name of Caesar,—the reformation of the Roman calendar. For centuries before his time the Roman year consisted of three hundred and fifty-five days ; and every other year an additional month, called Mercedonius, consisting alternately of twenty-two and twenty-three days, was or ought to have been inserted after the 23rd of February. As, however, this was an excessive correction, the excess amounting to four days in every four years, it was decided that twenty-four days should be omitted in the last eight of every twenty-four years.<sup>5</sup> But this regulation, if it ever took effect, was not consistently carried out ; and accordingly in 191 B. C. the College of Pontiffs was authorized to make or to omit intercalations at their own discretion.<sup>6</sup> This reform only led to further confusion.

Reform  
of the  
calendar.

<sup>1</sup> Cic, *Phil.*, i, 9, 23.

<sup>2</sup> Suet., 42, 3 ; Jos., *Ant.*, xiv, 10, 8. Cf. Th. Mommsen, *De collegiis*, &c., 1843, pp. 78-9 ; W. Liebenam, *Zur Gesch. . . d. röm. Vereinswesens*, 1890, p. 28 ; and H. Vogelstein and P. Rieger, *Gesch. d. Juden*, &c., i, 1896, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Dio, xliii, 25, 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Phil.*, i, 8, 19.

<sup>5</sup> Macroby., i, 13, 12-3.

<sup>6</sup> Censorinus, *De die natali*, xx, 4, 6.

46 B. C.

Farmers of the revenue might gain more if a month were arbitrarily inserted ; provincial governors might wish to extend or to curtail their period of office ; and pontiffs were sometimes accessible to influence or to bribes.<sup>1</sup> One cannot read without a smile the letters in which Cicero importuned his friends to prevent his term of office in Cilicia from being extended even by one intercalary month.<sup>2</sup> Thus the calendar year and the solar year gradually became divorced. When Caesar first went to Gaul the difference was slight : the 28th of March, 696, coincided with the 24th of March, 58 B.C. But in the political disorder which followed confusion became worse confounded ; in the seven years that intervened between 700 and 708 there was only one intercalary month ; and the date of the battle of Thapsus, which, according to the old calendar, was fought on the 6th of April, was really the 6th of February. Caesar had discussed the question in Alexandria with the scientists of the Institute. After taking counsel with Sosigenes, an Alexandrian astronomer,<sup>3</sup> and other mathematicians, he adopted a reform the principle of which, as we learn from an inscription in the Museum of Cairo, had been recognized in Egypt nearly two centuries before. The current year was to consist of four hundred and forty-five days, the Mercedonius having been intercalated in its proper place, while two other months, amounting to sixty-seven days, were to intervene between the last day of November and the first of December. Thus the Kalends of January, 709, would fall on the 1st of January, 45 B.C. In order to prevent future disturbance, a regulation was adopted which, in outline, is familiar to every one. It was based upon the computation, little more than eleven minutes in excess of the truth, that the length of the solar year was three hundred and sixty-five days and a quarter : the more accurate calculation of Hipparchus, though it was accessible to all who cared to visit the library of Alexandria,

<sup>1</sup> Censorinus, *De die natali*, xx, 4, 7. Cf. Plut., *Caes.*, 59 ; Macrob., i, 14, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, v, 9, 2 ; 13, 3 ; &c.

<sup>3</sup> Pliny, xviii, 25 (27), 211.

was forgotten or ignored.<sup>1</sup> The months were constituted as they are now, January, August, and December being lengthened from twenty-nine to thirty-one days, April, June, September, and November from twenty-nine to thirty. Every four years an additional day was to be intercalated after the 23rd of February; and the first intercalation was to take place in the year 713, the fifth of the new calendar.<sup>2</sup> 46 B. C.

While Caesar was engaged in all these labours, Cleopatra, attended by a train of courtiers, arrived with her boy husband and her infant son, Caesarion, in Rome. Caesar installed her in his suburban mansion, situated beyond the Tiber in a park on the Janiculan Hill.<sup>3</sup> That the Prefect of Morals should keep a mistress might have caused no great scandal; but that his mistress was an alien and openly recognized offended many.<sup>4</sup> Caesar cared nothing for public opinion; he enrolled the name of Cleopatra among those of the Friends and Allies of the Roman People;<sup>5</sup> and in the temple of Venus Genetrix he placed, side by side with the image of the goddess, a statue of the Egyptian queen.<sup>6</sup> Cleopatra entertained by Caesar.

But while Caesar's private life might furnish society with food for gossip, the leaders of opinion were anxiously waiting to see how the republican constitution, or what remained of it, would be moulded by his will. Although he consulted the Senate before he gave effect to his measures, the consultation was merely formal; and the consent of prominent senators was sometimes registered without their knowledge. 'Senatorial decrees', wrote Cicero to Papirius Paetus, 'are written out in the house Cicero complains of Caesar's arbitrary administration;

<sup>1</sup> Hipparchus, the greatest of ancient astronomers, provisionally computed the length of the solar year as 365 $\frac{1}{4}$  days— $\frac{1}{365}$  of a day, in other words 365 days, 5 hours, 55 minutes, 12 seconds (Ptol., *Syntaxis math.*, ed. J. L. Heiberg, vol. i, pars i, 1897, book iii, pp. 207-8).

<sup>2</sup> Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, 1907, pp. 706-26; *Class. Quart.*, vi, 1912, pp. 74-81. See vol. i, pp. 339-41.

<sup>3</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xv, 15, 2; Dio, xliii, 27, 3; Hieron., *Chron.*, Ol. 183, 4. Suetonius (52, 1) wrongly says that Caesar ultimately sent Cleopatra back to Egypt, loaded with presents.

<sup>4</sup> Dio, xliii, 27, 3. See p. 338.

<sup>5</sup> Dio, xliii, 27, 3.

<sup>6</sup> App., ii, 102, 424.



46 B. C. of your admirer, my intimate friend. Positively, whenever it occurs to him, I am put down as backing the decree, and hear of its having reached Armenia and Syria, purporting to have been made in accordance with my vote, before any mention whatever has been made of the affair. Don't imagine that I am joking. I assure you that I have had letters from kings at the other end of the earth, thanking me for having voted for giving them the royal title, though I was not only ignorant of their having received it, but of their very existence.<sup>1</sup> That some of Caesar's followers took advantage of his preoccupation with public business to seize estates which belonged to their opponents, and which were not included in the list of confiscated properties,<sup>2</sup> mattered, indeed, comparatively little: Cicero himself declared that Caesar would not allow such outrages to take effect; and he wrote to Marcellus, the ex-consul who, in order to insult Caesar, had caused a citizen of Comum to be flogged,<sup>3</sup> assuring him that his property was safe.<sup>4</sup> Cicero, indeed, was by this time convinced that no Pompeian who was not bent upon obstinate resistance need have any fear; and many of his letters testify not only to Caesar's clemency but also to his determination to deal equitably with all. 'Every day', he wrote, 'there is some instance of indulgence and generosity which belies our former fears.'<sup>5</sup> Warning Servius Sulpicius that it was not safe to write freely on certain topics, he added, 'This is not the fault of the victor, whose moderation is unsurpassable, but of the victory itself, which in civil wars, always passes due bounds.'<sup>6</sup> It is true that others besides Cicero mourned for lost political freedom, looking back with a regret which their countenances could not conceal even to the decade when the streets of Rome ran with blood and no prominent politician could venture abroad without an escort. Marcellus was still living at Mytilene in self-

but testifies to his equity and generosity.

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, ix, 15, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Sales of confiscated properties which occurred in 46 B. C. are noticed in *Fam.*, iv, 13, 2; ix, 10, 3; xv, 17, 2; 19, 3.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. ii, p. 242.

<sup>4</sup> *Fam.*, iv, 7, 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, vi, 10, 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, iv, 4, 2.

inflicted exile ;<sup>1</sup> and Servius Sulpicius, although Caesar 46 B C. had not only ignored his half-hearted adherence to the Pompeian cause, but had appointed him Governor of Achaia, was a saddened man.<sup>2</sup> But Cicero did his utmost to cheer the members of his party and strove to convince them that, although even legal procedure was no longer regular, nothing was to be feared and much was to be hoped from the master of Rome.<sup>3</sup> He constantly reminded them that Caesar was not wholly responsible for the decay of the constitution and that, however much he might desire to preserve it, he could only do what circumstances would permit : ' while we are his slaves,' he wrote, ' he is a slave to circumstances ; ' <sup>4</sup> ' a conqueror is forced to do many things against his inclination at the beck of those who helped him to conquer.' <sup>5</sup> ' The best feature in the situation,' he told Sulpicius, ' is Caesar himself.' <sup>6</sup>

Readers of Cicero's correspondence who have been pained or repelled by some of his utterances will turn with pleasure to the many letters in which he comforted those who were in exile and encouraged them to hope for the pardon which he was doing his utmost to obtain for them. Though he was greatly helped by his intimacy with Caesar's friends, who were willing to use their influence in a worthy cause, what most encouraged him was his conviction that Caesar would judge every case on its merits and would not be influenced by favouritism ; ' the petitions ', he observed, ' which have weight with Caesar are not those which proceed from interested motives, but those which are intrinsically sound.' <sup>7</sup> Prominent among those in whose behalf he laboured were Marcellus and Quintus Ligarius, who had served under Varus at Utica,<sup>8</sup> whom Caesar had pardoned after the battle of Pharsalia,<sup>9</sup> and whom, although he had again joined the Pompeians in Africa, he spared after the battle of Thapsus.<sup>10</sup> At a meeting of the Senate, which

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 8.<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 3, 1. Cf. Seneca, *De consol. ad Helv.*, 9, 4.<sup>3</sup> *Fam.*, ix, 16, 3 ; 18, 1 ; xiii, 68, 2 ; iv, 8, 2.<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, ix, 17, 3.<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, iv, 9, 3.<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 4, 5.<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, vi, 12, 2.<sup>8</sup> *Dig.*, i, 2, 2, 46.<sup>9</sup> *Cic.*, *Pro Ligario*, 10, 29.<sup>10</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 89, 2.

46 B. C.

Caesar  
pardons  
Marcellus.Cicero's  
congratu-  
latory and  
hortatory  
speech.

Caesar attended, his father-in-law, Piso, spoke of Marcellus's case. Gaius Marcellus<sup>1</sup> knelt at Caesar's feet and implored him to be merciful, whereupon, by a pre-concerted arrangement, the senators simultaneously rose and approached Caesar in the guise of suppliants. Caesar told them that Marcellus had behaved with excessive bitterness, and contrasted his temper with the fairness and good sense of Sulpicius; but when every one thought that he was about to reject the petition he concluded by saying that 'he would not refuse the Senate's request, despite the man's character.' Cicero was deeply moved. 'This,' he wrote to Sulpicius, 'appeared to me such an auspicious day that I fancied I saw a vision of the Republic in revival.' One by one the senators were invited by the President to state their views. When almost every one had expressed his gratitude to Caesar, Cicero was called upon. He had determined at the outset to remain silent; but, he wrote, 'My resolution broke down before Caesar's magnanimity and the loyalty of the Senate.'<sup>2</sup> His speech was not merely an outburst of gratitude; nor was it unredeemed flattery. In such language as he might dare to use he reminded the Dictator that Rome expected more from him than he had yet done. 'Though your achievements have embraced the whole State and the welfare of all its citizens, yet so far are you from setting the coping-stone on your greatest work that you have not yet laid the foundation which you design. . . . If, Caesar, this were to be the result of your immortal deeds, that after vanquishing your adversaries you should leave the commonwealth in the condition in which it now is, consider, I pray you, whether your superhuman prowess would not seem marvellous, indeed, but hardly glorious; for glory, I conceive, is the fame, spread throughout the world, of great services done to friends, to country, or to all mankind. . . . you have still to recreate the Republic; you have still to enter on and to share with us, amidst all peace and quiet, the joy of your creation. Then, if you will, when you have paid to your country her due . . . it

<sup>1</sup> Consul 50 B. C.<sup>2</sup> *Fam.*, iv, 4, 3-4.

will be time to say that "you have lived long enough" . . . 46 B.C.  
 Among those who are yet to be born there will be controversy, as there has been among ourselves ; some will extol your deeds, others perhaps will find something wanting, and that the one thing needful, unless you quench the flame of civil war by giving life to our State, so that men may ascribe the former to destiny, the latter to your design. Labour then for the verdict of that tribunal which will deliver judgement upon you many ages hence, a judgement perhaps more disinterested than ours ; for posterity will judge without favour or partiality and, on the other hand, without rancour or jealousy.' <sup>1</sup>

While the enthusiasm with which Caesar's magnanimity had inspired Cicero was still aglow he wrote to another exile, 'I often marvel at Caesar's solidity of character, fairness, and good sense. He never speaks of Pompey except in the most appreciative terms . . . See with what open arms he has welcomed us all ! Cassius he has made his legate, Brutus Governor of [Cisalpine] Gaul, Sulpicius of Greece ; Marcellus, with whom he was more angry than any one else, he has restored with the utmost consideration for his rank.' <sup>2</sup>

He writes  
to a friend  
in praise  
of Caesar.

Not long after that memorable day Cicero, accompanied by other callers, waited on Caesar, to plead for Ligarius. Nov. 26  
 'I endured,' he wrote, 'all the humiliation and annoyance (Sept. 23)  
 of securing an *entrée* and an interview. While your brothers and your relations were kneeling at his feet, I said what the merits of the case and your circumstances demanded. I went away with a conviction, gathered not only from Caesar's reply, which was most conciliatory and generous, but also from his eyes and expression and many other signs, which it was easier to perceive than to describe, that I need have no doubt of our success.' <sup>3</sup>  
 Presently, however, a difficulty arose. Aelius Tubero, who had himself been pardoned by Caesar but who had

<sup>1</sup> *Pro Marcello*, 8-9, §§ 25-9. Wolf did not enhance his reputation by impugning the authenticity of this speech. See *Zeitschr. f. d. österreich. Gymn.*, xlviii, 1897, pp. 1143-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Fam.*, vi, 6, 10.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 14, 2.



46 B. C.

a grudge against Ligarius, opposed his recall. Caesar allowed Tubero to state his case in the Forum, and Cicero, who for six years had not spoken there, replied on behalf of Ligarius. 'The story goes,' says Plutarch,<sup>1</sup> 'that

His speech  
in defence  
of Liga-  
rius,

when Quintus Ligarius was prosecuted as an enemy to Caesar, and Cicero appeared as his advocate, Caesar said to his friends, "Every one knows already that the fellow is a scoundrel and a public enemy, but what harm can it do to listen after this long time to a speech from Cicero?"

whom  
Caesar  
pardons.

One sentence in the peroration was justified not only by Caesar's past but by his decision,—'You never forget anything except injuries.'<sup>2</sup> Ligarius was permitted to return, and he did not forget to requite the boon.

Caesar's  
presence  
required  
in Spain.

But by this time dispatches were arriving from Spain which forced upon Caesar the conviction that he must suspend his creative work, and undertake a last campaign.

<sup>1</sup> *Cic.*, 39, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Pro Ligario*, 12, 35.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE SPANISH CAMPAIGN

THE campaign which Caesar was now obliged to undertake originated in the arrangement which he had made three years before for the government of Further Spain. It is doubtful, indeed, whether any of his lieutenants possessed the combination of firmness, integrity, and tact that was needed to manage a people so many of whom revered the name of Pompey; but Quintus Cassius, whom he had left in charge, possessed no qualification except knowledge of the country. Aware that the provincials detested him and determined to renew the extortions by which he had incurred their hatred, he was confident that no harm would befall him if he could secure the goodwill of his army. But such popularity as he gained by lavish presents was purchased by the corruption of discipline; for the soldiers knew that they had done nothing to deserve the bounty which they had received. Moreover, in order to release himself from debt and to amass a new fortune, Cassius made heavy requisitions on the well-to-do, while every man from whom any money could be extracted was haled before his court on some trumped-up charge and fined. Besides the two legions that had been left under his command and two others, the 21st and the 30th, which Caesar had sent from Italy to join him, he raised a fifth, at the same time increasing the number of his cavalry; and the expense which these levies entailed compelled him to make fresh exactions. Meanwhile he received a dispatch from Caesar, ordering him to invade Numidia and attack Juba, who was reported to be about to reinforce Pompey.<sup>1</sup> He determined to take

Maladministration of Q. Cassius in Spain.

48 B. C.

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 51, 1. The writer says that Juba had already sent large forces to join Pompey (*magna Cn. Pompeio Iuba miserat auxilia*). This statement is hardly credible; for Caesar in his enumeration of the various contingents that composed Pompey's army (*B. C.*, iii, 3-5) says nothing about Juba.

48 B. C.

all his troops except the 5th legion, which was to hold the province. While the expeditionary force was encamped near Corduba, an attempt was made to assassinate Cassius; but after he had received several wounds he was rescued by his bodyguard, and the two legions that had recently come from Italy, followed by the 5th and the 2nd, marched into Corduba to protect him. Meanwhile he saw his way to making his wounds profitable; for while most of the conspirators were of course executed, those who were able to pay sufficiently heavy fines were allowed to purchase life. Before going to join his fleet Cassius compelled all his remaining creditors to sign receipts for payments which he had not made, and raised further sums by ordering a levy to be held of the Roman residents and releasing them from service at a stipulated price. The units of the expeditionary force were marching by various roads to the Straits when the native legion<sup>1</sup> and the 2nd mutinied and, joined by four cohorts of the 5th, chose Titus Torius, a fellow townsman of the group which had conspired to assassinate Cassius, as their leader. A few days later Cassius learned that the inhabitants of Corduba had revolted, that his quaestor, Marcus Marcellus, whom he had sent to secure that important town, was associated with the rebels, and that two more cohorts of the 5th legion, which garrisoned it, had joined the mutineers. The 21st legion, the 30th, and the cavalry alone remained aloof; and when Cassius sounded them, he found that although they were ready to stand by him, their loyalty belonged not to him but to Caesar. Meantime Torius marched to Corduba and gave out that he intended to regain the province for Pompey. Two of the mutinous legions, having served under Varro, favoured the Pompeian cause; but as the people of Corduba, although they shared the general hatred of Cassius, remained loyal to Caesar, and Marcellus announced that he intended to act in Caesar's interest, the mutineers transferred the command to him. Cassius, occupying a strong position only four miles from Corduba, east of the Guadalquivir,

<sup>1</sup> See p. 76.

wrote to Bogud, the king of Mauretania, and to Lepidus, the Governor of Nearer Spain, urging them to come to his support. Marcellus succeeded in outmanœuvring Cassius, who, finding himself in danger of being surrounded, marched to Ulia, about fifteen miles south of Corduba, the inhabitants of which were disposed to support him. In his new position he soon found himself blockaded by Marcellus; and when Bogud came to the rescue, he was unable to drive Marcellus from his entrenchments. Not long afterwards Lepidus arrived with a force strong enough to compel respect, and, acting in concert with Marcellus, who placed himself at his disposal, he effected an arrangement by which Cassius was permitted to leave his camp and to go whithersoever he pleased. About the same time Trebonius, dispatched by Caesar, who had been informed of the misgovernment of Cassius, arrived to supersede him; and Cassius, leaving his troops in winter quarters, embarked at the port of Malaca. Off the mouth of the Ebro his ship was wrecked, and he perished with the treasures upon which his heart was set.<sup>2</sup>

Feb., 707<sup>1</sup>  
(Nov.-  
Dec., 48  
B. C.).

Malaga.

His death.

But the evil which he had done lived after him. For some little time the province was at rest. But after the battle of Thapsus the legions that had mutinied were fearful that Caesar would come to punish them, and they heard with alarm that one of his officers, Gaius Didius, was approaching with a fleet. They therefore expelled Trebonius and elected as their leaders two Roman knights, Quinctius Scapula and Quintus Aponius, who induced various native chiefs to join them.<sup>3</sup> In the earlier part of the African campaign Pompey's elder son, Gnaeus, had set out from Utica with a small force and, after an abortive attempt to invade Mauretania, occupied the Balearic Isles and thence sailed to Spain. Several urban communities, remembering the achievements of his father, spontaneously joined him; others he compelled to submit; and

Pompey's  
sons pre-  
pare to re-  
new war  
in Spain.

<sup>1</sup> W. Sternkopf (*Neue Jahrb. f. Philol.*, &c., cxlviii, 1893, pp. 424-6) has established the date from the following texts,—Cic., *Fam.*, xv, 21, 2; *Att.*, xi, 6, 3; *Caes.*, *B. C.*, iii, 20, 1; *Bell. Alex.*, 56, 1; 64, 1. 2. 5; *Bell. Afr.*, 1, 1; *Dio*, xliii, 1, 1; 29, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 48-64.

<sup>3</sup> *Dio*, xliii, 29.



46 B. C.

Caesar's  
arrange-  
ments for  
the gov-  
ernment  
of Italy.

About  
Nov. 5 (J.)

He arrives  
in Spain.  
About  
Dec. 2 (J.).

Scapula with his partisans elected him commander-in-chief. His forces rapidly swelled. His brother Sextus, fugitives from Africa, headed by Labienus and Varus, veterans who had served under Afranius and whom Caesar had allowed to settle in Spain, flocked to his standard.<sup>1</sup> When the news reached Italy, Caesar, thinking that his lieutenants, Quintus Pedius and Fabius Maximus, who commanded the troops which he had sent from Sardinia, would be able to dispose of a motley and undisciplined host, contented himself with dispatching reinforcements; but, receiving urgent appeals from the tribes opposed to Gnaeus, he determined towards the end of the year to start for the seat of war.<sup>2</sup> In the arrangements which he made for the government of Italy he revived, as he had done three years before, an occasional office, to which he gave added power. The kings, and afterwards the consuls, had been represented when they were away from Rome by a functionary called the Prefect of the City:<sup>3</sup> Caesar appointed eight prefects, empowered to discharge the duties of all the administrative magistrates, of whom none were in this year elected.<sup>4</sup> But their authority was overshadowed by that of Balbus and Oppius, to whom the ultimate decision on all vital points belonged.<sup>5</sup> Leaving Lepidus, his Master of the Horse, in charge, supported by these trusted confidants, he drove on rapidly in advance of his troops, beguiling the tedium of the journey by writing a poem,<sup>6</sup> and reached Obulco, thirty-five miles east of Corduba, in twenty-seven days.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xii, 2, 1; *Bell. Afr.*, 23; *Bell. Hisp.*, I, 1-4; Livy, *Epit.*, 113; Vell., ii, 55, 2; App., ii, 87, 366; Dio, xliii, 29. 2, 30. The author of *Bell. Hisp.* implies wrongly that Gnaeus went to Spain after the battle of Thapsus.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 541-2.

<sup>3</sup> Dion. Hal., vi, 2; Livy, iii, 8, 7.

<sup>4</sup> Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 76, 2; Dio, xliii, 28, 2; 48, 1. Cf. E. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie* <sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 429, n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, vi, 8, 1; Tac., *Ann.*, xii, 60.

<sup>6</sup> Suet., 56, 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*; Strabo, iii, 4, 9; App., ii, 103, 429 (who absurdly says that Caesar was accompanied by a large army); Oros., vi, 16, 16 (who incorrectly says that Caesar reached Saguntum on the 17th day). According to Suetonius, Caesar arrived in Spain on the 24th day. Schmidt (*D. Briefwechsel d.*

Including the troops that were still on the march, the whole force which Caesar could put into the field amounted to eight legions and eight thousand cavalry, besides light-armed auxiliaries.<sup>1</sup> Gnaeus commanded thirteen legions,<sup>2</sup> but only four were worthy of the name,—the two provincial legions that had served under Cassius, another which had been raised from Roman colonists, and a fourth, which had fought under Afranius in Africa and the ranks of which were doubtless completed by the Afranian veterans in Spain. The rest were composed of refugees, manumitted slaves, and others, who could hardly have learned more than the rudiments of drill. Their discipline must have fallen far below the standard even of a civil war; for troops who are bribed to be loyal, who dismiss and elect their officers, who are enlisted by desperadoes, who have no patriotism and no national feeling, who are held together only by the instinct of self-preservation, by common hate and by common fear, are not apt to obey. Of the leaders Labienus alone had the mind or the heart of a general; and as his name is barely mentioned by the chronicler of the campaign before the last scene of all, we may perhaps suspect that the jealousy or the fatuity of Gnaeus allowed him to contribute little to the result except inveterate rancour against his former chief. The war was one which even the most embittered partisan who gave a thought to his country's welfare would never have begun. The duty of all Pompeians was now to desist from useless rebellion and to support the head of the State; and no excuse can be imagined for Gnaeus except that he despaired of receiving the pardon which even to him, if he had frankly appealed to the magnanimity of the conqueror, would not have been denied. Yet apparently there were some who feared that he might even now succeed. 'Hang me', wrote Gaius Cassius to Cicero, 'if I don't feel anxious and prefer to have our old and merciful master rather than a new and

46 B. C.

The  
Caesarian  
and the  
Pompeian  
army.C. Cassius  
prefers  
Caesar to  
Cn. Pom-  
peius.

*M. T. Cicero*, 1893, p. 257, n. 1) thinks that a copyist wrote *IIII.* by mistake for *VII.*; but Suetonius does not mention the point of arrival.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 542.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 542-3.

46 B. C.

cruel one. You know what a fool Gnaeus is : you know how he thinks that cruelty is courage : you know how he always thinks that we are laughing at him. I'm afraid he will want to retaliate our chaff in boorish fashion with his sword.' <sup>1</sup> Even Caesar could hardly be expected to forgive the obstinate rebel who forced him to abandon his reconstructive work ; and Caesar's veteran troops, warworn and weary, who had already shown their temper in the massacre near Thapsus, were in a savage mood.

*Bellum  
Hispa-  
niense.*

The only original record that remains of this campaign is worthy of it. 'This book must have been written by some sturdy old centurion, who fought better than he wrote' : such was the verdict of Macaulay ; <sup>2</sup> and when he delivered it he was merciful. *Bellum Hispaniense* is the worst book in Latin literature ; and its text is the most deplorable. The language is generally ungrammatical and often unintelligible. The copyists performed their task so ill that in the forty-two paragraphs there are twenty-one gaps and six hundred corrupt passages, which Mommsen and lesser men have striven with an industry worthy of a better cause to restore. Trivialities and puerilities abound. Indispensable information is frequently sought for in vain. How Gnaeus contrived to defray the cost of the war, how Caesar fed his army, what were the numbers of the troops engaged, why sundry operations were undertaken, we are not told and cannot conjecture ; and the subjects of verbs are so often omitted that without intense cogitation we can sometimes hardly tell by whom an important movement was made. But the writer, who, centurion or not, quoted Ennius and had read Homer, did evidently take part in the campaign ; and he is at once so honest and so naïve that one reads his artless story sometimes indeed with despair but never with irritation. Moreover, although the reader is kept in ignorance of so much that matters, it is possible for one who has digested the narrative and explored the ground



<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, xv, 19, 4.

<sup>2</sup> G. O. Trevelyan, *Life . . . of Lord Macaulay*, 1881, p. 691.





# The SPANISH CAMPAIGN



to form a conception of the struggle which shall in the main be true. 46 B. C.

Caesar had in earlier years visited Corduba and traversed at least a portion of the country that was to be the theatre of war, and doubtless his observant eye had marked its features. Many tourists who included Malaga in their itinerary have travelled by the railway that leads thence through La Roda, Aguilar, and Montilla to Cordova; and those who, as the train carried them northward from Montilla to Torres Cabrera, gazed at the closely set cupola-like hills that extended on their right towards the river Guadajoz, have seen the country in which most of the combats took place that preceded the decisive battle of Caesar's last campaign. Theatre of the Spanish campaign.

When Caesar reached Obulco, Gnaeus was besieging Ulia, the inhabitants of which, alone among all the communities of the province, had never swerved from their allegiance: <sup>1</sup> his brother, Sextus, with two legions, was holding Corduba, which was not only the capital of the province, but also the chief dépôt of the Pompeian army. Envoys from the beleaguered town, eluding the vigilance of the sentries, made their way to Caesar and begged him to send them help at once. In the following night he dispatched six cohorts and a party of cavalry, who, favoured by darkness and tempestuous weather, penetrated the besiegers' lines and entered the town; but he decided that the best way of relieving it would be to threaten Corduba and thus compel Gnaeus to abandon the siege. On the march he sent a picked body of legionaries ahead with an equal number of cavalry. Approaching Corduba, the legionaries mounted, each behind one of the troopers; and as they were too far off to be detected, a force emerged from the town to attack the cavalry. At the right moment the legionaries slipped off the horses, and the combined corps, attacking the Pompeians, destroyed many of them. Sextus in great alarm wrote to his brother, urging him to come instantly if he wished to save the capital. Gnaeus immediately Caesar re-inforces Ulia; He threatens Corduba;

<sup>1</sup> Dio, xliii, 31, 4.

46 B. C. put his troops in motion ; but he had some twenty miles to march ; and before he could cross the Guadajoz, Caesar appeared on the southern bank of the Guadalquivir, opposite Corduba. The northern end of the bridge was of course held by the enemy, and as the river, which at that point is about a hundred yards wide, was unfordable, Caesar was obliged to build one. About a mile south of the permanent bridge he sunk baskets, which served as gabions, in the bed, filling them with stones in order to keep them steady. Piles were then made fast in the gabions, and thus a temporary bridge was erected. A *tête de pont* was of course established at its southern end ; and after crossing the river, Caesar disposed his troops in three camps, in order to invest the town. When Gnaeus arrived, he encamped on the hills near the left bank within the bend which the river forms at Corduba, intending, while he remained master of the country between Corduba and Ulia, to throw such reinforcements as his brother might require into the fortress and to draw supplies from the magazine. One might suppose that Caesar could have frustrated this purpose by fortifying the southern end of the permanent bridge immediately after he arrived ; but perhaps the necessity of building his own bridge and entrenching his camps made it impossible for him to spare a sufficient number of men. On the other hand, it is not easy to understand why Gnaeus with his superior force did not seize the bridge himself.<sup>1</sup> Anyhow, Caesar proceeded to construct an entrenchment from his *tête de pont* towards the bridge in order to prevent Gnaeus from communicating with the garrison ; and

<sup>1</sup> Stoffel (*Hist. de J. César*, ii, 1887, p. 309), remarking that ‘évidemment Pompée ne pouvait vouloir s’enfermer dans Corduba avec ses treize légions (50,000 à 60,000 hommes) puisqu’il eût, par là, livré à César tout le pays situé au sud du Bétis’ (Guadalquivir), goes on to say that ‘si Pompée en avait eu l’intention, il serait entré dans Corduba dès son arrivée, sans que César, campé sur la rive droite, eût eu le temps de s’y opposer’. But surely, if Pompey could have transported his army across the permanent bridge—an operation which would have required at least a day—he could have seized its southern end.

When Stoffel says that Pompey had 13 legions at Corduba, he forgets that there was a garrison in Ategua.

Gnaeus endeavoured to secure his communication by constructing a similar entrenchment from his own camp. During several days there were frequent combats between the troops that covered the operations of the workers. At length Caesar, unable to effect his object, tried to provoke Gnaeus to descend on to the level ground near the left bank and fight a general action ; but Gnaeus was not rash enough to pit his half-trained troops against veterans. Caesar therefore resolved to quit Corduba, which was too strong to be captured without a regular siege, and to attack Ategua, a fortress in the possession of Gnaeus, which was said to contain abundant corn.<sup>1</sup>

but, failing to bring Gnaeus to action, besieges Ategua.

Ategua, now Teba la vieja,<sup>2</sup> was situated on a hill, overlooking the Guadajoz, about a day's march south-east of Corduba. Caesar, in order to conceal his departure, left fires burning in his camps, and, crossing the Guadalquivir by night, arrived before Ategua in the morning. A contravallation was of course constructed round the fortress, and the troops proceeded to erect a terrace, as Trebonius had done at Massilia, in order to bring the battering-ram to bear against the wall. On many of the outlying hills there were towers, resembling those that have been mentioned in the story of the African campaign, which the natives had built long before, both as posts of observation and as fastnesses against the raids of hostile tribes. Caesar occupied some of them, to check any attempt which Gnaeus might make to surprise the besiegers, amongst others one called *Castra Postumiana*, which probably stood on the hill of *Harinilla*,<sup>3</sup> three or four miles south-west of Ategua, on the opposite side of the Guadajoz. The legions, in order to make themselves as comfortable as they could in the bitter weather, built huts which they thatched with straw. Gnaeus, whose outposts were evidently careless, was not aware whither his enemy had gone until he learned from deserters that he was besieging Ategua.<sup>4</sup> Trusting in the strength of the

<sup>1</sup> Dio, xliii, 33, 2.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 543.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 543.

<sup>4</sup> Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 175) says that 'Pompée . . . ne fut informé du départ de l'armée ennemie que dans le courant de la journée par des transfuges'.



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fortress and believing that in the depth of winter Caesar would not be able to persevere,<sup>1</sup> he at first disregarded the report ; but presently, hearing that Ategua was invested, he marched towards it and, taking advantage of a fog, attacked and nearly destroyed one of Caesar's outposts. Immediately afterwards, one of his lieutenants, Munatius Flaccus, succeeded by a stratagem in reinforcing the garrison.<sup>2</sup> On the following night Gnaeus encamped on a hill between Ategua and the fort of Ucubi, now Espejo, which protected his rear. His first aim was to capture the tower which Caesar had occupied, and as the intervening hills would screen his approach, he counted on being able to seize it before Caesar could cross the Guadajoz and come to the rescue ; but the piquet which held the tower, dispatching a messenger to inform Caesar, resisted gallantly, and when Caesar appeared with three legions the Pompeians fled, losing many men. On the following day Gnaeus, fearing for the safety of the supplies which his brother was forwarding, advanced some distance towards Corduba ; but, despite this precaution, Caesar's cavalry raided one of the convoys and captured many of the mules. Meanwhile the besiegers were steadily progressing. From time to time the garrison sallied forth and endeavoured to set fire to the wooden towers which carried Caesar's artillery and to the woodwork of the terrace ; but they were invariably repulsed. The besiegers in their exasperation slaughtered prisoners and cut off the hands of letter-carriers whom they intercepted. The besieged, who had confidently expected that Gnaeus would make an effort to relieve them, were becoming disheartened, and officers were deserting even from the Pompeian army. Dissensions broke out between the townspeople and the garrison, the former desiring to surrender, while the latter, dreading the vengeance of

This statement, which rests upon a misunderstanding of *Bell. Hisp.*, 6. 2, is incredible. Even if the sentries were asleep, Pompey could see that Caesar had gone. The chronicler only says that Pompey learned from deserters that Caesar had gone to *Ategua*.

<sup>1</sup> Dio, xliii, 33, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, § 4 ; Frontin., *Strat.*, iii, 14, 1.

Caesar's soldiers, were determined to resist. One day 45 B. C. a sling-bullet fell within Caesar's lines, bearing an inscription to the effect that the besiegers would do well to attempt a surprise and that a shield should be raised as a signal for them to assault. Encouraged by this offer, some of the troops succeeded in undermining and demolishing a section of the wall ; but a storming party, which attempted to follow up this success, was captured. A deputation was then sent out with an offer to surrender on conditions, which Caesar refused. Meanwhile Gnaeus, feeling doubtless that he must do something to encourage the garrison, crossed the river, constructed a redoubt without opposition, and drove in one of Caesar's cavalry piquets ;<sup>1</sup> but the little band, rallying under the protection of their comrades, turned upon their pursuers and routed them with heavy loss. The quarrels between the townsmen and the garrison had by this time become acute : and on the following day, by order of Munatius, all the citizens who were suspected of complicity with the Caesarians were butchered in full view of Caesar's camp, and their bodies pitched over the wall ; women with children at their breasts were murdered ; and babies were hurled into the air in the presence of their parents and caught on the points of spears.<sup>2</sup> The report of these abominable crimes, which Gnaeus and Labienus had the sense to condemn, produced the effect that might have been expected upon the population of the province.

Late on this day a messenger from Gnaeus passed unobserved through Caesar's lines and delivered a dispatch to the commandant, ordering him to fire Caesar's works and to cut his way out. The garrison streamed through the front gate, in sight of the Pompeian army,

<sup>1</sup> This movement would seem from the original narrative to have occurred *before* the inscribed bullet was found. I suspect, however, from 15, 5, that the writer got into a chronological muddle. This was a common failing of his, as one may gather from his reiteration of the quaint phrase *Hoc praeterito tempore* and his almost lovably naïve apology in 10, 2,—‘ I forgot to mention in the proper place that ’, &c. (*suo loco praeteritum est, quod . . .*).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Bell. Hisp.*, 15, 6, with *Val. Max.*, ix, 2, 4.

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which was formed in line of battle on the further side of the river ; but although the Caesarians were taken by surprise, they repulsed their assailants and took many prisoners, who were of course all massacred. Within the next few days deserters reported that Gnaeus had resolved, as he could not relieve the town, to retreat southwards. Still, the garrison continued to fight desperately and succeeded in burning one of Caesar's towers. But this was an expiring effort. A letter was flung down from the wall and delivered to Caesar. It was written by the commandant, who said that since Gnaeus had abandoned him, he would serve Caesar as faithfully as he had served Gnaeus if his life were spared. About the same time a deputation from the townsmen waited upon Caesar, and promised on the same condition to surrender the town. Caesar returned a favourable answer. On the following morning, the 19th of February, he took possession of Ategua and was once more hailed as Imperator by his troops.

Fall of  
Ategua.

As soon as Gnaeus heard that the stronghold which he had left to its fate was lost he retreated towards Ucubi and, constructing earth-works between that town and the river, prepared to make a stand. Caesar followed and, moving along the right bank, encamped hard by. Gnaeus directed the notables of Ucubi to ascertain the names of their fellow-citizens who favoured Caesar, and beheaded seventy-four ; Caesar's soldiers crucified three of Gnaeus's scouts who fell into their hands.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile deserters kept coming in from Gnaeus, and, after some trivial skirmishes, he continued his retreat and, closely followed by Caesar, encamped near a place called Soricaria, which may be tentatively identified with Castro del Rio,<sup>2</sup> six miles south-east of Ategua. Caesar now crossed the Guadajoz and, anxious as ever to force on a battle, threatened to cut off his opponent from a fort, called Aspavia,<sup>3</sup> about five miles from Ucubi. The possession of this fort was so important to Gnaeus that he found himself

Caesar  
forces  
Gnaeus to  
retreat  
south-  
ward.

<sup>1</sup> The scouts who were crucified were slaves. A legionary who accompanied them only had his throat cut (*Bell. Hisp.*, 20, 5).

<sup>2</sup> See p. 544.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 544.

constrained to fight for it ; but as he shrank from en- 45 B. C.  
 countering Caesar on a fair field, he advanced towards  
 Aspavia and endeavoured to occupy a knoll. While his Mar. 5.  
 troops were ascending, they were attacked by the  
 Caesarians and driven down, with the loss of nearly five  
 hundred men, but contrived on the approach of night to  
 find safety on high ground. On the following day Gnaeus  
 again attempted to seize the knoll, and a combat of horse  
 followed, in which his troops were beaten.<sup>1</sup> Repeated  
 failures were so affecting the morale of his army that all  
 the Roman knights were conspiring to desert, and were  
 only prevented by a slave who betrayed them. Gnaeus  
 was compelled to resort to fiction in the hope of keeping  
 up the spirits of his allies. Some forty miles south-west of  
 Ucubi there was an important town called Urso, now  
 Osuna, the inhabitants of which, it should seem, were  
 losing faith in his cause. A letter which he addressed to  
 the authorities fell into Caesar's hands : ' If only the  
 enemy had been willing to fight on equal terms, I should  
 have finished the war sooner than you expected ; but they  
 dare not trust their raw troops on the open field.' <sup>2</sup>  
 Further and further southward Gnaeus continued to  
 retreat, followed by Caesar, who received the surrender of  
 Ventipo, near the modern Casariche,<sup>3</sup> until on the 16th of  
 March, having turned westward and burned the town  
 of Carruca, the inhabitants of which had refused to admit  
 his troops, he reached the hill-fort of Munda and encamped  
 beneath its walls. He could not disguise his retreat, how-  
 ever roundly he might lie. His failures as well as his  
 cruelties were alienating the natives : the more intelligent  
 of his followers were abandoning his cause. The problem  
 of supply must have caused him much anxiety. The time  
 had come when he could no longer refuse to give Caesar  
 the opportunity of meeting him in battle ; for the citizens  
 of Urso, to whom he had again written, were greatly  
 heartened by the contempt with which he spoke of Caesar's  
 army, and were expecting that he would make good his

Gnaeus  
 encamps  
 by Munda  
 and en-  
 deavours  
 to secure  
 Urso  
 against a  
 siege.

<sup>1</sup> In regard to the operations near Soricaria see pp. 547-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 26, 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 544.



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boast. Urso was not more than six miles east of Munda, and communication would be easy : to secure the town against a siege he ordered all the timber within a radius of six miles to be felled and brought inside the walls, so that the Caesarians should have no siege-material ;<sup>1</sup> and, planted between the two fortresses, he might count upon being able to hold his ground.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps Caesar would shrink from attacking troops arrayed on a formidable position, and then he could boast with a show of reason that Caesar really was afraid of him. And if Caesar were to accept the challenge, superior numbers so strongly placed might gain the victory.

Battle of  
Munda.

Munda stood upon a group of heights, flanked by a rivulet, now called the Peinado, which, flowing through marshy ground, formed the western limit of a miniature plain.<sup>3</sup> Early on the 17th of March, the morning after he had reached the eastern fringe, Caesar was on the point of breaking up his camp when scouts reported that the enemy were in line of battle. They were ranged in front of their camp, four or five miles away, their eleven<sup>4</sup> legions flanked by cavalry and light-armed auxiliaries. Caesar determined to attack ; for probably he judged that his veterans, who were eager to bring the wearisome struggle to an end, could afford to disregard the odds. For more than two months Pompey had persistently declined to fight, and now that he seemed willing, he must be allowed to fight on his own terms. Caesar therefore began to cross the plain, the 10th legion in its usual place on the right, the 3rd and the 5th, flanked by the cavalry and auxiliaries, on the left. The sun was shining gloriously in the clear Andalusian sky : ' it almost seemed ', said one who was present, ' as if that marvellous day had been vouchsafed for the battle by the immortal gods.'<sup>5</sup> When

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 41, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Veith has emphasized these advantages in a memorandum which he has communicated to me.

<sup>3</sup> The site of Munda, which, despite the labours of more than eighty antiquaries, had not been determined before May, 1921, is now certain. See pp. 544-7.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 542-3.

<sup>5</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 29, 4.

the army approached the rivulet, it seemed that their advance would not be opposed, for the enemy still clung to their position ; but the troops had considerable difficulty in crossing the stream. At the foot of the hill, Caesar, who had no intention of following the example of Pharnaces, called a halt. The men grumbled at the order ; but the Pompeians justified it. Concluding that Caesar's troops were afraid of them, they moved some way down the slope, still, however, retaining much of the advantage which it gave them. In a few minutes the frontal lines were within range of one another, and the battle of Munda began. 45 B. C.

The Caesarians pressed shouting up the slope with a confidence begotten of contempt for inferiors who had so often shrunk from meeting them on a fair field, and many Pompeians fell under their javelins ; but when they drew their swords and closed on their despised enemies, they encountered a resistance so stubborn that the confidence of many began to wane. The Pompeians were desperate : they knew that if they failed they could expect no mercy ; and the ground helped them as it had helped the Gauls who routed the legions at Gergovia. And as the Caesarians were rendered savage by continual hardship and prolonged opposition, the hatred that stimulated them was not less potent than their enemies' despair : the interlocked lines swayed as the combatants pushed and stabbed and parried, but the Pompeians would not give way. Caesar, noticing that some of his cohorts were beginning to lose ground, hurried to the spot and called upon them for very shame to make a supreme effort and not to fail their old chief in his last fight. The 10th, animated by that regimental spirit which Caesar ever fostered, fought, though their ranks were depleted, as they had never fought before, and bore down the enemy's left with such irresistible energy that Pompey, fearing that he was about to be outflanked, ordered a legion on his right wing under Labienus to cross to its support. But Caesar had already seen how the battle could be won. His cavalry had overpowered their

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opponents, and before Labienus moved he had ordered Bogud, who commanded a corps of Moorish horse, to attack the enemy's left flank and rear. Labienus tried in vain to stop him. The Pompeians in the line of battle, fancying that Labienus was retreating, lost heart, and before they could discover their mistake the Caesarians dashed in and broke the line. Pursued by the legionaries, hunted by the cavalry, the beaten army—all who could escape the slaughter—fled, some into their camp, the rest into the town.<sup>1</sup> The former, after a frantic struggle, were destroyed: the latter prepared to stand a siege; and the Caesarians, before beginning to form a contravallation, piled up corpses as a rampart to bar the gates and fixed javelins which they picked up as a palisade.<sup>2</sup> Among the slain were Labienus and Varus; and Caesar gave orders that each should be honoured with a soldier's funeral. A thousand Caesarians perished in the action, besides five hundred wounded; and this loss, which for a victorious army in ancient warfare was very heavy, testifies to the desperate fury with which the doomed legions fought. The Pompeians are said to have lost three and thirty thousand; but the sceptical reader will allow for the credulity of the ardent Caesarian to whom we owe our knowledge of the campaign.

Escape  
and death  
of Gnaeus.

A few horsemen rode to Corduba with the news of the disaster and warned Sextus, who left the city to its fate. Gnaeus, who had been wounded in the battle, hurried with a few followers to Carteia on the bay of Gibraltar, and after much suffering and many adventures by sea and land, was slain by the troops of Didius, who perished soon afterwards himself in an affray with Lusitanian rebels.

Caesar  
occupies  
Corduba,

Meanwhile Caesar, leaving Fabius to reduce Munda, marched direct from the battle-field for Corduba. Fugitives from Munda had occupied the bridge, but they were

<sup>1</sup> Questions relating to the battle of Munda are discussed on pp. 548–51.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 552. A similar incident occurred in 'the first world war' (*The Times*, April 8, 1918, p. 7, col. 3.—'At one place the French made a rampart of the dead bodies of our [German] comrades reaching man-high.').

speedily dislodged, and Caesar encamped on the northern bank. Within the walls, as in every other Spanish town, there were Pompeians and Caesarians, and the yells of the two factions, which now began to quarrel, were audible in Caesar's camp. The two legions that garrisoned the city were mutually hostile. One of them prepared to resist the conqueror, and when his partisans sent out envoys to solicit aid, the desperadoes in the garrison<sup>1</sup> tried to burn the town; but they were quickly overpowered, and Caesar's infuriated legionaries, whom, if he would, he could not restrain, drenched the streets with blood. Meanwhile Scapula, who survived the disaster at Munda, had, like Cato, committed suicide, but in a manner which illustrated a different phase of Roman life. Assembling his freedmen and his slaves, he ordered his last dinner to be served with every luxury and a funeral pyre to be raised. As soon as he had dined he bade one of the slaves to kill him and directed a freedman, who was also his concubine, to set fire to the pile. Such was the man whom the mutinous legions had chosen as their chief.

Leaving a detachment to hold Corduba, Caesar marched to Hispalis, where, though there was no Pompeian garrison, the Pompeian faction was strong. Envoys came out to meet him and to deprecate his wrath. He sent in a small force under Rebilus; but a band of Lusitanians, with the connivance of the Pompeians, succeeded in eluding the outposts, entered the town, massacred the guard, and shut the gates. Caesar refrained from assault for fear the desperadoes in the town might set fire to it, and invested it so loosely that the Lusitanians, having accomplished their bloody work, moved out, as he intended that they should: they set fire to the ships in the river and, while the legionaries were trying to quench the flames, attempted to escape, but were caught by the cavalry and cut down. Caesar marched on to Gades, receiving on the way the

<sup>1</sup> *homines fugitivi* (Bell. Hisp., 34, 4). Whether these men were identical with those who had escaped from Munda (*qui ex caede eo refugerant* [*ib.*, 33, 1] or with the fugitives (*perfugae*) of whom the garrison was partly composed (*ib.*, 34, 2) or included both, is an unimportant question, which our authority does not answer.



45 B. C. surrender of a town called Hasta, and thence returned to and Has- Hispalis. During his absence the head of Gnaeus had been ta [Asta brought to the city and exposed to view ; but on his return de Mesa]. he gave it decent burial. Munda had already been captured

Capture of after a prolonged and furious struggle : Urso, whose Munda inhabitants had learned too late the worth of Gnaeus's and Urso. promises, soon afterwards surrendered ; and this disgraceful war came to an end.

Caesar Before Caesar quitted Hispalis he convened the leading upbraids burgesses, reminded them of all that he had done as the bur- quæstor and proprætor to promote the welfare of the gesses of Hispalis. province, and upbraided them for having helped Gnaeus to prolong a useless struggle, which had brought nothing but misery to their countrymen.

He settles Caesar had now leisure to prepare for the settlement of affairs in Spain. Spain. He is said to have raised much money by plundering treasures and by the sale of prisoners. Rebellious communities were deprived of their lands or condemned to pay additional tribute ; while those which had supported Caesar received or were allowed to purchase Roman citizenship or the status of Roman colonies and immunity from taxation.<sup>1</sup> He intended to found colonies at Hispalis and Urso, Ucubi, New Carthage, Tarraco, and other towns ;<sup>2</sup> and doubtless much of his time was spent in ascertaining the details which would serve as the basis of his legislation. But he did not leave his mark upon Spain as deeply as upon Gaul and Africa. The memory of Pompey the Great even now survived ; and Sextus, who concealed himself for a time in the north, attracted after Caesar's departure adventurers from divers parts of the peninsula. Returning to the province from which he had fled, he carried on a successful guerrilla warfare against a force which Caesar sent against him ; Asinius Pollio was still struggling with him in vain at the time of Caesar's death ;<sup>3</sup> and he lived to play a leading part as a corsair in the last of the civil wars.

Sextus Pompeius renews hostilities.

Caesar was still at Hispalis six weeks after the battle ; for

<sup>1</sup> Dio, xliii, 39, 2. 4-5.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 322, note.

<sup>3</sup> App., iv, 83 ; Dio, xlv, 10.

on the 30th of April he wrote thence to condole with Cicero on the death of his daughter Tullia.<sup>1</sup> About this time he was writing a pamphlet which added nothing to his fame. Cicero had published in the previous year a panegyric on Cato;<sup>2</sup> and Caesar condescended to reply to it. He took no offence at what Cicero had said:<sup>3</sup> indeed he told one of his correspondents that by reading and re-reading it he had gained in command of language,<sup>4</sup> and in his preface he deprecated comparison between the style of a plain soldier and that of a born orator who had devoted his leisure to perfecting his rhetorical gift:<sup>5</sup> but he did not see that he would best consult his own reputation by forbearing to reply. If we may judge from the criticisms of contemporaries and later writers, the magnanimity, the judgement, and the taste for which Caesar was renowned for once failed him; and although Cicero assured Atticus that he 'really had a high opinion' of *Anticato*,<sup>6</sup> there is perhaps no reason to regret that it has not survived. Hirtius was employed to collect evidence of Cato's faults and to write a preliminary tract which Caesar might recast;<sup>7</sup> and Cicero asked Atticus to publish it, partly 'in order to enhance Cato's reputation',<sup>8</sup> partly, as one of Cicero's admirers has suggested, because it contained a eulogy upon himself.<sup>9</sup> Cato was charged with avarice,<sup>10</sup> with incest,<sup>11</sup> with habitual drunkenness:<sup>12</sup> in short *Anticato* would seem to have been, as a scholiast<sup>13</sup> called it, a mere invective, and if, as we may suppose, its purpose was to vindicate the principles for which Caesar stood,<sup>14</sup> it missed its mark. Even under the Empire the memory of Cato continued to inspire those who clung to Republican ideals.

45 B. C.

*Anticato*.<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xiii, 20, 1.<sup>2</sup> *Orator*, 10, 35.<sup>3</sup> *Plut.*, *Cic.*, 39, 2.<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, xiii, 46.<sup>5</sup> *Plut.*, *Caes.*, 3, 2.<sup>6</sup> *Att.*, xiii, 51, 1.<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, xii, 40, 1.<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 44, 1. Cf. 45, 3.<sup>9</sup> Tyrrell and Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, v, 1897, p. 69.<sup>10</sup> *Plut.*, *Cato min.*, 36, 3, 52, 3.<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, 54, 1.<sup>12</sup> Seneca, *De tranq. animi*, 17, 9.<sup>13</sup> On Juvenal, vi, 338-42.<sup>14</sup> See *Neue Jahrb.*, &c., xli, 1918, p. 239. Caesar, as A. Dyroff (*Rhein. Mus.*, l, 1895, pp. 481-4) and E. Kalinka (*Philol.*, lxi, 1910, pp. 479-82) have demonstrated, wrote only one *Anticato*. Of the *Anticatones* mentioned by

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Caesar  
joined by  
Octavius.His *Com-  
mentaries  
on the  
Civil War.*

From Hispalis Caesar travelled to New Carthage, where he had much business to transact besides making preliminary arrangements for the colony which he purposed to settle there. He was accompanied by Octavius, the grandson of his sister Julia, a boy of seventeen, to whom, attracted by his ability and character, he had become warmly attached, whom he had begun before he left Rome to initiate in politics, and whom he had determined to adopt in the hope that he would live to carry on his work. The youth, who had not been well enough to take part in the campaign, joined his grand-uncle some time in May.<sup>1</sup> From New Carthage Caesar went to Tarraco; and it was not until the middle of September that he returned to Rome.<sup>2</sup> It was probably in these months that he used such leisure as he could command in continuing his *Commentaries on the Civil War*, which he had perhaps begun after the African campaign, but which pressure of work compelled him to leave incomplete.<sup>3</sup>

Suetonius (*Div. Iul.*, 56, 5) the earlier was the work of Hirtius (*Cic.*, *Att.*, xii, 40, 1; 41, 4). No sensible man, indeed, even if he had only read the relevant letters of Cicero, would believe that Caesar was so foolish as to reduplicate his invective.

<sup>1</sup> Nic. Dam., *Vita Caes.*, 10-1; Suet., *Div. Aug.*, 8, 1; Dio, xliii, 41, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cic., *Pro Deiot.*, 14, 38; Nic. Dam., 11.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H. Meusel's edition of Caesar's *Bell. civ.*, 1906, pp. 9-10, and *Class. Philol.*, iii, 1908, pp. 130-1. The *Commentaries on the Civil War* were not published until after Caesar's death.

## CHAPTER XXV

### LIFE IN ITALY DURING THE ABSENCE OF CAESAR.—HIS RECONSTRUCTIVE WORK.— THE CLOSING SCENE

THE peace of Italy was undisturbed, as we may gather from Cicero, throughout the nine months of Caesar's absence. The sale of confiscated estates continued, and the more avaricious of Caesar's partisans attended the auctions as speculative buyers ;<sup>1</sup> but public confidence was beginning to be restored. ' Prices ', wrote Cicero in May, soon after the news from Munda had arrived, ' are now lower all round '.<sup>2</sup> But this was a poor consolation to Conservatives, who reflected that the crowning victory of Caesar would seal the fate of the Republic. Cicero had relinquished the hopes which he expressed in his speech of gratitude for the pardon of Marcellus ; and from the beginning of the year the tone of his correspondence became markedly sadder. Perhaps his political utterances were in some measure affected by domestic troubles. He had lately divorced his wife,<sup>3</sup> for whom he had lost all affection ; a second wife, Publilia, whom, under the stress of financial embarrassment, he selected for her dowry,<sup>4</sup> proved so uncongenial that a few weeks later he divorced her also ;<sup>5</sup> and in February<sup>6</sup> the one woman whom he loved, his only daughter, Tullia, had died. Among the many who offered him their sympathy was Servius Sulpicius, who in the letter that inspired a famous stanza of *Childe Harold*<sup>7</sup> reminded him that ' she departed life when the Republic fell '.<sup>8</sup> Cicero was grateful to his friend, but when we read his answer we realize what his

45 B. C.

Italy in  
the ab-  
sence of  
Caesar.

Cicero's  
domestic  
sorrows.

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, ix, 10, 3 ; xv, 19, 3. Cf. *De off.*, ii, 8, 29.

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, xiii, 31, 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Fam.*, iv, 14, 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.* ; Plut., *Cic.*, 41, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Att.*, xii, 32, 1.

<sup>6</sup> O. E. Schmidt, *D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, p. 271.

<sup>7</sup> *iv*, xlv.

<sup>8</sup> *Fam.*, iv, 5, 5.



45 B. C.

bereavement meant, coming at such a time :—‘ I had a refuge and a resting-place beside one whose conversation and whose sweet nature made me put aside all cares and sorrows. But now, under this heavy blow, the wounds which seemed to have healed reopen.’<sup>1</sup> Atticus, to whom he rarely wrote without imposing some tax upon his friendship, relieved him, as ever, of all petty worries ; but his never-failing kindness left Cicero more time to brood upon his own sorrows and upon the destruction of political freedom. ‘ At this moment ’, he wrote in January, ‘ Rome is a wretched place for an honourable man ’ ;<sup>2</sup> and, despite all remonstrances, when Tullia died, he went away. ‘ You urge me ’, he answered Atticus, ‘ to return to the Forum . . . what have I to do with the Forum when there are no law courts and no senate house, and when men keep obtruding on my eyes the sight of whom I cannot endure ? ’<sup>3</sup> His literary activity, indeed, was unceasing : all day and far into the night he toiled, for he could get little sleep.<sup>4</sup> He was beginning to compose those treatises in which, without pretending to originality, he aimed at popularizing Greek philosophy for Roman readers, and preserved for later generations the substance of speculations which in their original form have perished. ‘ At this very moment ’, he told Atticus in May, ‘ the amount of my reading and writing is such that my servants find the holidays a greater strain than I do work ’ ; but, he added, ‘ That cheerfulness by which I used to temper the sadness of the situation I have lost for ever ’.<sup>5</sup> When Atticus warned him not to expect that Marcus Brutus, who had accepted office under Caesar, would attempt to influence him to restore the constitution, he asked whether Brutus had forgotten his ancestors, Ahala the tyrannicide and Brutus the first consul.<sup>6</sup> But the name of Cicero was still valuable to Caesar and to Caesar’s partisans ; and, sincerely or because they desired his support, they continued to treat him with the

His philo-  
sophical  
writings.

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, iv, 6, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, xii, 21, 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, xii, 40, 2-3. Cf. *Fam.*, v, 15, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, vi, 1, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, xiii, 26, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Att.*, xiii, 40, 1.

utmost deference. Towards the end of July he received a letter from the Master of the Horse, requesting him to attend a meeting of the Senate and adding that by doing so he would 'greatly oblige Caesar as well as himself'.<sup>1</sup>

He is  
courted by  
Caesar's  
friends.

It was on the evening of the 20th of April that the messenger who brought the news of the downfall of the Pompeians arrived in Rome.<sup>2</sup> The Senate of course proceeded, for the third, but not for the last time, to vote further honours to the victor. Cicero, who was in the country, was spared the necessity of sharing or of refusing to share in the official adulation. This time the customary service of thanksgiving was extended to fifty days.<sup>3</sup> The title of 'The Liberator', which was entered in the almanacs, might well have been approved even by the most unbending Republicans; for they could not deny that Caesar had delivered Italy from the tyranny of Gnaeus Pompeius, whose revengeful cruelty Cassius had feared.<sup>4</sup> A temple, dedicated to Liberty, was to be built at the public cost. Another title, the bestowal of which had hitherto been the prerogative of armies in the field, was now conferred by the Senate in a new sense, which became permanent: Caesar was to be Imperator, the designation, like that of Emperor, being a prefix;<sup>5</sup> and, although he had no legitimate son, the title was to descend to his children's children. These honours, remarked Dio, however extravagant they might appear, were not undemocratical: but when all the magistrates were placed under the supreme power of Caesar; when he was authorized to nominate those magistrates who had hitherto been elected by the people; when he was himself made consul for ten years while he remained dictator; when the army and the treasury were left under his absolute control, he was evidently a monarch, and Cicero, even before his return, sardonically

The Senate  
votes fur-  
ther hon-  
ours to  
Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 47 B, 1. Cf. 49, 2 and *Fam.*, vii, 24, 1. For the general tone of Cicero's correspondence in 45 B. C. see, besides the letters from which I have quoted, *Fam.*, vi, 4, 4; v, 13, 3; vi, 2, 1; ix, 11, 1; vii, 25, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Dio, xliii, 42, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 297-8.

<sup>5</sup> The designation as a prefix was not observed, as Caesar's coins show.

45 B. C.

spoke of him as 'the King'.<sup>1</sup> His statue, wrought in ivory, was to be borne in the procession which inaugurated the chariot races in the Circus, along with the statues of the gods; another was set up in the Capitol, side by side with the statues of the seven Kings; yet another, bearing the inscription TO THE UNCONQUERABLE GOD, in the temple of Quirinus, the deified Romulus.<sup>2</sup> Thus the conqueror was deified by Romans as Rome had already been by the Greek communities of the East.<sup>3</sup> 'Evidently', wrote Cicero to Atticus, 'the value of your house will go up with Caesar for a neighbour'; but, he added in a second letter, 'I would rather see him enshrined with Quirinus than with Health'.<sup>4</sup> Students of Roman history will appreciate the bitterness of this jest; for a legend was current that Romulus had died a violent death. Two months later, just after the races had been run,<sup>6</sup> Cicero wrote again, alluding to a rumour that Lucius Cotta, one of the keepers of the Sibylline Books, had announced that they contained a prophecy that the Parthians could be conquered only by a king:—'Hateful though the procession was, still it's high time to know everything that is going on,—even about Cotta. The people were splendid not to clap even the statue of Victory because of its impious neighbour'.<sup>7</sup>

Cicero's  
bitter  
remarks  
about  
Caesar.

About  
July 21.<sup>5</sup>

Cicero had contemplated writing to Caesar about the resettlement of the constitution, and he remarked that

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xiii, 37, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 76, 1; Dio, xliii, 44-5. 'Dio', says Warde Fowler (*Roman Ideas of Deity*, 1914, p. 116), 'may be wrong, or the inscription may have been added later. Cicero twice alludes to this statue without recognizing any attempt at deification'. This is hardly sufficient reason for doubting Dio's statement; if Cicero and Atticus knew of the inscription, Atticus would see that it was alluded to in the words 'enshrined with Quirinus' (σὺνναον Quirini).

<sup>3</sup> See *Bull. de corr. hell.*, vii, 1883, pp. 465-8; E. Babelon, *Invent. somm. de la coll. Waddington*, 1897, Nos. 145, 37; B. V. Head, *Hist. num.*,<sup>2</sup> 1911, p. 497; and J. Toutain, *Les cultes païens*, &c., 1907, pp. 19-21, 24-6, 33.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, xii, 47, 3; 45, 3. Cf. W. Warde Fowler, 1899, *The Roman Festivals*, pp. 191, 343.

<sup>5</sup> O. E. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 329-30.

<sup>6</sup> In the games (*ludi victoriae Caesaris*) instituted in honour of the victory of Thapsus.

<sup>7</sup> *Att.*, xiii, 44, 1.

Aristotle had addressed a similar treatise to Alexander the Great ; but doubting whether anything that he could say would be acceptable, he requested Atticus to show his letter to Balbus and Oppius and not to send it unless they approved.<sup>1</sup> He confessed that there was no point in it except to 'kotos' to Caesar ; but Balbus and Oppius suggested so many alterations that in disgust he resolved not to send the letter at all.<sup>2</sup> 'I give you my honour', he told Atticus, 'I cannot write it. It is not the baseness of the thing that prevents me, though it ought to be ; for how disgraceful is flattery when even to be alive is ignominious ! But, as I was saying, it is not the disgrace that stops me—I wish it was, for then I should be what I ought to be—but I can think of nothing to say . . . do you suppose that this god of the procession, this comrade of Quirinus is likely to be pleased with such moderate letters as I should write ? ' <sup>3</sup> After all, however, he did write to the Dictator, not, indeed, to offer advice about the restoration of the constitution, but, sincerely, as he assured Atticus, to compliment him on the style of his *Anticato*.<sup>4</sup> Caesar himself was now about to return. 'Our schoolmaster', wrote Cicero in August, 'is coming sooner than we thought' ;<sup>5</sup> and Dolabella, he told Atticus, was coming to instruct him how to behave to the great man.<sup>6</sup>

Antony, who since he tried to evade payment for Pompey's confiscated property, had been estranged from Caesar, and whom Cicero accused of having conspired with Trebonius to murder him,<sup>7</sup> went out from Rome to meet him and was cordially received.<sup>8</sup> Caesar, immediately after his return, made a will, in which he adopted

He abandons a project of writing to Caesar about the settlement of the constitution.

Antony goes to meet Caesar.

Caesar makes his will.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, xii, 40, 2 ; 51, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, xiii, 2, 1 ; 27, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 28, 2-3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 51, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Fam.*, vii, 25, 1. Cf. *Att.*, xiii, 45, 1 ; 47 A, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>7</sup> *Phil.*, ii, 14, 34. Cf. 27, 74, where Cicero says that Antony sent an assassin to murder Caesar, and that after the man was arrested Caesar complained in the Senate of Antony's conduct. As Long observes in his note on the passage, Cicero 'only wrote this speech', and therefore 'the assertion may be false'.

<sup>8</sup> *Phil.*, ii, 32, 78 ; *Plut.*, *Ant.*, 11, 1.



45 B. C.  
His  
second  
triumph.

His plans  
for recon-  
struction.

Octavius as his son and named him his principal heir.<sup>1</sup> Some three weeks later <sup>2</sup> he celebrated another triumph, which, as the occasion was a victory gained over fellow-citizens, gave great offence; and, to gratify his lieutenants, Fabius and Pedius, he allowed them a triumph also.<sup>3</sup> In his own a significant incident had occurred. When his car passed the benches of the tribunes he noticed that one of them, Pontius Aquila, whose estate had been confiscated,<sup>4</sup> remained seated instead of rising in token of respect, and, exasperated by the insult, he shouted, 'Then ask me to restore the Republic, Pontius Aquila, you—tribune.'<sup>5</sup> But he had not come back to rest. The great have few holidays; and Caesar, though his health was failing<sup>6</sup> and he often said that he had lived long enough,<sup>7</sup> set himself to work with unabated energy. He did not intend 'to recreate the Republic' in the sense which Cicero had in mind when, in his speech for Marcellus, he appealed to Caesar; and it would be interesting to learn from that letter of advice which Balbus and Oppius so freely criticized whether Cicero had more than the vaguest conception of what he meant by those high-sounding words. Perhaps he did not know what he desired; certainly it would be vain to search his correspondence or his political writings or any record of the period for evidence that either he or others whose political instinct may have been stronger than his had any practicable plan of reconstruction to propose. But if Caesar did not intend 'to recreate the Republic', neither did he intend to do that which Cicero had prayed him not to do,—'to leave the commonwealth in the condition in

<sup>1</sup> Suet., 83; Nic. Dam., 13.

<sup>2</sup> See O. E. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 371.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, *Epit.*, 116; Plut., *Caes.*, 56, 3; Quint., *Inst. orat.*, vi, 3, 61; Dio, xliii, 42, 1; *C. I. L.*, i, p. 461.

<sup>4</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xiv, 21, 3; Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 50, 2. Cf. Macrobian, ii, 2, 5. The estate was sold to Servilia, Caesar's former mistress, at a nominal price. When people remarked how little Caesar had received for it, Cicero said: 'You must know that the bargain is not so bad, for there's a third off' (*tertia deducta*). The point of this untranslatable *bon mot* was the suggestion that Servilia had procured for Caesar the favours of her daughter Tertius.

<sup>5</sup> Suet., 78, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 86, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Cic., *Pro Marcello*, 8, 25.

which it now is'. We have no clue to the principles that directed his policy except the bald and imperfect records of his acts; but we may well believe that as he purposed soon to take the field again against enemies who threatened the frontiers of the empire, as he knew that he alone, if any one, could heal the discord of factions, establish some tolerable government in Italy, and ameliorate the condition of the provincials, and as he felt that he had not long to live, he dismissed as impracticable (if he ever entertained it) the idea of attempting to revive a dying constitution, and determined to utilize the power which, since he had already won it, the Senate had recognized and had even made absolute. Justifying his title of Emperor, he acted as though he were indeed the Roman Emperor. The evils of provincial administration were chargeable to magistrates who, not only on account of remoteness but also from the weakness and the indifference of the central government, were practically free to do as they pleased: Caesar recognized no authority that was not derived from and answerable to him. 45 B. C.

The measures which Caesar carried out and those which he had only time to plan were partly administrative, partly legislative;<sup>1</sup> and his aims were to reconcile partisans and induce them to co-operate with him for the common weal, to improve the machinery of government, to ameliorate social conditions, to minimize crime, to purify the administration of justice, to invigorate the moral tone of the rich, to stimulate manufacture and trade, to execute public works, to promote self-education, to introduce municipal reform, to remove the evils of provincial taxation, and to make the provincials feel that they shared in the greatness of Rome.

In striving to heal old feuds Caesar was but developing the policy which he had announced to his friends when

<sup>1</sup> It is impossible to determine whether the laws, other than colonial, which I shall presently mention—for diminishing crime, forbidding continued absence from Italy, securing the employment of free labourers, and re-establishing duties upon imports—were passed in 46 or in 45 B. C. I tentatively refer them to the latter year because Dio ignores them in his account of the legislation of 46.

45 B. C.  
General  
amnesty.

Enlarge-  
ment of  
the Se-  
nate.

Allot-  
ments to  
old sol-  
diers.

they applauded the clemency with which he had treated the garrison of Corfinium. A general amnesty was carried into effect. The statues of Pompey, which had been overthrown when the news from Pharsalia arrived, even the statue of Sulla, were restored. Enemies of Caesar were pardoned, many of them were promoted, and all but the most dangerous of those who had been exiled were recalled.<sup>1</sup> The number of the senators was increased to nine hundred; and Caesar even admitted certain Gallic notables besides centurions, legionaries, diviners, and sons of freedmen.<sup>2</sup> Those who cannot believe that his motive was to advertise contempt for a degenerate council will probably conclude, though they may condemn his method, that he intended to broaden the basis of the Senate by the inclusion of members who, being free from the traditions of the noble families, would loyally support his policy,<sup>3</sup> and that he looked forward to a time when it should become representative of the entire empire. Dio,<sup>4</sup> who fancied that in creating additional magistrates his purpose was merely to reward clamorous partisans, forgot that the increased number of praetors exactly corresponded to the increased number of the provinces.<sup>5</sup> Along with these measures the provision for the veteran soldiers was steadily progressing. Not less than thirty-eight legions were now stationed in various parts of the empire;<sup>6</sup> and though most of them had been raised within the last five years, to provide for old soldiers and for others who were no longer fit to serve must have been a heavy burden. Commissioners had been appointed for carrying out the details of the allotments, which were made not only in Italy but also in the provinces;<sup>7</sup> and Cicero's letters show that Caesar found time to control the arrange-

<sup>1</sup> Plut., *Caes.*, 57, 2-3; Suet., 75, 4; App., ii, 107, 448; Dio, xliii, 49, 1; 50, 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, vi, 18, 1; *Phil.*, xi, 5, 12; xiii, 13, 27; Suet., 76. 3, 80. 2; Dio, xliii, 47, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H. F. Pelham, *Essays*, 1911, p. 26.

<sup>4</sup> xliii, 47, 2; 49, 1.

<sup>5</sup> E. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie* <sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 461.

<sup>6</sup> See *Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, pp. 157-79 and E. Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 477-8.

<sup>7</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, xiii, 4-5, 7-8; Suet., 81, 1.

ments of his subordinates, that he considered the claims of those who were aggrieved by the action of the commissioners, and that he associated the Senate with himself in the execution of this, as doubtless also of other measures. Certain lands had been confiscated in the district of Buthrotum in Epirus. Cicero, instructed by Atticus, who owned an estate in this region, approached Caesar, stated the case of the Buthrotians, and obtained a decree in their favour, which he described as 'most generous'. 'Caesar', he wrote, 'by a decree which I, along with many men of the highest standing, countersigned, exempted the Buthrotians and gave us to understand that, since the assignees of land had crossed the sea, he would send a dispatch stating into what district they were to be conducted'. To provide for discharged soldiers by the assignment of lands was an expedient which the course of events had made inevitable; but the element which Caesar had added to it was not merely consideration for the rights of existing landholders: combining with it a plan for ameliorating the condition of the poorer Italians by promoting colonization on the lines which Gaius Gracchus had projected, he gave it an imperial character. Eighty thousand citizens were deported over sea and established in various colonies.<sup>1</sup> The most famous were Carthage<sup>2</sup> and Corinth,<sup>3</sup> which were now to be rebuilt. Veterans of the 10th legion, whom Caesar sent to reinforce the old colony of Narbo,<sup>4</sup> and veterans of the 6th, whom he settled at Arelate, now Arles, helped to diffuse Roman influence in Gaul.<sup>5</sup> While full citizenship was granted to individuals whom the

Coloniza-  
tion, legis-  
lation, and  
judicial  
work.

<sup>1</sup> Suet., 42, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, xvii, 3, 15; Plut., *Caes.*, 57, 3; App., *Pun.*, 136; Dio, xliii, 50, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. Sic., xxxii, 27, 1, 3; Strabo, viii, 6, 23; Pliny, iv, 4 (5), 11; Mela, ii, 3, 48; Plut., *Caes.*, 57, 3; App., *Pun.*, 136; Dio, xliii, 50, 3-4. Cf. *Journ. internat. d'archéol. num.*, ii, 1899, pp. 94, 98. As Mr. G. F. Hill remarks (*Hist. Rom. Coins*, 1909, p. 111), it is difficult to decide whether the foundation of Corinth [and some other colonies] took effect in Caesar's lifetime or whether he only made the plans.

<sup>4</sup> Pliny, iii, 4 (5), 32; Suet., *Tib.*, 4, 1; *C. I. L.*, xii, No. 4333.

<sup>5</sup> Pliny, iii, 4 (5), 36; Suet., *Tib.*, 4, 1; *C. I. L.*, xii, p. 83. Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>8</sup>, 1889, p. 553, n. \* [Eng. tr., v, 1908, p. 422, note] un-



45 B. C.

Dictator deemed worthy to receive it,<sup>1</sup> Latin rights were bestowed upon Sicily, in the Cottian and Maritime Alps, in Gaul, and in Spain;<sup>2</sup> and the example of what he had done for the Transpadanes might awaken the hope that in due time the boon of citizenship would follow.

Caesar attempted by increased penalties to diminish

reasonably denies that the veterans were actually settled in the colonies called after the names of their legions. Cf. E. Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 487, n. 3.

Camille Julian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iv, 1914, p. 31) holds that Caesar settled veterans of the 8th legion at Forum Iulii (Fréjus), of the 7th at Baeterræ (Béziers), and of the 2nd at Arausio (Orange) (Pliny, iii, 4 (5), 35-6), and cannot understand why these colonies have been attributed to Augustus; but Meyer (*l. c.*) points out that while the names *colonia Iulia Paterna Arelate* and *colonia Iulia Paterna Narbo Martius* show that Arelate and Narbo were settled by Caesar, Paterna is omitted in the official designations of the other three.

The following is a list (omitting one or two, the authorship of which is doubtful) of the other colonies which Caesar founded:—in Spain Hispalis (*C. I. L.*, ii, p. 152; Suppl., p. 841); Itucci or Iptuci (*C. I. L.*, ii, pp. 213, 701-4); Ucubi (*ib.*, p. 210); Carthago nova (*ib.*, p. 462); Tarraco (*ib.*, No. 4071); Celsa (*ib.*, p. 409; Suppl., p. 940); Urso (*ib.*, p. 851; C. G. Bruns, *Fontes iuris Rom.*,<sup>6</sup> 1893, pp. 123-40 = H. Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 6087): in Africa Curubis (*C. I. L.*, viii, 977, 980 = Dessau, 6817) and Clupea (*C. I. L.*, x, 6104); in Bithynia Apamea (*C. I. L.*, iii, Suppl., 6992 = Dessau, 314); in Pontus Sinope (*C. I. L.*, iii, 6978; *Rev. arch.*, 5<sup>e</sup> sér., iii, 1916, p. 339). Cf. Kornemann's article in *Paulys Real-Ency.*, iv, 524, 527-32. The statement of Pliny (v, 31 [34], 128) that Caesar established a colony on the island Pharos, opposite Alexandria, seems very improbable (cf. *Bell. Alex.*, 19, 1). E. Meyer (*op. cit.*, p. 495, n. 2) conjectures that the place was occupied by the troops whom Caesar had left to protect Cleopatra.

A. W. Zumpt (*Comm. epigr.*, &c., 1850, pp. 317-8), observing that Caesar planted military colonies in Gaul and Spain, concludes that the eighty thousand citizens whom Suetonius mentions were sent to Africa, Greece, and Asia. Dr. Hardy, however (*Three Spanish Charters*, 1912, p. 10), infers from Pliny (iii, 1 (3), 12) that the colonists of Urso were among the emigrant citizens.

Kornemann has written an article (*Philol.*, lx, 1901, pp. 402-26), in which, glorifying the liberalism of Caesar's colonizing policy, he seems to me to give too free play to his imagination; and Meyer (*op. cit.*, p. 490, n. 3) apparently agrees with me. No doubt Kornemann is right in saying (p. 426) that Caesar began the work of Romanizing the provinces, which was resumed by Claudius and the Flavian Caesars; but when he insists (pp. 417-8) that the colony of Carthage comprised a settlement for the native communities, Strabo (xvii, 3, 15) and Dio (xliii, 50, 4), to whom he appeals, do not support him.

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, i, 10, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny iii, 3 (4), 25; 4 (5), 36-7; iv, 21 (35), 117. Cf. E. Herzog, *Gallia Narbon. . . hist.*, 1864, pp. 83-95; Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>e</sup>, 1889, p. 553, n. \*\* (Eng. tr., v, 1908, p. 423, note).

crime in Italy, and since wealthy criminals, who had hitherto been allowed to retain their property, sometimes evaded punishment by going into voluntary exile, he enacted that parricides should forfeit the whole of their possessions and other malefactors half.<sup>1</sup> He purposed to codify the whole mass of customary civil law and to publish the most useful parts in a compendious form;<sup>2</sup> and perhaps we may conjecture that the famous statute known as the 'Julian municipal law', a fragment of which was discovered nearly two centuries ago on the western shore of the Gulf of Tarentum, had some connexion with this resolve. This document consists of three sections, the first and the second relating only to Rome, the third to the municipal towns, primarily of Italy, but also probably of the whole Roman empire. The first is connected with the gratuitous distribution of corn, which, as we have seen, Caesar reformed: the second regulates the maintenance of the streets and foot-paths, the control of vehicular traffic, and other matters of police; the third provides for the constitution of municipal councils, for a municipal census, to be held simultaneously with a census at Rome, and for the revision within a fixed time of existing municipal charters. It has been suggested that the law was intended to assist the commissioners who were responsible for the revision by enabling them to copy or to adapt to their particular requirements any of the recent enactments framed for the capital which might appear to them applicable, and by formulating general principles of municipal government, based upon precedent, which they might follow more or less closely in their respective towns.<sup>3</sup> Unwearied by the work of legislation, Caesar administered law, as Suetonius says,<sup>4</sup> 'with the utmost diligence and the most rigid austerity'. One of his enactments, the motive of which it is difficult to determine, provided that no citizen between the ages of twenty and forty, unless

<sup>1</sup> Suet., 42, 3. Cf. Cic., *Phil.*, i, 9, 23; Dio, xliv, 49, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Suet., 44, 2; Isidor., *Etymol.*, v, 1, 5.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 553-64.

<sup>4</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 43, 1.

45 B. C.

he were serving in the army, might be absent from Italy more than three successive years, and that no senator's son might leave the country at all unless he were about to join the suite of a magistrate or of a general in order to study his profession. Suetonius is perhaps only expressing his own opinion when he says that the object of these restrictions was to prevent the city from being depleted.<sup>1</sup> Whatever the explanation may be worth, it seems probable that Caesar wished to check restless pleasure-seeking and to recall men's minds to a higher standard of public duty. If, however, the scope of the law has been correctly defined, it must have cut off many youths of the upper classes from the benefits, which they had hitherto enjoyed, of a liberal education in the universities of Greece. When Caesar decreed that flock-masters must employ at least one free herdsman for every two of their slaves,<sup>2</sup> he was perhaps making a hopeless attempt to mitigate a deep-seated evil; and when he re-established customs duties upon imports<sup>3</sup> he may not have given more than a faint stimulus to native industry: but other measures by which he endeavoured to quicken the life of Italy were wholly commendable. He intended, partly perhaps in order to provide employment, partly to beautify Rome, to erect a temple to Mars, to fill up and level the artificial lake in which the sea-fight that followed his triumph had taken place, to build a theatre upon the Tarpeian rock<sup>4</sup> besides the new senate-house in the Forum, and to divert the course of the Tiber, which often overflowed its banks, into a channel along the Vatican Hills.<sup>5</sup> Public libraries were projected on a magnificent scale; and Varro was selected, as the fittest man, for the post of Director.<sup>6</sup> Foreign physicians and men of learning, already domiciled in Rome, were

Measures  
and pro-  
jects for  
the benefit  
of Italy  
and the  
provinces.

<sup>1</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 42, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*
<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 43, 1. The duties had been abolished in 60 B. C. (*Dio*, xxxvii, 51, 3. Cf. *Cic.*, *Q. fr.*, i, 1, 33).

<sup>4</sup> *Suet.*, 44, 1; *Dio*, xliii, 49, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Cic.*, *Att.*, xiii, 33, 4. *Plut.*, *Caes.*, 58, 3. Cf. *Cic.*, *Q. fr.*, iii, 7, 1; *Dio*, xxxix, 61, 1-2; 63, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Suet.*, 44, 2; *Isidor.*, *Etymol.*, vi, 5, 1.

honoured with the citizenship, and others were encouraged 45 B. C. to settle there by the hope of receiving the same privilege.<sup>1</sup> The Pomptine marshes and the Fucine lake were to be drained and converted into arable land; a new road was to be carried across the Apennines from the Adriatic to Rome; the shallow haven of Ostia was to be transformed into a commercial harbour and a naval station; and a ship canal was to be dug through the Isthmus of Corinth.<sup>2</sup> More important, however, were the benefits which Caesar actually conferred upon the provinces. The law by which he had limited the duration of proconsular authority<sup>3</sup> would not have relieved the provincials if he had not taken care to prevent proconsuls and tax-gatherers from committing extortion. We have seen that by fixing the tribute which Transalpine Gaul was to pay<sup>4</sup> and by substituting in Asia a definite sum for tithes<sup>5</sup> Caesar had saved the inhabitants of those provinces from the worst evils of Roman administration; and there is indirect evidence that he treated Sicily with the same liberality.<sup>6</sup> But taxation could not be equitably adjusted without a census; and before a census could be taken it was necessary to carry out a survey of the whole empire. Caesar had already planned this laborious task, and it was completed in the reign of Augustus.<sup>7</sup>

While Caesar was engaged in all these labours, preparations for the campaigns by which he intended to secure the frontiers of the empire were being steadily matured. He purposed, first of all, to undertake a punitive expedition against the Dacians, who had made raids into

Preparations for campaigns to secure the frontiers of the empire.

<sup>1</sup> Suet., 42, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 44, 3; Cic., *Phil.*, v, 3, 7; Pliny, iv, 4 (5), 10; Plut., *Caes.*, 58, 3; Dio, xlv, 5, 1. The drainage of the marshes and the formation of the harbour were accomplished in the reign of Claudius (Suet., *Div. Claud.*, 20, 1); the project of the canal was revived by Caligula and Nero (Suet., *Cal.*, 21; *Nero*, 19, 1-2; 37, 3).

<sup>3</sup> See p. 285.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. ii, p. 232.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 179-80.

<sup>6</sup> The fact that Latin rights were granted to Sicily (Pliny, iii, 8 [14], 91). Cf. Varro, *R. R.*, ii, *praef.*, 3, and Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>8</sup>, 1889, p. 507, note (Eng. tr., v, 1908, p. 364, n. 1).

<sup>7</sup> Julius Honorius (*Geogr. Lat. min.*, p. 21). Cf. Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>8</sup>, 1889, p. 559 (Eng. tr., v, 1908, p. 430) and *Paulys Real-Ency.*, iii, 1918-9, x, 625-7.



45 B. C.

Pontus and Thrace, and afterwards to march through the Lesser Armenia against the Parthians.<sup>1</sup> Vatinius, who had again been dispatched with three legions to Illyricum, followed up the successes which he had gained two years before, and thus prepared the way for his chief.<sup>2</sup> The Parthian expedition had been planned while Caesar was still in Asia ;<sup>3</sup> but he was resolved to postpone it until he had completely re-established his authority in Italy, for, as he told a friend, he feared that his laws might otherwise be disregarded in his absence, just as his sumptuary law had been.<sup>4</sup> A campaign designed to avenge the disaster of Carrhae would in any case have been popular ; but there was a special reason for Caesar's resolve. Syria, continually exposed to Parthian invasion, had for some time been disturbed. Caesar's kinsman, Sextus, whom he had placed in charge of the province when he was about to march against Pharnaces, was soon afterwards murdered by some of his own troops, seduced by a Pompeian adventurer, Caecilius Bassus, who took advantage of a rumour that Caesar had been defeated in Africa. Bassus usurped the government of Syria and repulsed three officers whom Caesar sent successively against him, while a Parthian host had come to reinforce him.<sup>5</sup> An army such as Caesar had never commanded before—sixteen legions and ten thousand cavalry—was to assemble for the expedition ; and transports were beginning to convey them across the Adriatic.<sup>6</sup> Acilius,

<sup>1</sup> Vell., ii, 59, 4 ; Suet., 44, 3 ; App., ii, 110, 459. C. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iv, 1914, p. 40) and E. Meyer (*Caesars Monarchie* <sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 475, n. 3) accept Plutarch's statement (*Caes.*, 58, 2), which may have been founded upon irresponsible gossip, of Caesar's wild schemes of conquest.

<sup>2</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, v, 9 ; 10 A ; 10. Cf. App., *Ill.*, 13.

<sup>3</sup> App., iii, 77, 312 ; Dio, xlv, 46, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xiii, 7, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, xiv, 9, 3 ; *Pro Deiot.*, 9, 25 ; Strabo, xvi, 2, 10 ; Jos., *Ant.*, xiv, 11, 1 ; *Bell. Iud.*, i, 10, 10 ; Livy, *Epit.*, 114 ; App., iv, 58 ; Dio, xlvii, 26-7. Appian (iii, 77) gives two versions of the story. In the first, which he virtually repeats in iv, 58, he says that Caesar had left a legion in Syria under Bassus ; but the narrative of Hirtius (*Bell. Alex.*, 66, 1) shows that the legion was placed under Sextus Caesar, while Livy, Josephus, and Dio agree that Bassus was a Pompeian. Appian's second version is more accurate.

<sup>6</sup> App., ii, 110, 460.

the destined successor of Servius Sulpicius, was dispatched with a division to Achaia ; <sup>1</sup> and a large force was already quartered in Macedon.<sup>2</sup> 45 B. C.

In the middle of December Caesar, accompanied by Balbus and escorted by his bodyguard, was making a tour of inspection in Campania. Cicero was then staying in his country house by the Lucrine Lake near Puteoli. A few weeks before, speaking as counsel for Deiotarus, who was charged by his own grandson with having plotted to assassinate Caesar, he had begged the Dictator to ignore as idle gossip the stories that people were offended by seeing his statue among the statues of the kings and that his name was not applauded in the theatre.<sup>3</sup> Having reinforced his plea with abundant flattery, although no one had written more bitterly than he about the statue or with more glee about the lack of applause,<sup>4</sup> he might look forward without trepidation to a visit from Caesar. On the evening of the 18th Caesar, who had invited himself to dine with Cicero on the following day, arrived at the villa of Marcius Philippus, the stepfather of Octavius. How was Cicero to dispose of the soldiers and prevent them from making free with his property ? Let him tell the story ; for, like the account which he has left us of the memorable interview at Formiae, it enables us to see the Dictator almost face to face. Atticus was at Rome when the expected letter arrived.—‘ Oh what a formidable guest ! Still, I have no reason to regret his visit, for he was most agreeable. Philippus’s villa . . . was so chock-full of soldiers that there was hardly room for Caesar himself to dine : two thousand men if you please ! I was greatly upset about what was to happen the next day ; so Cassius Barba came to the rescue and gave me guards. The men had to camp in the open, and my villa was under protection. Caesar remained with Philippus . . . till one without admitting any one : I believe he was engaged on his accounts with Balbus. Then he

Insincerity of Cicero.

Caesar visits Cicero at his country-house near Puteoli.

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, vii, 30, 3.

<sup>2</sup> App., *Ill.*, 13 ; *B. C.*, iii, 8, 26 ; 63, 258-9

<sup>3</sup> *Pro Deiot.*, 12, 33-4.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 316.

45 B. C.

took a walk on the sea-shore. After two he went to the bath, heard about Mamurra without one word,<sup>1</sup> was anointed, and took his place at table. Being under a course of emetics,<sup>2</sup> he ate and drank without scruple and enjoyed his food. It was a very good dinner and well served, and, what is more,

‘ Well cooked, well seasoned food, with bright discourse:  
A banquet in a word to cheer the heart.’

Besides this the staff were served right royally in three rooms. The humbler freedmen and the slaves had everything they could want. But the select few were really entertained in style. In fact I showed that I was somebody. However, he is not a guest to whom one would say, “My dear fellow, come and see me again on your way back”. Once is enough. We didn’t discuss politics, but there was much literary conversation. In short, he was pleased and enjoyed himself . . . Now you have the whole story of the entertainment, or shall I call it the billeting on me,—troublesome, but not disagreeable’.<sup>3</sup>

Before many days had passed Cicero was writing of his ‘formidable guest’ in a different tone. Two months earlier Caesar had resigned the consulship, which he had held without a colleague,<sup>4</sup> in favour of Trebonius and Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom he wished to reward. The form of an election was of course observed: the electors registered their votes in favour of the Dictator’s

<sup>1</sup> *non mutavit*. The MS. reading (*Att.*, xiii, 52, 1) is *non mutavit*, which without an object yields no sense: *vultum non mutavit* (‘he did not change countenance’) is found in codex Turnesianus only, and *vultum*, as O. Hirschfeld remarks (*Kleine Schr.*, 1913, p. 786), is probably an obvious emendation. Hirschfeld (*ib.*) in 1871 ingeniously conjectured that the true reading was *non mutavit*. Tyrrell and Purser suggest, reasonably enough, that the news which Caesar heard without apparent emotion was of the death of Mamurra. H. A. J. Munro (*Criticisms . . . of Catullus*<sup>2</sup>, 1905, p. 84) thinks that, if we assume the correctness of the MS. reading, Manutius may have been right in his interpretation,—‘that a sentence against Mamurra for transgressing the sumptuary law . . . was read to him; and he let it stand,’ &c.

<sup>2</sup> Readers who know that Caesar was notoriously abstemious will not need to be told that he was acting on the advice of his physician. Cf. *Cic., Pro Deiot.*, 7, 21.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, xiii, 52; Pliny, xxxi, 2 (3), 6.

<sup>4</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, p. 440.

candidates, just as the Dean and Chapter of a diocese <sup>45 B. C.</sup> inevitably elect as their bishop, even when he is suspected of heresy, the nominee of the Crown. Ardent Republicans soon showed what they thought of this innovation : when Quintus Maximus entered the theatre and his lictors called upon the audience to rise, they shouted, ' He is no consul '.<sup>1</sup> He died on the last day of the year, and, in obedience to Caesar's recommendation, Caninius was elected to fill the vacant place—for the remaining hours of the day.<sup>2</sup> A day or two later<sup>3</sup> Cicero wrote to one of his friends, ' You would never believe how base I feel in countenancing the present state of things. Indeed I think you foresaw long ago what was coming at the time when you escaped from here. Painful as it is even to hear of, still hearing is more bearable than seeing. Anyhow you were not on the Field of Mars when, after the election of the quaestors had begun at nine, the official chair of Quintus Maximus—consul, as the Caesarians called him—was placed as usual, and then, on the announcement of his death, removed : whereupon Caesar, though he had taken the auspices for an election by the tribes, held an election by the centuries,<sup>4</sup> and between twelve and one announced that a consul had been elected to hold office till the 1st of January, namely, the next day ! Understand therefore that in the consulship of Caninius no one breakfasted. However, while he was consul there was no harm done, for he was so astonishingly vigilant that throughout his consulship he never closed his eyes. You think this a joke, for you are not here : if you saw it you would not be able to keep down your tears. There are countless other things of the same kind, if I chose to write about them : indeed I could not bear

Cicero's indignation at the election of a consul—to serve for one day.

<sup>1</sup> Suet., 80, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Plut., *Caes.*, 58, 1 ; Dio, xliii, 46, 2-4. Cf. Suet., 76, 3.

<sup>3</sup> O. E. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero's point (which is of course obvious to all who are acquainted with the procedure of Roman elections) is that the quaestors had been elected by a *comitia tributa*, and that Caesar neglected the formality of taking the auspices afresh before the election of the consul, which was held in a *comitia centuriata*.



45-4 B, C. them if I had not taken shelter in the haven of philosophy and if I had not my friend Atticus to share my studies'.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar's undis-  
guised au-  
tocracy. Caesar did not attempt to disguise his influence. He had, indeed, declined the right of appointing magistrates;<sup>2</sup> but before elections a notice was circulated:— 'Caesar, Dictator, to the electors: I commend such and such persons to your notice, to hold their respective offices by your suffrages'.<sup>3</sup> Ten ex-prætors were invested with 'consular distinctions': in other words, although they had never been consuls, they were allowed to call themselves consulars and to wear the badges of consular rank.<sup>4</sup> Caesar was authorized by a law introduced by Lucius Cassius to create new patricians, as the kings had done.<sup>5</sup> He even appointed some of his own servants to receive the revenues and to superintend the operations of the mint.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, as he was making preparations for a long war, he nominated certain magistrates for three years in advance;<sup>7</sup> but he was empowered to do this by a tribune, Lucius, the brother of Mark Antony.<sup>8</sup> For the new year he resumed the office of consul and named Antony as his colleague. This arrangement was not what he originally intended. He had promised the consulship to Dolabella, who, though he was eight years below the legal age,<sup>9</sup> had atoned for the follies of his tribuneship by loyal service in the campaigns of Africa and Spain.<sup>10</sup> But Antony intended that Caesar, not Dolabella, should be his colleague; for when Caesar set out for the Parthian war he himself would be supreme. The significance of what followed has not been duly

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, vii, 30, 1-2. L. C. Purser (*Hermathena*, ix, 1896, p. 372), with whom I agree, says, 'Caesar need not have had any intention of making the consulship ridiculous . . . it may have been merely an act of excessive formality.'

<sup>2</sup> See p. 315 and Dio, xliii, 47, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Suet., 41, 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 76, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 41, 1; *Aug.*, 2, 1; Dio, xliii, 47, 3; xlv, 2, 7; Tac., *Ann.*, xi, 25.

<sup>6</sup> Suet., 76, 3.

<sup>7</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xiv, 6, 2; Suet., 76, 3; Dio, xliii, 51, 2. Appian (ii, 128, 537; 138, 574) wrongly says that the appointments were made for five years.

<sup>8</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, vii, 6, 16.

<sup>9</sup> See p. 516.

<sup>10</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 30, 75.

appreciated. Dictator though Caesar was, he could not always exercise the absolute power which had been conferred upon him; for, as Cicero had lately said, repeating what he had often said before, 'It is an invariable result of civil war that the victor cannot have his own way in everything: concessions have also to be made to those who helped him to win.'<sup>1</sup> Caesar attempted to compromise. On the 1st of January he announced in the Senate that Dolabella should succeed to the vacant consulship immediately before he himself quitted Rome. Neither Dolabella nor Antony was satisfied. Dolabella, cheated of his expectation, furiously abused Antony: Antony roundly declared that, as an augur, he could prevent Dolabella from being elected, and would certainly do so. When the day fixed for the election arrived he fulfilled his threat; but the legality of his interference was questioned, and Caesar reserved his decision until the Ides of March.<sup>2</sup> For the following year Hirtius and Vibius Pansa were named as consuls, to be followed by Decimus Brutus and Munatius Plancus. The government of the provinces was also provided for. Decimus Brutus was to rule Cisalpine Gaul during the current year; Asia was assigned to Trebonius; and Crispus, then Governor of Bithynia, was to be succeeded by Tillius Cimber.<sup>3</sup> The reader will see presently why I have mentioned these three and these alone.

But whatever indignation these appointments, or the mode in which they were made, may have provoked, the Senate, which Caesar had in great part created, resolved that further honours should be conferred upon him. The title, which had been informally bestowed upon Cicero after his consulship, of 'Father of his country'—*Parens patriæ*—was stamped upon Caesar's coins, which also bore his image,—a symbol of monarchy.<sup>4</sup> Sacrifices were to be offered upon his birthday; his statue was to

The Senate grants him additional honours.

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, xii, 18, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Cic.*, *Phil.*, ii, 32-3. §§ 79-83; 35, 88; *Plut.*, *Ant.*, 11, 2; *Dio*, xliii, 51, 8.

<sup>3</sup> *App.*, iii, 2, 4-5.

<sup>4</sup> E. Babelon, *Descr. . . des monn. de la république rom.*, i, 1885, p. 497;

44 B. C.

be set up in all cities and in all the temples of the capital. A temple was to be built and dedicated to Concord in gratitude for the peace which Caesar had restored. The month Quintilis, in which he had been born, was thenceforward to be called Julius.<sup>1</sup> The Dictator was appointed Censor without a colleague :<sup>2</sup> his person was declared sacrosanct ; his son, if he should beget one, or his adopted son, was to inherit his office of Chief Pontiff.<sup>3</sup> Whenever he appeared in the Senate he should sit in a gilded chair, clad in a robe such as the Kings had worn ;<sup>4</sup> a guard of senators and knights was to escort him ; and the Senate bound itself by oath to protect his life.<sup>5</sup> Finally the title of Jupiter Julius, if we may trust Dio, was bestowed upon him ;<sup>6</sup> yet another temple was to be dedicated to him and to Clemency ;<sup>7</sup> and Mark Antony was appointed

ii, 1886, pp. 20-2, 25-8. See p. 567, *infra*. For the coins bearing the inscription PARENS PATRIAE see Babelon, pp. 26, 28.

Dr. G. Macdonald (*Coin Types*, 1905, pp. 193-4) thinks that the decree which authorized Caesar to engrave his portrait upon coins amounted merely to recognition of his sovereign power ; for ' we have upon coins portraits of all the " liberators ", including even Brutus ', and may infer that ' the right of portraiture . . . had come to be a mere token of personal authority '.

<sup>1</sup> Suet., 76, 1 ; App., ii, 106, 443 ; Dio, xlv, 5, 2 ; Censorin., 22, 16 ; Macrob., i, 12, 34. Cf. Cic., *Att.*, xvi, 1, 1 ; 4, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Dio, xlv, 5, 3. Drumann (*Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 595, n. 10) says that Dio here wrongly mentions the title of censor instead of *praefectus moribus*. But Dio (xliii, 14, 4) had already said that the latter title was conferred upon Caesar, and his statement is confirmed by Velleius (ii, 68, 4).

<sup>3</sup> Livy, *Epit.*, 116 ; App., ii, 106, 442 ; Dio, xlv, 5, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Cic., *De div.*, i, 52, 119 ; Pliny, xi, 37 (71), 186 ; Val. Max., i, 6, 13 ; Dio, xlv, 6, 1. Cf. Groebe (Drumann, *op. cit.*, p. 596, n. 5).

<sup>5</sup> Suet., 84, 2 ; 86, 1 ; Dio, xlv, 7, 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 4. Warde Fowler (*Roman Ideas of Deity*, p. 119) speaks of Dio's statement, which E. Meyer (*op. cit.*, p. 513) accepts, as ' generally discredited ', remarking that ' if it means anything, [it] means that he [Caesar] now became an incarnation of Jupiter, retaining his own gentile name as a cult-title. It is absolutely incredible ', he continues, ' that such a violation of all Roman religious practice and language should have remained unnoticed in all contemporary literature.' He infers (pp. 117-8) from Cicero (*Phil.*, ii, 43, 110) that the proposals for deifying Caesar, making Antony the priest of the ' new Caesar-cult ', &c., emanated from Antony himself, who, he thinks, was deliberately entering on a policy intended to ruin Caesar. The inference seems to me rash.

<sup>7</sup> Dio, xlv, 6, 4. The inscription CLEMENTIAE CAESARIS and a picture of the temple appear on a coin (No. 52) figured by Babelon (*op. cit.*, ii, 29).

a priest of Jupiter, to preside over the rites that were 44 B. C.  
to be celebrated in the shrine of the new god.<sup>1</sup>

It is useless to inquire and it would be unprofitable to ascertain whether, as Dio <sup>2</sup> says, the motive of many of the senators was to make Caesar odious in the hope that they might work his ruin. Some modern writers have supposed that the good sense which had been so conspicuous was corrupted by success and flattery; and, if we are to believe Suetonius,<sup>3</sup> Caesar openly declared that the Republic was a sham and that his word was law. Perhaps such utterances, the truth of which is undeniable, escaped him in conversation with his friends; and his enemies would certainly have made the most of them: but it is not credible that a ruler who was careful to associate the Senate with himself, however much he may have despised it, in the minutest details of public business,<sup>4</sup> would have deliberately flouted its self-esteem; and that Caesar retained his intellectual power to the last is evident both from the letter in which Cicero described his visit and from the prodigious energy with which he worked until the eve of his death. We may believe that he estimated the honours which merely signified adulation at their intrinsic value, and that all he cared for were those which recognized and sanctioned his real power.

Caesar had not been present when the Senate resolved to confer these honours; and, except Cassius and some others who had declined to vote, the members went in a body to inform him. He received them in the vestibule of the temple of Venus Genetrix, and remained sitting while they stood. Friends and enemies offered various explanations. Some said that he was about to rise when Balbus whispered to him to remember that he was Caesar; others that Trebonius dared to remonstrate and encountered a haughty stare; others again that illness forced Caesar to keep his seat. At all events the senators were deeply offended, and when the incident became known many spoke indignantly of the Dictator's intoler-

He gives  
offence by  
receiving  
the Senate  
without  
rising.

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 43, 110; Dio, xlv, 6, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 7, 3.

<sup>3</sup> 77, 1.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 321.



44 B. C. able insolence.<sup>1</sup> Not long before a diadem had been noticed on the head of Caesar's statue by the Rostra. Two of the tribunes, Caesetius Flavus and Epidius Marullus, ascertained the name of the man who had placed it there, ordered its removal, and committed him to prison, declaring that Caesar had threatened to punish any one who spoke of him as King.<sup>2</sup> On the same day,<sup>3</sup> when Caesar was riding back to Rome after celebrating the Latin Festival on the Alban Mount, some of the crowd which lined the Appian Way saluted him as King, and he replied that he was not King but Caesar. The two tribunes arrested the individual who was said to have first uttered the word 'King', and committed him for trial: Caesar let it be known that he was displeased,<sup>4</sup> but did not interfere. Soon afterwards, however, the tribunes published a notice to the effect that they had no liberty of action; whereupon Caesar summoned them before the Senate and, complaining that they were scheming to bring him into odium, demanded that they should be duly punished. Their names were accordingly erased from the list of senators, and at the instance of another tribune, the poet Helvius Cinna, they were removed from office by a *plébiscite*. Since Tiberius Gracchus had illegally deposed his colleague, Octavius, no tribune had been subjected to such indignity, and Caesar's conduct provoked general indignation.<sup>5</sup>

Two tribunes removed from office: consequent indignation.

On the 15th of February the Lupercalia, or Wolf-Festival, was held in Rome. Caesar, who within the last few days had been named Dictator for life,<sup>6</sup> took his seat

<sup>1</sup> Nic. Dam., 22; Livy, *Epit.*, 116; Plut., *Caes.*, 60, 2-3; Suet., 78, 1; App., ii, 107, 445-6; Dio, xlv, 8; Eutrop., vi, 25. According to Plutarch (*Caes.*, 57, 1; *Cic.*, 40, 2. Cf. *Cic.*, *Phil.*, xiii, 19, 40), Cicero was prominent in conferring honours upon Caesar.

<sup>2</sup> Nic. Dam., 20; Plut., 61, 3; Suet., 79, 1; App., ii, 108, 449; Dio, xlv, 9, 2-3. I follow Suetonius in regard to the date.

<sup>3</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, p. 461.

<sup>4</sup> So Dio says (xlv, 10, 1). I suspect that he is inventing.

<sup>5</sup> *Cic.*, *Phil.*, xiii, 15, 31; Nic. Dam., 20; Livy, *Epit.*, 116; Vell., ii, 68, 4-5; Plut., *Caes.*, 61, 3; *Ant.*, 12, 2; Suet., 79, 1-2; App., ii, 108, 450-3; Dio, xlv, 9, 2-3; 10, 1-3. Cf. E. Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 527, n. 2.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 567. Caesar became *dictator perpetuus* after his reception of the Senate (Dio, xlv, 8, 4). Cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 526, n. 2.

upon his gilded chair on the Rostra, clad in his purple robe and wearing his laurel wreath. The Luperci came running through the Forum, half naked according to ritual and striking with the strips of hide which they carried every woman whom they passed—a magic rite which, as I have explained,<sup>1</sup> was believed to promote fecundity. Antony, as priest of the Juliani—the ministers who had lately been added to the Lupercal college—ran with them, naked, like them, save the girdle of hide which he wore around his waist, and carrying a diadem wreathed with bay. Approaching the Rostra, he made his way through the crowd, ascended the platform, and exclaiming, ‘The Roman People offers you this through me’, attempted to place the diadem upon Caesar’s head. A roar of indignation was followed by shouts of approval as Caesar motioned Antony away, and when Antony again held out the diadem and Caesar again rejected it, the spectators clapped their hands with delight. Caesar ordered the diadem to be taken to the Capitol and placed upon the statue of Jupiter, and afterwards directed that an entry should be made in the public records:—‘Mark Antony, by order of the People, offered royalty to Gaius Caesar, the Dictator, who refused to accept it.’<sup>2</sup>

Antony offers a diadem to Caesar, who declines it.

Did Caesar covet the title which he disclaimed? Since the question does not admit of a certain answer, it will doubtless be disputed so long as Roman history continues to be studied. The direct evidence proves no more than a belief or a suspicion, whose grounds can be estimated only by the indirect evidence on which modern writers principally rely. If Caesar allowed himself to be deified,<sup>3</sup> if the gable which distinguished his mansion resembled the gables on the temples of the gods,<sup>4</sup> it does not follow that he desired to be called a king. When it is suggested that he permitted Antony to offer him the

Did Caesar covet the title ‘King’?

<sup>1</sup> See vol. i, p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 34, 84-7; *De div.*, i, 52, 119; ii, 16, 37; Nic. Dam., 21; Livy, *Epit.*, 116; Val. Max., i, 6, 13; Vell., ii, 56, 4; Plut., *Caes.*, 61, 1-2; Ant., 12; Flor., ii, 13, 91; Suet., 79, 2; App., ii, 109, 456-8; Dio, xlv, 11, 1-3. Cf. E. Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 528, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 316.

<sup>4</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 43, 110; Flor., ii, 13, 91.

44 B. C.

crown because he wished to test the feeling of the populace, one may make the not less plausible conjecture that (if the scene was prearranged by him) he intended to silence rumour by a public and definitive refusal. His quasi-regal dress,<sup>1</sup> the association of his statue with the statues of the gods—grounds of offence which a more cautious ruler would have avoided—will hardly convince those who can weigh evidence that he intrigued for a title which, he knew, was invidious, when he was already monarch and had, moreover, accepted a title which signified that his monarchy was absolute. Pais, who affirms that he schemed under the influence of an ambitious woman,<sup>2</sup> forgets that Cleopatra was not mentioned in his will: Meyer, who, premising that the only government for the Roman world was monarchy, insists that monarchy cannot dispense with the name of King,<sup>3</sup> forgets that it was dispensed with by the Roman Empire. The story, discredited by Cicero and Nicolaus, about the Sibylline oracle,<sup>4</sup> the rumour that Caesar intended to

<sup>1</sup> Dio, xliii, 43, 2; xlv, 6, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Atti d. reale accad. di archeol.*, &c., N. S., ii, 1913, p. 169. See also pp. 163–5, 167. The eminent historian's essay is most readable.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. Zeitschr.*, xci, 1903, p. 398. Cf. *Sitzungsber. d. Königl. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1916, Dec. 7, p. 1237.

<sup>4</sup> Pais, who asserts (*op. cit.*, p. 166) that when Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>8</sup>, 1889, p. 485, note [Eng. tr., v, 1908, p. 335, note]) rejected the story of the Sibylline oracle because Cicero declared the oracle an imposture, he forgot that all Sibylline oracles were false, is himself guilty of a double oversight: what Cicero declared was that the story was false (*De div.*, ii, 54, 119. Cf. *Nic. Dam.*, 20, *Plut.*, *Caes.*, 60, 1, *App.*, ii, 110, 460, and Dio, xlv, 15, 3), and Mommsen reported Cicero's words correctly. Pais remarks, further, that Plutarch may be believed when he says that Cassius and Brutus determined to assassinate Caesar on the day on which the Senate were to give him the royal title: what Plutarch really says (*Caes.*, 64, 1) is that Decimus Brutus told Caesar that the Senate intended to decree that he should be King of all countries outside Italy. Meyer (*op. cit.*, p. 529, n. 1), deriding Mommsen's conclusion that the story about the oracle was false, interjects 'as if Cicero could have said anything else!' The point of this gibe is obscure, and Meyer, contradicting himself, goes on to say, 'Mommsen has overlooked the fact that Cicero immediately afterwards treats the report as true: *hoc si est in libris* [Sibyllinis], *in quem hominem et in quod tempus est?*' I leave Meyer's remark to the judgement of the reader, only adding that if the rumour was true, it does not follow that the imposture was originated by Caesar.

transfer the seat of government to Alexandria or Ilium <sup>1</sup>— 44 B. C. a step which would have been worthy of Caligula—these and irrelevant apotheoses are the mainstay of the prevalent opinion, whose ablest advocate maintains, with perfect truth, that Caesar's intellect was unimpaired.<sup>2</sup> They imply, what is admitted by those who believe that he had lost his mental balance, that the title was to be limited to the East,<sup>3</sup> and that his mistress was to be his Queen.<sup>4</sup> It might indeed be argued that, remembering how the power of Sulla had perished with him, he desired a title which would prevent the recurrence of anarchy by ensuring the succession of a worthy ruler; but though we may be sure that he intended to transmit his monarchy, the title *Imperator* would serve as well as *Rex*.<sup>5</sup> May we suppose that he hoped to bequeath his authority, consolidated by the removal of the Parthian menace, to the adopted son whose genius for statesmanship he was fostering? <sup>6</sup>

But rumour—that rumour which Cicero had noticed a few months before—was not silenced: the story ran that at the next meeting of the Senate Lucius Cotta

<sup>1</sup> Suet., 79, 3. Cf. Nic. Dam., 20, who says that the rumour about Alexandria was proved by Caesar's will to be false.

<sup>2</sup> Pais, *op. cit.*, p. 152. Some may suppose that the epilepsy from which Caesar suffered, apparently twice, in his closing years (Suet., 45, 1. Cf. Plut., *Caes.*, 53, 3; Dio, xliii, 32, 6) had made his judgement weak (see *Ency. Brit.*<sup>11</sup>, ix, 692); but this hypothesis is inconsistent with his recorded work and with the letters of Cicero.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Plut., *Caes.*, 64, 1, and App., ii, 110, 461.

<sup>4</sup> Suetonius (52, 3. Cf. Dio, xlv, 7, 3) says that the tribune Helvius Cinna declared that he had drafted a bill, which Caesar directed him to introduce after he left Rome for the Parthian expedition, authorizing Caesar to marry as many wives as he pleased in order to beget children. Meyer (*op. cit.*, p. 525, n. 2) says that neither Suetonius nor Dio understood Caesar's motive: the bill was to enable him to marry Cleopatra and to legitimize Caesarion. Then did Caesar intend to make a new will, disinheriting Octavian and putting Caesarion in his place?

<sup>5</sup> I can conceive that Caesar may at one time have thought it politic to have the royal title in the East, and one may ask why, if he did not desire it, he did not make clear by an emphatic pronouncement in the Senate and the assembly that he would decline it; but could he without stultifying himself have accepted it on March 15 after he had ordered on February 15 a record to be made that he had refused it?

<sup>6</sup> I see that Dio (xlv, 1, 2) states this as a fact.



44 B. C.

Offence  
given by  
his quasi-  
regal  
dress, by  
the pre-  
sence of  
Cleopatra,  
and by the  
admission  
of Gauls  
to sena-  
torial  
rank.

intended to announce that the Sibylline books contained a prophecy that the Parthians could be conquered only by a king, and to move that the title of King should be conferred upon Caesar.<sup>1</sup> The degradation of the tribunes was rankling in men's minds.<sup>2</sup> Not only the more extravagant honours which Caesar had accepted and his uncompromising exercise of power, but even his dress gave offence. Rigid Republicans were scandalized by his availing himself of the privilege of wearing the laurel wreath, which hid his baldness. His purple robe was an emblem of royalty, and he habitually appeared in high red boots, like those which the Alban kings had worn.<sup>3</sup> The presence of Cleopatra was a stumbling-block to many; and Cicero, who visited her, was deeply offended by his reception: 'The insolence of the Queen', he wrote, 'when she was staying in the gardens beyond the Tiber, I cannot speak of without intense mortification.'<sup>4</sup> That foreigners—semi-barbarous Gauls—should be admitted into the Senate was bitterly resented by the idlers who fancied themselves the masters of the world. Placards appeared:—'In the interest of the public! No one is to show new senators the way to the Senate-House'; and loafers sang,

'Caesar, who led Gauls in triumph, now leads them to the House :

The Gauls have doffed their breeches and donned the purple stripe.'<sup>5</sup>

Caesar  
dismisses  
his body-  
guard, but  
harbours  
no illu-  
sions.

After the Senate had sworn to protect him, Caesar dismissed his bodyguard, and when his friends warned him that his life was in peril answered that it was of more value to his country than to himself, and that if anything befell him there would be fresh civil war. Hirtius, who believed that his clemency was misjudged, urged him to recall his guards; but he replied that it was better to die than to live in dread of death. He knew that he was surrounded by enemies, and he was under no illusions

<sup>1</sup> Suet., 79, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 80, 3; Dio, xliv, 10, 4; 11, 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, xliii, 43, 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, xv, 15, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Suet., 80, 2.

about those who pretended to be his friends.<sup>1</sup> One day, 44 B. C. when Cicero had called upon him and was waiting in an ante-room, he remarked to Gaius Matius, 'Can I doubt that I am cordially detested when Marcus Cicero has to sit waiting and cannot see me at his own convenience? If there is a good-natured man on earth, it is he; but I have no doubt that he hates me like poison.'<sup>2</sup> But Caesar bore no malice: 'For me at least', wrote Cicero, 'his tolerance was amazing.'<sup>3</sup>

Already the thought of assassinating Caesar<sup>\*</sup> had occurred to some; and about this time it began to mature. Gaius Cassius, who had perhaps forgotten what he owed to his 'old and merciful master',<sup>4</sup> took the lead, and prevailed upon Marcus Brutus, who at first scrupled to requite generosity with murder, to lend his name to the cause.<sup>5</sup> Brutus, though he accepted office under Caesar, had never ceased to sympathize with his old associates; but when he published his eulogy of Cato,<sup>6</sup> when he married Porcia, Cato's daughter, Caesar continued to treat him with tolerant indulgence.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps he was influenced by his strong-minded wife: probably his philosophical studies, reacting on that rigid, unsympathetic, ungracious temperament which made Cicero shrink from his society,<sup>8</sup> disposed him to persuade his conscience that tyrannicide was laudable. Who has not heard the story, which in one form or another divers

The conspiracy to assassinate Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Pro Marcello*, 7, 21; *Att.*, xiv, 22, 1; Vell., ii, 57, 1; Plut., *Caes.*, 57, 3; Suet., 75, 4; 86; Dio, xlv, 7, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, xiv, 1, 2. Cf. 2, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 17, 6.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 297.

<sup>5</sup> Fr. Fröhlich (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, iii, 1730) thinks that Brutus, not Cassius, was the chief conspirator, because Dio (xlv, 14, 1-2) says so, while Nicolaus of Damascus does not say that Cassius gained over Brutus, and when he names Cassius, designates him as one of many conspirators. What Nicolaus (19) really says is that the plot began with a few and is said to have ultimately included over 80 individuals, among whom the chief were Decimus Brutus, Cassius, and M. Brutus. According to Plutarch (*Brut.*, 8, 2; 10, 1) and Appian (ii, 113, 470-3), Cassius was the prime mover.

<sup>6</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xii, 21, 1; xiii, 46, 2.

<sup>7</sup> L. C. Purser (*Hermathena*, ix, 1896, pp. 369-84), refuting O. E. Schmidt (*Verhandl. d. 40. Philologenversamm.*, 1889, pp. 172-5). Cf. E. Schwartz (*Hermes*, xxxiii, 1898, p. 238).

<sup>8</sup> *Att.*, vi, 1, 7; 3, 7; xii, 29, 1; xiii, 23, 1.

44 B. C.

chroniclers tell, that below the statue of Brutus the Liberator was written, 'If only you were alive', and that around the tribunal of Marcus tablets were deposited with the words, 'Brutus, you are asleep: you are no true Brutus'? Doubtless when Brutus had made up his mind, his detractors appreciated his zeal; for Caesar said, 'Whatever Brutus wills, he wills with all his might.'<sup>1</sup> Ligarius, whom Caesar had lately pardoned, joined the conspiracy, and among Caesar's old officers Decimus Brutus, Servius Galba,<sup>2</sup> Minucius Basilus, and even Trebonius. In all the conspirators numbered more than sixty, many of whom were comparatively obscure; and Seneca<sup>3</sup> remarks that among them Caesar's friends were more numerous than his foes. But what of Cicero? A few weeks later he wrote to Marcus Brutus, 'You know I always thought that the Republic should be delivered not only from a king but also from royalty. Your view was more indulgent.'<sup>4</sup> These words suggest that Cicero may have been admitted to the confidence of Brutus; but at all events he was not an active partner. Plutarch<sup>5</sup> was perhaps only stating his own opinion when he said that the conspirators considered him too timid and too old; but they might feel sure that if the attempt succeeded, Cicero would applaud the deed.

What were the motives of the conspirators? Marcus Brutus declared his conviction that Caesar wished to be a king, and, he added, 'While Caesar was alive I was not really a citizen until after I had resolved to do the deed.'<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xiv, 1, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Mentioned by Cicero (*Phil.*, xiii, 16, 33) as well as by Appian.

<sup>3</sup> *De ira*, iii, 30, 4-5. The conspiracy is described in detail by Nicolaus (19-20, 22), Plutarch (*Caes.*, 62; *Ant.*, 13, 1: *Brut.*, 7-13), Suetonius (80, 3-4), Appian (ii, 113), and Dio (xliv, 12-4).

<sup>4</sup> *Brut.*, ii, 5, 1.

<sup>5</sup> Cic., 42, 1. Did Brutus dissuade his fellow conspirators from inviting Cicero to join them? Some months later he wrote to Atticus, 'death, exile, and poverty—I believe that these are the worst evils in Cicero's eyes, and so long as he has people from whom he can get what he wants, and who will make much of him and flatter him, he has no horror of servitude, provided it is tempered with a show of respect' (*Brut.*, i, 17, 4).

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 16, 3. This and 17 are the only letters ascribed to Brutus about the authenticity of which there is now any doubt, and probably they are

Cicero afterwards affirmed that Casca had been animated 44 B. C. by patriotism, and that Trebonius had preferred the liberty of the Roman People to his friendship for Caesar.<sup>1</sup> Doubtless they and some of their associates persuaded themselves that in ridding Rome of Caesar they would be doing what Cicero called 'a great and glorious deed';<sup>2</sup> but if we are bound to remember that Roman sentiment approved the lynching of a tyrant,<sup>3</sup> we must not, like the conspirators, forget that their destined victim was the one statesman whom Rome then had. It is hard for a little-minded man to forgive a favour conferred by one whom he has attacked; and Ligarius and his kind may well have writhed under the magnanimity of Caesar. Others, such as Cassius<sup>4</sup> and Galba,<sup>5</sup> had not received the rewards which they expected; and their hatred of tyranny was perhaps intensified by disappointed greed. Others again must have foreseen that Caesar's legislation would prevent them from enriching themselves by plundering provincials. But all that one can say with certainty is that the motives of so many men must have been manifold. What must strike every thoughtful reader is that the conspirators had not mastered the business of conspiracy, and had forgotten to think out their future course of action. It is not perhaps surprising that even the ringleaders failed to see that by destroying the monarch they would not destroy monarchy; but one may well be astonished that it did not occur to them that to kill Caesar would be useless if Caesar's partisans were allowed to live. Some, indeed, proposed to assassinate Antony; but Brutus urged that by so doing they might give occasion to the populace to say that not love of liberty had inspired them, but lust of power.<sup>6</sup>

genuine. See Bursian's *Jahresb.*, cv, 1900 (1901), pp. 196-8. L. Gurlitt (*Festschr. zu O. Hirschfelds sechzigstem Geburtstage*, 1903, p. 19) is still doubtful. <sup>1</sup> *Phil.*, ii, 11, 27. <sup>2</sup> *Att.*, xiv, 11, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, iii, 55, 5; Strachan-Davidson, *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law*, i, 1912, pp. 18-9.

<sup>4</sup> Plut., *Brut.*, 7, 2; 8, 2; App., ii, 112, 466-7.

<sup>5</sup> Suet., *Galba*, 3, 2.

<sup>6</sup> Plut., *Ant.*, 13, 2; *Brut.*, 18, 2; App., ii, 114, 478. Cf. Cic., *Fam.*, x, 28, 1.



44 B. C.

The day fixed for Caesar's departure was drawing nigh ; and the conspirators knew that there was no time to lose. On the 15th of March the Senate was to meet in a hall which adjoined the Pompeian theatre on the Field of Mars. The conspirators calculated that Caesar would not expect to be attacked among senators, most of whom he had himself nominated while some were centurions and soldiers who had served under his command. They intended to conceal daggers in the cases in which Romans carried their writing-styles : the rest of the senators would be unarmed ; and in the theatre a troop of gladiators, belonging to Decimus Brutus, would be posted, ready for emergencies.<sup>1</sup> On the night of the 14th Caesar went to sup with Lepidus, taking with him Decimus Brutus, the one of his old officers whom he cared for most. As the guests sat over their wine some one put the question, ' What is the best death to die ? ' Caesar, who was busy, signing letters, replied, ' A sudden one.'<sup>2</sup>

The Ides  
of March.

Early in the morning, so the story runs, Calpurnia told Caesar that she had dreamed that a room which had been added to their house had fallen in and that he had himself been murdered. She begged him to put off the meeting of the Senate, and, if he disbelieved her dream, to consult diviners. The omens were unfavourable, and Caesar, sending for Antony, bade him dismiss the senators. At all events Caesar remained at home ; and we may accept the sober statement that he was indisposed and that his physicians forbade him to go out.<sup>3</sup> The conspirators, waiting in the hall, became anxious and sent Decimus Brutus to urge Caesar to come. Popillius Laenas, one of

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *De div.*, ii, 9, 23 ; Plut., *Brut.*, 14, 1 ; Suet., 80, 4 ; Dio, xlv, 16. Nicolaus (26) says that the gladiators were posted between the Senate House and the theatre, in Pompey's colonnade.

Prof. M. E. Deutsch (*Univ. Calif. Publ. Class. Philol.*, ii, 1916, pp. 267-78) has, I think, satisfactorily explained the statement of Suetonius (80, 4) that some of the conspirators proposed to murder Caesar by throwing him ' from the bridge ' (*e ponte deicerent*) ; but since the proposal came to nothing, I need only refer to his paper and to one in *Berl. philol. Woch.*, Mar. 10, 1917, col. 315-20, by a writer who does not accept his explanation.

<sup>2</sup> Plut., *Caes.*, 63, 2 ; Suet., 87 ; App., ii, 115, 479.

<sup>3</sup> Nic. Dam., 23 ; Suet., 81, 4.

the senators, approaching Marcus Brutus and Cassius, 44 B. C. whispered, 'I hope you will succeed in your design; but don't delay, for the matter is no secret.' The conspirators began to suspect that some one had betrayed them. Decimus meanwhile reasoned with his chief, and persuaded him not to disappoint the senators. Towards noon Caesar stepped into his litter and was borne across the Forum, past the northern slope of the Capitol, and into the Field of Mars. On the way some one in the crowd thrust into his hands a roll of paper, which contained information of the plot. Caesar, as he descended from the litter, began to read it, but, being prevented by the throng, entered the hall with the paper in his hand. Trebonius, Decimus, and a few other conspirators remained outside, detaining Antony in conversation; for he was a man of great strength and proved courage,<sup>1</sup> and might interfere with their design. Laenas accosted Caesar and stood for some minutes talking to him. The conspirators watched him and looked meaningly at one another, grasping their daggers with the thought of anticipating by suicide the betrayal of their design. But Marcus Brutus, seeing from the countenance and manner of Laenas that he was merely asking for a favour, whispered to Cassius that all was well; and a moment later Laenas kissed Caesar's hand and withdrew. As Caesar stepped forward, the senators, among whom was Cicero, stood up. Caesar took his seat in his gilded chair. The conspirators clustered round; by a preconcerted arrangement Tillius Cimber spoke to him, pleading on behalf of his brother, who was in exile; and the rest supported Tillius by their entreaties, grasping Caesar's hands or kissing his head and breast. Caesar refused the petition and when they persisted attempted to rise. Then Tillius pulled down Caesar's toga from the shoulders, and Casca, who was standing behind, stabbed him. Caesar turned and clutched the dagger; but now, while Cicero gloated over the spectacle,<sup>2</sup> the whole crew

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 25, 63; Plut., *Ant.*, 4, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, xiv, 14, 4; *Phil.*, ii, 12, 30.

44 B. C. closed in, more than once wounding one another as they struck wildly at their victim. Two friends, Calvisius Sabinus and Censorinus, tried in vain to protect him; and, wrapping his gown over his head and round his loins, he fell dead by the blood-stained pedestal of Pompey's statue.<sup>1</sup>

The assassins retreat to the Capitol.

The corpse of Caesar conveyed to his home.

Later proceedings of the assassins.

The horror-stricken senators were already crowding towards the door when Brutus, holding up his dripping dagger, called Cicero by name, congratulated him on the restoration of liberty, and began a speech to which none would listen. As men ran eagerly to tell the tale houses and shops were closed, meals were left uneaten, and all hurried to gaze upon the body, while the assassins, one of them bearing a cap on an uplifted spear, called upon those whom they passed to accept the liberty of which it was the symbol. But no one heeded the appeal; and the assassins, chagrined and fearing to be attacked by the veterans who had lingered in the city or by the legion which Lepidus, as Master of the Horse, commanded, hastened to take refuge on the Capitol. Meanwhile three faithful slaves entered the hall, and laying the body in a litter, carried it across the Forum towards the Palatine, the onlookers weeping and groaning when they saw the wounded face and the lifeless arms hanging outside the litter. As the slaves approached the house Calpurnia came out, followed by her women, and spoke to her dead husband and recalled with cries of anguish how she had tried in vain to shield him from his doom.<sup>2</sup>

In the afternoon Cassius and Marcus Brutus ventured to descend into the Forum and harangued the populace: their arguments were received with silence, and they

<sup>1</sup> Livy, *Epit.*, 116; Val. Max., iv, 5, 6; Flor., ii, 13, 95; Ps. Victor, *De vir. ill.*, 78, 10; Eutrop., vi, 25; Oros., vi, 17, 1. For details see Nic. Dam., 24, 26; Val. Max., i, 7, 2; viii, 11, 2; Vell., ii, 57; Plut., *Caes.*, 63, 2-4; 64-6; *Ant.*, 13, 2; *Brut.*, 14, 2; 15-7; Suet., 81, 82, 1-3; App., ii, 115-7; Dio, xlv, 17-9; Obseq., 67. Nicolaus, differing from all the other writers, says that Caesar received thirty-five (not twenty-three) wounds.

<sup>2</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 12, 28; Nic. Dam., 25-6; Plut., *Caes.*, 67, 1-2; *Brut.*, 18, 1, 3; Suet., 82, 3; App., ii, 118-20, §§ 494, 5, 499-503; Dio, xlv, 20, 21, 1, 2.

immediately returned. Towards evening Cicero and 44 B. C.  
 others of lesser note visited the refugees. Cicero vehemently urged that the praetors should summon the Senate to the Capitoline temple, for he believed that all true Republicans were rejoicing at Caesar's death, and that instant advantage should be taken of their enthusiasm. But this proposal was rejected, and the assassins urged Cicero to visit Antony and call upon him to defend the commonwealth. Cicero declined : Antony, he said, would promise anything so long as he feared for his own safety ; when he ceased to fear he would be—what he had always been.<sup>1</sup> In truth both Cicero and the assassins were already in the power of Antony. The assassins had no troops except the gladiators of Decimus Brutus ; Lepidus with his legion obeyed the influence of Antony. But Antony was too wary to resort to violence when craft would avail. Immediately after the murder he had fortified his house ; and Calpurnia entrusted to him not only the money which Caesar had kept in his own coffers, but also all his papers. After Cicero left the Capitol a deputation was sent to Antony and Lepidus with a request that they should meet the conspirators and discuss the political situation. The envoys were informed that they might expect an answer in the morning. Lepidus was eager to avenge the murder, but Antony and Hirtius thought it prudent to temporize.<sup>2</sup> March 16. Antony suggested that the senators should be summoned, and fixed the meeting for the following day. It took place in the temple of Tellus, close to the house of Antony, which was on the slope overlooking the hollow where the Colosseum now stands. Most of the senators sympathized with the assassins and demanded that they should be invited to attend the meeting under a guarantee of safety. Antony readily consented ; for he knew that they would not come. When the senators insisted that a resolution should be passed about Caesar, Antony reminded them that if Caesar's dictatorship had been legitimate all his acts must be confirmed ; if they should resolve that Caesar was a usurper his body must be thrown into the

March 16.

Antony  
convenes  
the Senate.

March 17.

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 35, 89.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 568.



44 B. C.

Tiber and his acts, many of which affected the remotest parts of the empire, must be annulled ; and since some senators were actually holding offices by his appointment, while others had been designated by him for future posts, they would all be obliged to resign. Let them then decide whether they were prepared to make this sacrifice. It remained for the senators to consider on which horn of the dilemma they would prefer to be impaled. Cicero spoke in favour of an amnesty, but afterwards excused himself by the plea that he could not avow his real opinion when veteran soldiers were at hand. After prolonged discussion it was agreed that no inquiry should be held about the assassination, and that, in the interest of the State, all the acts of the Dictator should be confirmed. Furthermore, it was decided that Caesar's will should be read and that he should have a public funeral.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar's  
acts con-  
firmed.

His  
amended  
will read.

The will, later than that which Caesar had made in the preceding year, was opened and read in the house of Antony. Caesar had bequeathed his gardens to the people of Rome and to every citizen a sum equivalent to three pounds sterling of our money. Octavius was named as his adopted son, to be known thenceforth as Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus ; and to him three-fourths of the property was bequeathed. The remainder was to be divided between Quintus Pedius, who had served under Caesar in Gaul and Spain, and Lucius Pinarius, both grandsons of Caesar's elder sister, Julia. The will provided for the contingency that the heirs might, from whatever cause, fail to inherit ; and among the 'second successors' were Decimus Brutus, whom Caesar also adopted, and Mark Antony.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xiv, 6, 2 ; 9, 2 ; 14, 3 ; xv, 4, 3 ; *Fam.*, xii, 1, 2 ; *Phil.*, i, 1, 2 ; 13, 31 ; ii, 35, 89 ; Plut., *Cic.*, 42, 2 ; *Brut.*, 19, 1 ; App., ii, 142, 593 ; Dio, xlv, 23-34, 1. It is impossible and unimportant to determine the order of the speeches. L. Vogeler (*Schriften d. Univ. zu Kiel*, xxiv, 1877 (1878), pp. 6, 9-10) makes assertions which his authorities do not support.

<sup>2</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, ii, 42, 109 ; Livy, *Epit.*, 116 (inaccurate) ; Vell., ii, 59, 1 ; Pliny, xxxv, 4 (7), 21 ; Plut., *Caes.*, 68, 1 ; *Brut.*, 20, 2 ; Tac., *Ann.*, ii, 41 ; Suet., 83, 2 ; App., ii, 143, 596-7 ; iii, 17, 63 ; Dio, xlv, 35, 2-3. Cf. Zonaras, x, 12.

Notice was given that the body of Caesar was to be 44 B. C.  
 burned in the Field of Mars ; and there, near the mound  
 which covered the remains of his daughter, a funeral  
 pile was laid. The funeral oration was to be delivered,  
 according to custom, in the Forum. In front of the  
 Rostra was erected a gilded model of the temple of Venus  
 Genetrix. The body, clad in the gown which the Dictator  
 had worn on the Ides of March, was borne by high officers  
 of state, and laid within the temple on an ivory couch  
 draped with an embroidered coverlet of gold and purple.  
 The procession halted ; and amid lamentations and the  
 clash of weapons Antony mounted the Rostra and de-  
 livered that speech of which the spirit has been familiar  
 since childhood to us all. He did not forget, after he had  
 recited the list of the honours that had been conferred  
 upon Caesar, to remind his hearers that the senators had  
 bound themselves by oath to protect him and had invoked  
 a curse against all who might fail to defend him against  
 conspirators ; then, descending from the platform, he  
 lifted the torn and blood-stained gown and waved it  
 before the crowd. Solemn music followed, and a singer  
 seemed to personate Caesar as he chanted a line from  
 Pacuvius :

March 20.<sup>1</sup>

The funer-  
 al oration  
 of Antony  
 and the  
 sequel.

‘ Was it to slay me that I gave them life ? ’

And now when the Italian blood was already surging,  
 a wax figure of Caesar was raised above the bier and turned  
 by machinery so that all might see the three and twenty  
 wounds by which it was defaced. With a roar of indigna-  
 tion the lawless rushed to lynch the assassins ; but they  
 had seen the signs of what was coming and escaped.  
 Descrying the tribune Helvius Cinna,<sup>2</sup> who was a friend  
 of Caesar, the baffled rioters mistook him for a praetor of

<sup>1</sup> Groebe (W. Drumann, *Gesch. Roms*, i<sup>2</sup>, 1899, p. 417), remarking that the funeral could not have been fixed for March 19, which was a festival day (*C. I. L.*, i<sup>2</sup>, p. 298), holds that it could hardly have been later than the 20th, for there is no mention of a long postponement.

<sup>2</sup> I have no doubt that Helvius Cinna, whom Plutarch (*Brut.*, 20. 4) calls ‘ a man who wrote poetry ’ (*ποιητικὸς ἀνὴρ*), was the well-known poet of that name ; but the identification has been disputed. Cf. Drumann, *op. cit.* p. 420.

44 B. C. the same name, who had publicly glorified the murder, and, deaf to his explanations, tore him limb from limb. They attempted to burn the houses of the chief conspirators ; but the slaves held them at bay, and they were persuaded by the neighbours to withdraw.

Caesar's  
body  
cremated. Before the bier could be carried to the Field of Mars two men set fire to it, and the crowd heaped sticks and benches and everything that they could find into the flames, the musicians sacrificing their dresses, veteran soldiers their arms and decorations, women their ornaments and the charms which their children wore. All night they lingered by the burning pile ; and on succeeding nights the Jews, who cherished the memory of their benefactor, kept watch over the spot. The ashes of Caesar were collected by his freedmen and buried—we know not where.<sup>1</sup>

Those who, acknowledging the benefits which Caesar had conferred upon the world, contrast his short-comings with the achievement of Augustus, should remember that barely six months were allowed him, during which he had much legislative, judicial, and administrative work to perform, besides preparing for an arduous campaign ; and, above all, that we do not know how he intended ultimately to shape the constitution. None will deny that he needlessly shocked Republican sentiment, and that, unlike Augustus, he was intolerant of outworn forms : if the Senate, the assembly, and the magistrates were not really more subordinate to him than afterwards to his adopted son, he did not stoop to disguise the truth. Augustus saw as clearly as Caesar that despotism alone could organize that government which for four centuries kept the barbarians at bay and enabled civilization to

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Att.*, xiv, 10, 1 ; *Phil.*, ii, 36, 91 ; 42, 107 ; Livy, *Epit.*, 116 ; Val. Max., ix, 9, 1 ; Plut., *Caes.*, 68 ; *Ant.*, 14, 3 ; *Brut.*, 20, 2-4 ; Tac., *Ann.*, i, 8 ; Suet., 84, 85. 1 ; App., ii, 143-8, §§ 598-616 ; Dio, xlv, 35. 4, 36-50 ; Oros., vi, 17, 3. Cf. Ch. Huelsen, *Forum Rom.*, 1905, p. 137 (Eng. tr., pp. 156-7). Otto Hirschfeld (*Kleine Schriften*, 1913, p. 451), remarking that the place of interment is unknown, says that it is not to be looked for in the Field of Mars, where there were no private tombs. He admits, however, that it was intended that the burial should take place in the Field, where Caesar's daughter had been interred.

resist their onslaught when it came ; <sup>1</sup> but Augustus was 44 B. C.  
 shrewd enough to cover despotism with a decent veil.  
 He was more in sympathy with his countrymen than his  
 adoptive father, and he realized how much there may be  
 in a name. But it may be questioned whether in the time  
 of Caesar the Augustan policy was feasible. When  
 Augustus began his reconstructive work he had restored  
 peace to an exhausted world, which longed for orderly  
 settlement ; and he was not hampered by factious opposi-  
 tion, for he had had the Borgian wisdom, while he was  
 still a youth, to remove opponents by a proscription more  
 ruthless than that of Sulla. Caesar perhaps failed to  
 realize that his enemies were irreconcilable, and that, if  
 he were to work securely for the regeneration of the  
 State, he must terrorize them as he had terrorized the  
 irreconcilables of Gaul : at all events it was his clemency,  
 combined with undue trustfulness, that cut short his work  
 and brought him to his grave.

The funeral oration of Mark Antony had achieved its  
 aim, and Shakespeare has transmuted it into a possession  
 for all time ; but Gaius Matius left a tribute to the  
 memory of Caesar, which, although it is at present known  
 only to the few who are versed in Latin literature, may  
 eventually be recognized as of greater worth. Matius  
 had offended the assassins and their sympathizers by help-  
 ing to defray the cost of the games which Caesar had  
 instituted in connexion with the foundation of the temple  
 of Venus ; and Cicero had made remarks about this and  
 other matters which were repeated to Matius and wounded  
 him. Cicero composed an apology which did honour to  
 Matius if not to himself ; <sup>2</sup> and Matius, gladly accepting  
 his explanation, replied in a letter which seems to me the  
 noblest that has come from antiquity.<sup>3</sup>—‘ I know the  
 charges made against me since Caesar’s death. People  
 blame me for lamenting the death of a dear friend and

The tri-  
 bute of  
 Gaius  
 Matius to  
 the me-  
 mory of  
 Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> See Dr. Purser’s criticism (*Class. Rev.*, ix, 1895, p. 124) of Strachan-Davidson’s condemnation of Caesar’s autocracy (*Cicero*, 1894, pp. 350-1, 411, 425).

<sup>2</sup> *Fam.*, xi, 27.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 28, 2-5, 7-8.



44 B. C. expressing my indignation that the man whom I loved has perished : they say that country should be preferred to friendship, as though they had proved that his death has been good for the State. I will not enter any subtle plea. I confess that I have not attained that height of philosophy. I was not a partisan of Caesar in the political controversy (though, while I disapproved of what he was doing, I did not desert him) ; nor did I ever approve of a civil war or of the motive of the quarrel, which in fact I did my utmost to get nipped in the bud. So when my friend was victorious I was not caught by the charm of office or of money—prizes which others, though they had less influence with him than I, clutched at with unrestrained avidity. Indeed my own property was actually curtailed by Caesar's law,<sup>1</sup> thanks to which most of those who are now exulting in his death maintained their position in the country. That my vanquished countrymen should be spared was as much an object to me as my own safety. Can I, then, who desired that all should be left unharmed, help being indignant that the man by whom that boon was bestowed has perished ? Especially as the same men who caused his unpopularity also caused his death ? “ You shall smart then,” they say, “ for daring to condemn what we have done.” What unheard-of insolence ! One man may glory in a crime, another may not even lament it with impunity ! Why, even slaves have always been free to indulge their fears and joys and sorrows without any one's dictation ; but from what your champions of liberty keep saying they are trying to wrest this right from us by terrorism. But they will try in vain. No dread of danger shall ever turn me from gratitude or from humanity. . . . I will not do anything to give offence except that I do grieve at the hard fate of one who was to me the dearest of friends and withal the most illustrious of men. . . . Is not this the height of presumption, that, while Caesar never interfered to prevent my having friends of my own choice—even

<sup>1</sup> The law which Matius refers to was apparently the one that Caesar enacted in 47 B. C. (p. 234).

those whom he himself disliked—these men should now 44 B. C.  
captiously endeavour to prevent my bestowing affection  
on whom I choose? I have no fear, however, that the  
moderation of my life will hereafter prove an inadequate  
protection against slander, or that even those who  
dislike me for my steadfast loyalty to Caesar will not  
prefer friends of my stamp rather than of their own.'

Long before this letter was written, even before the  
corpse of the Dictator was cremated, Cicero's illusions had  
been swept away. Often as he exulted over Caesar's  
death, his exultation was alloyed by the thought that the  
assassins had done their work in vain. 'Do you remem-  
ber', he asked Atticus, 'that first day upon the Capitol  
my exclaiming that the praetors should summon the  
Senate to the Capitoline temple? God in heaven! what  
might not have been done then when all loyalists—even  
half-hearted loyalists—were rejoicing and the brigand  
crew dismayed. . . . Do you remember exclaiming that  
the cause was lost if he had a funeral? But he was  
actually cremated in the Forum, his eulogy pronounced  
in moving words, slaves and starvelings incited to set  
fire to our houses.'<sup>1</sup> As it became evident that Antony  
intended to be a second Caesar, Cicero's disenchantment  
deepened; again and again he lamented that Antony  
had not been removed along with Caesar. 'Our heroes',  
he said, 'or rather our gods . . . have a strong consolation,  
—the consciousness of a great and glorious deed: what  
consolation is there for us, who, though the tyrant is  
slain, are not free?'<sup>2</sup> 'What', he exclaimed again, 'will  
the change of masters have brought me except the delight  
with which I feasted my eyes upon the righteous doom of  
a tyrant?'<sup>3</sup> 'How I wish', he wrote to Trebonius,

Cicero's  
exulta-  
tion over  
Caesar's  
death:  
his illu-  
sions  
vanish.

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xiv, 10, 1. It may be worth while to point out that the well-known letter written by Cicero to Basilus (*Fam.*, vi, 15) was not, as Tyrrell thought (*The Correspondence of Cicero*, v, 1897, pp. xxvii, 219), a 'scream of triumph' uttered 'in the heat of the excitement which ensued immediately after the news of Caesar's assassination had become known': it had absolutely no connexion with the murder. This has been proved by Prof. E. T. Merrill (*Class. Philol.*, viii, 1913, pp. 48-56).

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, xiv, 11, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 14, 4.

44 B. C.

'you had invited me to that most glorious banquet on the Ides of March! We should have had no leavings!'<sup>1</sup> But even those who can believe that Cicero would have had the nerve to aim his dagger at Mark Antony will admit that he had no grasp of the political situation. He sneered at Octavian, who so easily outwitted him, as 'a mere boy';<sup>2</sup> and he forgot that even if Antony were removed, Octavian and all that Octavian stood for would remain.

The work  
of Caesar's  
adopted  
son.

In truth that 'great and glorious deed' was, as Goethe said, 'the most senseless deed that was ever done.'<sup>3</sup> The blood of Caesar was avenged by the blood of the conspirators;<sup>4</sup> and Cicero, who with an energy worthy of his consulship strove desperately to bring the Republic back to life, could not escape the fate that befell almost all the actors who played their parts in its decline. The work of Caesar was interrupted by renewed civil war until his adopted son gave peace to the wearied world and, reconciling, as Caesar had failed to do, republican forms and aristocratical self-love with his own supremacy, developed, in a more tolerant spirit and with sundry divergences in principle and detail, the idea of monarchy combined with municipal self-government, which had inspired the founder of the Roman Empire.

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, x, 28, 1. Cf. xii, 3, 1 and *Phil.*, ii, 14, 34

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, xvi, 11, 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Nachgelassene Werke*, xiii, 1833, p. 68.

<sup>4</sup> *Plut.*, *Caes.*, 69, 1; *Suet.*, 89.

## PART II

### THE BLOODLESS CONQUEST OF ITALY

**Antony's route from Ariminum to Arretium.**—Stoffel,<sup>1</sup> remarking that no roads lead directly from Rimini (Ariminum) to Arezzo (Arretium), but only mule-tracks, conjectures, somewhat doubtfully, that Antony marched by the shortest route,—that which the fish-mongers of Rimini used before the railway was made. This route skirts the right bank of the Marecchia (Ariminus) almost to its source before it crosses the Apennines. O. E. Schmidt,<sup>2</sup> however, does not believe that the cohorts which Antony commanded marched from Ariminum at all. He conjectures that on the 10th of January Caesar, as soon as he heard of the proceedings in the Senate which led to the flight of Antony and Cassius, sent five cohorts from Ravenna to seize Ariminum, and simultaneously ordered the other five of the same legion, which, he supposes, were in the valley of the Anemus, south of Faventia, to march to Arretium. When Caesar says that they received the order to march at Ariminum he distorts the truth. They must have received it before; for they reached Arretium on January 14, and therefore before January 11 they must have been at Faventia, whence they were probably pushed forward into the valley of the Anemus. Antony was sent after them from Ariminum and overtook them. This implies that they marched down the Cassian Way, a view which Schmidt tries to prove in a later chapter.<sup>3</sup> His reasons are, first, that no road led from Ariminum to Arretium; secondly, that, according to all the military officers whom he consulted, the route indicated by Stoffel would only have been adopted under extreme necessity; and, finally, that as Caesar misrepresented the truth about Ariminum in two other passages,<sup>4</sup> it is not unreasonable to assume that he did so here.

Schmidt may be right; but we must not accept a conjecture for which there is no historical evidence,<sup>5</sup> unless the reasons are irresistible. It is not certain that the cohorts reached Arretium on January 14, and Schmidt himself<sup>6</sup> twice affirms that the date was the 15th. The officers whom he consulted were perhaps ignorant

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 1887, p. 217.

<sup>2</sup> *D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, pp. 104-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 383-4.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, i, 10, 3; 11, 1. See p. 382.

<sup>5</sup> Except perhaps the unsupported statement of Orosius (vi, 15, 3) that when Caesar reached Ariminum he had only 5 cohorts.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 383, 403.



that the cohorts were most probably not hampered by wheeled transport. Colonel Veith<sup>1</sup> concludes from personal exploration that Caesar could easily have marched from Asculum to Corfinium along mountain tracks; and it is certain that Vibullius did so with fourteen cohorts<sup>2</sup>—a force nearly thrice as large as Antony's. There must have been a track of some sort from Ariminum to Arretium;<sup>3</sup> otherwise how could communication have been maintained between the towns?

**The proclamation of a state of war (*tumultus*) in Italy.**—Nissen<sup>4</sup> holds that the decree by which in 705 (50 B. C.) the Senate proclaimed a state of war in Italy<sup>5</sup> was passed about January 9. O. E. Schmidt<sup>6</sup> argues that it was later, because Cicero does not allude to it in his letter of the 12th;<sup>7</sup> the Senate did not know until the 13th that Caesar had crossed the Rubicon; and to pass the decree before would have been tantamount to a breach of the peace, which Caesar would have recorded in his *Commentaries*. Holzapfel<sup>8</sup> infers from Plutarch's narrative that the decree was passed on the day (January 17) on which Pompey left Rome. Groebe,<sup>9</sup> referring to a passage in Cicero's *Fifth Philippic*,<sup>10</sup> from which it would appear that the proclamation of a state of war in Italy was regularly succeeded by the levying of troops, argues that Dio was right in making the decree and the enactment that authorized Pompey to raise money and troops immediately follow the *senatus consultum ultimum* of January 7. It is clear, he insists, from Cicero's letter of the 12th that these measures had already been adopted: the statement of Plutarch avails nothing against Cicero; and Holzapfel is therefore wrong.

**The forces of Caesar at the outset of the Civil War.**—It is or used to be generally believed that at the beginning of the Civil War Caesar, having been obliged to restore the legion which Pompey had lent him in 53 B. C. and also the 15th<sup>11</sup>, had only nine legions, the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th; and this agrees with the testimony of Hirtius, who says that Caesar sent the 13th to garrison Cisalpine Gaul instead of the 15th. and that for the winter of 50–49 B. C. he quartered four legions in Belgium and four in the country of the Aedui.<sup>12</sup> Von Domaszewski,<sup>13</sup> however, maintains that this view overlooks the evidence of Cicero, who, writing to Atticus towards the end of 50, said, 'Now he has eleven legions' (*Nunc legiones XI*),<sup>14</sup> of Florus,<sup>15</sup> who contrasted Caesar's eleven

<sup>1</sup> *Klio*, xiii, 1913, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H. Nissen, *Ital. Landeskunde*, ii, 1902, p. 315.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. Zeitschr.*, xlv, 1881, pp. 54, 92, 96.

<sup>5</sup> Plut., *Pomp.*, 61, 3; *Caes.*, 33, 3; Dio, xli, 3, 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Briefwechsel*, &c., pp. 112–4.

<sup>7</sup> *Fam.*, xvi, 11.

<sup>8</sup> *Klio*, iv, 1904, pp. 329–31.

<sup>9</sup> W. Drumann's *Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 726. Cf. *Klio*, xiii, 1913, pp. 370–1.

<sup>10</sup> 11, 31.—*rem administrandam arbitror sine ulla mora et confestim gerendam conseo; tumultum decerni . . . delectum haberi*, &c.

<sup>11</sup> *B. G.*, vi, 1, 2–4; viii, 54, 3.

<sup>12</sup> *Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, p. 161.

<sup>13</sup> *Att.*, vii, 7, 6.

<sup>14</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 3–4.

<sup>15</sup> ii, 13, 5.

legions with Pompey's eighteen, and of Dio,<sup>1</sup> who said that Caesar readily obeyed the order to restore two legions because he intended to raise many more soldiers in their stead. If, as we learn from Plutarch,<sup>2</sup> Marcellus implied that Caesar had only ten, he did not really contradict Cicero: Cicero included in his eleven the legion called *Alaudae*—more correctly *Alaudae*—and numbered V., which Caesar had raised in Transalpine Gaul;<sup>3</sup> Marcellus ignored it because the Gauls of whom it was composed had not yet received the franchise.

<sup>1</sup> xl, 65, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Pomp.*, 58, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 24, 2. Th. Widmann (*Philol.*, I, 1891, p. 556), remarking that no text proves that *Alaudae* bore the number V. during the Civil War, argues that it is improbable that this legion, having first appeared without a number (Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 24, 2) should afterwards have been designated [by the writer of *Bell. Afr.*, I, 5, 28, 2, 47, 6, 60, 5, 84, 1, and by the writer of *Bell. Hisp.*, 28, 3, 30, 7] by the number V. without a name, and then (Cic., *Phil.*, I, 8, 20, &c.) only by its name. Accordingly he agrees with Mommsen (*Hermes*, xix, 1884, p. 14, n. 1) that in Caesar's life-time *Alaudae* had no number. Widmann failed to see that his argument tells equally against his own view that the 5th legion after the battle of Munda received the title of 'the legion of Mars' (*legio Martia*), for, as Mommsen (*op. cit.*) observed, the name of this legion also is never coupled with a number. Widmann (*op. cit.*, p. 557) identifies the 5th legion which served in Africa with the one bearing the same number which is mentioned repeatedly in *Bell. Alex.* (50, 3; 52, 1; 53, 5; 54, 2; 55, 1; 57, 3-5), and which, he insists, referring to *Bell. Alex.*, 53, 5, was raised not in Gaul but in Italy. The identity of the two, he argues, is proved by comparison of *Bell. Afr.*, 28, 2, where two Spanish tribunes of the 5th legion, called *Titii*, are mentioned, with *Bell. Alex.*, 57, 1, from which we learn that L. Titius [their father?] had served in 'the native legion' (*in legione vernacula*). The argument may seem plausible; but it is clear that a legion raised in Italy would not have been called a *legio vernacula*, and Widmann himself insists that the 5th was raised from Roman citizens.

In *Bell. Alex.*, 50, 3 we read that Cassius, who already had four legions (*B. C.*, II, 21, 3), raised a fifth, obviously in Spain. Therefore Widmann is wrong in concluding that when Hirtius says (*Bell. Alex.*, 53, 5) that this 'fifth legion [which in 54, 2, 55, 2, 57, 3-5 he designates by the number V.] had been recently formed there' (*quinta legio nuper erat ibi confecta*), he means by *ibi* 'in Italy'; and since, as Widmann says, relying upon Appian (III, 69, 283), the *legio Martia* was composed of Italians, it was certainly not the 5th which was raised in Spain. The theory that the 5th legion which served in Africa was the same as the 5th which Cassius raised in Spain is confronted with this difficulty: the latter was younger than the 30th (*Bell. Alex.*, 50, 3; 53, 5), whereas the former is called by the writer of *Bell. Afr.* (I, 5) a veteran legion in contradistinction to the five legions of recruits which accompanied it from Sicily, and of which the 30th was one. Another text, which has been neglected, seems conclusive. We learn from *Bell. Hisp.*, 7, 4 that among the legions which Gnaeus Pompeius commanded in the Spanish campaign (46-45 B. C.) were 'the two native legions (*duae vernaculae*) which had deserted from Trebonius'. One of them had been raised by Varro (*B. C.*, II, 20, 4. Cf. p. 76, *supra*); the other must have been the 5th, for the remaining three legions commanded by Cassius were the 2nd, 21st, and 30th (*Bell. Alex.*, 53, 4-5), none of which was 'native'. Therefore since Gnaeus and Caesar each had a legion numbered V., it follows that Caesar's was *Alaudae*. If it was not the 5th legion which served in Africa and Spain, we should be driven to suppose either that it took no part in the Civil War, which is incredible, or that its services were never mentioned. [Von Domaszewski (*op. cit.*, pp. 174-5) actually affirms that the writer of *Bell. Alex.* nowhere says that the 'fifth' legion which he first mentions in 50, 3 bore the number V., and adds that it could not have done so because V. (*Alaudae*) had been raised

It is certain that at the outset of the war Caesar had ten legions including *Alaudae*, which Hirtius as well as Marcellus ignored. But is the evidence of Cicero, Florus, and Dio enough to prove that he had eleven? Dio does not say that Caesar raised another legion before the war: he merely says that Caesar intended to raise many more soldiers in place of those whom he had restored, and we know that he did so at Ariminum soon after he had crossed the Rubicon.<sup>1</sup> Florus may only have meant that Caesar had eleven legions when he encountered Pompey in Macedonia; for von Domaszewski can only maintain that Florus was referring to the force which Caesar commanded at the outset of the war by appealing to Cicero. Cicero's statement therefore has to bear the whole weight of von Domaszewski's case. But the inaccuracy of Cicero is notorious; when he wrote the letter on which von Domaszewski relies he was returning to Rome from Cilicia; and he may have forgotten that Caesar had been obliged to give up two of the eleven legions which he commanded in 51 B. C. Considering that Caesar, if he had raised a new legion in the latter part of 50, would have been virtually threatening the Roman Government, it seems to me probable that Cicero made a slip, and that the legion numbered XVI., which von Domaszewski postulates, was not raised, at all events not organized as a legion, until after the war began.

Groebe,<sup>2</sup> who in the main follows von Domaszewski, differs from him on one important point. He argues that just as the 15th legion, which Caesar surrendered, was afterwards known in Pompey's army as the 3rd,<sup>3</sup> so the 6th legion which Caesar commanded in 51 B.C.<sup>4</sup> was identical with the 1st,<sup>5</sup> which Pompey lent to Caesar in 53 and which Caesar restored in 50. In *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>6</sup> I gave reasons for accepting Groebe's view. But one fact, which at the time escaped me, tells strongly against it. Caesar commanded a legion called the 6th at Dyrrachium,<sup>7</sup> in Alexandria<sup>8</sup> (and therefore also at Pharsalia),<sup>9</sup> in Asia Minor,<sup>9</sup> and in Spain.<sup>10</sup> Groebe<sup>11</sup> holds that Caesar raised this legion in Cisalpine Gaul after he had restored the other 6th to Pompey. But if he raised it in the latter part of 50 B. C., how could it have been called a veteran legion in 48,<sup>12</sup> and how does Groebe account for its having then undergone so many hardships

before the war! I conjecture that *Alaudae* was not numbered V. until after the 5th legion raised by Cassius had deserted from Trebonius. That conjecture removes an obvious difficulty. G. Veith (*D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, 1920, pp. 217-8), who rightly holds that Caesar had ten veteran legions in Greece, but does not believe that *Alaudae* was one of them, imagines that the one whose number is not stated was 'one of the youngest veteran legions', raised, he fancies, in 50 B. C. Rather infantine veterans?]

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 11, 4.

<sup>2</sup> W. Drumann, *Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, pp. 706-7.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *B. G.*, viii, 54, 3 with *B. C.*, iii, 88, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, viii, 4, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 54, 2.

<sup>6</sup> Second ed., pp. 802-4.

<sup>7</sup> Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 68, 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 33, 3, compared with *B. C.*, iii, 102, 1; 106, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 69, 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 12, 5.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 710-1.

<sup>12</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 69, 1.



and served in so many campaigns that it numbered less than 1,000 men ?<sup>1</sup>

**The Pompeian forces in Italy at the outset of the Civil War.**—It will be worth while to enumerate the forces which Pompey and Domitius commanded in Italy before the former sailed for Greece. In 51 B. C. Pompey had troops at Ariminum,<sup>2</sup> but we do not know how many. In the following year he took over the two legions which Caesar had given up in obedience to the Senate.<sup>3</sup> While Caesar was overrunning Italy Pompey and Domitius lost by desertion and surrender 42 cohorts, an uncertain number of legionaries (the greater part of 10 cohorts), who deserted Lentulus Spinther, and an uncertain number of cohorts indicated as 'some' (*non nullae*) and 'others' (*aliae*).<sup>4</sup> Pompey, while he was marching from Luceria to Brundisium or after he arrived, was reinforced by new levies, the number of which is not known, and also by about 800 slaves, whom he organized as cavalry.<sup>5</sup> When Caesar reached Brundisium he found that the greater part of Pompey's army had already sailed to Dyrrachium, and that Pompey, who remained behind, had 20 cohorts.<sup>6</sup> According to Plutarch,<sup>7</sup> the division which had gone to Dyrrachium consisted of 30 cohorts; and this statement is confirmed by Caesar,<sup>8</sup> who says that Pompey transported 5 legions in all from Italy to Greece.

Caesar<sup>9</sup> says that Pompey lost 130 cohorts of Roman citizens in Italy and Spain; and we know that in Spain 6 Roman legions, or 60 cohorts, besides a native legion (*vernacula*), which doubtless received the franchise, surrendered to Caesar.<sup>10</sup> By our analysis 112 cohorts, besides the doubtful number, are accounted for as lost. Probably '130' is a round number: if it is exact, the un-

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, Caesar never mentions the 6th legion in connexion with the Gallic War; but neither does he notice the part which the 7th played in the Civil War. H. Delbrück (*Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, i<sup>2</sup>, 1908, pp. 546-7, n. 1) holds that the 6th, like *Alaudae*, originated in the 22 Gallic cohorts raised in 52 (*B. G.*, vii, 65, 1); for Caesar employed it in that year (*ib.*, viii, 4, 3).

<sup>2</sup> *Cic.*, *Fam.*, viii, 4, 4.      <sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, viii, 54, 3; *B. C.*, i, 9, 4. See vol. ii, p. 247.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, i, 12, 1-3; 13, 1-4; 15, 3-4; *Cic. Att.*, viii, 12 A, 1; *B. C.*, i, 18, 1-4; 23, 5; 24, 3-4. See p. 29.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 24, 2. Cf. iii, 4, 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, i, 25, 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Pomp.*, 62, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 4, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, 10, 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, i, 84-7; ii, 20, 4, 7-8; 21, 3. The view which Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1889, pp. 382-3 [Eng. tr., v, 1908, p. 205]) made popular, namely, that when Pompey said that he had 10 legions ready for service (*B. C.*, i, 6, 2) he did not include the Spanish legions, is untenable unless Pompey hoodwinked the Senate. Mommsen held that, besides the two legions which Caesar had surrendered, Pompey had three remaining from the levies of 55 B. C. (which he had sent to Spain!) as well as the levies raised in 52, all of which, he says, 'could be recalled from their furlough, so that he had at his disposal altogether ten legions', &c. He insists that his view is confirmed by the fact that Pompey lost in Italy about 60 cohorts and took 25,000 men to Greece; but if he had taken the trouble to analyse the records of Pompey's losses, he would have recognized the futility of his calculation. Of the cohorts which Pompey lost in Italy a large proportion, as I have shown, were new levies; what Mommsen failed to notice was that Pompey told the Senate that he had 10 legions 'ready for action' (*paratus*). When he said this his new levies were only beginning, and, except the two legions surrendered by Caesar, the untrustworthiness of



certain number of cohorts (*non nullae cohortes . . . aliae*)<sup>1</sup> plus the uncertain number of legionaries must have amounted to 18 cohorts.<sup>2</sup>

**When were Roscius and L. Caesar sent to Ariminum?**—I have stated in my narrative<sup>3</sup> that Pompey sent Roscius and Lucius Caesar to Ariminum after he heard that Caesar had crossed the Rubicon. Stoffel<sup>4</sup> thinks that they started before; for, he remarks, Caesar describes the mission as purely personal, which would be inexplicable if Pompey had already been aware that the invasion of Italy had begun. Accepting the testimony of Dio,<sup>5</sup> he supposes that Pompey, when he asked Caesar not to take offence at the measures which he had adopted in the public interest (*ea quae rei publicae causa egerit*),<sup>6</sup> was referring to the measures which were sanctioned by the Senate on the days that followed the session of January 7.<sup>7</sup> Pompey, so Stoffel thinks, was afraid that when Caesar heard of these measures he would invade Italy, and, not being ready for war, attempted to negotiate, merely in order to gain time. But Dio himself says that Pompey dispatched his messengers after he heard that Caesar had advanced to Ariminum! Besides, the measures in question were adopted on January 8 and 9, and, according to Stoffel, Roscius and Lucius Caesar did not leave Rome until January 13. Why should Pompey have waited four days, thereby virtually inviting Caesar to begin the invasion, before attempting to conciliate him? And why should he not have sent an unofficial message to Caesar, even if he had been aware that the invasion had begun? The message was unofficial in the sense that it was apparently not sent with the sanction of the Senate and the consuls; but it was not 'purely personal', for its avowed object was to deprecate invasion.<sup>8</sup> Stoffel thinks that Lucius Caesar reached Ariminum on January 17, and left it on January 19. We know that he met Pompey at Teanum on January 23.<sup>9</sup> Stoffel allows 4 or 5 days for the journey from Rome to Ariminum, though Curio travelled from Rome to Ravenna—33 miles farther—in 3 days, and though Roscius and his colleague had a strong motive for making haste. If they started on the morning of January 15, they could have reached Ariminum by the evening of January 17. Assume, however, that they started on the evening of January 14. Caesar began the invasion not later than January 11.<sup>10</sup> Bad news notoriously travels fast, and it is reasonable to suppose that Pompey heard of this movement by January 14. Probability is all

which Mommsen himself emphasizes, we may doubt whether he had one cohort which would have been a match for Caesar's veterans (see his own remark in *Att.*, viii, 12 D, 2). If he intended to convey that he had 10 legions in Italy ready to fight, we can only conclude that, like certain highly placed officials in the war which is now devastating Europe, he deemed it expedient to encourage his hearers by suppressing the truth. [Written in October, 1915.]

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 24, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar incorrectly reckoned Domitius's force as 33 cohorts instead of 31. See pp. 368–71.

<sup>3</sup> p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 214–5.

<sup>5</sup> xli, 5, 1–2.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, i, 8, 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 5, 3–4; 8, 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>9</sup> *Cic., Att.*, vii, 14, 1.

<sup>10</sup> See p. 377.

that we can attain, but the balance is surely in favour of the view that Pompey sent his deprecatory message because he learned that the invasion had begun.<sup>1</sup>

[Since Stoffel wrote Ludwig Holzapfel has propounded a novel theory of the mission. He observes<sup>2</sup> that, according to Dio, Lucius Caesar and Roscius went *twice* to Caesar before the Senate left Rome, and then proceeds to inquire whether Dio's narrative is trustworthy. Before we follow him let us see exactly what Dio says.

After relating that Caesar advanced from Ravenna to Ariminum, and thence marched towards Rome (!), occupying all the towns on his way, and that Pompey, alarmed by the report of these movements, heard from Labienus with increased anxiety what Caesar intended,<sup>3</sup> Dio goes on to say that Pompey, not having yet assembled an army and noticing that his adherents in Rome were panic-stricken, sent Lucius Caesar and Roscius to Caesar in the hope of making peace on reasonable terms. Caesar in reply repeated the ultimatum embodied in his former dispatch and added that he should be glad to have an interview with Pompey.<sup>4</sup> This was unacceptable to the majority [of the Senate?], who feared that Caesar and Pompey would come to some agreement injurious to their interests; but as the envoys protested that nobody should be injured and, further, promised that the armies [of both Pompey and Caesar] should be forthwith disbanded, they were sent back to Caesar, and directed to insist that both generals should simultaneously lay down their arms.<sup>5</sup> Pompey took alarm at this, feeling sure that if the dispute between himself and Caesar were to be referred to the people, he would get the worst of it. Accordingly before the envoys could return he left Rome for Campania, bidding the Senate and the officers of state to follow. On learning that Caesar had not made a conciliatory reply to the envoys, but had denounced the false statements that were being made about him, they [apparently the senators and officers of state] became alarmed and quitted Rome.<sup>6</sup>

I infer from this narrative that Dio described with variations and obvious chronological mistakes precisely the same incidents as Caesar, namely, the dispatch of Lucius Caesar and Roscius, their return, and their second journey; and my inference is confirmed by

<sup>1</sup> More than a year after writing this article I find that I am substantially in agreement with O. E. Schmidt, who holds (*Briefwechsel*, &c., p. 381, n. 2) that L. Caesar and Roscius started on January 15. In the passage just cited Schmidt corrects the date which he proposed in pp. 123-4, n. 1. In that note he argued that the interview between Caesar and Roscius did not take place, as Caesar says, at Ariminum, but at Fanum, because, according to Cicero (*Att.*, vii, 14, 1), he had already occupied more than one Italian town. But he may himself have remained at Ariminum.

<sup>2</sup> *Klio*, iii, 1903, p. 222.

<sup>3</sup> xli, 4, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Holzapfel truly remarks (*op. cit.*, p. 233) that the request for an interview is attested by Caesar himself (*B. C.*, i, 9, 6) as well as by Dio. It would appear then that Holzapfel agrees with me in identifying the first mission described by Dio with the first described by Caesar.

<sup>5</sup> Dio, xli, 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 6.

the fact that Dio omits to mention that the envoys came to Teanum and returned thence to Caesar. For it is evident that if he made no mistake—if the envoys really returned to Rome before Pompey started for Campania, that is on or before January 17—he ought to have added that they returned again from Caesar to Teanum, and thence made a third journey to Caesar. Let us, however, hear what Holzapfel has to say.

Holzapfel begins by asserting that the object of the first mission of Lucius Caesar and his colleague was to inform Caesar officially of the Senatorial decree of January 8 [?]<sup>1</sup>—that he must resign his province by the 1st of July [!]<sup>1</sup> or else be declared a public enemy. Therefore, he continues, the envoys must have left Rome on January 8 or, at the latest, on January 9. On the 11th or the 12th they would have reached Ariminum; on the 14th or the 15th they would have been back in Rome. Starting again immediately with fresh instructions, they could have reached Ariminum by the 18th, returned again to Rome by the 21st, and moved on to Minturnae, where Cicero met them<sup>2</sup> on the morning of the 23rd. Parenthetically I may remark that Holzapfel evidently thinks that Lucius Caesar and Roscius were proof against fatigue. Fifteen days' continuous travelling, at the utmost speed of which we have any record, is a phenomenon which does not seem to him to call for any comment. He notices that Dio makes the envoys start on their first journey after Labienus joined Pompey, although Labienus did not join Pompey in Rome at all, but on the 22nd of January in Teanum;<sup>3</sup> but he denies that this blunder affects the credibility of Dio's account. Dio went astray because he passed from one authority to another; we know that he did this because he first says that Caesar marched from Ariminum towards Rome and afterwards, when better informed, corrects this mistake.<sup>4</sup> Again, considering the excellence of the authority which Dio used in this part of his work, we must not attach excessive weight to another error: he believes<sup>5</sup> that the news of the unfavourable answer which the envoys received from Caesar reached Rome before the Pompeians left it; but such a trifle cannot impair his credit.<sup>6</sup> One objection, however, Holzapfel admits, does look serious. Dio says that when the envoys presented themselves before Caesar for the second time, they met with no friendly reception: in fact [!] negotiations were continued on the basis of Caesar's answer. One might, then, be inclined to suppose that Dio mistakenly referred the ill success of the last mission, which he entirely overlooked, to the second. Close inspection, however, leads to a different conclusion. In a letter<sup>7</sup> written from Minturnae on the 22nd [really 23rd] of January Cicero laments that the time for negotiation is past. How could he say this at a time when the return of the envoys was still awaited? Evidently because unfavourable rumours about the

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 2, 6. The decree was passed on January 2, and Caesar was to resign by the 1st of March. See vol. ii, pp. 266, 306, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Att.*, vii, 13 B, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Att.*, vii, 13 B, 3 with 11, 1 and 12, 5.

<sup>4</sup> xli, 10, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Klio*, 1903, p. 224.

<sup>7</sup> *Att.*, vii, 13 A, 2.

result of the negotiations were already afloat. The first impression, indeed, which the announcement of the conditions formulated by Caesar left on men's minds was by no means satisfactory;<sup>1</sup> and even when opinion changed Cicero<sup>2</sup> gave expression to the indignation with which they had been received.<sup>3</sup>

Now Dio, whoever his authorities may have been, made gross blunders; and it is not easy to believe that they were due to his having turned, again and again in the course of three paragraphs, from his 'excellent' authority to a bad one. Having had long experience of the way in which he misused Caesar, I suspect that they were chargeable to his own ingrained carelessness. Holzapfel has not the slightest warrant for saying that after the envoys presented themselves before Caesar for the second time negotiations were continued. Dio made a mess of his description of the first two missions; he was silent about the 'third' for the sufficient reason that it never occurred.]

**O. E. Schmidt discovers a mare's nest.**—Schmidt,<sup>4</sup> referring to two of Cicero's letters<sup>5</sup> and to Caesar's narrative,<sup>6</sup> argues that while Lucius Caesar and Roscius were travelling to and fro between Caesar's camp and Pompey's quarters, Caesar's left was threatened by the Pompeians from Picenum, and that he was compelled by this demonstration to abandon the line Arretium-Igouvium and to concentrate all his forces on the northern frontier of Picenum. Any one who reads the texts which Schmidt cites will see that he exaggerates the activity of the Pompeians, that when Caesar withdrew his detachments from Arretium and Igouvium the occupation of those posts had served its purpose, and that the concentration which appears to Schmidt to have been motivated by fear was effected in preparation for a continual advance.<sup>7</sup>

**Why Pompey abandoned Rome.**—Holzapfel<sup>8</sup> says that Plutarch<sup>9</sup> and Appian<sup>10</sup> agree in ascribing the flight of the Pompeians from Rome to the panic, caused by Caesar's advance from Ariminum, which prevented Pompey from doing what he thought right. Thus, says Holzapfel, the consuls constrained Pompey, against his own judgement, to abandon Rome.

What Appian really says is that when the news of Caesar's advance reached Rome, the consuls would not suffer Pompey to act on his own judgement, but urged him to move out into Italy and raise an army. Pompey, he adds,<sup>11</sup> replied that there would be troops enough if the consuls would follow him, abandon Rome, and, if necessary, abandon Italy also ("Εξέτε [τὰ στρατόπεδα], εἶπεν, ἂν ἐπακολουθήτέ μοι, καὶ μὴ δεινὸν ἡγήσθε τὴν Ῥώμην ἀπολιπεῖν, καὶ εἰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐπὶ τῇ Ῥώμῃ

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 13 B, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 15, 2; 17, 2; viii, 3, 3; *Fam.*, xvi, 12, 4. <sup>3</sup> *Klio*, 1903, pp. 224-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Briefwechsel*, &c., pp. 122, 125.

<sup>5</sup> *Att.*, vii, 16, 2; 18, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, i, 12, 3.

<sup>7</sup> I find that what I have written is supported by G. Veith (*Klio*, xiii, 1913, p. 2, n. 1).

<sup>8</sup> *Klio*, iv, 1904, p. 345.

<sup>9</sup> *Pomp.*, 60, 3-4; 61; *Caes.*, 33, 3.

<sup>10</sup> ii, 36, 142.

<sup>11</sup> 37, 146. See also §§ 147-8.



δεήσειεν). Plutarch also says that Pompey was not suffered to act on his own judgement, but adds that he ordered all the senators to follow him and left Rome (κελεύσας ἅπαντας ἔπεισθαι τοὺς ἀπὸ βουλῆς . . . ἀπέλιπε τὴν πόλιν). What Plutarch and Appian meant by saying that the consuls did not suffer Pompey to act on his own judgement, though they added that the consuls quitted Rome in obedience to his order, is not clear. Dio,<sup>1</sup> who also relates that Pompey ordered all the senators to follow him, and adds that he threatened to treat any who remained behind as enemies—a statement which Caesar<sup>2</sup> and Cicero<sup>3</sup> confirm—says that he left because he feared that if the dispute between him and Caesar were referred to the people their decision would be unfavourable to him, and because he thought that he could conduct the war better in Campania. The truth is, as I have shown elsewhere,<sup>4</sup> that Pompey had long since determined to abandon Rome, which, as he knew, was untenable.

**Caesar's route from Castrum Truentinum to Corfinium.**—Caesar says that after leaving Auximum he overran Picenum and, on being overtaken by the 12th legion, set out for Asculum, about 19 miles (30 kilometres) west by south of Castrum Truentinum. Lentulus Spinther, who held Asculum with 10 cohorts, hearing of his approach, fled, and was immediately deserted by the bulk of his troops.<sup>5</sup> In the next paragraph Caesar states that after receiving the submission of Firmum (25 miles NNW. of Castrum Truentinum) and after the 'expulsion' of Lentulus, he remained 'there' (*ibi*) one day to collect supplies, and then pushed on for Corfinium. His advanced guard engaged some troops which Domitius had sent from Corfinium to destroy the bridge that spanned the river about 3 miles from the town, and drove them off. Caesar then crossed the bridge and encamped close to Corfinium.<sup>6</sup>

It is certain that Caesar marched direct from Firmum to Castrum Truentinum<sup>7</sup> and he does not say that he reached Asculum. Stoffel,<sup>8</sup> however, assumes that he did, and accordingly, interpreting *ibi* as meaning 'at Asculum', maintains that Caesar marched thence by the shortest route to Corfinium. Meusel says,<sup>9</sup> 'Caesar was undoubtedly in Asculum, as his march to Corfinium proves: he struck the left bank of the Aternus; therefore he came from the north, that is, from Asculum. Besides, Asculum was the largest and strongest town in the whole of Picenum,<sup>10</sup> and it is in the highest degree probable that Caesar intended to occupy and secure this important stronghold in person. That he did not mention the reception which he met with . . . is doubtless due to the fact that in this town, whose sympathies were Pompeian, he was rather coldly received.' These arguments are

<sup>1</sup> xli, 6, 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 33, 2. Caesar (14, 1-3) was misinformed as to the date of Pompey's departure.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, ix, 10, 2; xi, 6, 6.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 6, with which cf. *Att.*, vii, 8, 5; 9, 2-3; viii, 11, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 15, 1-3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 16.

*Cic.*, *Att.*, viii, 12 B, 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 218.

<sup>9</sup> In a note on *B. C.*, i, 15, 3.

<sup>10</sup> Strabo, v, 4, 2.

inconclusive. If Caesar had marched along the coast from Castrum Truentinum to the mouth of the Aternus, and had then moved up its left bank, or if he had diverged from the coast near Adria and advanced thence by way of Pinna, he would have come to the bridge near Corfinium. After Lentulus abandoned Asculum, what further motive had Caesar for going there? If he still considered it essential to occupy the town, and had found its inhabitants ill disposed, he must either leave a garrison to hold it, which he certainly did not do, or depart without having achieved his aim. Moreover, Stoffel's explanation of *ibi* is inadmissible. Between the only passage in which Caesar mentions Asculum and the word *ibi* six sentences intervene, in which the flight of Lentulus Spinther, the movements of Vibullius Rufus, and the defensive measures of Domitius are described. Then, beginning a new paragraph, Caesar writes, 'After the occupation of Firmum and the expulsion of Lentulus Caesar ordered that the soldiers who had deserted him should be searched for and that a levy should be held; he himself remained one day in the neighbourhood to collect supplies, and then pushed on for Corfinium' (*Recepto Firmo expulsoque Lentulo Caesar conquiri milites qui ab eo discesserant dilectumque institui iubet; ipse unum diem ibi rei frumentariae causa moratus Corfinium contendit*). Who can seriously maintain that *ibi* refers to Asculum?

Let us see whether the dispatches of Pompey illuminate the question.

On the 11th or 12th of February Pompey, who was at Luceria, 130 miles ESE. of Corfinium, wrote to Domitius, 'as you had determined (according to Vibullius's letter to me of the 9th) to leave Corfinium and join me, I cannot imagine why you have changed your mind. The reason given by Vibullius—that you delayed because you heard that Caesar had moved on from Firmum and reached Castrum Truentinum—is wholly inadequate'.<sup>1</sup>

On the 16th Pompey received a dispatch from Domitius, which he immediately answered:—'You say that you intend to watch Caesar and, if he marches along the coast against me, to come with all speed into Samnium and join me; but that if he stops near the towns in your neighbourhood, you purpose to resist, in case of his approaching you. . . . After I had written this letter Sicca brought me a dispatch from you and a verbal message. You urge me to join you: that in my view is impossible,'<sup>2</sup> &c. On the following day Pompey wrote again, 'February 17. Your letter to hand, in which you say that Caesar has encamped close to Corfinium.'<sup>3</sup>

Caesar arrived at Corfinium on the 15th of February.<sup>4</sup> The shortest distance from Castrum Truentinum by way of Asculum to Corfinium is 195 kilometres, or 121 miles. According to Stoffel, Caesar halted one day at Asculum. If, as Stoffel supposes, he marched

Cic., *Att.*, viii, 12 B, 1.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 12 D, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 12 C, 1. 4.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 378.

at the rapid rate of 28 kilometres a day in a hard winter<sup>1</sup> over hilly tracks, he must have started from Castrum Truentinum, at the latest, on the morning of February 8. The first letter which Pompey received from Domitius on February 16 would have required not less than two days for transmission, and was therefore most probably written on February 14.<sup>2</sup> If, then, Caesar had left Castrum Truentinum for Asculum on the 8th, Domitius, when he wrote the letter, could not have received any report since that day that Caesar had been seen on the coastal road. This would have accounted for his remaining at Corfinium instead of marching to join Pompey; but it would be strange, if not inexplicable, that he should have thought it possible that Caesar might march by the coastal road against Pompey. If, on the other hand, when Domitius wrote, he had learned from scouts that Caesar was still marching down the coast, the letter is intelligible; for Domitius did not yet know whether Caesar would cross the Aternus and move on against Pompey, or diverge towards Corfinium. Moreover, a few hours after he dispatched this letter he wrote another, begging Pompey to come to his assistance, which shows that he then knew that Caesar was marching against Corfinium. It is true that scouts sent up the road towards Asculum might have brought this information; but Domitius may also have inferred the fact from a report made by the scouts who had watched the coastal road. It therefore seems more than probable that Caesar marched from Castrum Truentinum to the mouth of the Aternus, or some point north of it, and thence struck inland.<sup>3</sup>

P. Groebe,<sup>4</sup> however, followed by Veith,<sup>5</sup> has brought an objection against this view. He argues, first, that Domitius was surprised by Caesar, although he had watched the coastal road, and, secondly,

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, viii, 15, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the argument of Miss Peaks in *Class. Rev.*, xviii, 1904, p. 348. She supposes that the first letter which Pompey received from Domitius on February 16 was written on the 13th; but the messenger could have conveyed the letter in two days (see p. 376), and, as speed was essential, probably did so. Besides, if he started on February 14, he was travelling on three days. Miss Peaks also supposes that the letter in which Domitius announced that Caesar had encamped close to Corfinium, and which Pompey received on the 17th was written on the 14th. Here she is certainly wrong. Caesar says (*B. C.*, i, 23, 5) that he spent seven days at Corfinium; and he left it on the afternoon of the 21st. See p. 378.

<sup>3</sup> O. E. Schmidt (*op. cit.*, pp. 128-9, 385-9), who agrees with me that Caesar did not go to Asculum, holds that he marched from Aternum *via* Teate and Interpromium (that is along the line of the later Via Claudia Valeria) to Corfinium. This is of course impossible; for if Caesar had marched along the southern bank of the Aternus, he would not have had to cross a bridge.

<sup>4</sup> W. Drumann, *Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, pp. 728-31.

<sup>5</sup> *Klio*, xiii, 1913, pp. 6-7. Cf. p. 9, where Veith argues that the remark of Caelius (Cic., *Fam.*, viii, 15, 1) that Caesar's troops had traversed 'the most inclement and frozen districts' (*durissimis et frigidissimis locis*) supports Stoffel's view that Caesar marched over the mountains. If Caelius was thinking of mountains, he may well have referred to Antony's march from Ariminum to Arretium or to the country between the coast and Corfinium.

that from the coast to Corfinium, even before the construction of the Via Claudia Valeria, the road followed the southern bank of the Aternus, there being no practicable route along the northern bank, at all events between Torre dei Passeri and Popoli, where the bridge by which Caesar crossed spanned the river.<sup>1</sup> The former argument has already been implicitly answered, and, I may add, there is no evidence that Domitius was surprised; on the contrary, so soon as it became evident from the reports of his scouts that Caesar was marching against Corfinium, he wrote the second letter and sent the verbal message to which Pompey alluded in his postscript. The other argument may be met by supposing either that Caesar diverged from the coastal road at some point north of the Aternus or that he turned the impracticable section of the northern bank between Torre dei Passeri and Popoli.<sup>2</sup> As H. Nissen<sup>3</sup> observes, Strabo<sup>4</sup> only knew of one bridge which spanned the Aternus 3 miles from Corfinium; and, he remarks, the existence of this bridge proves that the old Via Valeria must have lain along the left bank as far as Interpromium. This I doubt: it only proves that a road from the north or the north-east led to the northern end of the bridge.<sup>5</sup> I am rather inclined therefore to believe that Caesar diverged from the coastal road at a point about 15 miles south of Castrum Truentinum and struck inland by the road that led thence through Adria to Pinna, from which important town a road doubtless led to the bridge near Corfinium. If, however, he hugged the coast as far as possible in order to deceive Domitius, he probably moved up the northern bank of the Aternus.<sup>6</sup>

In conclusion I would ask Groebe to answer this question. If Caesar went to Asculum, why did he go to Castrum Truentinum, far out of his way, instead of taking the direct road through Firmum?

**How Cicero discharged his duty as president of the Campanian coast.**—O. E. Schmidt<sup>7</sup> has attempted to defend Cicero against the charge of having shirked the duty of supervising the Campanian coast. His argument may be summarized thus:—When Cicero wrote to Atticus on January 19, 705 (50 B. C.), ‘Pompey wishes me to be a kind of “president” of the whole of this Campanian sea-coast,’ (*Vult enim me Pompeius esse quem tota haec Campana et maritima ora habeat ἐπίσκοπον*<sup>8</sup>), he could not have meant Campania, properly so

<sup>1</sup> *Papers Brit. School at Rome*, ix, 1920, p. 106, where Mr. Robert Gardner implicitly withdraws an untenable opinion which he expressed in *Journ. Rom. Studies*, iii, 1913, pp. 231–2.

<sup>2</sup> See the Italian Staff Map (*Istituto geogr. mil.*), 500000, F<sup>o</sup> 146.1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ital. Landeskunde*, ii, 1902, p. 439. Cf. p. 447. <sup>4</sup> v, 4, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Mr. Gardner (*Papers Brit. School at Rome*, ix, 93, n. 5), questioning Nissen's view, remarks that ‘the Via Valeria, in republican times, did not go beyond Corfinium’, &c.

<sup>6</sup> If Caesar diverged from the coast near Adria, Domitius ought to have been informed of the movement before he wrote his first letter to Pompey; but the service of his scouts may have been intermittent.

<sup>7</sup> *Briefwechsel*, &c., pp. 116–22.

<sup>8</sup> *Att.*, vii, 11, 5. Schmidt reads *Campania*, an emendation.



called, for how could he have reached Campania on the 19th when he had left Rome only two days before? One of his letters<sup>1</sup> proves that he did not arrive in Campania till the 24th; therefore *Campania* (sic) must mean 'the Roman Campagna'. The defence of Capua (*Capuam tueri*<sup>2</sup>)—the duty with which he was entrusted on or before January 12—had nothing to do with *haec Campania*. When he wrote on the 25th that he was in charge of the Latin coast (*ora maritima . . . cui ego praesum*<sup>3</sup>), he said nothing about Capua. On February 15 he told Pompey that he was still in his sphere of duty, the Latin coast (*Nos adhuc in ea ora ubi praepositi sumus*<sup>4</sup>), and that, if Pompey thought that it was defensible, he would remain (*si teneri posse putas Tarracinam et oram maritimam, in ea manebo*). His transference from Capua to the Latin coast was not due to any evasion, but was made because he openly refused to remain responsible for Capua. On February 27 he wrote to Pompey, 'I resigned [?] the charge of Capua . . . not to escape a burden, but because I saw that that city could not be held without an army' (*a me Capuam reiciebam; quod feci non vitandi oneris causa, sed quod videbam teneri illam urbem sine exercitu non posse*<sup>5</sup>). From this passage, combined with what he wrote to Pompey on February 15—'If everything is to be concentrated in one spot, I feel no hesitation about joining you at once' (*Sin omnia in unum locum contrahenda sunt, non dubito quin ad te statim veniam*<sup>6</sup>)—one must conclude that he had resigned the charge of Capua on January 17, when, in consequence of the loss of Ancona and Arretium, Pompey deemed Rome untenable. If after that date he had retained his command of Capua, an arsenal of Pompey, his action would have been tantamount to abandoning his rôle of mediator and joining Pompey's side.

Let us reserve judgement until we have considered certain passages in Cicero's correspondence which Schmidt keeps in the background. It is not true that when Cicero wrote the letter of January 25 he said nothing about Capua. In the second section of that letter he wrote, 'Pompey has desired me to come to Capua and assist the levy' (*Me Pompeius Capuam venire voluit et adiuvare delectum*). Again in his letter of February 15 he said to Pompey, 'I . . . went to Capua on the same day as you left Teanum [January 23]<sup>7</sup> . . . for you had expressed the wish that I . . . should superintend operations there' (*Ego . . . Capuam veni eo ipso die quo tu Teano Sidicino es profectus. Volueras enim me . . . illa negotia tueri*<sup>8</sup>). It is clear, then, that Cicero had not resigned the charge of Capua before January 25, even though his retention of it after the 17th may have been tantamount to abandoning his rôle of mediator; and if it was, why did he accept it? Another passage proves that he did not resign, if he *resigned* at all, until February 15. Immediately before the sentence which Schmidt quotes from the letter of that date and after the passage

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, vii, 14, 1.<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, viii, 11 B, 1.<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, vii, 13 B, 3.<sup>2</sup> *Fam.*, xvi, 11, 3.<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 11 D, 5.<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, viii, 11 B, 2. Cf. vii, 14, 2.<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, vii, 14, 3.<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 11 B, 3.

which I have just cited will be found these words: 'I visited Capua a second time, in accordance with an order of the consuls, on the 5th of February. After staying there three days I returned to Formiae. . . . If you think that this coast ought to be held . . . there must be some one to command in it' (*Iterum, ut erat edictum a consulibus, veni Capuam ad Nonas Februar. Cum fuisset triduum, recepi me Formias . . . Si tuendam hanc oram putas . . . opus est esse qui praesit*). Then follow the words quoted by Schmidt, 'But if everything is to be concentrated in one spot, I feel no hesitation about joining you at once'. Is it not clear that 'this coast' (*hanc oram*) included Campania and that *haec Campania* means, not or not only, the Roman Campagna, but Campania? When we remember, further, that Cicero told Trebatius, intending that Trebatius should repeat the remark to Caesar, that he 'had not undertaken any levy or accepted any commission' (*neque delectum ullum neque negotium suscepisse*<sup>1</sup>), which, if he told the truth, meant that he was deceiving Pompey and deliberately neglecting the duty which he had promised to fulfil, it must be admitted that the scorn which Drumann<sup>2</sup> expressed for his conduct was not unfounded.

[Since I wrote the foregoing paragraphs I have read an excellent article by Mr. J. D. Duff (*Journal of Philology*, xxxiii, 1914, pages 154-160), who (page 155) does 'not believe that there was any definite resignation of the charge of Capua' and, commenting on the words *a me Capuam reiciebam* in Cicero's letter of February 27, says (page 160), 'I believe that this means "when I wished to refuse charge of Capua"'. Considering the letter, quoted above, which proves that before January 25, at all events, Cicero had not resigned or that his resignation had not been accepted, I cannot see how Mr. Duff's interpretation, which is supported by the imperfect tense (*reiciebam*), can be set aside. Dr. Purser,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 17, 4. Schmidt (*Neue Jahrb. f. Philol.*, &c., cxliii, 1891, p. 126) tries to convince us that there was nothing discreditable in this letter: 'at that time' [Feb. 4-11], he says, 'the preparations in Capua had come to a standstill, while on the Latin coast there was never any question of serious preparation' (*Att.*, vii, 23, 3). Therefore Cicero was justified in writing as he did to Trebatius. Not to mention that *Att.*, vii, 23 was written on Feb. 10 and that Cicero wrote to Trebatius on or just before Feb. 2, whose fault was it if nothing was done in Capua or on the coast? Besides, on February 15 Cicero, writing to Pompey from Formiae, says (*Att.*, viii, 11 B, 2-3), 'On arriving there [Capua, on Jan. 25], I saw that Titus Ampius was holding a levy with the greatest energy' (*Cum eo venissem, vidi T. Ampium dilectum habere diligentissime*), and he adds that 'this coast . . . has many advantages and is an important district and . . . can, I think be held' (*hanc oram . . . et opportunitatem et dignitatem habet et . . . ut arbitrator, teneri potest*). As Mr. J. D. Duff says (*Journ. of Philol.*, xxxiii, 1914, p. 156), Cicero 'gives no hint to Pompey of any slackness on his own part or of anything amiss in the preparations'. Even Tyrrell admits that the words *neque negotium suscepisse* are not true, and since Cicero himself avowed that he had undertaken the charge of Capua and added on Jan. 25 that Pompey had desired him 'to come to Capua and assist the levy', it is evident that when he told Trebatius that he had remained inactive he either lied or was self-condemned.

<sup>2</sup> *Gesch. Roms*, vi, 1844, p. 207.

<sup>3</sup> *The Correspondence of Cicero*, iv<sup>2</sup>, 1918, p. 561.

however, thinks that Cicero was referring to the 'resignation of his office' implied in his letter of February 15. I fail to detect the implication.]

**The date of Pompey's letter to the consuls.**—O. E. Schmidt<sup>1</sup> holds that the letter (*Att.*, viii, 12 A) which Pompey sent to the consuls on hearing that Domitius was blockaded, was written on the same day (February 17) as the one (*Att.*, viii, 12 D) which he wrote to Domitius himself. Holzapfel,<sup>2</sup> however, argues that in the former the words 'Domitius is surrounded' (*factum est ut Domitius implicaretur*) could not have been written until Pompey knew that Caesar had made a second camp near Corfinium,<sup>3</sup> which he did on February 17, thus cutting the communications of Domitius. As Pompey received news of Caesar's arrival on February 17,<sup>4</sup> two days after it occurred, Holzapfel concludes that he did not hear about the second camp until the 19th, and therefore that he wrote to the consuls on that day, not on February 17.

Any one who compares the two letters will see that Holzapfel lays excessive stress on the word *implicaretur*; for in writing on February 17 to Domitius Pompey says, 'Do your best, if it is still by any means possible, to extricate yourself' (*da operam, si ulla ratione etiam nunc efficere potes, ut te explices*), which implies that Domitius was *implicitus*; while he tells the consuls, first (§ 1), that Domitius 'could not extricate himself even if he wished' (*neque <se>, si vellet, expedire posset*), and, secondly (§ 3.), that he must 'extricate himself by crossing the mountains' (*se per montes explicare*). The two sentences might be reconciled by supposing that in the second Pompey meant, 'I'm afraid he can't get out at all; but anyhow to cross the mountains is his only chance'; but I suggest that in the first Pompey meant that Domitius could not extricate his army, in the second he hinted that Domitius might (as he did) try to escape alone. I am inclined with Schmidt to assign the second letter to February 17, because Pompey would naturally have informed the consuls of Domitius's predicament as soon as possible. The only reason for assigning it to February 19, or more probably 18, is that Pompey tells the consuls that he has decided to march to Brundisium, adding, 'I must not let the enemy catch me on the march' (*non est nobis committendum ut . . . hostis . . . in itinere me consequi possit*), and we know that he started from Luceria on February 19; but it does not follow that when he wrote he was on the eve of starting, for he knew that the enemy was 130 miles—six or seven long marches—in his rear.

**The forces of Domitius at Corfinium, Sulmo, and Alba.**—According to Appian,<sup>5</sup> Domitius left Rome for Corfinium with 4,000 men. According to Caesar,<sup>6</sup> he was reinforced before the blockade of Corfinium began by 13 cohorts under Vibullius Rufus, including 6 which had fled from Camerinum under Lucilius Hirrus, and he

<sup>1</sup> *Briefwechsel*, &c., pp. 135–41, 407.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 18, 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, viii, 12 D, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, i, 15, 5–7.

<sup>5</sup> *Klio*, iv, 1904, p. 362, n. 4.

<sup>6</sup> ii, 32, 129. Cf. 38, 149.



had already raised 'about 20' from Alba, the Marsi, the Paeligni, and the adjoining districts. Caesar says, further, that Domitius, in a letter which he wrote to Pompey, asking for help, pleaded that unless Pompey rescued him more than 30 cohorts would be imperilled.<sup>1</sup> Seven cohorts which garrisoned Sulmo, near Corfinium, surrendered to Caesar during the blockade, and were forthwith incorporated in his army.<sup>2</sup> Immediately after the fall of Corfinium he sent 'the cohorts of Domitius', which had surrendered and sworn fidelity to him,<sup>3</sup> to Sicily<sup>4</sup>; and, describing the arrangements which he made after Pompey left Italy, he says that he sent Curio to Sicily with 3 legions.<sup>5</sup>

Turn now to the evidence of Pompey. Writing on February 10 to Cicero, he says that he has just heard from Quintus Fabius (who evidently came from Corfinium) that Domitius was about to leave Corfinium for Luceria 'with his own 12 cohorts and 14 brought to

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 17, 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 18, 1-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, ii, 28, 1-2; 32, 7-9.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, i, 25, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 30, 2. Stoffel (*Hist. de J. César*, i, 304), remarking that the words 'he [Caesar] had sent the cohorts of Domitius immediately from Corfinium to Sicily' (*Domitianus enim cohortes protinus a Corfinio in Siciliam miserat*) are contradicted by a later passage in which Caesar says that he 'sent Curio to Sicily with three legions' (*Mittit . . . in Siciliam Curionem pro praetore cum legionibus III*), concludes that the former passage was interpolated by a mediaeval scholar who did not understand what he read. He also stigmatizes it as intrinsically improbable; for Caesar would never have dreamed of sending an expedition to Sicily so long as Pompey remained in Italy. But, as Holzapfel points out (*Klio*, iv, 1904, pp. 366-7), this argument is refuted by a sentence (*B. C.*, i, 29, 2), in which Caesar explains that he could not follow Pompey across the Adriatic because he would have had to await the arrival of ships from Gaul, Picenum, and the Straits of Messina: he could only expect ships from the Straits if he first occupied Sicily. Stoffel does not allow for the looseness with which Caesar occasionally expresses himself. In point of fact Curio was not sent to Sicily with any legions: he went to Sicily to take over the command of troops which had been already sent under Asinius Pollio (*App.*, ii, 40, 162; *Plut.*, *Cato min.*, 53, 1-3. Cf. *Cic.*, *Att.*, x, 4, 8-9), and this was what Caesar meant. Stoffel might have been put on his guard against this looseness of expression if he had noticed that Caesar said that he sent Curio to Sicily with the rank of *propraetor*; for this rank was not conferred upon him until Caesar met the Senate at Rome. As Meusel remarks, one would expect to be told in *B. C.*, i, 25, 2 what became of the cohorts of Domitius; and since Caesar did not require them at Brundisium (i, 25, 1), why should he not have sent them to Sicily? Before he reached Brundisium he knew that he would be able either to blockade Pompey or to force him to leave Italy; for in a letter which he wrote to Cicero on the march (*Att.*, ix, 7 A) he remarked that he felt sure that he would soon be in the suburbs of Rome.

Von Domaszewski (*Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, p. 165) has given reasons for believing that 3 legions were dispatched to Sicily in addition to the 'Domitian cohorts' which had been sent thither under Pollio. Remarking that as Africa was controlled by Pompeians Rome could only draw supplies of corn from Sardinia and Sicily, he points out that owing to the maritime strength of the Pompeians, which lasted until Caesar sailed for Africa in 47 B. C. (*Bell. Afr.*, 1, 4), both islands required strong garrisons. Four legions in all were assigned to Curio (*B. C.*, ii, 23, 1); one garrisoned Messana at the time of the battle of Pharsalia (*B. C.*, iii, 101, 3); another was stationed at Lilybaeum when Caesar was about to sail (*Bell. Afr.*, 1, 1). I suggest that these two may have been identical with the legions which Curio did not use.



him by Vibullius,' and that 'Hirrus with 5 cohorts was coming up behind.'<sup>1</sup> Writing a week later to the consuls, just after he had received a letter from Domitius himself, Pompey said, 'Domitius . . . has my 19 and his own 12 cohorts distributed among three towns, for he has stationed some at Alba and some at Sulmo,<sup>2</sup> &c. It will be noticed that Pompey, like Caesar, did not mention the 4,000 men, who, if he was correctly informed, must either have been identical with Domitius's 'own twelve cohorts' or have been included among them. On the other hand, Pompey differs from Caesar on two important points:—according to Caesar, Vibullius had only 13 cohorts, including Hirrus's six; Pompey says that he had 14 and Hirrus's five: Caesar says that Domitius had *raised* 'about 20' cohorts, Pompey says that he had 12.

Stoffel<sup>3</sup> interprets the evidence thus.—Domitius took 4,000 men to Corfinium and raised 'about 20 cohorts' from the Marsi and the other peoples. Of these 6 occupied Alba, 7 Sulmo, and the remaining 7 (though Caesar does not say so) reinforced the 4,000 men, who already garrisoned Corfinium, and who were identical with the 12 cohorts which Pompey called Domitius's own. Thus the garrison of Corfinium consisted of 19 cohorts *plus* the 13 which (according to Caesar) Vibullius brought, and these 32 cohorts formed the 3 legions which Caesar sent to Sicily.

But what does Stoffel make of the evidence of Pompey? He simply rejects it. Caesar, he insists, was on the spot; therefore his testimony is to be preferred to that of Pompey, who was at Luceria. This criticism is shallow. Caesar of course knew the number of the cohorts which came to him from Sulmo and Alba, and the number (which he does not specify) that surrendered at Corfinium; but he could only estimate the numbers that had belonged to Vibullius and Hirrus by hearsay, unless he made inquiries after the fall of Corfinium; and we may well doubt whether he took the trouble to institute researches in order to settle a question which was purely academic. Pompey's information, on the other hand, was official and came direct from the fountain-head. The letter which he wrote to Cicero on February 10 was based upon information received from Vibullius: the statements which he made in his letter of February 17 were based upon information supplied by Domitius himself; and the former was confirmed by the latter. Moreover, Stoffel's conclusion is open to two other objections: it implies that when Domitius warned Pompey that 'more than 30 cohorts would be imperilled', he took no account of the garrisons of Alba and Sulmo; and it implies that Caesar absolutely ignored the 4,000 men, in other words, 12 cohorts, which Pompey called Domitius's own. I therefore regard it as certain that Domitius had 12 cohorts of his own and no more; that Vibullius brought him 14 and Hirrus 5; and that these 31 cohorts were distributed in Corfinium, Sulmo, and Alba. Subtract the seven that belonged to Sulmo and the six that belonged

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, viii, 11 A.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 12 A, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 226-7.

to Alba, and 18 remain for Corfinium.<sup>1</sup> Domitius had not brought his 'own' cohorts from Rome, but had raised them, as Caesar says (though he was misinformed about their number) from Alba and the adjoining lands. In other words, Appian blundered or was misinformed.

Now, however, an apparent difficulty arises. We must believe Caesar when he says that the force which he sent to Sicily amounted to 3 legions. The six cohorts that belonged to Alba cannot be included among 'the Domitian cohorts' that were sent to Sicily from Corfinium. How then are we to reconcile the figures given by Pompey with the statement of Caesar? Simply enough. The number of cohorts—13 *plus* 'about 20'—which Caesar assigns to Domitius virtually agrees with the number—exactly 31—which Domitius himself reported to Pompey. As Veith<sup>2</sup> has pointed out, when Vibullius and Hirrus joined Domitius the cohorts which afterwards garrisoned Sulmo and Alba had not been detached from Corfinium. It is clear therefore that 'the Domitian cohorts' which were sent to Sicily from Corfinium were only the eighteen that had surrendered there and the seven that had garrisoned Sulmo; but the six which belonged to Alba and which did not join Caesar until he had advanced some way towards Brundisium must, although he does not expressly say so, have been sent to Sicily afterwards, and on their arrival the whole 31 cohorts were rearranged so as to form 3 legions.

It is of course impossible to determine the numerical strength of 'the Domitian cohorts'. Stoffel supposes that they numbered about 12,000 men.<sup>3</sup> I am rather inclined to believe that this estimate is too high. If we can trust Appian's figures, which, however, are suspiciously round, the 12 cohorts which properly belonged to Domitius, and which were evidently new levies, numbered only 4,000 men,<sup>4</sup> yielding an average of less than 350 per cohort. It is perhaps doubtful whether the other 19 cohorts exceeded this strength, for we learn from Cicero<sup>5</sup> that in January recruits were slow to come in. But in all such calculations one is groping in the dark. The full strength of a legion was 6,000 men; but if the twelve cohorts of Domitius really numbered no more than 4,000, he had formed cohorts which fell far short of the proper standard, perhaps intending to complete them when he could. It would seem that Pompey's

<sup>1</sup> Since the present article was written I have found that my interpretation of the evidence is supported by O. E. Schmidt (*Briefwechsel*, &c., pp. 132-3) and by Veith (*Klio*, xiii, 1913, pp. 19-21).

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 20-1.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 227. Cf. Veith (*op. cit.*, pp. 19 n. 2, 22).

<sup>4</sup> Cicero heard on February 10 that, according to one Nigidius, who had recently left Corfinium, 'Domitius had not got 6,000 men' (*Att.*, vii, 24). This confirms the view that Domitius had only 12 cohorts before Vibullius joined him. [In the passage which I have just cited the MSS. have (Domitium non habere) *vim* (milia). For the nonsensical *vim* the editors substitute *III*; but Holzapfel (*Klio*, 1904, p. 359, n. 3), remarking that this does not tally with Appian's estimate, concludes that Cicero wrote *VI M.* (*VI milia*).]

<sup>5</sup> *Att.*, vii, 13 A, 2; 14, 2. Cf. 15, 3.

recruiting officers proceeded in the same way; for after he landed at Dyrrachium, although he had not lost a man in action, he increased the strength of his legions by large drafts from Thessaly and other lands as well as by 15 cohorts which had recently surrendered under Gaius Antonius.<sup>1</sup>

**The *via Minucia*.**—While Caesar was marching from Corfinium to Brundisium six cohorts from Alba Fucens, and three from Tarracina descried Caesar's cavalry under Vibius Curius in the distance and surrendered.<sup>2</sup> Cicero, who mentions the cohorts from Alba only, says that when they joined Curius they were on the Minucian Way.<sup>3</sup> Schmidt<sup>4</sup> argues that, hoping to find Luceria still occupied by a Pompeian garrison, they moved north-eastward from Beneventum

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 4, 2. Cf. 10, 5 and *Oros.*, vi, 15, 9. We learn from Cicero (*Att.* ix, 6, 3) that Clodia (the mother-in-law of the tribune L. Metellus) was said to have written that Pompey had crossed the Adriatic on March 4 with 30,000 men; but Cicero afterwards told Atticus (ix, 9, 2) that Clodia had exaggerated the number by one half (*Ipsa dimidio plus scripsit Clodia*). On reading these words I (like Tyrrell and Purser) took them to mean that the real figure was 20,000. Shuckburgh's translation, however, runs, 'Clodia just doubled them' (*The Letters of Cicero*, ii, 1900, p. 329). Evidently Clodia's meaning was misrepresented; for she herself crossed the Adriatic with the consuls, who sailed from Brundisium on March 4 (*B. C.*, i, 25, 2), and therefore she could not have said that Pompey, who remained in Brundisium till March 17 (*Att.*, ix, 15, 6), had crossed on the earlier day. Plutarch (*Pomp.*, 62, 2) says that the consuls took with them 30 cohorts, that is 3 legions (cf. *B. C.*, i, 25, 2; iii, 4, 1). If Cicero's later information was right and he meant that the force which sailed on March 4 numbered 20,000 men, auxiliaries must have been counted as well as legionaries; but as this is improbable and the number is inconsistent with Caesar's statement that Pompey afterwards supplemented the strength of his legions by large drafts, I provisionally accept Shuckburgh's translation, which implies that the average strength of each legion was 5,000. If the other translation is right, Cicero's informant was misled, and perhaps Clodia really said that Pompey's entire force comprised 20,000 men. [This note corrects a paragraph which I wrote in *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, 1911, p. 561.]

Fr. Stolle (*D. Lager u. Heer d. Römer*, 1912), in a chapter on 'The strength of the Roman legion, especially of Caesar's army in 58–57 B. C.', builds upon the area of the camp discovered by Stoffel near Berry-au-Bac, which, if it was made by Caesar (*Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 659–66), does not help to determine the strength of newly raised corps.

It would be useless to notice Stoffel's guesses (e. g. i, 339–40) concerning the strength of particular legions: they are puerile waste of labour. He supposes (i, 246) that Pompey's newly levied cohorts numbered each 450–500 men, and yet (p. 228) that Caesar's averaged only 370—a purely arbitrary distinction; he reckons (p. 339) that the sick and wounded whom Caesar left at Apollonia numbered only 1,200 though nearly 1,000 had just been killed (*B. C.*, iii, 71, 1); he estimates (p. 340) Caesar's infantry on the day of the battle of Pharsalia at 32,600 and his cavalry at 1,400, forgetting that, as his own calculations prove, the estimate implies that not a single man had become unfit for action since the army marched from Apollonia; and he habitually ignores or minimizes losses from disease.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 24, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, ix, 6, 1. Dr. Ashby and Mr. Robert Gardner (*Papers Brit. School at Rome*, viii, 1916, p. 107, n. 2) say that 'From Cicero . . . and from the indications supplied by Caesar . . . it is clear that Alba Fucens lay upon 'the Minucian Way. I doubt whether any one will endorse this dictum. If a battalion marching from Oxford were to surrender to an invader at Hindhead, would it be clear that Oxford is on the Portsmouth Road ?

*Briefwechsel*, &c., p. 150.

and met Curius near Aecae, about 25 kilometres (nearly 17 Roman miles) south-west of Arpi.

The line of the Minucian Way is not known. Besides Cicero's statement the only direct evidence is in Horace,—‘ which is the best road [from Rome] to Brundisium, the Minucian or the Appian ? ’ (*Brundisium melius Minuci via ducatur ad Appi*<sup>1</sup>). Bunbury<sup>2</sup> suggested that the former was a road which Strabo<sup>3</sup> describes as leading from Brundisium to Beneventum ; but Dr. Ashby and Mr. Robert Gardner<sup>4</sup> consider it ‘ impossible to reconcile this with Cicero ’. I cannot see the force of this objection ; for a corps marching from Tarracina in Latium to join Pompey would naturally have passed through Beneventum, while the cohorts that came from Alba, unless they followed Caesar, which is obviously out of the question, would have marched by way of Sulmo, Aufidena, Aesernia, Bovianum Undecimanorum, and Saepinum until at Beneventum they struck either the Appian Way or the road which Strabo described. Ashby and Gardner themselves think that the road from Sulmo to Saepinum ‘ may have been partially or wholly the Via Minucia ’.<sup>5</sup> I cannot agree with them ; for the shortest distance in a *straight line* between this road and the one which Caesar took is 65 kilometres, and it is incredible that Caesar's cavalry diverged so far from the main column. Stoffel<sup>6</sup> asserts that the Minucian Way ran from Corfinium *via* Sulmo to Arpi and there terminated ; but if such a road existed, the cohorts that came from Tarracina could not have been on it. The road described by Strabo passed through Herdoniae and Canusium, and a conjecture which I made on reading his description, that it also passed through Aequum Tuticum and Aecae, and was therefore the route along which the Via Traiana was constructed in A. D. 109, is confirmed by Ashby and Gardner.<sup>7</sup> I am inclined to believe that it was the Minucian Way.

It is important to determine whether the cohorts surrendered before or after Caesar entered Arpi, which he reached on March 1.<sup>8</sup> The letter in which Cicero mentioned the surrender was most probably written on the 11th, and he learned the fact at Formiae from Balbus, who was at Rome. Schmidt<sup>9</sup> infers that the surrender occurred at the end of February, immediately before Caesar reached Arpi. But Balbus's letter would have reached Formiae from Rome in two days, and Schmidt himself<sup>10</sup> allows only 6 or 7 days for the transmission of a letter from a point between Arpi and Brundisium to Rome. It would seem then that the cohorts met Curius about March 1 or 2, either while Caesar was at Arpi or soon after he resumed his march. If the surrender occurred while he was at Arpi or just before he arrived, it must, as Schmidt thinks, have taken

<sup>1</sup> *Ep.*, i, 18, 20.

<sup>2</sup> W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Rom. Geogr.*, ii, 1282.

<sup>3</sup> vi, 3, 7.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, v, 794.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 247.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 133.

<sup>9</sup> *Cic.*, *Att.*, ix, 3, 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, p. 151.



place near Aecae; but in that case the cavalry of Curius would have diverged some 16 or 17 Roman miles from Caesar's line of march. I am therefore rather inclined to place the scene near Herdoniae, which is just 9 Roman miles from Caesar's route.<sup>1</sup>

**The rafts used in the blockade of Brundisium.**—Describing the operations by which he endeavoured to blockade the harbour of Brundisium, Caesar says that he 'placed rafts thirty feet square in pairs in a line with the mole' which he had constructed in the shallow water on either side of the channel (*rates duplices quoque versus pedum XXX e regione molis conlocabat* <sup>2</sup>). 'It is not clear', says Mr. Peskett, 'whether this means two rafts, each 30 ft. by 15 ft., placed side by side so as to form as it were a single raft of 30 ft. square, or whether we must suppose that for the sake of additional carrying power one raft was placed on the top of another, each of the two being 30 feet square.' It is to my mind perfectly clear that the former alternative is wrong: not only does it contradict the text, but nothing was to be gained by making two parallel and contiguous rafts instead of one. The other view is adopted by von Göler<sup>3</sup> and Stoffel,<sup>4</sup> on the ground that a single raft would not have been strong enough to carry the defenders, the parapets, and the turret. The two experts evidently forgot that only one raft—not pair of rafts—in four carried a turret (*in quarta quaque earum turres . . . excitabat* <sup>5</sup>); and if they fancied that an ordinary raft 30 feet square could not sustain the weight of a few men and a line of wooden shields along three of its sides, they did not understand their business. Evidently then in three cases out of four to put one raft on the top of another would have been a work of supererogation; and surely the fourth could carry a two-storied wooden turret if the timbers were sufficiently stout. If it could not, Caesar failed to express a simple thought clearly, which I decline to believe. Professor J. S. Reid, says Mr. Peskett, 'suggests that the word *duplices* may mean that the rafts were made in pairs and one of each pair anchored at each of the two incomplete *aggeres*.' It never occurred to me that it could mean anything else.

Caesar says that when the ships which had carried the first detachment of Pompey's troops to Dyrrachium returned to Brundisium, he had 'completed nearly half the work' (*Prope dimidia parte operis effecta* <sup>6</sup>). Whereupon Stoffel, remarking that the entrance of the port was 350 metres wide and that, owing to the depth of the water, neither of the two moles could have been more than 75 metres long, observes that 3 or 4 rafts at one only of the extremities would [along with the moles] have barred half the

<sup>1</sup> Between Herdoniae and Canusium the Via Traiana approaches more and more closely to Caesar's route, and on March 2 he must have been near Canusium.

It is possible that, although the cohorts from Alba had come by the Minucian Way, Cicero may have been wrong in saying that they were on it when they surrendered.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 25, 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, &c., ii<sup>2</sup>, 1880, p. 20. Von Göler coolly changes XXX into XXXX.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 250.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 25, 10.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 27, 1.

entrance. Accordingly he concludes that Caesar had no time to make any more. Did it never occur to Stoffel that *operis* meant 'the work of constructing the rafts', which, in order to bar the entrance, would have had to cover a space of 200 metres, or 676 Roman feet? To do this 22 rafts were needed; so Caesar had made at least ten.

**The chronology of Caesar's Italian campaign.**—In trying to determine the chronology of Caesar's operations in Italy we are helped by several known dates. The attempts that have been made to fix the others necessarily rest upon calculations of the rate at which messengers travelled and of that at which the troops marched. The rate of course varied according to circumstances,—the state of the roads, the quality of the cattle which the messengers used, the existence (or the absence) of motives for travelling faster than usual, and so on; and we must therefore generally be satisfied if we can approximate to the truth. But every one who reads this note will conclude that the limit of error rarely exceeds one day; and, after all, the only thing that matters much is to put the events in their right order.

Stoffel<sup>1</sup> has compiled a table of distances, which (with unimportant omissions) I subjoin, correcting his figures where I have found them wrong and giving the equivalent of kilometres in English miles:

Rome	to Ravenna	.	.	.	.	385 km.	(239 m.)
"	" Ariminum	.	.	.	.	331 "	(206 ")
"	" Teanum	.	.	.	.	190 "	(118 ")
Ariminum	" Ravenna	.	.	.	.	54 "	(34 ")
"	" Pisaurum	.	.	.	.	35 "	(22 ")
"	" Ancona	.	.	.	.	98 "	(61 ")
"	" Iguvium <sup>2</sup>	.	.	.	.	128 "	(80 ")
Pisaurum	" Fanum	.	.	.	.	13 "	(8 ")
Fanum	" Ancona	.	.	.	.	50 "	(31 ")
Ancona	" Auximum	.	.	.	.	18 "	(11 ")
Arretium	" Ancona <sup>3</sup>	.	.	.	.	205 "	(127 ")
Auximum	" Firmum	.	.	.	.	60 "	(37 ")
Firmum	" Truentum	.	.	.	.	40 "	(25 ")
Truentum	" Asculum	.	.	.	.	30 "	(19 ")
Asculum	" Corfinium <sup>4</sup>	.	.	.	.	165 "	(102 ")
Corfinium	" Luceria <sup>5</sup>	.	.	.	.	210 "	(130 ")
Corfinium	" Brundisium <sup>6</sup>	.	.	.	.	465 "	(289 ")

Stoffel<sup>7</sup> points out that, according to Plutarch,<sup>8</sup> Caesar travelled in 58 B. C. from Rome to the Rhône in 8 days, that is at the rate of about 100 Roman, or 92 English, miles a day, and that L. Piso and Roscius offered to go from Rome to Ravenna and back—478 English miles—in 6 days.<sup>9</sup> But Caesar's journey was extraordinarily fast; and Piso intended to do his best.

Stoffel<sup>10</sup> holds that the average daily rate of marching in Caesar's time can be estimated from the march which he made from Corfinium

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 198.

<sup>2</sup> *Via Fanum.*

<sup>3</sup> *Via Iguvium.*

<sup>4</sup> By the shortest route.

<sup>5</sup> *Via Sulmo and Larinum.*

<sup>6</sup> *Via Anxanum, Histonium, Arpi, and Canusium.*

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 195-6.

<sup>8</sup> *Cæs.*, 17, 3. Cf. *Suet., Div. Iul.*, 57.

<sup>9</sup> *B. C.*, i, 3, 6.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 196-7.

to Brundisium,—465 kilometres in 17 days,<sup>1</sup> which gives an average of  $27\frac{1}{3}$  kilometres. Probably, Stoffel adds, Caesar allowed two days for rest: this would raise the average to 31. Thus Stoffel draws a general conclusion from one particular. Immediately afterwards, however, he corrects (and contradicts) himself by observing that Caesar was hurrying to catch Pompey, and therefore marched exceptionally fast.

I have collected the relevant passages in the correspondence of Cicero; but it is unnecessary to quote more than a few. Letters were carried from Britain to Rome (or Arpinum?) in 32 days,<sup>2</sup> and on two other occasions in 27;<sup>3</sup> from Rome to Pompeii in 3;<sup>4</sup> from Rome to Puteoli in 4 or 5;<sup>5</sup> from Puteoli to Rome in 2;<sup>6</sup> from Rome to Athens in 21.<sup>7</sup> A freedman of Trebonius made the much longer journey from Seleucia Pieria (the port of Antioch) to Brundisium in 27 days.<sup>8</sup> These examples show how much the speed of couriers varied: their value is somewhat impaired by the fact that it is generally impossible to ascertain how soon after letters were written the messengers started, or—which in the case of short journeys is important—at what hour they started and arrived. All that we can say is that it was possible in favourable circumstances to travel about 92 English miles a day and that an average of 80 miles was remarkable. But it would be reasonable to suppose that in the period with which we are concerned this rate was sometimes attained; for it was generally important to deliver dispatches as quickly as possible.<sup>9</sup> News of the battle of Munda, fought on

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, viii, 14, 1; ix, 13 A, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Q. fr.*, iii, 1, 13.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 17, 25. Cf. *Anc. Britain*, 1907, pp. 728–9, n. 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, xiv, 18, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, xvi, 11, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 14, 2. Cf. xiv, 20, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Fam.*, xiv, 5, 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Att.*, xi, 20, 1. Cf. W. Judeich, *Caesar in Orient*, 1885, p. 194, and O. E. Schmidt, *Briefwechsel*, &c., pp. 231–2.

<sup>9</sup> In a letter written in September, 57 B. C. to Atticus (iv, 1, 4) Cicero says (if the MSS. are right) that on the 8th of August he learned at Brundisium from his brother Quintus, who was at Rome, that the law which authorized his return from exile had been passed (*Ante diem VI. Id. Scat. cognovi cum Brundisii essem, litteris Quinti . . . legem comitiis centuriatis esse perlatam*); and in an earlier sentence of the same letter he says that the law was passed on the 4th. It would seem then that the courier who carried Quintus's letter travelled from Rome to Brundisium—360 Roman miles (or, according to Stoffel, *op. cit.*, i, 198, 580 kilometres)—in 4 or 5 days. But this does not suit the views of Schmidt, who, showing (*op. cit.*, pp. 201–2) that the usual time was 8 or 9 days, roundly asserts that instead of (*Ante diem*) VI. we must read III.; and Messrs. Tyrrell and Purser (*The Correspondence of Cicero*, ii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 6), after remarking that 'Sternkopf retains VI.' and 'thinks it confirmed by the words *cum Brundisii essem*, which he believes were added to indicate that Cicero had not, as the dates might seem to indicate, already proceeded . . . towards Rome', nevertheless follow Schmidt: 'the alteration . . . is so slight and so common . . . that we have not hesitated to accept it'. I suggest that, while the alteration may be right, it is reasonable to assume that Quintus would have urged the courier to convey the glad tidings to Marcus as fast as he could; and since Curio travelled from Rome to Ravenna (260 Roman miles) in 3 days, it is possible that a courier may have made the journey from Rome to Brundisium in 4 or 5. In 1852, Lord Dalhousie rode and drove from Benares to Barrackpore, 400 miles, in 80 hours, including stoppages (Sir W. Lee-Warner's *Life of . . . Dalhousie*, i, 1904, p. 403). [Schmidt reckons the distance from Rome to

March 17, 45 B. C., reached Rome, distant about 1,800 Roman miles, on April 20.<sup>1</sup> Since couriers could travel 51 Roman miles a day or more for five continuous weeks, they could evidently go much faster on a journey of a few days.<sup>2</sup>

The following table exhibits the results at which Stoffel, O. E. Schmidt, Miss M. B. Peaks, and I have arrived. An asterisk is prefixed to those dates which are known.

	Stoffel.	Schmidt.	Peaks.	Holmes.
Antony, Cassius, Caelius, and Curio leave Rome . . .	*Jan. 7 <sup>3</sup> (night)	Jan. 7 (night)	Jan. 7 (night)	Jan. 7 (night)
They reach Ariminum . . .				Jan. 10
Caesar leaves Ravenna . . .	Jan. 11	Jan. 10		" 11
Caesar's troops occupy Ariminum . . .	" 12	" 11		" 12
Pisaurum occupied . . .	" 12 <sup>4</sup>			
Fanum . . .	" 13			
Ancona . . .	" 14			
Antony seizes Arretium . . .	" 15	" 15 <sup>5</sup>		" 15
Caesar sends Curio to occupy Iguvium . . .	" 16			
Pompey leaves Rome . . .	" *17	" 17		" 17
Roscius and L. Caesar meet Caesar at Ariminum . . .	" "	" 18		" "
Cicero and the consuls leave Rome . . .	" *18 <sup>6</sup>	" "		" 18
Roscius and L. Caesar leave Ariminum . . .	" 19	" 19		
Curio reaches Iguvium . . .	" 20	" 18 or 19		
Caesar orders Antony and Curio to march for Ancona . . .	" "	" 22 or 23	" 22	
L. Caesar reaches Teanum . . .	" *23 <sup>7</sup>	" 23	" 23	" 23
Antony and Curio leave Arretium and Iguvium respectively <sup>8</sup> . . .	" 24	" 24	" 24	" 24
Cicero meets the consuls and various senators at Capua . . .		" *25 <sup>9</sup>		" 25
Roscius and L. Caesar leave Capua <sup>10</sup> . . .		" "		" "

Brundisium as 'about 370 Roman miles': according to Strabo (vi, 3, 7) and Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, ii, 108 (112), 244), it was 360, or about 532 kilometres.]

<sup>1</sup> Dio, xliii, 42, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. L. W. Hunter (*Journ. Rom. Studies*, iii, 1913, pp. 75-6), remarking that 'when Schmidt states that Cicero could travel . . . 126 Roman miles in three days . . . such an estimate at least challenges our curiosity', concludes (p. 94) that '50 m. p. per day was possible: but so high a rate of speed must be regarded as quite exceptional'. That Cicero preferred to travel leisurely is notorious; whether he *could* cover '126 Roman miles in three days', and whether Mr. Hunter's conclusion is sound, readers who verify the statements which I have made will judge.

<sup>3</sup> *B.C.*, i, 5, 4-5.

<sup>4</sup> Implies a march of 89 kilometres in two days.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 383, 403.

<sup>6</sup> *Cic., Att.*, viii, 11 B, 3; ix, 10, 3-4. Cf. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 114, n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Att.*, vii, 14, 1.

<sup>8</sup> According to Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 9), Curio waited at Iguvium for Antony.

<sup>9</sup> *Att.*, vii, 15, 2.

<sup>10</sup> Meusel remarks in his note on *B. C.*, i, 10, 1 that the proposals which Caesar had made to Pompey through Roscius and Lucius Caesar, and which were delivered to Pompey at Teanum on January 23, were finally discussed at Capua on January 25, and therefore that the envoys did not start on their



	<i>Stoffel.</i>	<i>Schmidt.</i>	<i>Peaks.</i>	<i>Holmes.</i>
Curio reaches Ancona . . .	Feb. 1		Jan. 27 or 28	Jan. 28
Roscius and L. Caesar rejoin Caesar <sup>1</sup> . . .	Jan. 29	Jan. 28	" "	" 29
Caesar leaves Ariminum . . .			" 21 or 22	" "
Antony reaches Ancona . . .	Feb. 1	" 29	" 29	" "
Caesar arrives at Auximum . . .	" 3	Feb. 1	" "	" "
Caesar marches from Auximum . . .	" 4			Feb. 1
Caesar occupies Firmum . . .	" 5	" 6	Feb. 2	" 3
The 12th legion joins Caesar <sup>2</sup> . . .	" "	" 7	" 3	" 4
Caesar halts one day at Firmum . . .	" "	" 8 <sup>3</sup>	" 4	" 5
Caesar moves on from Firmum . . .	" 6	" 8 <sup>3</sup>	" 4	" 5
Caesar occupies Castrum Truentinum . . .	" "		" 5	" 6
Caesar leaves Castrum Truentinum . . .	" "			" 7
Vibullius arrives at Corfinium . . .	" *8 <sup>4</sup>	" 8	" 8	" 8
Caesar reaches Asculum <sup>5</sup> . . .	" "			" "
" halts at Asculum . . .	" 9			" "
" leaves Asculum . . .	" 10			" "
" reaches Corfinium . . .	" *15	" 14 <sup>6</sup>	" 14 <sup>6</sup>	" 15

return journey until that day (cf. Schmidt, p. 124, n. 4). This view rests upon a statement in one of Cicero's letters (*Att.*, vii, 15, 2):—'Arriving at Capua on the 25th . . . I met the consuls and many members of the Senate. All were anxious that Caesar should stand by his offer, with the addition of withdrawing his garrisons. Favonius alone disapproved of any conditions being imposed on us by him; but he was not listened to in the discussion.' It appears, however, from a letter written by Cicero on the 25th (*ib.*, 14, 1) that Caesar's proposals were conditionally accepted and a reply drafted on January 23, and from a later letter (*ib.*, 17, 2) that Pompey, who left Teanum on the same day (*ib.*, 13 B, 3), had commissioned Sestius to draft the reply. I was originally inclined to infer that when Cicero met the consuls on the 25th they were not deliberating with a view to amending the answer which Lucius Caesar was to take back to his kinsman, but informally talking over the matter. But when I re-read the passage (*B. C.*, i, 10, 1) in which Caesar says that Roscius and L. Caesar found the consuls and Pompey at Capua, it seems to me probable that his mistake originated in the fact that the consuls and the senators held a final discussion there on January 25.

<sup>1</sup> According to Schmidt (p. 124, n. 4), at Ancona. He supposes (*l. c.* and p. 404), virtually contradicting his own estimate of the speed of couriers, that Roscius and L. Caesar travelled from Capua to Ancona—considerably over 400 kilometres—in 4 days.

<sup>2</sup> At Firmum, Stoffel thinks. Caesar (*B. C.*, i, 15, 3), immediately after saying that he advanced from Auximum, overran Picenum, and received envoys from Cingulum, adds that 'meanwhile' the 12th legion overtook him. The word *interea* leaves it doubtful where. Schmidt (p. 127) observes that Caesar heard from Dolabella, probably on Feb. 7, at latest on Feb. 8, that Picenum (= Auximum and Cingulum) was lost (*Att.*, vii, 21, 2). Dolabella's letter was therefore written on Feb. 3 or 4; and Schmidt infers that the 12th reached Picenum about Feb. 1. But the inference leaves it an open question when and where the legion overtook Caesar.

<sup>3</sup> Schmidt (p. 129) allows only 6-7 days for the march, which he calls 150 Roman (about 138 English) miles, from Firmum to Corfinium!

<sup>4</sup> *Att.*, viii, 11 A; 12 B, 1.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 362-5, where I show that Caesar did not go to Asculum at all.

<sup>6</sup> Schmidt (p. 129) infers from Caesar's words, *VII omnino dies ad Corfinium moratus* (*B. C.*, i, 23, 5) that he spent 7 entire days there, and therefore that, as he departed on Feb. 21, he must have arrived on Feb. 14. But compare *Att.*, ix, 13 A, 1, where we learn that Caesar reached Brundisium on March 9,

	<i>Stoffel.</i>	<i>Schmidt.</i>	<i>Peaks.</i>	<i>Holmes.</i>
The garrison of Sulmo joins Caesar . . . . .	Feb. 16	Feb. 18 (at the latest) <sup>1</sup>		
The 8th legion joins Caesar . . .	*17 <sup>2</sup>			Feb. 17
Pompey leaves Luceria . . .	*19 <sup>3</sup>	19		19
„ reaches Canusium . . .	*20 <sup>4</sup>	20		20
„ leaves Canusium . . .	*21 <sup>4</sup>	21		21
Corfinium surrenders . . .	* „ <sup>4</sup>	„		„
Caesar leaves Corfinium . . .	* „ <sup>4</sup>	„		„
Pompey arrives at Brundisium . .	*25 <sup>5</sup>	25		25
Caesar halts at Arpi . . .	*March 1 <sup>6</sup>	March 1		March 1
The consuls sail from Brundisium . . . . .	4 <sup>7</sup>	4		4
Caesar reaches Brundisium . . .	*9 <sup>8</sup>	9		9
Pompey leaves Brundisium . . .	*17 <sup>9</sup>	17		17
Caesar enters Brundisium . . .	*18 <sup>10</sup>	18		18

Miss Peaks infers from one of Cicero's letters (*Att.*, vii, 17, 3) that Caesar heard on January 21 or 22 that Pompey had abandoned Rome. 'Deciding therefore,' she continues, 'to reunite his scattered forces, he sent word to Antony and to Curio, of whose occupation of Iguvium he had just been informed, to overtake him as soon as possible. He then marched slowly down the coast, picking up his garrisons along the way'. Miss Peaks goes on to say that Caesar's order, dispatched on January 22, reached Curio on the 23rd; that 'he doubtless started the 24th'; that 'to march the eighty-four miles from Iguvium [*via Fanum*] to Ancona . . . would require at least four days'; and therefore that Curio could not have reached Ancona before the afternoon of January 27. She then sets herself to prove that Antony did not arrive at Ancona until Caesar and Curio had reached or passed Auximum, and did not overtake them 'before Feb. 3 at Firmum'. Cicero received on the morning of February 3 at Formiae a letter from Atticus, who was at Rome, enclosing one 'in which Curio ridicules the mission of L. Caesar.'<sup>11</sup> Miss Peaks says that this letter 'could not have left Rome later than the night of Feb. 1-2, because Cicero at Formiae (ninety-six miles distant) received it early on the morning of Feb. 3', and 'the enclosure from Curio would have required more than two days to come down from the north to Rome. By Jan. 28, then, at the latest, Curio knew that the embassy had failed. Since the envoys [L. Caesar and Roscius], who probably started from Teanum Jan. 23, p.m., could not reach Caesar before Jan. 27 or 28, there was not time for Curio to have received this information, unless he was then with

with *Att.*, ix, 15, 6, which shows that Pompey quitted Brundisium on March 17, and with *B. C.*, i, 27, 1, where Caesar says that he spent 9 days in trying to blockade Pompey (*diebusque in ea re consumptis VIII*): is it not clear that in *B. C.*, i, 23, 5 he also reckoned inclusively? He did not leave Corfinium until the afternoon (*Att.*, viii, 14, 1).

<sup>1</sup> Schmidt (p. 129) observes that Cicero, who was at Formiae, heard of the surrender of Sulmo on or before the morning of Feb. 22 (*Att.*, viii, 4, 3).

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 18, 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, viii, 9, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 14, 1; ix, 1, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 10, 8.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 3, 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 3 (cf. p. 372, n. 1).

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 13 A, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, 15, 6.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>11</sup> *Att.*, vii, 19.

Caesar. Curio consequently arrived [at Ancona] on Jan. 27 p.m. or early on Jan. 28. Now Antony undoubtedly started at the same time as Curio, but as Arretium is about 110 Roman miles,<sup>1</sup> or six days' march, from Ancona, he cannot have reached there before Jan. 29 . . . and by that time Caesar had moved on to Auximum or further . . . Stoffel . . . and Schmidt . . . are therefore wrong in assuming that Antony and Curio met at or near Iguvium, and arrived at Ancona together Feb. 1 or Jan. 29.<sup>2</sup>

This argument is somewhat weakened by the assumption that the envoys left Teanum on the 23rd, whereas there is some reason to suppose that they did not leave Capua till the 25th,<sup>3</sup> and by the assumption that when Curio ridiculed the mission of L. Caesar he knew that it had failed. The cynical fellow may well have ridiculed the mission by anticipation, either because he did not believe that his chief was sincere or because he felt sure that Pompey's reply would not be acceptable.

Holzapfel<sup>4</sup> independently reaches by a different method much the same conclusion as Miss Peaks. Caesar, he remarks, occupied Ancona on January 15 and about the same time sent Curio to seize Iguvium.<sup>5</sup> Accepting Stoffel's statement that 4 days were required for Curio's march, and inferring from a letter written on the 23rd<sup>6</sup> that on that day Cicero, who was at Minturnae, did not yet know that Iguvium had fallen, he concludes that Curio reached it on the 19th or, at the latest, on the 20th. Then, quoting a letter<sup>7</sup> written by Cicero at Formiae on February 2, in which he complained that Caesar, who ought to have remained quiet until he received an answer to the proposals which he had instructed Lucius Caesar to submit to Pompey, was said to be 'extremely active' (*Nam cum ista mandata dedisset L. Caesari, debuit esse paullo quietior dum responsa referrentur, dicitur nunc esse acerrimus*), he remarks that Cicero can hardly have referred to Curio's seizure of Iguvium, of which he would have heard several days before, but rather to the concentration of troops on Auximum. This, he argues, is supported by the fact that on or before the 2nd [or rather the 3rd] of February Cicero heard that the Pompeians had recovered Ancona.<sup>8</sup> The rumour was false; but Holzapfel infers from it that Caesar had withdrawn from Ancona the cohorts which he had stationed there<sup>9</sup> and directed them to advance upon Auximum, which was only 11 Roman miles further south. Immediately after mentioning the rumour Cicero adds that 'although Caesar dispatched Lucius Caesar with instructions to treat for peace, he is said to be busily raising troops, occupying positions, and

<sup>1</sup> According to Stoffel, 127.

<sup>2</sup> *Class. Rev.*, xviii, 1904, p. 346. Schmidt (p. 125) holds that Antony marched from Arretium to Ancona by way of Fanum, there being no military road over the mountains; but from Iguvium, where, according to Schmidt, he met Curio, a road (marked in Kiepert's maps) must have led by Sentinum, Aesis, and Sestra to Ancona.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 377, n. 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Klio*, iii, 1903, pp. 218-9.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 11, 4; 12, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Att.*, vii, 13 B, 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 17, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 18, 2.

<sup>9</sup> *B. C.*, i, 12, 3.

securing them by garrisons' (*Caesarem quidem L. Caesare cum mandatis de pace misso tamen aiunt acerrime dilectum habere, loca occupare, vincere praesidiis*). Evidently, says Holzapfel, the words *loca occupare* point to Auximum. The news of the fall of Corfinium—a most important event—took 3 days to reach Formiae.<sup>1</sup> The news of the occupation of Auximum, which was much farther off, must therefore have taken 3 or 4 days, and the occupation must have occurred on January 27 or 28. Holzapfel's theory implies that Caesar did not, as he himself affirms,<sup>2</sup> remain at Ariminum till the return of the envoys, but that they met him at Auximum; and, as we shall see, it is certain that Caesar's statement is incorrect.

Now if Caesar arrived at Auximum on January 27, it seems difficult to account for the time that elapsed between that date and his arrival at Castrum Truentinum, which he could hardly have reached before February 5.<sup>3</sup> From Auximum to Castrum Truentinum the distance is only 100 kilometres, or 62 English miles, which could have been easily covered in four or five marches. Caesar halted one entire day at Firmum; but is there any reason to suppose that he made similar stoppages at other towns? When Cicero in the first passage which Holzapfel quotes spoke of the activity of Caesar, he may only have referred to the preparations which he made for the concentration of troops; and it is far from evident that *loca occupare* means that Auximum had been already occupied. Cicero was confessedly repeating a mere rumour; and though he may have heard several days before that Iguvium had been seized, the *loca* may well have included both that town and Ancona, while if he thought of Auximum, he may only have been told that Caesar was about to occupy it. His words are too vague to justify the conclusion which Holzapfel so confidently draws. Cicero, however, learned on February 9 at Formiae by a letter from Rome<sup>4</sup> that cohorts under Lentulus had joined Domitius. Though the news, as regards the cohorts, was inaccurate, Schmidt<sup>5</sup> reasonably concludes that Lentulus himself must have reached Corfinium on February 5 at the latest, and therefore must have left Asculum by February 3. As he left on hearing of Caesar's approach,<sup>6</sup> Caesar could hardly have reached Auximum later than February 1.

Miss Peaks endeavours to work out the chronology of Caesar's march from Auximum to Castrum Truentinum by the following process. Vibullius joined Domitius on February 8. 'A little later [on February 9]', says Miss Peaks, 'he [Vibullius] wrote Pompey a second letter . . . saying that their [Domitius's and Vibullius's] plans were changed because of the report that Caesar had . . . reached Castrum Truentinum. The news of this move of Caesar's, therefore, reached Corfinium Feb. 8 p.m. or Feb. 9 a.m. Allowing three days for the courier (130 miles), we get Feb. 5 as the probable date of Caesar's occupation of Truentum [that is Castrum

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, viii, 8.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 382.

<sup>3</sup> *Att.*, vii, 23, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, i, 8, 2 with 11, 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, i, 15, 3. See p. 362.



Truentinum]. He probably left Firmum (26 miles away) on Feb. 4. . . . For Caesar's arrival at Firmum, we have his statement (i, 16, 1) that he stopped there one day.<sup>1</sup> This would put his coming on Feb. 2. The same date can also be obtained by working back from Feb. 8, when Lentulus's troops, under the command of Vibullius, reached Corfinium. As these men had marched *magnis itineribus* (B. C., i. 15. 6) 110 miles<sup>2</sup> through the mountains, they must have begun their retreat Feb. 3. Consequently Caesar's capture of Firmum (25 miles from Asculum . . .) was probably not later than Feb. 2.<sup>3</sup>

Why *must* we allow 3 days for a courier to travel 130 Roman (about 120 English) miles, when we know that couriers could do 80 English miles a day? If we allow two days and a half, we get not February 5, but February 6 as the probable date of Caesar's occupation of Castrum Truentinum; therefore he probably reached Firmum on February 3 and left it on February 5. Can we obtain the same date if, like Miss Peaks, we work backwards? Vibullius had only 14 cohorts, and Miss Peaks doubtless knows that a small force can move faster than a large one. She allows 6 days for the march, which yields an average of 17 miles a day. Five days were enough if Vibullius made the first of his forced marches on the day on which Lentulus left Asculum; but, as this is doubtful, let us accept Miss Peaks's estimate. It does not, however, follow that Caesar reached Firmum on February 2. A courier could have ridden or driven from Firmum to Asculum in 3 or 4 hours, and may well have started as soon as it was known that Caesar intended to go to Asculum, and before he arrived at Firmum. Miss Peaks hardly allows sufficient time for the march from Auximum to Firmum,<sup>4</sup> and she might have advanced her dates by one day if she had realized that Caesar reached Corfinium not on the 14th, but on the 15th of February.

It remains to account for the notorious chronological errors in Caesar's narrative.<sup>5</sup> He says that he occupied Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona because he could not accept the conditions embodied in the dispatch which Roscius and Lucius Caesar brought to him.<sup>6</sup> Now we know on the authority of Cicero<sup>7</sup> that Lucius Caesar did not reach Teanum, where he delivered Caesar's message to Pompey and the consuls, until January 23. Cicero, who left Rome on January 18,<sup>8</sup> says that he did so after Caesar had successively occupied Ariminum, Pisaurum, Ancona, and Arretium.<sup>9</sup> We may, perhaps, infer from an earlier letter that when he made this statement his memory was at fault, and that he did not hear of the seizure of Ancona (and therefore also of Arretium) until the following day;<sup>10</sup> but at all events it is certain that Ancona as well as the other

<sup>1</sup> See p. 363.

<sup>2</sup> 102 English miles.

<sup>3</sup> *Class. Rev.*, 1904, p. 348.

<sup>4</sup> See B. C., i, 15, 1.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. vol. ii, p. 337.

<sup>6</sup> B. C., i, 11, 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Att.*, vii, 14, 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, ix, 10, 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Fam.*, xvi, 12, 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Att.*, vii, 11, 1. Schmidt (*op. cit.*, pp. 114-5) thinks that this letter, which, as we may infer from its tone, was written shortly after Cicero left Rome—probably on the evening of January 18 or the following morning—described what had passed through his mind during the senatorial session (the existence

three towns had been occupied several days before Roscius and L. Caesar returned. I have discussed the question in *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*.<sup>1</sup> Here I will only add that although Caesar was doubtless capable of falsifying history in order to achieve a political end if he was likely to gain general credence, it may be questioned whether he would have thought it worth while to pervert events which were generally known, especially at a time when he was master of the Roman world ; and, moreover, if Cicero, writing on the 27th of January, unintentionally misrepresented what had occurred only nine days before, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Caesar may have suffered from failure of memory in writing three or four years after the events which he described. Besides, it is surely probable that if Caesar had intended to deceive, he would have taken care to make his narrative consistent. In fact he contradicts himself. In *B. C.*, i. 10, 1, he says that Roscius and L. Caesar delivered his proposals to Pompey and the consuls at Capua,—that is, after Pompey and the consuls had left Rome. In 14, 1-2, he says—evidently in good faith, but either from lapse of memory or from false information—that the consuls left Rome in consequence of the measures—the occupation of Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona—which, according to 11 and 12, he did not adopt until after Roscius and L. Caesar had returned to him. The occupation of Iguvium, which Caesar describes in 12, also occurred several days before they returned.

Another chronological error was manifestly due not to bad faith, but either to forgetfulness or to defective information. Caesar says that Pompey quitted Luceria on learning that Corfinium had fallen.<sup>2</sup> Corfinium, as we have seen, was surrendered on the 21st of February, and Pompey left Luceria two days before.

of which is merely hypothetical) that immediately preceded the departure of Pompey. It proves, he says, that Pompey's flight was prompted by the loss of Ancona and the other towns. The words on which he bases his conclusion are these :—'What, I ask you, does this mean ? What is happening ? To me it is all as dark as night. They say, "We hold Cingulum, but have lost Ancona : Labienus has deserted Caesar." Are we talking of a Roman general or of a Hannibal ?' (*Quaeso, quid hoc est ? aut quid agitur ? Mihi enim tenebrae sunt. 'Cingulum,' inquit, 'nos tenemus. Anconam amisimus. Labienus discessit a Caesare.' Utrum de imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimur ?*) Schmidt takes the subject of *inquit* to be *Pompeius* (understood) : Tyrrell and Purser rightly translate *inquit* by 'People say' : in other words, it is equivalent to *on dit*. Would Pompey have mentioned the facts that he still held Cingulum and that Labienus had ratted as reasons for leaving Rome ? Surely the following words, *Utrum de imperatore [Caesar] populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimur ?* prove that the subject of *inquit* is not *Pompeius*. As to Pompey's reasons for leaving Rome see pp. 361-2.

<sup>1</sup> Second ed., pp. 252-3.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 24, 1.

## CAESAR'S PREPARATIONS FOR THE SPANISH CAMPAIGN AND FOR THE SIEGE OF MASSILIA

The first session of the Senate after Caesar returned from Brundisium to the outskirts of Rome was held on April 1.<sup>1</sup> Stoffel,<sup>2</sup> referring to a letter in which Cicero says that 'in the course of a week Caesar brought upon himself the bitterest hatred' of the Roman rabble,<sup>3</sup> supposes, reasonably enough, that he did not leave for Massilia till about April 7, and that he reached Massilia (941 kilometres, or 567 miles, from Rome) about April 19. At all events he did not arrive till after April 16, for on that day, while he was still travelling, he wrote to Cicero.<sup>4</sup>

When did Caesar send orders to his various legions to march for Spain? Stoffel<sup>5</sup> infers from *B.C.*, i. 33, 4 that he determined to make war there on the 3rd or the 4th of April. From that passage we learn that after he had wasted several days in trying to get what he wanted from the Senate he left Rome for Transalpine Gaul. But why quote the passage at all when Caesar says that he decided to undertake the campaign before he left Brundisium?<sup>6</sup> Most probably indeed he had contemplated it before; for he had already transferred Fabius and his three legions from the valley of the Saône to the neighbourhood of Narbo, near the Pyrenees,<sup>7</sup> and he wrote to Cicero before he reached Brundisium that he expected to be at Rome before long.<sup>8</sup> Stoffel concludes that on April 3 or 4 he sent orders to Fabius<sup>9</sup> and to Trebonius, who was apparently at Matisco (Mâcon), to concentrate their forces on the Spanish frontier. Now Caesar says distinctly that he sent the order to Fabius while he was preparing for the siege of Massilia;<sup>10</sup> and there is no evidence that he sent a similar order to Trebonius at all.

Stoffel then puts the question, what were the three legions which Caesar assigned for the siege of Massilia?<sup>11</sup> Rejecting the theory of Guischart<sup>12</sup> that they were legions which Caesar had levied in Italy,<sup>13</sup> on the ground that he would not have employed recruits for such work and did employ the famous Tenth,<sup>14</sup> Stoffel concludes that Caesar sent a messenger on April 21—immediately after he learned that the Massilians intended to oppose him—to order Trebonius not to march to Spain, but to come to Massilia instead.

Von Domaszewski<sup>15</sup> insists that the legions in question were the veterans who had served in Italy. Remarking that, according to Orosius,<sup>16</sup> Caesar travelled from Rome to Massilia by way of Ariminum, where legions were assembled, he says that this détour was meaning-

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Att.*, ix, 17, 1.      <sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 253-4.      <sup>3</sup> *Att.*, x, 8, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Cic., *Att.*, x, 8 B. Cf. 10, 4.      <sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 257.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, i, 30, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 37, 1, compared with *B. G.*, viii, 54, 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Att.*, ix, 6 A.

<sup>9</sup> See vol. ii, p. 322.

<sup>10</sup> *B. C.*, i, 37, 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, i, 36, 4.

<sup>12</sup> *Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, p. 22.

<sup>13</sup> *B. C.*, i, 25, 1.

<sup>14</sup> Stoffel refers to *B. C.*, i, 57, 1 and Val. Max, iii, 2, 22.

<sup>15</sup> *Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, p. 167.

<sup>16</sup> vi, 15, 6.

less unless Caesar intended to take those legions to Spain. As, he continues, Caesar himself says that he 'brought three legions to Massilia' (*legiones tres Massiliam adducit*), there is nothing to prevent us from identifying them with those which followed him from Ariminum. What Caesar says is that he brought three legions to Massilia because the Massilians refused to admit him within their walls (*Quibus iniuriis permotus Caesar legiones . . . adducit*<sup>1</sup>), which implies that they were not then with him. Moreover, von Domaszewski forgot to make a simple calculation. Caesar left Rome about April 7. The distance from Brundisium *via* Ariminum to Massilia is 1,516 kilometres,<sup>2</sup> or about 941 statute miles. Caesar did not enter Brundisium until March 18.<sup>3</sup> Even if he had dispatched his legions to Ariminum on the same day they could hardly have reached Massilia before May 20 or thereabouts, whereas Caesar reached it a month earlier. It is therefore certain that the three legions which Caesar brought to Massilia were not those which had served under him in Italy. What they were we shall presently see.

We know that six legions served under Caesar in Spain;<sup>4</sup> and since Fabius had only three when Caesar ordered him to march,<sup>5</sup> the legions which Caesar summoned to reinforce him must also have been three. Stoffel<sup>6</sup> holds that veteran legions only would have been employed in such an arduous campaign. Observing that to march from Tarentum, where one of them had been quartered,<sup>7</sup> to Ilerda—a distance of 2,082 kilometres (1,293 miles)—would have required at least 70 days, that Caesar reached Ilerda on June 22, and that two days earlier the army of Fabius was complete,<sup>8</sup> he infers that they arrived before June 20, say on June 19, and therefore that the legion quartered at Tarentum must have started not later than April 10. Accordingly he assumes that Caesar sent the order to march while he was still at Rome. This implies that the legions made the extraordinary average of 18½ miles, or rather, as we must suppose that they rested one day in each week,<sup>9</sup> 21½ miles a day. Stoffel argues, further, that Caesar in the first instance ordered these legions to occupy the southern part of Transalpine Gaul, and that he only ordered them to march on to Spain when he found that the Massilians intended to oppose him. This argument depends, first, on the assumption that he originally intended to employ the legions of Trebonius in Spain, and, secondly, upon the passage in which, immediately after telling us that he ordered Fabius to march thither, he says that he 'ordered the remaining legions, which were in winter-quarters a long way off, to follow' Fabius (*Reliquas legiones, quae longius hiemabant, subsequi iubet*<sup>10</sup>). *Longius*, according to Stoffel, means Southern Italy; and in accordance with his theory that

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 36, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Stoffel, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 379.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, i, 39, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 37, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 259–60.

<sup>7</sup> *Cic., Att.*, ix, 15, 1. It is not absolutely certain that the legion quartered at Tarentum was a veteran legion.

<sup>8</sup> *B. C.*, i, 40, 3–4.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Lord Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket-book*<sup>s</sup>, 1886, p. 322.

<sup>10</sup> *B. C.*, i, 37, 2.



these legions when they received the order to follow Fabius were already marching for Transalpine Gaul, he assumes that a careless copyist wrote *hiemabant* (were wintering) instead of *hiemarant* (had wintered).<sup>1</sup>

Nobody, so far as I know, has disputed Stoffel's theory; but in this, as in many other cases, he misunderstood Caesar's narrative. When he pronounces that 'César n'a pu songer à faire assiéger Massilia par des légions de recrues, parce que de pareilles légions n'auraient pas pris la ville', he apparently forgets that the town was captured without serious fighting by means of a breach made by troops who worked securely inside a strong sappers' hut and by other siege works;<sup>2</sup> that two legions of recruits helped to overthrow the formidable host of Ariovistus;<sup>3</sup> that recruits only were assigned by Caesar to Curio for the campaign in Africa;<sup>4</sup> and that of the legions with which Caesar won his African campaign four were newly raised.<sup>5</sup> When he infers from the passage in which Valerius Maximus says that a soldier of the 10th fought near Massilia that the legion itself must have fought there, he forgets that, as he himself explained,<sup>6</sup> a soldier of the same legion fought at Ruspina before it had arrived in Africa,<sup>7</sup> and therefore that the soldier mentioned by Valerius may well have been a time-expired volunteer: when he cites the passage<sup>8</sup> in which Caesar says that he assigned to Brutus at Massilia valiant men from 'all the legions', he forgets that Caesar, if he did not select men from the veteran legions in Gaul, may have stiffened the ranks of his recruits by old soldiers who responded to his appeal, not to mention that even recruits may give evidence of valour.<sup>9</sup> He appears quite unconscious of the contradiction between Caesar's words and the interpretation which he puts upon them. Caesar says that on leaving Brundisium—that is on or after March 18—he quartered his troops in the neighbouring towns in order to let them rest for 'the time that remained' (*reliquum tempus*<sup>10</sup>). The veteran legions, after seven or eight years of hard fighting in Gaul, had just marched nearly 1,100 miles—the distance from Matisco to Brundisium—in 67 days (if Stoffel's estimate<sup>11</sup> can be accepted), of which seven were spent at Corfinium: surely they had earned a rest of more than the bare three weeks which Stoffel gives them! Surely in *reliquum tempus* means until Caesar should be ready to start for the campaign against Pompey in Greece.<sup>12</sup> Again, the reader who is

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 260–1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *B. G.*, i, 10, 3 with 51, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, i, 5; 60, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Bell. Afr.*, 16, 1 with 53, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 8–16. Cf. pp. 86–92.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, i, 25, 2; 30, 2; ii, 23, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, ii, 294.

<sup>8</sup> *B. C.*, i, 57, 1.

<sup>9</sup> Some of Caesar's recruits may have been veterans. Cf. App., ii, 34, 134, where we read that the Senate directed Pompey to raise 130,000 recruits, especially veterans.

<sup>10</sup> *B. C.*, i, 32, 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 207. Stoffel's estimate refers to the 12th legion only; but the 8th, which joined Caesar at Corfinium (*B. C.*, i, 18, 5), must have marched almost as fast. The rate of marching which Stoffel assumes is excessive. Cf. G. Veith, *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, &c., 1920, pp. 229–32.

<sup>12</sup> Caesar (*B. C.*, iii, 2, 3, with which cf. 87, 3) says that the health of the legions which had been quartered in and near Brundisium (32, 1; Cic., *Att.*,

not disposed to bow to Stoffel's authority may well ask why Caesar should have marched these long-suffering legions all the way back to Gaul, merely in order to occupy the southern part of the Province. Gaul had been thoroughly subdued and was now thoroughly well disposed towards Caesar :<sup>1</sup> would not newly raised legions have served well enough as an army of occupation in a peaceful land ? And, even if veterans were required, why were they condemned to get there by forced marches of  $21\frac{1}{2}$  miles a day ? Simply because Stoffel was obliged to rush them along in order to bring them to Ilerda by the 19th of June. Consider the labours which he imposed upon the much-enduring men. First they march nearly 1,100 miles between December 29 and March 9 ; then they work hard at Brundisium till the 17th ; after three weeks' rest they are set going again and march 1,293 miles in 70 days : then comes a hard campaign of 40 days ; and finally they are sent back the whole 1,293 miles to Brundisium. Caesar understood the management of troops better than Stoffel, who, since he frequently reminded his readers of his professional knowledge, would have done well to ponder the warning of a soldier more experienced than himself,—that forced marches, 'when made to excess' are 'ruinous to military efficiency' and that 'for every 100 miles that are marched continuously you will lose in strength from 2 to 3 per cent.'<sup>2</sup>

We must not forget *quae longius hiemabant*. What right has Stoffel to change *hiemabant* into *hiemarant* ? Did he suppose that Caesar would have used the expression 'had wintered' of troops who had merely rested for three weeks near Brundisium ? Or that, if the troops to which he referred had spent a fraction of the winter in Southern Italy, he would have failed to make his meaning clear ? He wrote *quae longius hiemabant* because he had just been speaking of legions that were wintering near Narbo, and it never occurred to him that any commentator would be so stupid as not to see that by *longius* he meant a part of Gaul more remote from Spain. To any one who is not determined to twist the plain meaning of words into a show of agreement with a preconceived theory it is clear that the legions which were ordered to follow Fabius were those which were wintering near Matisco ; and that the legions which Caesar brought to Massilia were legions which he had raised at the beginning of the Civil War.

*B. C.*, i, 35, 4.—Caesar, reporting the answer which the Massilian Government made to his request that they should refrain from armed resistance, says that they remarked that 'the leaders of the parties

ix, 15, 1 ; App., ii, 40, 160-1) was impaired by the unhealthy autumnal climate. Stoffel's theory compels him to argue that the effects of the climate made themselves felt in the few days during which the troops awaited embarkation at Brundisium.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 39, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Wolseley, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-1. Cf. *B. C.*, iii, 106, 2, where Caesar says that many men, 'exhausted by long marches, were unable to follow' (*magnitudine itineris confecti consequi non potuerunt*) when he was about to embark for Alexandria.

[into which the Roman people were divided] were Gnaeus Pompeius and Gaius Caesar . . . the latter had officially granted to them [the Massilians] lands belonging to the Volcae Arecomici and the Helvii ; the former had placed under their authority the Sallyes, whom he had subdued' (*Principes vero esse earum partium Cn. Pompeium et C. Caesarem . . . quorum alter agros Volcarum Arecomicorum et Helviorum publice iis concesserit, alter bello victos Sallyas attribuerit*). I agree with Nipperdey<sup>1</sup> that the first *alter* refers to Caesar and the second to Pompey (for a certain instance of a similar inversion cf. *B. G.*, vii, 17, 2). Caesar, as far as we know, never interfered with the Sallyes, and Pompey never went near the Helvii, whereas the Sallyes were among the tribes which he subdued when he was marching in 77 B. C. from Italy to Spain.

### THE CAMPAIGN OF ILERDA

**The armies of Afranius and Petreius and of Caesar.**—According to the MSS. (*B. C.*, i, 39, 1), Afranius had about 80 cohorts of Spanish auxiliaries besides cavalry. I agree with Stoffel<sup>2</sup> that the number *LXXX*, for which he would substitute *XXX*, is wrong ; for if each of the cohorts was of about the same strength—say 400 men—as a legionary cohort, 80 auxiliary cohorts would have numbered 32,000 men,—considerably more than Afranius's 5 legions. Yet when the armies confronted each other on the day before Afranius surrendered, the auxiliaries formed only one line while the legions formed two.<sup>3</sup>

Caesar, before describing the operations which Fabius conducted against Afranius, says that he had himself 'sent on in advance into Spain 6 legions, 5,000 auxiliary infantry, 3,000 cavalry, which he had had in all his previous campaigns, and the same number from Gaul, which he had himself subdued, raised by a summons addressed individually to the most warlike knights of all the tribes . . . men of the best class from the Aquitanians and the mountaineers in the neighbourhood of the Province' (*Caesar legiones in Hispaniam praemisera VI, auxilia peditum V milia, equitum III milia, quae omnibus superioribus bellis habuerat, et parem ex Gallia numerum, quam ipse pacaverat, nominatim ex omnibus civitatibus nobilissimo et fortissimo quoque evocato . . . optimi generis hominum ex Aquitanis montanisque qui Galliam provinciam attingunt*).<sup>4</sup> The 3,000 cavalry which had served in Caesar's Gallic campaigns were composed largely of Gauls ; but he had also employed Spanish and German cavalry.<sup>5</sup> The 3,000, then, may have included Spaniards and almost certainly included Germans ; for Caesar says that he had 'light-armed Germans' (*Germanos levis armaturae*)<sup>6</sup> in Spain, and their presence seems to imply the presence of German cavalry, in conjunction with whom light-armed active footmen regularly fought.<sup>7</sup> Stoffel<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *C. I. Caes. comm.*, 1847, p. 137.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 265.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, i, 83, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 39, 2-3.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, v, 26, 3 ; vii, 13, 1, &c.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, i, 83, 5.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, i, 48, 5-7.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 263.



assumes that the 3,000 cavalry which Caesar had just raised from Gaul were also with Fabius when he reached Ilerda: but, notwithstanding the word *praemisera*, this is not certain; for three of the legions had not yet joined him,<sup>1</sup> and the newly raised cavalry may not have done so either. I am not sure that they all arrived until after Caesar had built the bridge by which he regained communication with the eastern bank of the Segre;<sup>2</sup> for that bridge enabled a large Gallic convoy, which for some days had been barred by the Segre, to reach his camp.<sup>3</sup> The convoy included a body of cavalry sufficiently strong to keep the whole of Afranius's cavalry at bay:<sup>4</sup> yet Stoffel does not so much as mention them when he is computing the strength of Caesar's force. Is it not probable that they formed a part of the 6,000 cavalry which Caesar mentions, and that he loosely used the word *praemisera* because he had summoned the Gallic knights to bring their contingents before he ordered Fabius to invade Spain? The 900 cavalry which Caesar reserved for his own escort,<sup>5</sup> and which accompanied him from Massilia to Ilerda, were evidently not included in the 6,000.

Stoffel insists that in the passage which I have quoted *parem ex Gallia numerum* refers not only to *equitum III milia*, but also to *auxilia peditum V milia*—the number by the way is doubtful—and therefore that the auxiliaries numbered 10,000.<sup>6</sup> If so, Caesar expressed his meaning badly; but the reason which Stoffel gives is insufficient. Caesar, he argues, says that part of the Gallic levies was raised in the mountainous country bordering on the Province, and evidently these levies were not cavalry. But between the words *fortissimo quoque evocato* and *optimi generis . . . provinciam attingunt* there is an obvious lacuna; and in the missing words Caesar may have referred to the *auxilia peditum* and have gone on to say that some of them came from Aquitania and from the country bordering on the Province. Stoffel<sup>7</sup> supposes that Caesar's archers and slingers were not counted in the *auxilia* which he mentioned. I see no sufficient reason for this assumption. As the archers and slingers formed a part of his force, he would surely have either mentioned them separately or tacitly included them under the head of *auxilia*. Some at all events of the archers who served under him in Spain were raised in the country of the Ruteni,<sup>8</sup> who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Rhodéz.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 37, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 54, 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 51; 54, 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 51, 4-6.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 41, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 263-4. Referring to Cic., *Att.*, ix, 13, 4, Stoffel says, 'Il serait possible que les 10,000 fantassins et les 6,000 cavaliers . . . représentassent le contingent qu'au dire de Matius, les Gaulois s'étaient engagés de fournir à César', &c. Apparently he was ignorant that in this letter the words *decem milia* before *peditum* have been supplied by conjecture. There is a lacuna in the text, and the number which Cicero mentioned is unknown.

The number of the auxiliaries also is uncertain. The MS. reading, obviously absurd, is (*auxilia peditum*) *nulla. V milia* is an emendation, proposed by Nipperdey (*C. I. Caesaris Comm.*, &c., 1847, pp. 140-1) and based upon reasons so doubtful that they are not worth reproducing.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 265.

<sup>8</sup> *B. C.*, i, 51, 1.



Of the six legions which Caesar employed in this campaign the distinguishing numbers of two are directly attested, namely, IX. and XIV.<sup>1</sup> Stoffel, as we have seen, holds that three of the others were the legions that had recently served under Caesar in Italy, the 13th, 12th, and 8th; but as I have confuted him,<sup>2</sup> it follows that, besides the 9th and the 14th, the corps that served in Spain were the 6th, 7th, 10th, and 11th.

**B. C., i, 39, 3.**—Caesar writes that (before the Spanish campaign) he ‘had heard that Pompey was marching through Mauretania to Spain and would speedily arrive. At the same time he borrowed money from the military tribunes and the centurions, and distributed it among the troops. By this expedient he achieved two objects,—secured a pledge for the loyalty of the centurions and purchased the goodwill of the men’ (*Audierat Pompeium per Mauretaniam cum legionibus iter in Hispaniam facere confestimque esse venturum. Simul a tribunis militum centurionibusque mutuas pecunias sumpsit; has exercitui distribuit. Quo facto duas res consecutus est, quod pignore animos centurionum devinxit et largitione militum voluntates redemit*). Meusel says that these words cannot apply to Caesar, who certainly did not believe that Pompey was then coming to Spain and who could depend upon the fidelity of his troops. Probably, he concludes, something has dropped out of the text before *Audierat*. But if the subject of *Audierat* is not Caesar, it must be either *Afranius* or *Petreius*; and if Pompey’s lieutenants deemed it necessary to take account of the rumour that Pompey was coming to command in person against Caesar, why should it be thought incredible that Caesar did the same? <sup>3</sup> The native tribes were certainly influenced by the rumour, for we are told in 60, 5 that it was no longer believed, and that accordingly many tribes transferred their allegiance from Afranius to Caesar. From time to time Caesar distributed gifts of money among his troops,<sup>4</sup> presumably with the object of confirming their loyalty; why should he not have done so before, as well as after, an arduous campaign? Besides, I doubt whether, if Afranius had adopted this method of securing the goodwill of his army, Caesar would have thought it worth while to inform us of the fact, and I am sure that he would not have sandwiched in this information between two sentences which related respectively to his own operations and those of his lieutenant, Fabius.

**The sites of Fabius’s camp and of his bridges.**—The two bridges with which Fabius spanned the Segre were 4 Roman miles apart.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Von Domaszewski (*Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, pp. 167–8) says that it is not certain that the 14th legion served in Spain, for the centurion of this legion whom Caesar mentions (*B. C.*, i, 46, 4) was a time-expired volunteer (*evocatus*). This assertion is disposed of by Caesar’s description of Fulginius,—an officer ‘who had risen by dint of conspicuous valour from the lower grades to the position which he held’ ([*Q. Fulginius ex primo hastato legionis XIII.*] *qui propter excimiam virtutem ex inferioribus ordinibus in eum locum pervenerat*).

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 384–7.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero wrote to Atticus on May 3 that a like rumour was believed by all the Pompeians (*Att.*, x, 9, 1).

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii, 89, 5; viii, 4, 1; &c.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 40, 1.

A broad torrential stream, the Noguera-Ribagorzana, enters the Segre from the west about  $6\frac{3}{4}$  Roman miles above Lerida. Stoffel<sup>1</sup> rightly infers that the upper bridge was between the Ribagorzana and Ilerda, while the lower could not have been more than about 2 miles above the latter: on the other hand, it could not have been much less, or it would have been inconveniently near Afranius's camp. The positions which Stoffel indicates in his map (Planche 5) are at all events approximately correct.

Caesar says that on the day before he reached Ilerda two of Fabius's legions under Plancus went out as usual to escort his foragers by 'the nearer bridge' (*propiore ponte*); that soon afterwards this bridge was destroyed by a storm; and that Fabius sent two more legions by 'the further bridge' (*ulteriore ponte*) to succour the foragers and their escort.<sup>2</sup> The word *ulteriore* shows that Fabius's camp was not between the bridges, but that the nearer as well as the further bridge was north of it; and Stoffel accordingly located the camp on the southern slopes of the hill of Larrala. His choice hardly needs to be verified by excavation, a test which he was unable to apply.<sup>3</sup>

*B. C.*, i, 40, 5.—*L. Plancus . . . locum capit superiorem diversamque aciem in duas partes constituit, ne ab equitatu circumveniri posset.* Stoffel<sup>4</sup> holds that Plancus formed his two legions back to back; but the hill which he rightly identifies with the *locus superior*—that on which Alcoetge now stands—slopes so steeply immediately below its summit towards the river that Plancus was not likely to be attacked by cavalry on that side. I therefore agree with Captain G. Veith<sup>5</sup> that the line was formed on obliquely divergent fronts.

**The *antesignani*.**—Who in the army of Caesar were the *antesignani*? This problem was already being discussed in the time of Milton; but I believe that it can be solved.

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 266.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 40, 3. 5. 7.

<sup>3</sup> R. Schneider (*Ilerda*, 1886, pp. 5-6), writing before Stoffel's book appeared, maintained that Guischart (*Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, pp. 29, 44-5) was right in locating Fabius's camp near Corbias, immediately south of the Ribagorzana, and accordingly he places the upper bridge near Termens and 6 kilometres above Corbias. His reasons are these:—When Afranius learned that the nearer bridge had been destroyed, he sent four legions and all his cavalry across the stone bridge at Ilerda to attack the two legions of Plancus (*B. C.*, i, 40, 4). The cavalry soon came into touch with Plancus; but the four legions did not arrive until the two which Fabius sent to support Plancus appeared upon the scene. These two legions had to march 4 Roman miles up stream and the same distance down the left bank of the Segre. The Afranians of course began their march later than the two legions which Fabius sent to the rescue, but they only had to march 10 kilometres instead of 12, and therefore arrived simultaneously. Now any one who reads Caesar's narrative attentively will see that this argument is worthless; for, first, Caesar says that when the legions of Fabius appeared in the distance the Afranian legions were already in action (*ib.*, §§ 6-7), and, secondly, Schneider had no right to assume that the point to which the legions of Fabius had to march was opposite the lower bridge. Moreover, he forgot that on the theory of Guischart the legions of Fabius would have been obliged to cross the Ribagorzana; and it is self-evident that Fabius would not have allowed his bridges to be separated by this considerable stream.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 48.

<sup>5</sup> *Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, 1906, p. 253.

From the five passages in which Caesar mentions the *antesignani* it is evident that they were, or at all events comprised, the best and the most active soldiers in each legion;<sup>1</sup> but the first is the only one that throws any light on the position which they occupied when they were fighting in a pitched battle. We shall consider this passage when we come to examine one of the theories which modern writers have devised.

Livy frequently mentions the *antesignani*; and from what he says it has been inferred almost unanimously that before the military reforms of Marius they were the *hastati*,—the foremost of the three lines (*triplex acies*) in which the army was normally formed for action. If Livy understood what he was writing about, the evidence of the following passages cannot be gainsaid: *cadunt antesignani, et ne nudentur propugnatoribus signa fit ex secunda prima acies*<sup>2</sup> ('the *antesignani* fell, and that the standards might not be left defenceless, the second line was transformed into the first'); *nova . . . exorta pugna est, non illa ordinata per principes hastatosque ac triarios, nec ut pro signis antesignani, post signa alia pugnaret acies*,<sup>3</sup> &c., ('it was a new kind of battle that ensued, not the familiar formation of *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*, the *antesignani* fighting in front of the standards, and a second line behind,' &c.). From these passages and others<sup>4</sup> C. L. E. Zander<sup>5</sup> concluded that the *antesignani* comprised all the legionaries who fought in the first line, not only in the time of the manipular organization, but after the reforms of Marius. 'This opinion', says Stoffel,<sup>6</sup> 'which makes *antesignani* the equivalent of *prima acies*, is indefensible. How can one admit that two-fifths of the effective strength of each legion [that is, four cohorts] was composed of picked troops?' One might reply that from the relevant passages it may be inferred that the picked troops were selected from the *antesignani*.

C. C. L. Lange<sup>7</sup> identified the *antesignani* with the 300 active men whom Caesar selected from each legion during the African campaign to support his cavalry.<sup>8</sup> That this corps, which was organized in extraordinary circumstances for a special purpose, was composed wholly or in part of *antesignani* is probable enough; but to infer from this probability that there were 300 *antesignani* in each legion and no more is hardly logical. Before the battle of Pharsalia Caesar, who then had nine legions under his command, reinforced his cavalry by 400 *antesignani*:<sup>9</sup> would it be reasonable to infer that there were only  $\frac{400}{9}$  *antesignani* in each legion?

Masquelez holds that the *antesignani* were the foremost ranks of each of the three lines.<sup>10</sup> This, he says, enables us to understand the description which Frontinus<sup>11</sup> gives of the dispositions adopted

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 43, 3; 44, 5; 57, 1; iii, 75, 5; 84, 3.

<sup>2</sup> ix, 39, 7.

<sup>3</sup> xxii, 5, 7.

<sup>4</sup> xxx, 33, 3, &c.

<sup>5</sup> *Andeutungen zur Gesch. d. röm. Kriegswesens*, 1859, pp. 25-32.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 336.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, 1846, pp. 19-20.

<sup>8</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 75, 5; 78, 5.

<sup>9</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 75, 5.

<sup>10</sup> Dairemberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, i, 288.

<sup>11</sup> ii, 3, 17.



by Sulla against Archelaus: *Sulla . . . postsignanis, qui in secunda acie erant, imperavit ut densos numerosque palos firme in terram defigerent, intraque eos adpropinquantibus quadrigis antesignanorum aciem recepit* ('Sulla . . . ordered the *postsignani*, who were in the second line, to plant numerous stakes closely and firmly in the ground, and on the approach of the chariots he received the line of the *antesignani* within them'). How this passage is to be explained on Masquelez's theory I cannot see. 'The *postsignani*, who were in the second line', were evidently distinct from *antesignani*, who, on Masquelez's theory, included the foremost ranks of the same line; if that were true, one would ask in vain what Frontinus meant by 'the line of the *antesignani*',<sup>1</sup> and the manœuvre which he so clearly describes would be unintelligible. Obviously he meant that the second line was composed of *postsignani*,<sup>2</sup> the first line of *antesignani*. In other words, the testimony of Frontinus, who was a military expert, agrees with that of Livy; and, according to him, the *antesignani*, after as well as before the reforms of Marius, were identical with the first line.

Stoffel,<sup>3</sup> whose view is substantially the same as that of Masquelez, has defended it by reasoning which takes no account either of Livy or of Frontinus. Premising that the three maniples of each cohort stood abreast and that the two centuries of each maniple stood one behind the other, he begins by arguing that the cohort had a standard of its own. 'How', he asks, 'can they [the scholars who deny this] believe that Marius, in creating a new fighting unit, did not give it a special standard? . . . We are disposed to believe that the standard of the 1st maniple (that of the right) was also . . . the standard of the cohort'. The scholars to whom Stoffel referred would probably reply that the cohort was not a new tactical unit, but rather a new administrative unit; but, given the qualification which Stoffel adds—that the standard of the 1st maniple was also the standard of the cohort—I am disposed to agree with him.<sup>4</sup> He then observes that soldiers who were fighting hand to hand in a confused *mêlée* were obliged, in order to keep together and to avoid disorder, to group themselves round numerous standards. The standard of each maniple must, he argues, have been in one of the foremost ranks, for there only could it be easily seen by all the men. But as its importance and its sacred character forbade its being needlessly exposed, it would not have been placed in the front rank of all.

<sup>1</sup> According to Masquelez, there must have been *postsignani* as well as *antesignani* in the first line.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Amm. Marc.*, xviii, 8, 7; xxiv, 6, 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 329–38.

<sup>4</sup> See *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, 1911, p. 851. I have given reasons (vol. i, p. 116, n. 6), for believing that in Caesar's time the tactical unit was the cohort. A. J. Reinach (Daremborg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, iv, 1316–7) and others deny that the cohort had a standard; but (apart from *B. G.*, ii, 25, 1, where Caesar's meaning is unmistakable) my view is supported by a passage in Vegetius (*De re mil.*, ii, 20); a letter of Sulpicius Galba (*Cic., Fam.*, x, 30, 5), to which Reinach appeals, proves nothing; and Reinach admits that under the Empire the cohort had a standard (*Tac., Ann.*, i, 18).



Referring to the well-known passage <sup>1</sup> from which we learn that in the combat of Ruspina Caesar ordered that no legionary was to stir more than 4 feet in front of the *signa* (*ne quis miles ab signis IIII pedes longius procederet*), Stoffel argues that this order can only be explained on the assumption that the standards were placed in the second rank. Perhaps, he says, the standard-bearer stood a little behind the rank: anyhow the *antesignani* were the two front ranks of each line.

Now to any one who was not familiar with the relevant passage in Frontinus this theory would probably at first sight commend itself; but if Stoffel's arguments were valid, they would tell also against Livy's implied statement that the *hastati* and the *antesignani* were the same. Moreover, Dr. Purser emphasizes 'the probability that the standard-bearers, impeded with the excessively heavy standards, would have been almost sure to have been at once cut down if they stood in the front rank . . . and so the rallying-point of the maniples gone'; <sup>2</sup> and even if they had stood in the second rank, their position would still have been dangerous. Dr. Purser adds that 'the front-rank men could be recalled by the trumpet if they pushed away from the standards'; <sup>3</sup> and Stoffel seems to forget that if the two front ranks could keep together and avoid disorder though their standard was behind them, so could the ranks in the rear. His theory is open to another serious objection, which, like the one that I have just stated, has, so far as I know, hitherto escaped notice. When Caesar sent the *antesignani* of the 14th legion to seize the Puig Bordel—the knoll between Ilerda and the camp of Afranius—he could not afford to lose any time: every second, as his narrative shows, was precious. <sup>4</sup> If the *antesignani* were all in the first line, no time was actually lost: if the bulk of them were behind, in the second line and the third, they were, owing to the very short distance that separated them from the enemy, most seriously handicapped; for the three divisions of the *antesignani* would have started from three different positions unequally distant from the knoll. Finally, in the passage which Stoffel quotes from *Bellum Africanum signis* almost certainly means not standards but maniples. <sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 15, 1.

<sup>2</sup> W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Ant.*, ii, 672 b.

<sup>3</sup> Mommsen (*Archaeol.-epigr. Mitth.*, 1886, p. 5) says much the same.

<sup>4</sup> (*antesignanos procurrere atque eum tumulum occupare iubet.*) *Qua re cognita celeriter quae in statione pro castris erant Afranii cohortes breviorē itinere ad eundem occupandum locum mittuntur.* *B. C.*, i, 43, 3-4.

<sup>5</sup> F. Fröhlich, *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, 1889, p. 32. The passage in the *Bellum Gallicum* (ii, 25, 1) which records that in the battle with the Nervii the standard-bearer of the 4th cohort of the 12th legion was killed, might be adduced in favour of the theory that the manipular standards were placed in one of the front ranks. Fröhlich (*op. cit.*, p. 32), who holds that the standard-bearer of the 4th cohort must have been there, suggests that the legion had attacked in column instead of in line; for, as all scholars are aware, when the army was marching in column the standards were carried at the head of each corps. So unusual a proceeding as that which Fröhlich imagines seems most unlikely, even considering the exceptional nature of the battle with the Nervii, but since *all* the centurions of the 4th cohort were killed (*B. G.*, ii, 25, 1), is it not likely that the standard-bearer who fell was in the rear?

A. von Domaszewski,<sup>1</sup> accepting the common opinion that before the reforms of Marius the *antesignani* were identical with the *hastati*, nevertheless originally held that in Caesar's time they formed a special corps. In opposition to Marquardt,<sup>2</sup> according to whom they derived their name from the fact that the standards of the maniples were placed behind the first line, he argued that the standards which Livy so often mentions were not the manipular but the legionary standards, of which in the pre-Marian legion there were five.<sup>3</sup> After the Marian reforms the eagle, then the only standard of the legion, was, he admitted, always placed behind the first line;<sup>4</sup> but he insisted that the standards of the maniples stood in the front rank. Caesar's *antesignani*, he observed, often fought in conjunction with cavalry and were light-armed troops; Cicero expressly distinguishes them from the ordinary legionaries, for he speaks of *antesignanos et manipulares*.<sup>5</sup> Von Domaszewski therefore concluded that they derived their name from the fact that, as a general rule, and under Caesar's command invariably, they fought outside the line of battle. In support of this conclusion he pointed out that a legionary, lightly armed like the Italian auxiliaries (*velites*) of the pre-Marian army, is depicted on a sepulchral monument of the time of Tiberius.<sup>6</sup> Either Caesar was the first to introduce these light-armed legionaries or in the Civil War he formed them into a special corps of picked troops in order to counterbalance Pompey's superiority in cavalry and light-armed auxiliary infantry. In other words, von Domaszewski substantially agreed with Lange, and Professor Stuart Jones<sup>7</sup> is of the same opinion. Remarking that 'an inscription found in the armoury of the camp at Lambaesis<sup>8</sup> distinguishes *arma antesignana* and *postsignana*,' he concludes that 'In Caesar the word *antesignani* bears a different meaning [from that assigned to it by Livy], and denotes a picked troop of light-armed legionaries who skirmished in front of the line of battle in co-operation with the cavalry'.<sup>9</sup>

Did not von Domaszewski lay excessive stress upon Cicero's words, *antesignanos et manipulares*? Surely he would not have denied that the *antesignani* were themselves organized in maniples? Cicero was not speaking as a military historian, but as a rhetorician. He

<sup>1</sup> *Pardys Real-Ency.*, i, 2355-6. Cf. von Domaszewski's article, 'Die Fahnen,' &c. (*Abhandl. d. archæol.-epigr. Seminars d. Univ. Wien*, 1885, pp. 2-3, 12).

<sup>2</sup> *Röm. Staatsverw.*, ii<sup>2</sup>, 1884, pp. 353-5. <sup>3</sup> Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, x, 4 (5), 16.

<sup>4</sup> Tac., *Hist.*, ii, 43.

<sup>5</sup> *Phil.*, v, 5, 12.

<sup>6</sup> L. Lindenschmidt, *Die Alterthümer uns. heidn. Vorzeit*, i, 1858, Heft ix, Taf. 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Companion to Roman Studies*, 1912, p. 213.

<sup>8</sup> *Arma ANTESIGNANA XXX POSTSIGNANA XIV* (*Mém. de l'Inst. . . Acad. des Inscr.*, &c., xxxviii, 1909, p. 259). G. Veith (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, 1912, p. 790) holds that the distinction between *arma antesignana* and *arma postsignana* was that the *postsignani* had no javelins (*pila*). The camp at Lambaesis was constructed early in the second century.

<sup>9</sup> A passage in Vegetius (*De re mil.*, ii, 2)—*Legio autem propriis cohortibus plena cum gravem armaturam, hoc est principes hastatos triarios antesignanos . . . teneat*, &c.—shows that he regarded the *antesignani* as heavy-armed troops; but what period he had in mind I do not know.

mentions the *antesignani* first as the best men of the legion,<sup>1</sup> and then adds *et manipulares*,—‘and (other) privates’. Immediately after *et manipulares* in the same sentence he writes *et alaudas* (‘and soldiers of the legion *Alaudae*’); but von Domaszewski would admit that the *alaudae* were themselves *manipulares*. It is true that Caesar only mentions the *antesignani* in connexion with operations which required that they should fight elsewhere than in the line of battle; but when those operations were in progress no pitched battle was being fought; and von Domaszewski would hardly have contended that Caesar left the *antesignani* out of the line of battle at Thapsus and Munda. The statement that ‘In Caesar the word *antesignani* . . . denotes a picked troop of light-armed legionaries who skirmished in front of the line of battle in co-operation with the cavalry’ seems to me to lack the writer’s usual precision. In the first and the second of the five passages in which Caesar mentions *antesignani* they figure merely as a division of the 14th legion detailed to seize a strong position, and they do not act in co-operation with cavalry. In the third they are selected to serve on board the fleet of Brutus, just as legionaries served in his fleet in the Bay of Biscay,<sup>2</sup> in Caesar’s fleet at Alexandria,<sup>3</sup> and on many other occasions. In the fourth passage and the fifth light-armed *antesignani* act in co-operation with the cavalry; but their arms are not part of their ordinary equipment, they are specially selected for the occasion. Similarly in the Indian Mutiny infantry of the line were hastily trained by the younger Havelock to act as mounted infantry, and Highlanders were mounted on camels in the pursuit of Tantia Topi.<sup>4</sup> The *antesignani* who served in the fleet of Brutus and those who served in conjunction with the cavalry in Thessaly afterwards fought as heavy-armed infantry in the battle of Pharsalia, just as the 10th legion, which for the nonce served as cavalry in the plain of Alsace soon afterwards fought on foot against Ariovistus.<sup>5</sup> The Roman legionary, like the British sailors who worked their heavy guns at Lucknow and at Ladysmith, was a handy man.

The inscription of Lambaesis led von Domaszewski to change his mind; and the conclusion which he draws from it is different from that which commends itself to Professor Stuart Jones. He now holds<sup>6</sup> that ‘the deep-rooted error’ that during close fighting the standards were in the front rank is refuted by the inscription, which, he says, proves that two-thirds of the legionaries regularly stood in advance of the standards. Therefore, he concludes, the words in *Bellum Africanum* (15, 1)—*ne quis miles a signis IIII pedes longius procederet*—(from which he formerly inferred that the standards were in the front rank) do not refer to the standards, but *signa* here, as in

<sup>1</sup> Cicero (*Phil.*, ii, 29, 71) apostrophizes Antony himself as an *antesignanus*:—*fueras in acie Pharsalica antesignanus*.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, iii, 14, 3–8.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 13, 5. Cf. 10, 1–3.

<sup>4</sup> Rice Holmes, *Hist. of the Indian Mutiny*<sup>2</sup>, 1898 (and later reprints), pp. 456–7, 546.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, i, 42, 5–6; 43, 2; 46, 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Sitzungsber. d. Heidelb. Akad. d. Wiss.*, Philos.-hist. Kl. i, 1910, p. 9, n. 5.



other passages, denotes the body of troops to which the standard belonged. I have already said much the same. Von Domaszewski also infers from the number of weapons—44—mentioned in the inscription that they belonged to a half century, and that four ranks stood in front of, two behind the standard. Surely this conclusion is rash. Pompey's line at Pharsalia was ten, not six, deep.<sup>1</sup> It would be absurd to argue from a solitary inscription, when we do not know the circumstances in which it was engraved, that the ratio between the numbers of *antesignani* and of *postsignani* was constantly 30 to 14; and a document which belonged to the second century of the Empire is not sufficient evidence for the time of Caesar. Remember the tactical changes that have been made in the German army since von Moltke's day.

I conclude that for the theory of Stoffel there is no evidence, and that not only the evidence of Livy and Frontinus, but the first passage in which Caesar mentions the *antesignani* is fatal to it; that, whatever the *antesignani* may have become under the Empire, Caesar employed them for any duty for which they were fitted,—as ordinary combatants, as marines, or in conjunction with his cavalry; and that the theory of Zander—that they belonged to the four cohorts of the first line, and were selected from them in numbers which varied according to circumstances—is in harmony with the evidence and is open to no valid objection.

**Where did Caesar's coracles cross the Segre?**—Mr. A. G. Peskett finds a stumbling-block in the statement of Caesar that the point where his troops crossed the Segre in coracles was 22 Roman miles from his camp. 'How', he asks,<sup>2</sup> 'did these wagons cross the Noguera Rivagorzana, especially as it must have been more or less in flood? And how . . . did they escape the notice of the enemy, when, as Caesar himself says,<sup>3</sup> all the roads were beset by Afranius' horse and foot? M. Stoffel ignores the difficulty'. Because, if he gave it a thought, he knew that it was imaginary. South African farmers regularly take ox-wagons across rivers by fords. The troops escaped the notice of the enemy because they marched, as Caesar says,<sup>4</sup> in the night. The roads that were beset by Afranius's horse and foot were on the left bank of the Segre.

**The works by which Caesar made the Segre fordable.**—Caesar says that he 'proceeded to dig several trenches, each 30 feet wide, in order to divert part of the waters of the Segre and thereby render it fordable' ([nactus idoneum locum] *fossas pedum XXX in latitudinem complures facere instituit, quibus partem aliquam Sicoris averteret vadumque in eo flumine efficeret*<sup>5</sup>). The work went on without intermission by day and night,<sup>6</sup> probably for about a week.<sup>7</sup> Stoffel,<sup>8</sup> who supposes that the 'suitable place' (*idoneus locus*) which Caesar selected was about 2 kilometres above Ilerda, where the

<sup>1</sup> *Frontin.*, ii, 3, 22.

<sup>2</sup> In a note on *B. C.*, i, 54, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, i, 54, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 61, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 62, 1.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 408.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 58-9.



river, though it expands to a breadth of 600 metres, contains large islands,<sup>1</sup> believes that the trenches were dug in the western island, and that the water ran through them into the stream below. Rudolf Schneider,<sup>2</sup> objecting that such an operation would not have sensibly diminished the volume of water above the islands, holds that Caesar adopted a method described by a certain Baron d'Arletan in a memoir written for Frederick the Great, which was approved and explained by Guischart.<sup>3</sup>

The problem, says Guischart, was to reduce the depth of the water from 6 to 4 or  $3\frac{1}{2}$  [French] feet. The Segre has a mean breadth of about 240 [=256 English] feet. Therefore the profile of the water which had to be removed was 480 [=512] feet. Suppose that the stream flowed at the rate of 2 feet a second, or 7,200 [=7,680] feet in an hour : then the volume of water to be removed every hour was 3,456,000 [=3,932,160] cubic feet. The country west of the Segre above Lerida is below the level of the bank. About 1,000 toises (2,133 yards) from the bank Caesar excavated a basin 1,200 toises (2,560 yards) long, 700 toises (1,493 yards) wide, and 6 feet (2.13 yards) deep, to contain the overflow ; and from the Segre to the basin he dug 8 trenches, each 30 feet wide and gradually increasing in depth from 3 to 6 feet, their aggregate breadth being exactly equal to the breadth of the river. Guischart neglects the difference between French and Roman feet : 30 Roman are really equivalent to 29.1 English feet). Thus, Guischart continues, every hour 3,456,000 [=3,932,160] cubic feet of water flowed into the basin, which in 9 hours was full. Meanwhile Caesar had made a canal 1,200 toises (2,560 yards) long, in order to conduct the water from the basin into a branch of the Ribagorzana.

What does the reader think of it all ? First, why did Guischart suppose that the Segre in flood flowed only 2 feet a second ? Caesar says that it was a swift stream, and nobody who has seen it will gainsay him ; but a river which flows less than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile an hour is slow.<sup>4</sup> The capacity of the basin, according to Guischart, was 30,240,000 (French) cubic feet ; but he seems to have forgotten that he said it was 6 feet deep. If so, its capacity was 181,440,000 cubic feet, and it would have taken not 9 but more than 50 hours to fill. Now consider the question of labour. Guischart<sup>5</sup> thinks it 'quite possible that nearly 50,000 men were employed' : but in order to assemble this number, he is obliged to press camp-followers 'and others' into the service and to count in each legion 5,000 men ; and apparently he forgets that until the basin and at least one of the trenches had been dug no water could have been drawn off. Finally,

<sup>1</sup> G. Veith (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, 1906, p. 261) assures us that traces of Caesar's works are still to be seen 'on the spot in question', but does not add that he has himself seen them.

<sup>2</sup> *Ilerda*, pp. 21-3. Cf. *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin (Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, xiv, 1888), p. 332.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, pp. 164-76.

<sup>4</sup> See A. J. Jukes-Browne, *Handbook of Physical Geology*, 1892, p. 127.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 174.

he does not explain why it should have been necessary to excavate a basin at all, or why it should have been made of such a gigantic size. One would like to know what Frederick the Great thought of the memoir—if he ever read it.

The upshot of the matter is this. Stoffel's method will not do : for before the legionaries could dig trenches in the island to which he points they would have had to cross the unfordable western branch of the river ; and if they had performed this miracle, would not Caesar have mentioned that when the passage was ultimately made, cavalry and infantry were obliged to cross the numerous parallel trenches by the plank bridges which must necessarily have spanned them ? The trenches, then, were dug through the bank away from the river. Their natural outlet was the river itself or one of the rivulets that flowed into it. I made this suggestion to Mr. Fletcher Toomer, M.I.C.E., who unhesitatingly approved it. As Guischart remarks, the efforts of the excavators were seconded by mere lapse of time ; for doubtless the river was sinking naturally while they were at work.<sup>1</sup>

I am not sure that the spot which Caesar selected was not higher up than the one which Guischart and Stoffel indicate. Caesar<sup>2</sup> says that the *détour* which he was obliged to make when he pursued the Pompeians added 6 miles to his march. If he means that he marched 6 miles more than he would have done if he had been able to cross the Segre by the permanent bridge, and if he crossed at the place which Stoffel indicates, the additional march was not more than 3 Roman miles.

**Octogesa.**—Octogesa is mentioned by Caesar alone, who describes it as ' a stronghold situated on the Ebro, 30 miles from the [Pompeian] camp '.<sup>3</sup> Those who have read his narrative or mine will remember that Pompey's lieutenants, when they determined to abandon their position near Ilerda and to transfer the war to Celtiberia, ordered a pontoon bridge to be built at Octogesa, and attempted to reach it by crossing from the western to the eastern bank of the Segre ; that Caesar pursued them and two days later succeeded in turning their position and preventing them from following the direct road, which led through a defile between hills ; that Afranius thereupon sent four cohorts of Spanish targeteers to seize ' a high mountain ' in full view of both armies (*montem, qui erat in conspectu omnium excelsissimus*<sup>4</sup>), intending to follow with his whole force and reach Octogesa by moving over high ground ; and that Caesar's cavalry instantly charged the targeteers, surrounded and destroyed them.

Octogesa was identified by Stoffel<sup>5</sup> and earlier writers with Mequinenza, on the north bank of the Ebro, immediately west of its

<sup>1</sup> Schneider (*op. cit.*, p. 23) raises the question why Caesar did not build another bridge instead of trying to make a ford, when the difficulty of diverting the stream was so great. Because, he answers, the enemy were too near, and timber, in which the neighbourhood of Lerida is deficient, was lacking. The available timber had perhaps been used up ; but Schneider's question was answered in anticipation by Caesar (*B. C.*, i, 50).

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 61, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, i, 70, 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 272-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 64, 8.

junction with the Segre. Stoffel premised that the mountain which the targeteers tried to seize was Monmaneu, about 4 miles ENE. of Mequinenza, whence he inferred, first, that the direct road to the Ebro, which Afranius had intended to follow and from which he was cut off by Caesar's turning movement, was the road that led through a defile to Ribarroja; secondly, that as Afranius intended to adopt a new route (*mutato itinere*<sup>1</sup>) and to reach Octogesa by moving over high ground (*iugis*<sup>2</sup>), and as the only route that leads along a ridge from Monmaneu to the Ebro is that which follows the crest of the Sierra de Campells, Octogesa must have been situated at the termination of this route, that is, on the site of Mequinenza.

I have not the slightest doubt that Stoffel was right in identifying the mountain with Monmaneu. This mountain, which is 491 metres, or 1,611 feet, high, is the only one in the whole country between Lerida and the Ebro which corresponds with Caesar's description. Viewed from Lerida, 15 miles away, it is as conspicuous as it was to the armies of Afranius and Caesar; and in the vast landscape it is the feature which, first and last, enchains attention. Rudolf Schneider<sup>3</sup> maintained that there were other mountains, as conspicuous, near Granadella, some 14 miles east of Monmaneu; but he would never have made such an assertion if he had visited the theatre of the campaign. On the 1st of May, 1914, I travelled in a motor-car from Lerida, by way of Sarroca and Llardecans, to Mayals, about 5 miles east by south of Monmaneu, and thence through Llardecans to Granadella; and, except Monmaneu, I could not see any mountain that could by any stretch of imagination be identified with the one which Afranius tried to seize. It follows, as Stoffel says, that the direct road, leading to the Ebro, which Caesar barred against Afranius was the road that led through the defile of Ribarroja; and, since he used the plural, *itineræ*, he may perhaps have been thinking also of another road which runs through Almatret to the same place. But it does not follow that Octogesa was identical with Mequinenza. For Ribarroja, by way of which Stoffel supposes that Petreius had intended to march to Octogesa, is nearly 15 miles from Mequinenza by the shortest road;<sup>4</sup> and if we may suppose that he had any reason for choosing to make such a *détour*, we may as reasonably suppose that when he found himself cut off from the direct route to Ribarroja, he intended, as a last resource, to reach Ribarroja by way of the Sierra de Campells. Moreover, various other considerations prove that Octogesa was not on the site of Mequinenza. If it was, why did not Afranius march thither by the shortest road,—down the right bank of the Segre? Because, says Stoffel,<sup>5</sup> this road traversed level

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 70, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>3</sup> *Jahresh. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin (Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen)*, 1888, p. 332. Cf. Schneider's *Ilerda*, pp. 36-8.

<sup>4</sup> Stoffel's map (Pl. 6) shows a much longer road or track, which follows the north bank of the Ebro from a point opposite Ribarroja to the mouth of the Segre.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 273. One might say, 'Because he would have been obliged to ford the Cinca'. But if the bridge of boats was opposite the site of Mequinenza, he would have been obliged, since he chose the easterly route, to ford the Segre in order to reach it.



ground, where Afranius would have been even more harassed by Caesar's cavalry than he actually was. Very well; but why did not Afranius originally make for Monmaneu, and the Sierra de Campells instead of attempting to go out of his way through the defile of Ribarroja, thus adding 20 miles and more to his march? Stoffel of course says that he did originally intend to make for Monmaneu, but that when he encamped at the end of his long march he changed his mind. Why? Stoffel gives no valid reason;<sup>1</sup> nor can any be given. And if Octogesa and Mequinenza are one, why did not Caesar, when Afranius had crossed from the right to the left bank of the Segre, send a troop of cavalry down the right bank to destroy the bridge of boats at Octogesa? Caesar himself implies that the right bank of the Segre had no interest for the last act of the campaign. After telling us that Afranius crossed from the right bank to the left in order to march to Octogesa, he says that 'The only course open to Caesar was to harass and worry the enemy's column with his cavalry; for his own bridge would require him to make such a long détour that the enemy could reach the Ebro by a much shorter march' (*Relinqueretur Caesari nihil nisi uti equitatu agmen adversariorum male haberet et carperet. Pons enim ipsius magnum circuitum habebat, ut multo brevior itinere illi ad Hiberum pervenire possent*<sup>2</sup>). Surely these words suggest that Afranius intended to cross the Ebro below Mequinenza? Finally, there are two sentences in Caesar's narrative which imply unmistakably that Octogesa was below Mequinenza: when he is about to describe the turning movement by which he succeeded in interposing his army between Afranius and the Ebro, he says that 'the roads which led to Octogesa on the Ebro were commanded by the enemy's camp' (*quae itinera ad Hiberum atque Octogesam pertinebant castris hostium oppositis tenebantur*<sup>3</sup>); and in the next paragraph<sup>4</sup> he says that the enemy pushed on from their camp by the direct road to the Ebro (*rectoque ad Hiberum itinere contendunt*), namely by the road that led into the defile of Ribarroja. As the former passage, compared with the latter, stultified Stoffel's identification of Octogesa, Meusel conjectured that Caesar wrote (*quae itinera . . . atque*) *ad* (*Octogesam . . . tenebantur*). Why did Meusel make this conjecture? Simply because he provisionally accepted Stoffel's identification against his own judgement. And the conjecture is in any case futile. Will any one believe that Caesar would have implied that the defile of Ribarroja led to a town situated at the confluence of the Ebro and the Segre? As well might one say that the Brighton Road leads to the confluence of the Medway and the Thames.

Meusel, like Rudolf Schneider, would identify Octogesa with

<sup>1</sup> Stoffel merely says (p. 63) that 'après avoir été harcelés sans relâche par la cavalerie, poursuivis maintenant par toute l'armée ennemie et encore éloignés d'Octogesa de plus de dix-huit kilomètres, ils ne pouvaient plus s'y porter par la route directe qui contourne le mont Maneu'. Why would it have been harder to follow this route than the far longer one through the defile of Ribarroja?

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 63, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 68, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 69, 4.



Flix,<sup>1</sup> a little town situated in a bend of the Ebro, about 3 miles ESE. of Ribarroja. I do not think that this suggestion is admissible; for it seems clear that the pass (*angustias* <sup>2</sup>) which Afranius hoped to seize because it would enable him to baffle pursuit was the defile of Ribarroja, not the valley of San Juan, which leads to Flix.<sup>3</sup>

One question remains:—how did Afranius propose to reach Octogesa from Monmaneu? Either he must have hoped to be able somehow to cross the Ebro just below Mequinenza and the mouth of the Segre, and then to march by the road which leads to Fayon, and thence, crossing the Matarraña, to Ribarroja; or he must have intended to gain the road which, starting from the western extremity of the Sierra de Campells, leads to Ribarroja through Almatret; or to follow the northern bank of the Ebro;<sup>4</sup> or perhaps to diverge somewhere from the Sierra and move across the hills to his goal. The first course seems out of the question: as Afranius had built a bridge at Octogesa, it follows that he could not cross the river elsewhere. The second seems the most probable, through Afranius, who had been obliged to abandon his baggage,<sup>5</sup> might have marched, as Caesar had done in his turning movement, where there was no road. It may be objected that if Octogesa was on the site of Ribarroja, Caesar could have seized the town and destroyed the bridge before Afranius, marching by a circuitous route, could arrive. But when Afranius tried to occupy the high mountain he was wellnigh desperate; and whoever identifies Octogesa with Mequinenza will find himself confronted with a like difficulty:—if Afranius had succeeded in penetrating the defile of Ribarroja, Caesar, by marching along the Sierra de Campells, could easily have seized Octogesa and destroyed the bridge.

Apart from the identification of Octogesa, it seemed to me when I explored the country that Stoffel's map of the operations between Ilerda and the Ebro was unobjectionable. As the car sped southwards over hill and dale, past steep bluffs and rocky gullies, often slowing down that I might observe better, I wondered how Caesar could have used the words *itineris campestris*;<sup>6</sup> but when I took up my book again I saw that he was mentally contrasting the country through which he had marched with the mountains beyond.

[I have lately read the note on Octogesa in Professor Hans Delbrück's *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*.<sup>7</sup> He gives an additional reason in support of Stoffel's argument:—if Afranius had ordered his bridge of boats to be made at Flix or Ribarroja, he would have been obliged to face the risk of Caesar's immediately crossing the Segre and barring his advance. The answer is so obvious that I hesitate to write it: Caesar, as his own words show, could not cross the Segre a moment before he did, and only the enthusiasm of his troops enabled

<sup>1</sup> Schneider (*Ilerda*, p. 38) was informed by H. Kiepert that Stoffel originally hesitated between Flix and Ribarroja. Kiepert himself (*Formae orbis ant. [Hispania]*) says that in 1869 Stoffel decided for Flix.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i, 66, 4; 70, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Stoffel, p. 272.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 400, n. 4.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 70, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 66, 4.

<sup>7</sup> *ib.*, 1908, pp. 557–9.

him to cross at all. Having given his benediction to his predecessor, Delbrück candidly admits that the identification of Octogesa with Mequinenza involves difficulties. Why did not Afranius march down the right bank of the Segre? What did he gain by crossing the river? Stoffel's explanation is not satisfactory: Caesar's cavalry, as it happened, manœuvred on the left bank without difficulty; the right bank would at all events have protected the left of the Afranian column, and the route was shorter than that which Afranius chose. Again, Stoffel does not convincingly explain why the Pompeian general, having, as one must of course suppose, originally intended to march to Octogesa by way of Monmaneu, changed his mind as soon as Caesar overtook him and headed instead for Ribarroja. Finally, it is surprising that when Caesar, after apparently marching back towards Ilerda, turned 'to the right' (*ad dexteram*) and hastened, as Stoffel said, to gain the defile that led to Ribarroja, Afranius did not immediately move towards Octogesa by Monmaneu.

But after stating these difficulties, two of which I have myself pointed out, Delbrück assures us that they will all disappear if only we grasp the meaning of the words *ad dexteram*, which all commentators except himself have misunderstood. Caesar did not mean that he turned to the right from the point of view of the Afranians who were watching him: he was thinking of their standpoint as it was when they were facing towards Octogesa (in other words, I venture to remark, he was assuming that they had eyes in the backs of their heads). He meant that he turned 'towards the left, westward' (*nach links, westwärts*). Thus, Delbrück triumphantly concludes, the Pompeians never for a moment intended to enter the defile of Ribarroja: from first to last their aim was to march direct to Octogesa, that is to Mequinenza, by way of Monmaneu.

I am not surprised that it was left to the editor of the *Preussische Jahrbücher* to discover that Caesar, when he said that the enemy 'saw that the column was turning back towards the right' (*ubi . . . retorqueri agmen ad dexteram conspexerunt*), meant that it turned *ad sinistram*—to the left; for Delbrück has not noticed, or has ignored, two other Latin words, the meaning of which can by no ingenuity be distorted. Caesar says that when Afranius ordered his targeteers to seize that conspicuous hill, which we recognize as Monmaneu, his object was to gain it himself with his whole force and, *altering his route*, to make his way along the ridge to Octogesa (*Hunc . . . iubet occupare, eo consilio uti ipse eodem omnibus copiis contenderet et mutato itinere iugis Octogesam perveniret*).<sup>1</sup> Clearly then the intention of reaching Octogesa by Monmaneu was an afterthought; and since Delbrück, like myself, has exposed the futility of Stoffel's argument—that Afranius originally intended to go by Monmaneu, then changed his mind and made for Ribarroja, and finally changed his mind again—it is clear that he intended throughout to make for Ribarroja until sheer desperation compelled him to abandon the attempt. Finally, since Afranius, being in his right mind, would never have

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 70, 4.

attempted to march through the defile of Ribarroja to a town situated at the confluence of the Ebro and the Segre, it is evident that Octogesa was not on the site of Mequinenza.

But Delbrück did not write in vain. Without knowing it he helped to clinch the proof that Octogesa was at the end of that defile.]

*B. C.*, i, 64, 6.—Caesar relates that when his infantry crossed the Segre by the imperfect ford which he had made, he stationed a large number of *iumenta* in the river above and below, and that a few legionaries who were carried off their feet were rescued *ab equitatu*. *Iumentum* generally means a beast of burden; but some at least of the *iumenta* mentioned in Caesar's description of the manners and customs of the Suebi<sup>1</sup> were evidently used by German cavalry. If in the present passage *iumenta* means 'transport cattle', *equitatu*, which obviously denotes their riders, must mean not 'cavalry', but simply 'mounted men'—doubtless baggage-drivers and other camp-followers. Stoffel<sup>2</sup> translates *iumentorum* by *bêtes de somme*, and yet infers from *ab equitatu* that a few cavalry had remained behind 'pour fournir aux escortes, à convois et à divers autres services'.<sup>3</sup> Meusel, who accepts this dictum, consistently implies that *iumentorum* means 'cavalry horses'. As I believe that Caesar, if he had kept cavalry with him, would have called their horses *equorum*, or would have written (*magnaque numero*) *equitum*, I conclude, doubtfully, that *iumentorum* bears its ordinary meaning.

*B. C.*, i, 69, 2.—Caesar says that when the Afranians saw the retrograde movement which he describes in 69, 1, they fancied that under the pressure of want he was retreating (*fugere*) and returning to the neighbourhood of Ilerda, and that they were confirmed in this delusion by the fact that 'they could see that their adversaries had set out upon their march without transport cattle and heavy baggage' (*sine iumentis impedimentisque ad iter profectos videbant*). Meusel insists that *iter* simply means the retrograde march and the flanking movement that followed it, not the march which Caesar had made two days before from Ilerda. For, he says, the mention of *impedimenta* in 80, 4 and of *tabernacula* in 80, 3 and 81, 2 proves that he must have taken both baggage and transport cattle; and, besides, no army could dispense with baggage for 8 days. At first sight the argument looks conclusive; but if the Afranians noticed that Caesar, when he was about to make his retrograde march, left his baggage and beasts behind, how could they be thereby confirmed in their belief that he was forced by want of food to retreat? To leave his baggage behind would not help him to get food. *Ex hypothesi* he had marched from Ilerda in one day with baggage to the point from which he was apparently returning: therefore he could return with baggage in one day. If his apparent object was to abandon the campaign, it could not be supposed that he was so foolish as to abandon his baggage also: if he was expected to resume the campaign after he had fetched

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iv, 2, 2. Cf. *Bell. Afr.*, 18, 4, where cavalry horses are called *iumenta*, and *B. C.*, iii, 49, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 275.



supplies, the baggage would be useful. But he was not expected to resume the campaign; for, apart from the significant word *fugere*, it was evident that if he was going back to Ilerda, he would have to resign the hope of preventing Afranius from crossing the Ebro. I conclude therefore that he loosely said that he had started from Ilerda without baggage or transport cattle, meaning that he had left behind all the baggage that was not absolutely indispensable and the beasts which would have drawn or carried it. There is a similar looseness of expression in the *Seventh Commentary on the Gallic War*. In 10, 4 Caesar says that at the outset of the campaign he left 'the heavy baggage of the whole army' (*impedimentis totius exercitus*) at Agedincum (Sens); in 35, 3 he says that he halted with two legions opposite one of the bridges on the Allier and sent on the rest of the force 'with all the baggage' (*cum omnibus impedimentis*). Stoffel appears to agree with Meusel; for he says,<sup>1</sup> 'Le doute [of the Afranians] leur sembla d'autant moins permis, qu'elle [Caesar's army] partait<sup>2</sup> sans bagages ni bêtes de somme'; but I suspect that he had misgivings, for in an earlier passage<sup>3</sup> he says that when Caesar was about to march from Ilerda in pursuit of Afranius, 'une légion tout entière fut désignée pour garder le camp et les bagages'. The last three words were evidently based upon the passage which I have here discussed.

*B. C., i, 78, 1-2.*—Caesar says that when the Afranians began to march back from their camp [about 3 miles NNE. of Mayals] towards Ilerda, 'the legionaries, who had been ordered to take enough grain for seven days from Ilerda, had a fair supply, but the targeteers and the other auxiliaries, whose means were too slender to provide any and whose muscles were not habituated to carrying loads, had none' (*Frumenti copiam legionarii non nullam habebant, quod dierum VII<sup>4</sup> ab Ilerda frumentum iussi erant efferre, caetrati auxiliaresque nullam, quorum erant et facultates ad parandum exiguae et corpora insueta ad onera portanda*). Under the Roman system rations of grain were periodically served out to the troops, and the price (except when corn was requisitioned without payment from conquered tribes)

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de J. César, i, 64.*

<sup>2</sup> The italics are mine.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib., p. 62.* G. Veith (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 264) appears to agree with me.

<sup>4</sup> *VII* is Köchly's emendation for *XXII*, the MS. reading, which is obviously absurd; for though it was possible for soldiers to carry rations for 16 or 17 days (Cic., *Tusc.*, ii, 16, 37; Amm. Marc., xvii, 9, 2; Lampridius, *Alex. Sev.*, 47, 1) in the form of compressed food (?) (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin [Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, xix, 1893], pp. 279-85), it was unnecessary to do so on this occasion, and, moreover, on the fifth day of the march the legionaries had no food to spare for the auxiliaries. This would seem to condemn the emendation *XII*, which Mr. Peskett suggests, unless the legionaries were extremely selfish. [Fr. Stolle (*D. rom. Legionar.*, &c., 1914, p. 18) thinks that *VIII* was more likely to have been corrupted into *XXII*, but that *VIII* (cf. Varro, *R. R.*, ii, 1, 1) would have meant only 8 days. Inferring from the statements of Cicero and Marcellinus that legionaries generally carried enough food to last at least 16 days, he estimates their load (which would of course have daily diminished) as 42·259 kilogrammes, or nearly 91 lb. (pp. 2-6, 52) !]



was stopped out of their pay.<sup>1</sup> The pay of the auxiliaries was less than that of the regulars. They must, however, have taken some grain with them,—perhaps enough to last for two days, at the end of which Afranius had hoped to reach Octogesa. But if they could pay for a two days' supply, why not for more? I believe that the solution is to be found in 61, 2, from which we learn that Afranius's motive for abandoning Ilerda was the fear that Caesar's cavalry might prevent him from getting grain and forage. Under the influence of this fear the price may have risen.

*B. C.*, i, 79, 1.—The text (*Expeditae cohortes novissimum agmen claudabant pluresque in locis campestribus subsistebant*) seems to Meusel (who thinks that *plures* means 'more than usual') suspicious; for, he says (page 314 of his edition), one would expect in *locis campestribus etiam plures*, and, moreover, *subsistebant* simply means 'halted': to give it the sense of 'confronted' (their pursuers), one would have to add some such words as *ut sint auxilio suis* or *equitumque nostrorum impetum sustinebant*. That, as one may gather from 64, 2, is of course the meaning. Mr. Peskett in his editorial note on the passage takes *plures*, rightly in my opinion, in the sense of 'several', and I see no reason to doubt the correctness of the MSS.

*B. C.*, i, 80, 4.—In the MSS. this passage runs (*Qua re animum adversa Caesar relictis legionibus subsequitur, praesidio impedimentis paucas cohortes relinquit; hora X. subsequi pabulatores equitesque revocari iubet*). *Relictis legionibus*, which would mean that Caesar left his legions behind and pursued the enemy with his light-armed auxiliaries only, is obviously impossible, unless some words were omitted by the copyist; and accordingly Dinter supplies *impedimentis cum* after *relictis* and deletes *impedimentis* after *praesidio*. Of the other emendations that have been proposed <sup>2</sup> *reflectis*, which some editors adopt, seems very flat: *eductis*, which Meusel provisionally accepts, may or may not be right, but, like Dinter's suggestion, certainly describes what Caesar did. Stoffel,<sup>3</sup> referring to *B. C.*, i, 40, 3, says that when cavalry went to forage, they were regularly escorted by infantry, and on this occasion certainly by at least one legion. Accordingly he insists that *relictis legionibus* (which could only mean 'leaving [all] his legions behind') is right, though on his own showing not more than one or at most two legions were left! The question remains whether the order which Caesar gave to follow (*subsequi . . . iubet*) 'at the tenth hour' applied to the cohorts only or to the foragers (*pabulatores*) as well. Stoffel, removing the comma, which is usually, and I think rightly, inserted after *subsequi*, explains Caesar's meaning thus: he ordered the cavalry to be recalled and to follow immediately, the foragers (by which Stoffel means the infantry whom he supposes to have assisted the cavalry in foraging, in other words the one or two legions that were left behind) to follow at the tenth hour. Thus Stoffel ignores the order that must have been

<sup>1</sup> Polyb., vi, 39, 12.

<sup>2</sup> See H. Meusel, *Tab. coniect.*, p. 52 (*Lex. Caes.*, vol. ii).

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 278-9.

given to the cohorts left to guard the baggage. If we retain the comma,<sup>1</sup> the meaning is that Caesar ordered those cohorts to follow at the tenth hour, the foragers and the cavalry to be recalled at once.

**B. C., i, 81, 6.**—Caesar says that the Afranians, when they were suffering the blockade which led to their surrender, were compelled by lack of forage and by the necessity of ridding themselves of every encumbrance that might hinder a sortie, to slaughter ‘all their beasts of burden’ (*et inopia pabuli adducti et quo essent ad id expeditiores, omnia sarcinaria iumenta interfici iubent*). I understand by *sarcinaria iumenta* all the transport cattle; and Stoffel<sup>2</sup> is apparently of the same opinion. Meusel, however, holds that they were pack animals which on special occasions carried the men’s rations and other things which the men were generally obliged to carry themselves. The other beasts, he remarks, which were required for the transport of the heavy baggage, were retained. But Caesar expressly says that the men carried their rations themselves:<sup>3</sup> the animals which, according to Meusel, were spared would have been far more numerous than those that were slaughtered; and the mobility of the troops would hardly have been increased by getting rid of a comparatively small number. Stoffel<sup>4</sup> thinks that the *iumenta* mentioned in 84, 1 were ‘un petit nombre de bêtes de somme que l’armée avait nécessairement dû conserver pour différents services indispensables’. Perhaps some of them were; but the majority surely belonged to the Afranian cavalry. Sometimes, as I have shown (page 404), *iumenta* means troop-horses.

**B. C., i, 87, 4; ii, 19, 1; 21, 3.**—When Caesar sent a portion of the troops which had surrendered near Ilerda to the river Var, he placed them in charge of legions with which he had fought against Afranius and Petreius, ordering two to march in front of the prisoners and the others in their rear (*duas legiones suas antecedere, reliquas subsequi iussit*<sup>5</sup>). It may be inferred from this passage, says von Domaszewski,<sup>6</sup> that the two legions with which Caesar undertook the conquest of Further Spain<sup>7</sup>—the province which was ruled by Varro—were composed of recruits. The commentator misunderstands Caesar’s words. *Reliquas* here does not mean ‘four’, but ‘two’. Caesar would not have relied upon recruits to subdue Varro when he had veterans available; nor is there any evidence that when he sent two legions into Further Spain two legions of recruits had arrived. After the submission of Varro Caesar left Quintus Cassius in charge of the province, assigning him four legions, namely the two which Varro had commanded and two newly raised legions, the 21st and the 30th;<sup>8</sup> but these two had not served under Caesar, for when he was about to return from Spain to Massilia he required ten ships belonging to the people of Gades and several others which Varro had

<sup>1</sup> Meusel, who retains the comma, follows H. Schiller in inserting *has* [cohortes] before *hora X*.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 70.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, i, 78, 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 281.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 87, 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, p. 168.

<sup>7</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 19, 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 18, 6; 20, 4, 7; 21, 3; *Bell. Alex.*, 53, 5

built to transport his army from Gades to Tarraco.<sup>1</sup> Evidently therefore the 21st and the 30th were sent from Italy to join Cassius.

**The chronology of the campaign.**—Besides various indications in Caesar's narrative we have two statements to go upon: according to three calendars—the Fasti Amiternini, Antiates, and Maffeiiani<sup>2</sup>—Afranius and Petreius were finally defeated on August 2 (of the unreformed calendar), and Curio is said to have affirmed that the campaign was finished 40 days after Caesar reached Ilerda.<sup>3</sup> The number XL is perhaps suspiciously round; but we must accept it, and therefore suppose that Caesar opened his campaign on June 23.<sup>4</sup> Working back from the date of the surrender, I have constructed the following table, which, except the final date and the six dates that immediately precede it, is of course only to be regarded as approximately true. It does not differ materially from Stoffel's, which I print in a parallel column.—

		(According to Stoffel.)
Caesar reaches Ilerda . . . . .	June 23	June 22
Caesar constructs a new camp . . . . .	June 24–6 <sup>5</sup>	June 23–5
Combat of Ilerda . . . . .	June 27	June 26
Destruction of Fabius's bridges . . . . .	June 28 <sup>6</sup>	June 28
Caesar's new bridge finished . . . . .	July 10 <sup>7</sup>	July 12
Caesar begins to divert the Segre . . . . .	July 19 <sup>8</sup>	July 18
Afranius quits Ilerda . . . . .	July 25 <sup>9</sup>	July 26
Petreius and Caesar reconnoitre . . . . .	July 26 <sup>10</sup>	July 27
Slaughter of four cohorts of targeteers . . . . .	July 27 <sup>11</sup>	July 28
Intercourse between the two armies . . . . .	July 28 <sup>12</sup>	July 29
Retrograde march of Petreius begins . . . . .	July 29 <sup>13</sup>	July 29
Last encampment of Petreius . . . . .	July 29 <sup>14</sup>	July 29
Afranius and Petreius surrender . . . . .	August 2 <sup>15</sup>	August 2

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 18, 1; 21, 4. See p. 390.

<sup>2</sup> *C. I. L.*, i<sup>2</sup>, pp. 225, 244, 248 (H. Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 8744).

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 32, 5. Cf. pp. 421–2.

<sup>4</sup> As June in the unreformed calendar contained 29 days, the period from June 23 to August 2, reckoning inclusively, comprised  $7 + 31 + 2 = 40$  days. I have assumed that by (haec acta diebus XL quibus) in conspectum adversariorum venerit Caesar Curio meant Caesar's arrival in camp (in castra [*B. C.*, i, 41, 1]): Stoffel (*Hist. de J. César*, i, 254) supposes that he was thinking of the position which Caesar took up on the next day opposite the Pompeian camp (§ 2). The difference matters nothing.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 48, 1. Stoffel accepts the usual interpretation of *Eo biduo*, which I, in agreement with Prof. J. C. Rolfe, understand as equivalent to *Postero die*. See my complete edition of the *Bellum Gallicum*, 1914, p. 56 (note to i, 47, 1) and vol. ii, p. 166, n. 2 of this book.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 59–62.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 63.

<sup>8</sup> *B. C.*, i, 50 1; 52, 2; 54, 4; 59, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, 68, 1; 70, 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, 65, 2; 66, 1. 3.

<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, 68, 1; 70, 5.

<sup>12</sup> *Ib.*, 73, 1; 74.

<sup>13</sup> *Ib.*, 78. Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 277) argues that if the march had not begun on the day on which the armies fraternized, Caesar would have written *postero die* (ex castris proficiscuntur); 'car il indique avec précision les jours des différents événements de la fin de la campagne.' Both Stoffel and Meusel, who submissively follows him, have failed to notice one word by which Caesar does 'indicate with precision' that the march did not begin until the day after that on which the armies fraternized. In 76, 4 he says that the friendly Afranians concealed most of the Caesarians whom they had entertained and let them pass out of their camp in the night (*nocturne per vallum emittunt*). The context proves that this was the night which preceded the march.

<sup>14</sup> *Ib.*, 81, 1.

<sup>15</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 2–4; 82, 1; 83, 4; 84, 1.

## THE SIEGE OF MASSILIA

**Who wrote *B. C.*, ii, 1-16?**—The authorship of the narrative of the siege of Massilia, contained in *B. C.*, ii, 1-16, is disputed. Meusel<sup>1</sup> simply affirms that 'the greater part of the Second Book is not from Caesar's hand. Whether he revised the reports of other writers or not, can hardly be decided now. If it had been granted to him to complete the entire work and to publish it himself, he would certainly have subjected the reports of his officers to revision; but perhaps this was not done at all or at all events quite superficially'. My own belief is that a scholar familiar with Caesar's style might read the story once or twice without suspecting that it was written by another; but if he scrutinized the Latin closely, he would discover two or three expressions which Caesar would perhaps hardly have used,—in 6, 3 *magna vis . . . inferebant* (instead of the singular), in 8, 3 *hominum adhibita sollertia*, and in 14, 1 *arma . . . reposita* (instead of *seposita*). The introductory words, *Dum haec in Hispania geruntur*, were evidently written by Caesar or the original editor. If Caesar had lived to complete his work, he would have made no unnecessary alterations in the reports which formed his material; and if he did not carefully revise the original draft, one must conclude that Trebonius (or his chief engineer) and Decimus Brutus wrote excellent Latin,—far better than that of Hirtius. But for historical purposes the question of authorship is unimportant: the report is in the fullest sense an original authority.

**Lucan as a historical authority.**—The authority of Lucan has been emphasized by various writers, notably Camille Jullian<sup>2</sup> and R. Pichon, whose analysis, *Les sources de Lucain*, is indispensable to all students of the poem.<sup>3</sup> He has demonstrated that Lucan derived his information mainly, if not solely, from Livy. 'Il ne me paraît pas douteux', he says,<sup>4</sup> 'que Lucain ait aimé la vérité presque autant que ses propres idées'; and those who have collated his verses with our other sources will probably admit that when he had no motive for misrepresentation he aimed at accuracy. But Tennyson did the same when he was writing *The Defence of Lucknow*<sup>5</sup>; yet a historian who followed Tennyson would hardly attain a high degree of truth. When Lucan<sup>6</sup> tells us that Curio sailed from Lilybaeum, we may believe him, even though no other writer vouches for the fact. But M. Pichon<sup>7</sup> himself warns us that while some of Lucan's 'inexactitudes' are due to carelessness or haste and others were deliberately committed for artistic effect, not a few were inspired by political partisanship. For instance, sympathizing with the Massilians as adherents of Pompey, he was silent about their perfidy;

<sup>1</sup> See p. ix of his edition (1906). <sup>2</sup> *Rev. des études anc.*, ii, 1900, pp. 301-16.

<sup>3</sup> pp. 72, 98, 109, 115-6, 137, 140-3, 148, 152-3, 157-8, 163 are particularly worthy of study.

<sup>4</sup> p. 163. <sup>5</sup> *Alfred Lord Tennyson*, ii, 1897, p. 327. <sup>6</sup> iv, 583.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 72, 109. See also Prof. J. P. Postgate, *M. A. Lucani De bello civ. liber VIII*, 1916, pp. x-xiv.



he ignored the cruelties of the Pompeians ; he very rarely mentioned Caesar's acts of clemency, and then tried to belittle them, or even ascribed them to sordid motives.<sup>1</sup>

**The area of Massilia.**—Massilia is washed by the sea on, one may say, three sides ; the fourth is so placed as to be accessible by land. Of the last-named space the part connected with the citadel, being naturally protected by a deep valley, makes a siege long and difficult, (*Massilia enim fere tribus ex [oppidi] partibus mari adluitur ; reliqua quarta est quae aditum habeat ab terra. Huius quoque spatii pars ea quae ad arcem pertinet, loci natura et valle altissima munita, longam et difficilem habet oppugnationem* <sup>2</sup>). The map will show that this description is accurate ; but the northern inlet, opposite La Joliette, is not to be found on modern maps : it has disappeared in consequence of the construction of the basin of La Joliette.<sup>3</sup> Most commentators, including Stoffel,<sup>4</sup> affirm that in Caesar's time the coast extended considerably further seaward than it does now ; but the evidence for this view has been disputed.<sup>5</sup> The configuration of the coast, however, has no bearing upon the history of the siege : the important question is, what was the valley of which the historian speaks ? Before we can answer this question we must fix the site of Trebonius's camp. Camille Jullian,<sup>6</sup> following Michel Clerc,<sup>7</sup> locates it upon the hill called the butte des Carmes, the elevation of which is 38 metres ; but, according to our original authority,<sup>8</sup> the camp commanded a view of the interior of the town ; and as the summit of the butte des Moulins, on which the citadel must *ex hypothesi* have stood, was 40·86 metres above the sea, Meusel<sup>9</sup> argues that it would have been impossible from the butte des Carmes to see what people were doing in the streets. I am not sure that this objection is valid, and at all events that part of the town which adjoined the harbour would have been visible ; but there is another objection, the force of which Jullian himself admits : <sup>10</sup> the butte des Carmes, being only about one hectare (2½ acres) in extent,<sup>11</sup> was many times too small to accommodate 3 legions. Jullian, however, remarking that Lucan <sup>12</sup> calls the site of Caesar's camp *parvus campus*, argues

<sup>1</sup> ii, 512 ; iv, 337-64.

<sup>2</sup> B. C., ii, 1, 3.

<sup>3</sup> It is shown in old maps. Compare *Plan . . . de Marseille* (1730) with *Plan gén. . . de Marseille* (1900).

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 1887, pp. 288-9.  
<sup>5</sup> According to Commandant Rouby (*Le Spectateur mil.*, xxxiv, 1874, pp. 201-6), documents belonging to the old cathedral of La Major mention streets which existed before 1773 between it and the coast : 'on ne retrouve plus ces rues sur les plans de la fin du xviii<sup>e</sup> siècle que possèdent les dépôts de la guerre de marine.' A. E. E. Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 1878, p. 154) accepts Rouby's evidence ; but see *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr. de Marseille*, xxv, 1901, pp. 11-2, and *Annales du Musée d'hist. nat. de Marseille*, xiii, 1914, p. 231.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. des études anc.*, ii, 1900, pp. 338, 341.

<sup>7</sup> *Le développement topogr. de Marseille*, 1898. The efforts which I have made to buy a copy of this work have failed. I am therefore obliged to rely upon Jullian's account of it.

<sup>8</sup> B. C., ii, 5, 3.

<sup>9</sup> See p. 301 of Meusel's edition of the *Bellum Civile*. He supposed that the butte des Moulins was 42 metres high.

<sup>10</sup> *Rev. des études anc.*, 1900, p. 341.

<sup>11</sup> *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 1909, p. 584.

<sup>12</sup> iii, 376.

that that portion of the army which was engaged in constructing the *agger* encamped on the butte des Carmes, while the rest occupied the main camp in the rear; and he reminds us that Caesar had two camps in the last stage of the campaign which he conducted against Ariovistus<sup>1</sup> and also in the neighbourhood of Gergovia.<sup>2</sup> These arguments appear to me unsound. Caesar was obliged, for special reasons, to construct two camps in the course of his operations against Ariovistus and at Gergovia, and he expressly states that he had two; in the official narrative of the siege of Massilia one only is mentioned. Moreover, the soldiers and labourers engaged in constructing the *aggeres* and the other works must have been very numerous; and even for their accommodation the butte des Carmes would have been too small. I conclude therefore that the camp was where Stoffel places it (and where Jullian places the main camp), on the hill of St. Charles, where the principal railway station stands, 54 metres above the sea.

Four theories, of which three survive, have been propounded as to the area of Massilia. Commandant Rouby,<sup>3</sup> whose view was adopted by Stoffel,<sup>4</sup> and others, maintained that it comprised three hills, extending ENE. almost in a straight line from the sea, namely, the butte St. Laurent, the butte des Moulins, and the butte des Carmes. Clerc excludes the butte des Carmes, on which he locates the Roman camp, and also excludes the summit of the butte des Moulins, but includes the spur which projects from this hill eastward, and on which, at the height of 38 metres, stands the hospital.<sup>5</sup> Jullian includes the summit of the butte des Moulins.<sup>6</sup> Clerc relies principally upon three fragments of an ancient wall, which have been discovered in the Rue Ste-Barbe (close to the Rue de l'Échelle), at the foot of the Rue des Grands-Carmes, and in the foundations of the Tour des Accoules. These discoveries are not conclusive: that of the Rue Ste-Barbe is the most important, but, as M. G. Maurin says, it is impossible to decide whether the wall enclosed or merely turned the butte des Carmes.<sup>7</sup> Another argument, however, has been adduced for excluding the butte des Carmes from Massilia. According to Cornutus, one of the scholiasts who commented on Lucan, the terrace (*agger*) described by the poet was 'at a place which rises towards the west' (*ad locum in occidentem adsurgentem*<sup>8</sup>). If Rouby and Stoffel

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i, 49, 2. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, vii, 36, 7.

<sup>3</sup> *Le Spectateur mil.*, xxxiv, 1874, pp. 319-28: xxxv, 1874, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, Atlas, Pl. 9.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. des études anc.*, 1900, p. 335, n. 6.

<sup>7</sup> *Mém. de l'Acad. de Nîmes*, 1898, pp. 481-2. Clerc (*Rev. des études anc.*, xx, 1918, p. 48) cites as 'une autre preuve' an inscription found on the 'Place Jean-Guin', which he has published in *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des Inscr.* He omits to give the reference.

<sup>8</sup> *Scholia in Lucani Bell. Civ.*, ed. H. Usener, 1869, p. 110 (scholium on iii, 381). M. Froehner (*Rev. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., xviii, 1891, p. 325) remarks that this scholiast's notes 'n'ont rien des gloses du moyen âge; c'est de l'érudition romaine, sûre et sérieuse'; and Usener identified him with the Stoic, Lucius Annaeus Cornutus. Perhaps, as M. Jullian says (*Rev. des études anc.*, 1900, p. 335), he derived his information from Livy.

are right, this place must have been the butte des Carmes; but M. Froehner maintains that the words can only apply to the butte des Moulins,<sup>1</sup> while Jullian hesitates between the butte des Moulins itself and the spur on which the hospital stands.<sup>2</sup> Now if by *locum in occidentem adsurgentem* Cornutus meant the most westerly of the three hills, he was evidently thinking, not of the butte des Moulins or of its spur, but of the butte St. Laurent, the lowest of the three, which, as the map will show, is out of the question: evidently then he meant a hill situated west of the Roman camp. If so, his description may apply to the butte des Carmes just as well as to the butte des Moulins; and the original report, which emphasizes the depth of the valley that separated the wall near the citadel from the besiegers, suggests that the butte des Carmes was within the town. Finally, it is hardly credible that the founders would have thrown away the manifest advantage of including a position so commanding within the wall; and considering that Pompeii comprised 160 acres,<sup>3</sup> it seems improbable that a city of the world-wide fame and the vast commercial importance of Massilia should have been confined within an area more than twice as small.<sup>4</sup>

[M. G. Vasseur, in a paper<sup>5</sup> which I have read since the foregoing paragraphs were written, gives further reasons, based upon information obtained in the course of drainage works, for including the butte des Carmes within Massilia. He points out<sup>6</sup> that the depression which separates the butte des Carmes from the spur of the butte des Moulins on which the Hôtel-Dieu stands is only 5m. 50 below the surface of the latter and 9 metres below the mean level of the former, and therefore could not have been called a *vallis altissima*. The remains of an ancient rampart, skirting the Rue Cordellerie and turning northward towards the church of St. Martin,<sup>7</sup> which stands on the eastern edge of the butte des Carmes, are adduced as additional evidence.]

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. arch.*, xviii, 1891, pp. 328-9. 'Rouby,' says Froehner, 'n'a pas tenu compte du récit de César, qui place la seconde terrasse *ad id mare quod adiacet ad ostium Rhodani* ["near the sea which adjoins the mouth of the Rhône"]'. These words are bracketed as spurious by W. Paul and Meusel; but if they are genuine, they imply, as Froehner points out, or at least suggest, that the principal terrace traversed, not, as Rouby and Stoffel hold, the valley of St. Martin, or, as Jullian thinks, the valley between the butte des Carmes and the butte des Moulins, but the valley of La Joliette. This, however, is untrue. See pp. 415-6.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Rev. des études anc.*, 1900, p. 335, n. 6, with *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 584, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> F. Haverfield, *Anc. Town-Planning*, 1913, pp. 63-4.

<sup>4</sup> See C. Jullian's *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 1908, p. 210. Lucan's statement (iii, 341) about the smallness of Massilia—*Moenibus exiguis*—is too vague to be of any use.

<sup>5</sup> *Annales du Musée d'hist. nat. de Marseille*, xiii, 1914, pp. 201-32, 278-9, 282-3.

<sup>6</sup> pp. 218-9. Remains of Greek pottery discovered in 1907-8 prove that the whole of the butte des Moulins was within the city (pp. 225-6).

<sup>7</sup> pp. 203-4. Cf. the unnumbered page preceding pl. 1, where Vasseur mentions 'La partie du mur grec mise à découvert' a little to the west of the Place Jean-Guin, which is just east of the north-eastern end of the old harbour (Lacydon).



**Caesar's operations at Massilia.**—In *B. C.*, ii, 1, 4 we read that Trebonius, before he commenced the siege of Massilia, collected labourers and draught cattle from the Province, ordered timber and wood suitable for wattle-work to be brought up, and then proceeded to construct the principal terrace. In *B. C.*, i, 36, 4-5, however, Caesar says that he himself, on learning that the Massilians intended to resist, brought up three legions, prepared to place [wooden] towers and sappers' huts in position for the siege, and caused 12 galleys to be built at Arelate (Arles). The galleys were built and equipped within 30 days, and sent [down the Rhône] to Massilia; Caesar placed Decimus Brutus in command of them, and, before departing for Spain, left Trebonius to prosecute the siege. The conclusion seems to be that Trebonius carried out the preliminary arrangements under the direction of Caesar.

M. Jullian, however, insists that in the time which Caesar spent at Massilia—30 days at least—he must have done a great deal more than he admits: 'Évidemment il supprime ou dissimule un grand nombre de détails.'<sup>1</sup> Dio<sup>2</sup> says that he counted on being able to beat the Massilians easily (ὡς καὶ ῥαδίως αὐτοὺς αἰρήσων), but that they nevertheless repulsed him; and M. Jullian concludes that 'Il éprouva devant Marseille, sinon la honte de la défaite, du moins l'échec du retard'<sup>3</sup>. Finally, relying upon Lucan,<sup>4</sup> M. Jullian, in the third volume of his *Histoire de la Gaule*,<sup>5</sup> develops his theory: the Massilians, he says, destroyed the sappers' huts belonging to the original terrace and the men who were working upon it, and then, making a sortie, set fire to the terrace itself; Trebonius had to do the work all over again. Thus the brick terrace which he built after the pretended surrender of the Massilians<sup>6</sup> was not the second but the third that was erected during the siege.

Now, according to M. Jullian, the second terrace was the one which in the *Bellum Civile*<sup>7</sup> is described as the first (in reality as I shall hereafter show,<sup>8</sup> two, erected simultaneously, are there described); and M. Jullian says that it traversed the valley that separated the butte des Carmes from the butte des Moulins.<sup>9</sup> Then where was M. Jullian's first terrace built? Would he maintain that it too spanned the valley, and that before the second was begun the débris of the first was removed? Apparently he would, for, following the description in the *Bellum Civile*, he says that before Trebonius proceeded to construct the second terrace he levelled the ground. Does he realize the stupendous labour that would have been required to raise and cart away thousands of tons of rubble, charred timber, and ashes? Lucan only mentions one terrace; and, according to him, the Massilians destroyed it, not while Caesar remained at Massilia, but long after he had gone to Spain:<sup>10</sup> his testimony then does not

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. des études anc.*, i, 1899, pp. 314-5.

<sup>2</sup> xli, 19, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 316.

<sup>4</sup> iii, 463-508.

<sup>5</sup> pp. 585-6.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 15.

<sup>7</sup> ii, 1, 2; 2, 1-4.

<sup>8</sup> See pp. 414-5.

<sup>9</sup> See pp. 410-2.

<sup>10</sup> Lucan's account (iii, 498-508) of the burning of the terrace (*agger*), which he mentions before the sea-fight, is evidently an anachronism.



confirm that of Dio. Perhaps Caesar suffered some check at the hands of the Massilians, and the work of constructing the terraces may have begun before he left Massilia; but when one considers that he was obliged to wait there before Trebonius and the three legions arrived,<sup>1</sup> and that to impress an army of labourers and collect draught cattle from the Province, then to cut down thousands of trees and transport them to Massilia, must have taken a considerable time, it seems gratuitous to charge him with having suppressed a great many details. And one knows Dio too well to be much impressed by the remark that 'Caesar counted on being able to beat the Massilians easily'.

**Did Trebonius originally erect one terrace or two?**—We learn from the official narrative of the siege of Massilia (*B. C.*, ii, 1, 1–2) that Trebonius 'prepared to construct a terrace and to place sappers' huts and towers in position against the town on two sides,—one close to the harbour and the docks, the other by the gate which gives access from Gaul and from Spain' (*duabus ex partibus aggerem, vineas turresque ad oppidum agere instituit. Una erat proxima portui navalibusque, altera ad portam qua est aditus ex Gallia atque Hispania*). Almost all commentators have inferred from this passage and from others<sup>2</sup> that Trebonius constructed two terraces; but Camille Jullian holds that there was only one, and that the two *aggeres* were only parts of a single structure, like the two viaducts, destined each to carry one movable tower and connected by a broad platform, which Caesar constructed at Avaricum<sup>3</sup> (Bourges). I have examined Jullian's arguments in *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*,<sup>4</sup> concluding that the prevalent opinion is correct; and I may add three further reasons. First, if Jullian is right, it would seem to follow that the central platform which he postulates must have been enormously broad. Jullian,<sup>5</sup> indeed, who believes that the two viaducts were built along either side of the line of the Rue de la République,<sup>6</sup> affirms that the width of the entire structure was not more than 300 feet,—about the same as that of the terrace which Caesar erected at Avaricum; but in order to maintain this opinion he is obliged to put a severe strain upon the words of our authority,—*una* [pars] *erat proxima portui navalibusque, altera ad portam, qua est aditus ex Gallia atque Hispania*. He pleads that his terrace 'sera, comme le dit César, "conduit de deux points différents". La plate-forme [*agger*] et la tour du Nord viseront l'Hôtel-Dieu et les Moulins, c'est-à-dire la Ville . . . et cette même ligne de travaux dominera, à 300 mètres au

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 50, 79–80.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 14, 2, compared with § 5 of the same paragraph.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii, 17, 1; 24, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Second ed., pp. 604–6. 'Finally,' I wrote (p. 606), 'I would ask M. Jullian whether he has not forgotten that in the siege of Jerusalem there were not two *aggeres* only, but four.' He did not forget, for he remarked (*Rev. des études anc.*, 1900, p. 334, n. 4) that 'Devant Jérusalem, Josèphe parle de χώματα . . . mais il est encore vraisemblable que Titus n'éleva qu'un seul système de remblai.' Though Josephus speaks not only of χώματα but of τέσσαρα χώματα?

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. des études anc.*, 1900, p. 340.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 595, n. 2.

plus, "la route des Gaules" . . . En revanche, la tour et la jetée [*agger*] du Sud menaceront . . . à une distance égale ou moindre, les rives du Port et les Arsenaux de la Ville Basse.'<sup>1</sup> This will not do: 300 metres does not sound much, but, compared with the very small extent of the wall of Massilia, the distance is too great. Jullian, indeed, insists that if a second terrace had been built close to the harbour, the foundations must have been laid on marshy ground;<sup>2</sup> but any engineer would tell him that this difficulty could have been overcome, and, moreover, I can find no evidence that the marsh extended north of the harbour to the point where the terrace would have been built. Secondly, when Caesar described the terrace which he constructed at Avaricum, he did not call each of the flanking viaducts an *agger* and ignore the central platform: he applied the word *agger* to the entire structure. Lastly, if Jullian is right in maintaining that the two *aggeres*<sup>3</sup> at Massilia were only parts of one whole, why was the entire structure not destroyed when the Massilians set fire to the northern viaduct?<sup>4</sup> Jullian would perhaps reply that the central platform was not inflammable; but if so, it must have consisted mainly of earth or stones, which, being far heavier than wood, would have entailed a vast amount of needless toil. I freely admit that Jullian has Lucan<sup>5</sup> on his side; but as Lucan, for artistic reasons, only mentioned one of the two naval defeats which the Massilians suffered, it is not surprising that he only mentioned one terrace.

The reader may remember that Caesar, immediately after making the remark which I have quoted in the first sentence of this article and explaining that Massilia is washed by the sea on three sides, while the fourth is approached by land, adds that 'of this [landward] space the part connected with the citadel, being naturally protected by a deep valley, makes a siege long and difficult' (*Huius quoque spatii pars ea quae ad arcem pertinet, loci natura et valle altissima munita, longam et difficilem habet oppugnationem*<sup>6</sup>). In the next sentence we read how Trebonius prepared for the siege; then that he constructed a terrace 80 feet high. Commentators have generally inferred that he directed his principal, or northern, attack against the part connected with the citadel; but Colonel G. Veith has decided<sup>7</sup> that they are wrong. Why? Because since the part connected with the citadel involved a long and difficult siege, it follows logically that Trebonius erected his two terraces in the two low tracts (*in den beiden Niederungen*) on either side of it, where the ground presented less difficulties—in other words, that he directed his principal attack against the north-western part of the wall.

Veith asked me what I thought of his theory. I replied that I could not agree with him. Caesar always went straight to the point. He would not have gone out of his way to describe a mode of attack

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. des études anc.*, 1900, p. 340.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 333-4.

<sup>3</sup> Jullian admits (*ib.*, p. 335) that Cornutus, one of the scholiasts of Lucan, mentions two.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 14, 5.

<sup>5</sup> iii, 381-3, 394-8, 455-7.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 1, 3.

<sup>7</sup> In a paper which he has submitted to me (April, 1921).

which he did not adopt : at all events he would have made it clear that he did not adopt it, but another. Furthermore, if Trebonius had attacked the northern or north-western part of the wall, the assailants, after effecting an entrance, would have found themselves on low ground dominated by the citadel, which it was their object to seize ; and in fact the siege *was* long and difficult. Veith adhered to his opinion. ' If ', he wrote, ' the sentence began with the words *pars ea quae*, your view would be unassailable. But the insertion of *Huius quoque spatii* in contradistinction to *pars* proves that this *spatium* was divided into sections '—the part which involved a difficult siege and the flanking parts which Trebonius selected.—Obviously the *spatium* was divided into sections. But what then ? *Huius quoque spatii* is really superfluous, for *pars ea* connotes it ; and so far my view remains unassailable. I will give a further reason for retaining it. If Trebonius had built his principal *agger* where Veith places it, what would have been the use of raising it to the height which Caesar emphasizes. Granted that the height was exaggerated :<sup>1</sup> still the context shows that it was required to compensate for the depth of the valley. Evidently Caesar meant to contrast *pars ea*, which Trebonius was obliged to attack, with the part near the harbour, where his task was comparatively easy.

**The moat.**—Commandant Rouby<sup>2</sup> affirmed that the moat which the Massilians deepened in order to baffle the Roman miners<sup>3</sup> was in the low ground near the harbour. ' That part of the rampart ', he explained, ' which crowned the butte des Carmes, being defended naturally by the escarpment " des Prénestines " and the valley of St. Martin, presented a sufficient obstacle . . . consequently the garrison had not deemed it necessary to dig a trench there.' Vitruvius, however, says that behind that part of the rampart which was

<sup>1</sup> According to the scholiast Cornutus, the height of the *agger* was 60, not, as our original authority says, 80 feet. G. Vasseur (see p. 412) says that the bottom of the valley that separates the butte des Carmes from the plateau of St. Charles is 23 metres above the level of the sea : add 60 feet (17 m. 75) and one finds that the *agger* would have stood 40 m. 75 above the level, whereas the elevation of the butte des Carmes is only 38, and that of its edge, along which the wall probably ran, only 36. Accordingly he concludes (*op. cit.*, p. 222) that the height of the *agger* was not 60 feet, but only 13 metres (44 Roman feet). But he seems to forget that the surface of the *agger* must have been considerably higher than the foot of the wall.

<sup>2</sup> *Le Spectateur mil.*, xxxv, 1874, pp. 172-3.

<sup>3</sup> See Vitruvius, x, 16, 12. Vitruvius did not say that the siege of Massilia to which he referred was the one with which we are concerned—doubtless because his readers would know that there had been no other. When one mentions the siege of Delhi one does not explain that it occurred in the Indian Mutiny. If Massilia had been besieged by the Carthaginians, the siege would have been recorded : Gauls, if they had been mad enough to attack such a fortress, could not have used the battering-ram to which Vitruvius alludes. I should not have written this note if a military historian had not submitted to me a paper in which he argued that Vitruvius was not speaking of the siege of 49 B. C. Vitruvius, he says, implies that the Massilians were victorious (*ita ac civitates . . . contra machinarum rationem architectorum sollertia sunt liberatae*). But, granted that these words imply ultimate, not merely temporary, success, various other *civitates* had been named before.



not protected by a moat the garrison baffled the miners by digging a deep pit and filling it with water drawn from the harbour. M. Jullian, then, is perhaps right in locating the moat 'in the low ground near the quay of La Joliette and the Boulevard de la Major'<sup>1</sup>, that is, on the north of the town.

**The relation of the battle of Taurois to the siege.**— Judging from the official report of the siege, one would say that the decisive victory which Brutus gained over the Massilian fleet occurred several weeks before the garrison surrendered. For after picturing the despair which the news caused, the writer tells us that 'Nevertheless the Massilians proceeded to complete their preparations for the defence of the city',<sup>2</sup> and he devotes the rest of his narrative to describing successively the erection of the brick tower, the construction of the *musculus*, the demolition of one of the bastions, the pretended surrender of the garrison, followed several days later by the sortie in which they set fire to the Roman works, the building of the brick terrace, and, lastly the real surrender. But M. Michel Clerc, relying partly upon Lucan's description of one of the two naval battles, endeavours to show that Caesar, for some interested motive, distorted the sequence of events.<sup>3</sup>

Lucan describes one only of the battles and makes it follow the destruction of the terrace (*agger*). Clerc supposes that he chose to describe the second and more important battle.

Clerc<sup>4</sup> begins by arguing that the Massilians, before they burned the Roman works, would never have consented to go to Taurois in order to join the squadron which Pompey had sent under Nasidius to assist them;<sup>5</sup> for, first, it would have been extremely rash to sail past the fleet of Brutus, which was stationed off the island of Ratonneau; secondly, it is hardly credible that Brutus would have let them pass without attacking them; and, lastly, it is not likely that those Massilian ships which escaped destruction or capture would have been able to return safely from the bay of Ciotat to Massilia. Having thus demolished the official narrative, Clerc sets himself to prove that the battle really took place after the Massilians had burned the [principal] Roman *agger*, and that not the Massilians but the Romans were the aggressors.

After their first naval defeat the Massilians could not put to sea again for some time, not only because they were obliged to repair and equip old ships, but also, says Clerc, because all the available men were needed to defend the town, and therefore the volunteers who served in the second battle<sup>6</sup> could not be spared. But after the *agger* had been burnt, they were free to try again, for, Caesar's statement notwithstanding,<sup>7</sup> Trebonius could not have built the brick terrace 'in a few days'. Meanwhile Nasidius had arrived; and after he had communicated with the Massilians, the fleet set sail and headed eastward in order to join the Roman squadron [of Nasidius] and then to

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 596, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Mélanges Perrot*, 1903, pp. 45-51.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 3; 4, 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 5, 5.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 7, 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 46.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 16, 1.



return and attack Brutus'. 'It is true', Clerc admits, 'that this does not explain any better the very commonplace manœuvre of Brutus, who merely followed the Massilian fleet instead of trying to bar its passage', but 'it is possible that he did try to stop the fleet and that it escaped him thanks to its superior speed'.<sup>1</sup>

Now what must first strike Clerc's readers is that if his reasons for denying that the Massilians sailed to join Nasidius before they burned the Roman works are valid, they tell equally against his own view that they did so later; and the suggestion that the ships were able to give Brutus the slip because they were faster than his, is so obvious that it was not worth making. Then one racks one's brains to try to discover any motive which Caesar, or, as it is safer to say, the writer of the official report, could have had for distorting the order of events. Clerc implies that the battle of Taurois took place not long before the real surrender of the Massilians, and therefore not long before Caesar returned from Spain. But Nasidius was at Messana, on his way to join the Massilians, while Curio was still in Sicily;<sup>2</sup> and Curio, who reached Sicily in April,<sup>3</sup> left about the 8th of August.<sup>4</sup> Nasidius could hardly have taken more than a fortnight to sail from Messana to Taurois; so he must have arrived there, at the latest, by the 22nd of August, probably a good deal earlier, and Caesar did not reach Massilia till near the end of October.<sup>5</sup> When Clerc urges that the Massilians would have deferred their second attempt to destroy the Roman fleet until a moment when the volunteers who were needed to complete the crews could be spared, his argument is plausible; but may there not have been a lull in the siege before the principal *agger* was burned? Besides, the volunteers were evidently few in proportion to the rest of the garrison,<sup>6</sup> and could well be spared for a day or two at a time when the besiegers were not yet ready to assault the town. Moreover, while Clerc relied upon Lucan, he forgot that Lucan himself was voting against him. For the battle which Lucan describes was not the battle of Taurois: it was fought off the Stoechades.<sup>7</sup> Two groups of islands were known by this name: one was identical with the islands of Hyères, the other with the three islands, the most conspicuous of which is Ratonneau, that are opposite Marseilles; and it was near Ratonneau that Brutus gained his first victory.<sup>8</sup> The history of the siege presents many difficulties and its chronology is obscure; but no light will be thrown upon it by damning the official narrative and replacing it with guesswork.

*B. C.*, ii, 10, 1.—*Ubi ex ea turri quae circum essent opera tueri se posse sunt confisi, musculum . . . facere instituerunt.* The tower in question was the brick tower which the Romans built during the siege. According to Stoffel,<sup>9</sup> the words which I have quoted mean 'when they felt sure that from the tower they could protect the

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 48-9.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 3, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, i, 30, 5, compared with *Cic.*, *Att.*, x, 16, 3.

<sup>4</sup> June 16 of the Julian calendar. See pp. 95-6, 408, 423.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 77.

<sup>6</sup> See *B. C.*, ii, 5, 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, iii, 516.

<sup>8</sup> *B. C.*, i, 56, 3.

<sup>9</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 299.

works that *were about to be erected* round it, they proceeded to erect a sappers' hut', &c. One would think that the writer, if he meant this, would have written *futura essent* or *essent aedificanda*; and, as far as we know, only one other 'work' was about to be constructed, namely, the *musculus* itself. It is surely allowable to suppose that he was thinking of the works that had already been or were being constructed, namely, the principal terrace<sup>1</sup> and the sappers' huts that belonged to it.<sup>2</sup>

**B. C., ii, 10, 7.**—Stoffel<sup>3</sup> says that it was necessary to prevent the Massilians from finding out that the *musculus* was being built, lest they should collect materials, inflammable and other, for destroying it: accordingly the Romans ranged sheds in front of the brick tower 'in such a way as to form a kind of curtain, behind which they executed the work'. You are to understand, says Stoffel, that (*Hoc opus omne*) *tectum* (vineis ad ipsam turrem perficiunt) means not 'protected' but 'concealed' by sheds, for 'the real protection was afforded by the discharge of the engines'.

No doubt it was—partly; but I should have liked to ask Stoffel these questions.—Why was it more necessary to conceal the construction of the *musculus* than that of the brick tower, which could not be concealed?<sup>4</sup> What would have been the use of trying to prevent the Massilians from collecting destructive materials, which they did collect as soon as they were wanted?<sup>5</sup> Were the Massilians so densely stupid as not to perceive that something was being built behind the 'curtain' formed by the sheds? And why should not *tectum* mean 'protected' or imply protection, seeing that the normal object of sheds (*vineae*) was not to conceal, but to protect besiegers?

**The battering ram.**—The soldiers who worked inside the *musculus* at Massilia dislodged the masonry at the base of one of the bastions by means of crowbars.<sup>6</sup> Stoffel,<sup>7</sup> referring to a passage in Vitruvius,<sup>8</sup> says that they had previously used a battering-ram, but that the garrison had noosed the head of the ram and thus rendered it useless. Now it is obvious that if Stoffel is right, the *musculus* must have been placed not parallel with the wall, but at right angles to it, and that after the ram had been put out of action the *musculus* must have been moved round till it was parallel and in contact with the wall; for otherwise only one man could have used his crowbar at any given time and the great length of the *musculus*—60 feet—which would have enabled a dozen men or more to work simultaneously, would have been wasted.<sup>9</sup> Besides, it is unlikely that the writer would have omitted to mention the ram if it had been used; and any one who reads the passage in Vitruvius with the context will conclude

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 1, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 2, 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 93, 297.

<sup>4</sup> If any one should answer, 'Because it was inflammable,' I would refer him to *B. C.*, ii, 14, 3, which shows that the brick tower with its woodwork was afterwards burnt as well as the *musculus*:—*musculum turrinque latericiam libere incendunt*.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 11, 1-2.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 11, 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 299.

<sup>8</sup> *x*, 16, 12.

<sup>9</sup> Stoffel evidently thinks that it was wasted! See Pl. 9 of his Atlas.

that he may have referred and probably did refer to the ram which was used on its proper place,—the *agger*.<sup>1</sup>

Having committed himself to the theory which I have just noticed, Stoffel was driven to argue that when the brick tower was built the work of constructing the *agger* was abandoned, which is as much to say that the enormous labour which had been expended upon it was useless:—the face of the operations changed completely: relinquishing the principal attack, on the right . . . they [the Romans] abandoned the tedious works which it demanded',<sup>2</sup> &c. But, Stoffel notwithstanding, the *agger* must still have been useful: otherwise why was its destruction a disaster,<sup>3</sup> and why was a new *agger* built to replace it?<sup>4</sup> Evidently the brick tower and the *musculus* were not intended to supersede, but to supplement the *agger*.

**Hirschfeld on Caesar's account of his treatment of Massilia.**—Otto Hirschfeld,<sup>5</sup> remarking that Dio says nothing about the alleged treacherous sally of the Massilian garrison after their feigned submission,<sup>6</sup> but rather affirms<sup>7</sup> that the Romans were the aggressors, concludes that Caesar attempted to justify the punishment which he inflicted upon the Massilians<sup>8</sup> by a false accusation. Such criticism, if it came from an obscure writer, would not be worth noticing; but that Hirschfeld should have thought it worth reprinting is deplorable. He fails to see that a passage which he quotes from Cicero's *Eighth Philippic*<sup>9</sup>—'Caesar himself, who had been deeply angered by their conduct, nevertheless in view of the unique importance of the city and its former loyalty, gradually abated in some measure his wrath' (*Caesar ipse, qui illis fuerat iratissimus, tamen propter singularem eius civitatis gravitatem et fidem cotidie aliquid iracundiae remittebat*)—confirms Caesar's narrative. Dio's account of the operations at Massilia is both fragmentary and superficial; and when he says that the Romans attacked the Massilians by night during a truce, but encountered such a reception that they never dared to attack them again, he is only giving a characteristic specimen of his credibility.<sup>10</sup>

**The legions that garrisoned Massilia after its surrender.**—What were the two legions which Caesar left (*relinquit*) to hold Massilia when he returned to Italy? As we have seen,<sup>11</sup> he had brought with him two veteran legions from Spain, and he found three legions at Massilia. Stoffel,<sup>12</sup> who wrongly holds that these were veteran legions,

<sup>1</sup> *Etiam cum agger ad murum contra eos [Massilienses] compararetur et arboribus excisis eoque conlocatis locus operibus exaggeraretur, ballistis vectes ferreos candentes in id mittendo totam munitionem cogerunt conflagrare* [this hardly agrees with B. C., ii, 14, 1, though it is not absolutely irreconcilable with it]. *Testudo autem arietaria cum ad murum pulsandum accessisset, permiserunt laqueum et eo ariete constricto per tympanum ergata circumagentes suspenso capite eius non sunt passi tangi murum. Denique totam machinam malleolis candentibus et ballistarum plagis dissipaverunt.* Evidently the *machina* (sappers' hut) that was destroyed in this way was different from the *musculus*, which the Massilians burned.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 297.

<sup>3</sup> B. C., ii, 14, 2-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 15.

<sup>5</sup> *Kleine Schr.*, 1913, p. 53, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> B. C., ii, 14, 1-5.

<sup>7</sup> xli, 25, 2.

<sup>8</sup> B. C., ii, 22, 6.

<sup>9</sup> 6, 19.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 216-7, 236-7.

<sup>11</sup> See p. 77.

<sup>12</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 316.



which had been summoned from the winter quarters of Trebonius to undertake the siege,<sup>1</sup> naturally concludes that they were required for the arduous campaign which Caesar was about to conduct against Pompey, and accordingly infers that those which garrisoned Massilia were newly raised legions, sent from Italy. Newly raised they certainly were, for veteran legions could not be spared; but there is no reason to doubt that Caesar used the word *relinquit* in its strict sense, and that he left behind two of the three legions which had besieged the town.

## CURIO'S CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA

**The credibility of the official narrative.**—What may be called the official narrative of Curio's campaign is contained in chapters 23–44 of *The Second Commentary on the Civil War*, and was doubtless based upon information furnished by Caninius Rebilus,<sup>2</sup> Asinius Pollio,<sup>3</sup> Marcius Rufus,<sup>4</sup> and perhaps some of the few soldiers who escaped the disaster.<sup>5</sup> Apart from a copyist's error, which I have discussed in the article on Anquillaria,<sup>6</sup> only one passage—the speech attributed in chapter 32 to Curio—is open to suspicion. Every one would of course admit that, even if the writer himself listened to Curio or had before him a report supplied by some one who heard him, the speech, as it stands, was the writer's own composition. But Alfred Klotz argues that it was simply a work of Caesar's imagination. 'Have you not heard', Curio is made to say, 'of Caesar's exploits in Spain,—two armies

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 384–7.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 34, 4.

<sup>3</sup> *App.*, *B. C.*, ii, 45–6.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 23, 5; 24, 1; 43, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 44, 1. P. Menge (*Ist Caesar d. Verfasser d. Abschn. über Curios Feldzug in Afrika?* 1910–1) argues that the narrative was not written by Caesar, because (1) it contains 41 words which occur once only,—far more than are to be found in any portion of the same length of Caesar's writings; (2) some of these expressions are startling: thus in 23, 2 we find *incommodus*, whereas Caesar uses *iniquus* in the same sense 20 times; in 25, 7 the substantive *pronuntiatio* does duty for the verb *pronuntiare*, which Caesar uses 23 times; in 29, 1 *unus quisque* is used instead of *quisque*, which occurs 65 times in Caesar; in 34, 5 *eloquor* means the same as *loquor*, which Caesar writes 24 times; instead of *dumtaxat* (41, 2) Caesar uses *solum*, *tantum*, *modo*, or *tantummodo*; and (3) Caesar would not have jumbled harsh criticism with sympathetic apology. This jumble, says Meusel (*Jahresh. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin [Sokrates]*, i, 1913), pp. 20–1), becomes quite intelligible if we accept Menge's suggestion that the narrative was the work of three or four independent witnesses.

I have found no jumble, and for historical purposes it matters little whether Caesar or one or more of his officers wrote the report; but that it was the work of four writers I do not believe. The narrative is on the whole clear and vivid—far superior to *Bell. Alex.* and *Bell. Afr.* I am inclined to think that Caesar threw the dispatch of Rebilus into shape, perhaps excising superfluities but leaving un-Caesarian expressions unchanged. Some superfluities remain, e.g. 33, 1–4. Also we are not told what part Juba's elephants (40, 2) played in the battle. If Caesar was the editor, he perhaps had not time to do his work well. [Mr. A. G. Peskett, whose edition of the *Second Commentary* has appeared since I wrote the foregoing note, shares my view that Caesar modified the reports of Curio's surviving officers. Cf. *Rhein. Mus.*, lxvi, 1911, pp. 81 ff.]

<sup>6</sup> See p. 424.



defeated, two generals beaten, two provinces regained? ' (*An vero in Hispania res gestas Caesaris non audistis? duos pulsos exercitus, duos superatos duces, duas receptas provincias?*<sup>1</sup>) But in the description of the events that happened two days later we read that 'By this time the news of Caesar's success in Spain was reaching Africa through messengers and dispatches' (*Iamque Caesaris in Hispania res secundae in Africam nuntiis ac litteris perferebantur*<sup>2</sup>). These words, says Klotz,<sup>3</sup> prove that Caesar's victory did not become known in Curio's camp until, at the earliest, the day after Curio's speech. Meusel in a note on *B. C.*, ii. 32, 5 attempts to reconcile the two passages by suggesting that in the speech Curio alluded to a rumour, which was followed by authentic information; but Klotz replies that in the speech Curio is made to allude not only to the surrender of Afranius near Ilerda, but also to Caesar's occupation of Further Spain, which occurred several weeks later. The retort is unanswerable; but when Klotz infers that the inconsistency between the two passages 'proves conclusively that Curio's speech proceeded from Caesar's pen', by which he evidently means that it was a pure invention, he goes too far.<sup>4</sup> There is no reason to deny that when Curio harangued his men he had heard of the surrender of Afranius; for when the historian says in the second passage that 'by this time'—two days after the speech—'the news of Caesar's success was reaching Africa through messengers and dispatches,' he is evidently speaking of successive reports, the earliest of which had doubtless preceded the speech; and all that we can reasonably infer is that in composing the speech from the reports which he had received he inadvertently or by way of embellishment made Curio speak of the overthrow of Varro, which had not yet taken place, as well as of the surrender of Afranius.

It remains to notice a recent criticism. Aldo Ferrabino<sup>5</sup> endeavours to prove that Caesar, in order to excuse Curio, exaggerated the difficulties of the march which preceded his defeat. Remarking that the Roman infantry covered only 24 kilometres (less than 15 statute miles) before they went into action, and the cavalry only 36, he contends that these distances cannot be called excessive when it is remembered that the men were well fed, that the march was made in the cool of the night, and that the Bagradas supplied abundant water. The vanguard left the 'Cornelian Camp' at dusk,—say about 9 p.m.;<sup>6</sup> the bulk of the army started in the fourth watch;<sup>7</sup> we may infer from the narrative of Appian<sup>8</sup> that the battle did not begin before 9 or 10 a.m. Thus the infantry had ample time for rest and refreshment, while the cavalry took twelve hours, including the short time that was spent in the encounter with Saburras' Numidians, to ride 36 kilometres.

It might be sufficient to reply that Caesar, or the writer, whoever he

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 32, 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 37, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Rhein. Mus.*, 1911, p. 88.

<sup>4</sup> Klotz (*op. cit.*, p. 89) may be right in explaining the inconsistency between ii. 32, 5 and 37, 2 by the suggestion that the speech was not written at the same time as the context.

<sup>5</sup> *Atti d. R. Accad. d. sc. d. Torino*, xlviii, 1913, pp. 508–10.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 38, 3,

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 39, 1.

<sup>8</sup> ii, 45, 182.

may have been, says enough to show that Curio was responsible for the disaster; and the statements which Ferrabino impugns, far from excusing Curio, only accentuate his guilt: for the fatigue of the troops, if it was real, was the result of his folly in leaving the 'Cornelian Camp', and after the first mention of it the writer says, 'Not even this'—the spectacle of the wearied cavalry—'could moderate Curio's ardour' (*Ne haec quidem res Curionem ad spem morabatur*<sup>1</sup>). If Caesar tried to excuse Curio, Asinius Pollio, who was Appian's authority, and Dio<sup>2</sup> did the same, for both laid stress upon the weariness of the troops; yet Pollio had no motive for defending Curio, who had superseded him. Appian<sup>3</sup> says that the latter part of the march was made over a difficult country in the heat of summer, and that no water was to be had; and if Ferrabino had taken the trouble to study the map, he would have seen that it was impossible for the troops, without going far out of their way, to reach the Bagradas. That the cavalry were exhausted after riding 36 kilometres may appear surprising: but we do not know what they had been doing on the previous day; the men had had little or no sleep; and their horses, since they left the camp, had had no water. As for the infantry, it is surely conceivable that after a march of 24 kilometres in the circumstances which Appian describes, they were not very fit to go into action. Ferrabino<sup>4</sup> appeals to Veith, who says that 'the climate is in general not unfavourable for campaigning'. 'In general'; but Veith could have told him that at the end of June (Julian), when Curio was defeated, the heat is terrible.<sup>5</sup>

The truth is that details which make all the difference—the health of the troops and of the horses, the work which they had been doing before they left the camp, the arrangements that had been made for feeding them, &c.—are all unknown. I can cite a modern instance, the facts of which have been attested by eye-witnesses, whose letters I possess. On the morning of the 30th of June, 1857, Sir Henry Lawrence marched out of the Lucknow Residency with about 700 men to attack an army of mutineers. Chinhat, where the battle was fought, is only seven miles from Lucknow. 'It was remarked by one who saw them start that they looked more as if they had gone through a hard day's march than as if they were going to begin one. On reaching the Kokrail bridge [4 miles from the Residency], they halted; but, contrary to Lawrence's orders, neither food nor drink was served out to them'. Assistant-Surgeon Partridge protested strongly against advancing, on the ground that the men were not fit to go into action; but his advice was disregarded by Brigadier

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 39, 6. Mr. A. G. Peskett (p. xi of his edition), like Ferrabino, thinks that 'the dispatch was so framed by its author, or so modified by Caesar, as to conceal, or at any rate to minimize, the faulty strategy of the . . . general.' If this was Caesar's aim, he failed to deceive Mr. Peskett; but whoever reads chapters 37–41 (see especially 37, 1: 38, 2; 39, 3–6) must be dull indeed if he does not perceive what Curio did amiss. 'The faulty strategy' was self-evident.

<sup>2</sup> xli, 42, 3.

<sup>3</sup> ii, 45, 182.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 515.

<sup>5</sup> M. S. Gsell in a valuable article on the climate of North Africa in antiquity (*Rev. afr.*, lv, 1911, pp. 343–410) concludes (see especially pp. 392–410) that it differed little from what it is to-day.

Inglis, the second-in-command, and the defeat which led to the siege of the Residency ensued.<sup>1</sup> If the record of the surgeon's protest were to perish, some future Ferrabino might argue that the historical statement of the weariness of the men was a fiction, designed to shield Lawrence from blame.

**Anquillaria.**—Curio sailed from Sicily<sup>2</sup> for Africa in the summer of 705 (49 B. C.) with two legions and 500 cavalry,<sup>3</sup> and landed at Anquillaria. This place was 22 miles from Clupea, and had a roadstead, formed by two bold headlands (*duobus eminentibus promunturiis*), which in summer afforded a fairly commodious anchorage.<sup>4</sup> The name Clupea survives in Kelibia, a town on the eastern coast of the peninsula that terminates in Cape Bon; but Clupea was about 2½ kilometres (one Roman mile and a half) ESE. of Kelibia and just north of Ras Mostefa; for the remains of quays and moles are still discernible.<sup>5</sup> From Anquillaria Curio marched round the Gulf of Tunis to the river Bagradas, now called Medjerda, the nearer bank of which he reached, if the original authority is trustworthy, in two days.<sup>6</sup> The Bagradas has shifted its course northward: in Caesar's time it entered the gulf about 10 Roman miles south-east of Utica.<sup>7</sup>

Stoffel,<sup>8</sup> perhaps following V. Guérin,<sup>9</sup> identified the roadstead of Anquillaria with a bay about a mile wide and stretching two-thirds of a mile from open sea to shore, 2 or 3 miles south of Rass el Ahmar and 8 miles in a straight line south-west of Cape Bon. Meusel<sup>10</sup> distrusts this identification, first, because the bay is not 22 but, as he affirms, only 18 Roman miles from Clupea,<sup>11</sup> secondly, because it would have been impossible for Curio's army to march to the Bagradas—distant 110 kilometres, or about 68 English miles—in two days.<sup>12</sup> Stoffel, who of course anticipated the second objection, tried to remove it by substituting *et V dierum iter* for *bidnique iter*; but Meusel rightly rejects this emendation as palaeographically unsound. He suggests that Anquillaria was near Aquae Calidae, now Hammam-Korbeus, on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Tunis. The distance from Aquae Calidae to the Bagradas was not much more than 60 kilometres; but Meusel admits that Aquae Calidae was 32, not 22, miles from Clupea.

Now mere inspection of the French staff map<sup>13</sup> convinced me that

<sup>1</sup> Rice Holmes, *Hist. of the Indian Mutiny*<sup>5</sup> (reprint of 1913), pp. 263–4, 583–4.

<sup>2</sup> According to Lucan (iv, 583), from Lilybaeum.

<sup>3</sup> Appian (ii, 46, 190) mentions light-armed auxiliaries as well.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 23, 1–2.

<sup>5</sup> *Atlas archéol. de la Tunisie*, ed. E. Babelon, R. Cagnat, and S. Reinach, Feuille xvi.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 24, 1.

<sup>7</sup> C. J. Tissot, *Le bassin du Bagrada*, 1881, pp. 104–110; *Bull. archéol. du Com. des travaux hist.*, 1887, p. 443.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 307–10.

<sup>9</sup> *Voyage archéol. dans la régence de Tunis*, ii, 1862, p. 224.

<sup>10</sup> See pp. 319–20 of his edition.

<sup>11</sup> The distance, measured on the map along the shortest road, is just over 19 Roman miles.

<sup>12</sup> Curio's troops were young soldiers, recruited only a few months before.

<sup>13</sup> *Atlas archéol. de la Tunisie*, Feuille xiv.



Anquillaria was nowhere near Korbeus ; and when I saw that place the conviction deepened. The inlet formed by the two little promontories which one observes as one walks northward from Korbeus is tiny ; it could not have sheltered more than a small fraction of a fleet which must have numbered fully 100 ships.<sup>1</sup> Korbeus is shut off from the interior by mountains which reach the height of 419 metres (about 1,375 feet) and descend to the water's edge : along the edge and in the sea close to the shore rocks abound ; unless there was a mole, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to disembark the army ; and it would have been excessively troublesome to transport the baggage to the plain which extends south of the hills. The existing road, which runs *en corniche*, was constructed recently ; and in order to ensure its safety, the overhanging mountains are faced in several places with masonry. Before the road was made Korbeus was not accessible from the south except by a path, which in the staff map of 1889 is indicated by a line signifying 'sentier muletier'.<sup>2</sup> Is it credible that Curio would have selected this spot for a landing-place when the commodious anchorage near Cape Bon was open to him ? Is it likely that Aquae Calidae was also called Anquillaria ? And if Korbeus itself was not Anquillaria, no place can be found near it which satisfies the conditions. Furthermore, even if we were to substitute XXXII for XXII, it would be misleading to say that Anquillaria, supposing that it was near Aquae Calidae, was 32 miles from Clupea. Thirty-two miles the distance is in a straight line ; but the Romans measured distances between towns along roads ; and there was no direct road, not even a direct path, from Aquae Calidae or any place near it to Clupea. The distance along the tortuous paths which are traced in the staff map was more than 40 Roman miles ; and in a mountainous country routes remain unchanged. Again, if Anquillaria had been anywhere near the site of Korbeus, there would have been no point in mentioning its distance from Clupea. Let us see why our author did mention it. In the next sentence he tells us that Lucius Caesar the younger had been waiting off Clupea with 10 ships of war to intercept Curio, but that, shrinking from an encounter with Curio's fleet, he ran his own trireme ashore and escaped by land : then we read that Marcus Rufus, who with 12 galleys had convoyed Curio from Sicily, chased Lucius Caesar, but, desiring the stranded trireme, took it in tow and returned to Curio, who was still at Anquillaria. If Anquillaria was near Cape Bon, the motive for mentioning the distance between Anquillaria and Clupea is clear. The first objection which Meusel brings against Stoffel's choice is cancelled by the similar objection which he himself admits against his own ; and while the latter is insuperable, the former has no weight, for (apart from the possibility that Caesar was not accurately informed) the distance between two

<sup>1</sup> The fleet which Caesar assembled for his first expedition to Britain and which had to convey an army of about the same size as Curio's, numbered, besides ships of war, about 100 Gallic transports. *B. G.*, iv, 22, 3-4 ; 24, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Atlas archéol. de la Tunisie*, Feuille xxi.



points in a hilly country is longer than that measured on the map. Moreover, as Meusel himself points out, *biduique* may well have been written in mistake for *triduique*. If so, Curio marched at the rate of 36 or 37 kilometres—about 22 English miles—a day. This was a remarkable feat, especially in June; but it is not improbable that Curio tried to emulate the *celeritas* of his master, even when nothing was to be gained by doing so.<sup>1</sup>

Groebe<sup>2</sup> maintains that there are two reasons for rejecting Stoffel's choice: first, Curio's fleet took a longer time to sail from Anquillaria to Utica than his army to march to the Bagradas;<sup>3</sup> secondly, Lucius Caesar waited for Curio off Clupea, and then fled southward to Hadrumetum. Groebe concludes that Anquillaria was between Clupea and Hadrumetum; but, as he has to admit, there is no landing-place here which corresponds with Caesar's description, 'assuming that the coast has not since changed.' Mr. Peskett,<sup>4</sup> who follows Groebe, wishes that 'some one trained in geological and antiquarian research would investigate the east coast . . . and ascertain whether Anquillaria could have been situated somewhere between Curubis (Kourba) and Neapolis (Nabel)'; and he adds that 'the configuration of the ground as shown in Stoffel's atlas [Pl. 11] indicates that there may have been such an anchorage between projecting headlands some centuries ago'.<sup>5</sup> Why does he trust to Stoffel's atlas? If he had scrutinized the staff-map ( $\frac{1}{500000}$ ), reproduced in the *Atlas archéologique de la Tunisie* (sheet XXX), he would have seen that between the points which he names there could have been no 'projecting headlands'. Moreover, the northernmost of those points is more than 25 Roman miles from Clupea; and since Curio would have had to march across the peninsula from Curubis or any other place which Groebe or Peskett might select, the length of his march would have been nearly as great as if he had started from Stoffel's site. It may be added that nothing in Caesar's narrative proves that Curio's fleet had not reached Utica before he reached the Bagradas,<sup>6</sup> and if it had not, it may have been delayed by causes of which we are not informed. When Caesar says that Lucius was waiting for Curio 'off Clupea' (*ad Clupeam*), he evidently means, not that his vessels remained stationary, but that off Clupea was the anchorage from which they started and to which they would return for water or supplies. That Lucius sailed or sent out scouts as far northward as the latitude of Cape Bon is proved by the stubborn fact that at the required distance south of Clupea and for a long way beyond no projecting headlands are or were ever to be found.

It may perhaps be objected to the bay which Stoffel selected that it was too close to Missua, the site of which has been identified by an

<sup>1</sup> I find that Veith (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, 1912, p. 732) has said much the same.

<sup>2</sup> W. Drumann's *Gesch. Roms*, iii.<sup>2</sup> 1906, p. 403, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 24, 1; 25, 6.

<sup>4</sup> In his edition of *B. C.*, ii, 1915, p. xi.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 51.

<sup>6</sup> Can *adventu* (longarum navium) (*B. C.*, ii, 25, 6) mean 'in consequence of the arrival', &c.?

inscription with Sidi Daoud;<sup>1</sup> but ancient remains are visible behind the bay.<sup>2</sup>

Tissot<sup>3</sup> identified Anquillaria with El Haouaria, 3 miles SSE. of Cape Bon and about a mile from the shore. The two headlands, according to Tissot, were Cape Bon itself and Rass el Ahmar, which is 11 kilometres (about 6½ miles) WSW. of Cape Bon; but between these two there are several minor promontories, and, if Tissot's choice is right, the *promunturii* must surely have been the headlands on either side of the 'Quarries' (Λατομῖαι), at which Agathocles landed.<sup>4</sup> This place is about 9 kilometres further from the Bagradas than the site which Stoffel approves, and the eastern headland could hardly be called *eminens*.

The editors of the *Atlas archéologique de la Tunisie*—MM. Babelon, Cagnat, and S. Reinach—tentatively point to a little bay, less than one kilometre south of Rass el Ahmar, close to which there are ancient remains. 'Sous l'eau', they remark, 'on distingue des murs de quais et des vestiges de môles'.<sup>5</sup> No doubt there was a port here; but it was not more than about 250 yards wide—too small to have sheltered Curio's fleet.

The choice evidently lies between Stoffel's site<sup>6</sup> and El Haouaria; and the former seems to me the more probable.

**The Cornelian Camp.**—The Cornelian Camp was not on the northern extremity of the ridge east of Utica, where Stoffel<sup>7</sup> placed it, but, as Veith<sup>8</sup> has shown, on the plateau, about a mile and a quarter further south. The site adopted by Stoffel is lower than the plateau; it does not command as good a view, the outlook southward being obstructed by the plateau; Caesar's description, according to which the slope of the ridge on the side facing Utica was rather more gentle than on the other,<sup>9</sup> applies only to the plateau; and, finally, a camp placed on the northern end would have afforded no protection to Curio's ships, which, in order to avoid exposure to storms, would have anchored further south.

**Appian and the alleged poisoning of the Bagradas.**—It would appear from the official narrative of Curio's campaign<sup>10</sup> that he returned from the 'Cornelian Camp' to the camp which he had pitched near the Bagradas on the same day on which he reconnoitred

<sup>1</sup> *C. I. L.*, viii, p. 129 and No. 989 (H. Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 9043).

<sup>2</sup> *Atlas archéol. de la Tunisie*, Feuille viii.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, i, 1884, pp. 174–5.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. Sic., xx, 6, 3. Cf. *The Mediterranean Pilot*, i, 1904, p. 377. The little bay on which El Haouaria stands is encumbered with rocks; but I do not gather from *The Mediterranean Pilot* that they would have prevented ships from approaching the shore.

I asked Mr. E. Edwards of the British Museum (Dept. of Oriental Printed Books, &c.) whether *El Haouaria* could have been derived from *Anquillaria*: he answered, 'No.'

<sup>5</sup> Letterpress accompanying Feuille viii.

<sup>6</sup> Stoffel coolly asserts (i, 310) that 'Après la chute de Carthage les Romains . . . créèrent en face de Missua, sur la pointe opposée du croissant qui formait la rade, une ville nouvelle qu'ils appelèrent du nom latin Anquillaria'.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Hist. de J. César*, i, 102 with Pl. 11.

<sup>8</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, 1912, p. 734.

<sup>9</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 24, 3.

<sup>10</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 25, 26, 1.

the former. Appian,<sup>1</sup> however, says that he encamped on the 'Cornelian Camp', but that as his army was attacked by various maladies in consequence of the enemy's having poisoned the water, he abandoned the position and moved to the outskirts of Utica. This would imply that he spent a day or two at least with his whole army on the 'Cornelian Camp', whereas he had gone there with his cavalry alone, merely to reconnoitre, and had left the bulk of his force on the Bagradas. Besides, as Veith points out,<sup>2</sup> to poison the Bagradas for any length of time would have been impossible; it was too far from the 'Cornelian Camp' to be available; and Curio returned a few days later to the 'Cornelian Camp', on the plateau of which, as our original authority informs us,<sup>3</sup> water was abundant. One may conjecture that Appian's blunder originated in the fact, if such there was, that individuals in the army suffered from enteric fever in consequence of their having somewhere drunk impure water.<sup>4</sup>

**The battle of the Bagradas.**—The evidence for fixing the site of the battle in which Curio perished is contained in *B. C.*, ii, 38–42. His cavalry, numbering about 500, marched soon after sunset from the Cornelian Camp, 3 miles E. by S. of Utica,<sup>5</sup> against Saburra, who was encamped near the Bagradas; surprised the enemy, of whom they killed a considerable number; and returned with their prisoners to meet Curio, who had followed them with the infantry in the fourth watch, that is, within two hours of dawn. When the cavalry met Curio, he had advanced 6 Roman miles from the Cornelian Camp. Marching on, he ordered the cavalry to follow him; but they were so tired that only 200 could obey. When Curio encountered Saburra he had covered 16 Roman miles; when it became evident that he was defeated he attempted to occupy the hills close by, but was anticipated by the enemy.

Tissot<sup>6</sup> places the battle-field where I have placed it,—on the north bank of the Bagradas, near the ford 3 miles east of Djedeida; but he thinks that the hills (*proximi colles*<sup>7</sup>) which Curio tried to occupy were those along the crest of which he had moved during the earlier stage of his march. This seems to me impossible, for those hills terminate about 8 miles north of the supposed battle-field: if it has been correctly determined, the hills must have been those called Djebel Chaouat.

Stoffel<sup>8</sup> maintains that the site was only 16½ kilometres (rather

<sup>1</sup> ii, 44, 178–9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, p. 733, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 37, 5. Cf. Veith, p. 734.

<sup>4</sup> A. Ferrabino (*Atti d. Accad. d. sc. d. Torino*, 1913, p. 501) suggests that Appian may have confounded Curio's intention of encamping on the *Castra Cornelia* with the (imaginary) act of encamping. I should say rather that he assumed wrongly from Pollio's report (see p. 423) that Curio intended to encamp there, and inferred that he carried out the supposed intention. There is no evidence that he intended in the first instance to encamp on the plateau. He visited it merely to reconnoitre, doubtless thinking that he might, as he afterwards did, find it convenient to encamp there in the course of the campaign.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 427.

<sup>7</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 42, 1

<sup>6</sup> *Le bassin du Bagrada*, p. 106.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 313–4.



more than 10 miles) from the Cornelian Camp, not far south of the heights along which Curio had advanced. In order to defend this theory, he is of course compelled to do violence to the text: instead of *XVI*<sup>1</sup> (miliun) he substitutes an emendation of his own, *XII*. He attempts to justify this alteration by the following arguments:—if *XVI* were right, Curio's cavalry, at the moment when he met them,<sup>2</sup> would have marched 26 Roman miles, besides fighting and looting, in one night,—a sheer impossibility; and the 200 horsemen who followed Curio to the battle would have marched 36 Roman miles before going into action. Everything is explained if in 41, 1 we substitute (confecto iam labore) *equitatu* for *exercitu*.

Nemesis punishes the rash emendator. Having made one needless emendation, Stoffel was forced, in order to bolster it up, to make another. Remembering the words of Boeckh—'In general one may affirm that out of one hundred conjectural emendations . . . not five are right'—who will believe that Stoffel hit the nail on the head in two successive attempts? The cavalry had no fighting to do except butchering a number of defenceless and sleepy men; and, as far as we know, their loot consisted of a few prisoners. I therefore see no reason for disbelieving that the 200 horsemen who were able to follow Curio could have marched 36 Roman miles. 'Could have marched' I say advisedly; for as Veith has shown,<sup>3</sup> even though *XVI* is right, it is morally certain that they did march less than 36 miles. Veith argues that the place where Saburra's horsemen were surprised by the cavalry of Curio was near Haras de Sidi Tabet, 3 or 4 miles north-east of the battle-field. When they were attacked Juba was encamped 6 Roman miles behind Saburra,<sup>4</sup> on the further bank of the Bagradas.<sup>5</sup> As soon as he heard from Saburra of the attack he sent 2,000 cavalry and his best infantry to reinforce him, and followed with the rest of his force.<sup>6</sup> Saburra, expecting that Curio would himself attack him, formed up his troops and ordered them to retreat gradually in pretence of fear.<sup>7</sup> Curio, believing that they were really afraid of him, descended from the ridge along which he had been advancing into the plain, marched on, and halted after he had moved 16 miles from the Cornelian Camp, when the battle began.<sup>8</sup> It follows that Saburra's retreating troops were visible from the southern extremity of the ridge; and we must infer either that Saburra pushed them forward considerably in advance of his camp with orders to retreat, or that, as Veith maintains, he ordered them to retire from the position which they already occupied, in which case that position must have been considerably north of the battle-field. The former alternative is unsupported by the evidence and is unlikely to the last degree; for, as Veith justly observes, to push forward troops which had just been defeated would have put Curio on his guard.<sup>9</sup> I therefore have no doubt that Veith's conclusion is sound.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 41, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 39, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, pp. 737, 739-40. Cf. Karte 16 b or my map of the campaign.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 38, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *App.*, ii, 45, 181-2.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 40, 1-2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, § 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, § 4; 41, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 737.



## DYRRACHIUM AND PHARSALIA

**Dio (xli, 38, 1-2) on one of Caesar's financial measures.**—Dio, after describing the measures which Caesar devised in 49 B. C. for the relief of debtors in Italy, says that as it was reported that many persons were secretly hoarding money, Caesar re-enacted an old law which provided that no one should keep in his possession more than 15,000 *denarii* (£600); but that it was doubtful whether his object was to compel debtors to make some payment to creditors and to induce capitalists to lend to those who were in need, or to ascertain who were well off and to prevent such an accumulation of wealth in the hands of individuals as might lead in his absence to civil strife. Dio's statement is unsupported;<sup>1</sup> but Mommsen,<sup>2</sup> who accepts it, thinks that the enactment 'was probably issued only to allay the indignation of the blind public against the usurers; the form of publication,' he continues, 'which pretended that an old and forgotten law was only being enforced anew, shows that Caesar was ashamed of the enactment, and it can hardly have passed into actual application.' Could it have been passed at all? What was to be done with the surplus hoards? Were they to be confiscated, or banked by the Government during the war, or distributed among long-suffering creditors and needy debtors? E. Meyer<sup>3</sup> thinks that the statement of Cicero<sup>4</sup> that Antony, when he was acting as Caesar's Master of the Horse after the battle of Pharsalia, confiscated gold and silver in Rome is explicable on the assumption that he was enforcing this law; but Antony may only have seized the property of Pompeians.<sup>5</sup>

**B. C., iii, 1, 4.**—Speaking of the exiles whom he recalled in the autumn of 49 B. C., Caesar affirms that the verdicts by which they had been condemned under Pompey's law [of 52 B. C.] were given by jurors who had not heard the evidence, and that the trials were severally finished in a single day (*quae iudicia aliis audientibus iudicibus, aliis sententiam ferentibus singulis diebus erant perfecta*). 'This', says Long,<sup>6</sup> 'is almost unintelligible, and is a proof either that Caesar was imperfectly acquainted with the facts or did not take the trouble of learning what they were.' It seems to me that whether Caesar was ignorant or not, his meaning is, as usual, transparently clear. Mr. Peskett<sup>7</sup> says that 'the expression *aliis . . . ferentibus* is only Caesar's misleading way of expressing the fact that judgement was given by only 51 of the original 360 *iudices*,<sup>8</sup> some of whom might have been prevented . . . from hearing the evidence

<sup>1</sup> Tacitus (*Ann.*, vi, 16) has been supposed to refer to it; but this seems to me doubtful.

<sup>2</sup> *Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1889, p. 534 (Eng. tr., v, 1908, p. 398).

<sup>3</sup> *Caesars Monarchie*, 1919, p. 372 and n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Phil.*, ii, 25, 62.

<sup>5</sup> Drumann (*Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 423), remarking that the law which Caesar had enacted in the interest of debtors might lead to the locking up of capital, suggests that he supplemented it by the law which Dio describes.

<sup>6</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 1874, p. 115.

In his edition of *B. C.*, i.

\* See vol. ii, p. 169.

of the witnesses,' &c. Mr. Strachan-Davidson<sup>1</sup> admits that 'it would be very difficult to secure the constant presence of so large a body [360 jurors] over many days and still more difficult to make them pay serious attention to evidence, as to which each one would feel that very probably he would not be called upon to judge of it after all. We cannot but suspect that a good many of the 51 who eventually voted . . . would prove to have only a very imperfect knowledge of the evidence. Caesar's ill-natured criticism may be excused, though not justified.' Why ill-natured if substantially true?

**The earlier movements of Pompey in Macedonia.**—Appian,<sup>2</sup> remarking that Pompey did not expect that Caesar would attempt to cross the Adriatic before the end of winter, says that he distributed his troops in winter-quarters in Thessaly and Macedonia. We learn from Plutarch<sup>3</sup> that he trained his new levies at Berrhoea, on the northern bank of the Vistritza, about 40 miles west of Thessalonica. According to Dio,<sup>4</sup> he wintered at Thessalonica itself. As it seems evident that he would not have gone back from Berrhoea to Thessalonica after hastily drilling recruits who required all the training that they could get, and as he had advanced as far westward as Candavia by January 5, 706 (November 6, 49 B. C.), or a few days later,<sup>5</sup> and must therefore have quitted Thessalonica several weeks before, I infer that Dio was mistaken, and that when a sufficient number of troops had concentrated at Berrhoea, Pompey moved thither from Thessalonica and began to train them. Appian was obviously wrong in saying that they wintered in Thessaly, which was far south of the road by which Pompey had to advance against Caesar. He probably meant, or he found in his authorities, that some of the contingents which formed Pompey's army moved up from Thessaly to Berrhoea, and others through Macedonia from the east.<sup>6</sup>

**B. C., iii, 4, 4.**—Caesar says that among the cavalry which Pompey raised in 49 B. C. for the campaign in Greece were 500 Gauls and Germans from Alexandria, belonging to the force which Gabinius had left there as a garrison with Ptolemy after he had restored him to the throne (*D ex Gabinianis Alexandria, Gallos Germanosque, quos ibi A. Gabinius praesidii causa apud regem Ptolemaeum reliquerat*). A. J. Reinach<sup>7</sup> conjectures that what Caesar wrote was not *D*, but *MD* (1,500). For, he says, the fleet which Pompey's son Gnaeus raised at Alexandria and in which the cavalry sailed to join Pompey and most of them returned to Alexandria after his defeat comprised 50 ships,<sup>8</sup> and it seems unlikely that there were only 10 troopers in each ship. Moreover, we learn from *Bellum Africanum*<sup>9</sup> that in the African campaign Labienus had 1,600 Gallic and German cavalry,

<sup>1</sup> *Problems of the Rom. Crim. Law*, ii, 1912, p. 111.

<sup>2</sup> ii, 52, 213.

<sup>3</sup> *Pomp.*, 64, 1.

<sup>4</sup> xli, 43-4.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 11, 2.

<sup>6</sup> See *B. C.*, iii, 4, 2. 3. 6.

<sup>7</sup> *Rev. des études anc.*, xiii, 1911, pp. 62-3.

<sup>8</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 111, 3.

<sup>9</sup> 19, 6.

and the only other Gallic cavalry, so far as we know, which had served under Pompey, except a few who deserted from Caesar near Dyrrachium,<sup>1</sup> were 600 Galatians furnished by Deiotarus,<sup>2</sup> who returned home after the battle of Pharsalia. Reinach thinks that some of Labienus's corps belonged to the cavalry which Pompey had summoned from Alexandria; if so, he concludes, 'we are forced to believe that Gnaeus had brought 1,500 troopers at least from Alexandria, and not 500.'

These reasons seem to me insufficient to warrant Reinach in altering Caesar's text. The Egyptian galleys were not transports: they had to carry their rowers and marines, and if anything in Caesar's statement is surprising, it is that room could be found on board of each for 10 troopers and their horses as well. Indeed it is not certain that room was found for any:<sup>3</sup> the cavalry may have been brought in transports conveyed by the galleys, and there is no evidence that any of them returned to Alexandria. Besides, Reinach's emendation is of no avail. If Pompey had 1,500 Gallic and German cavalry at the beginning of the war in Greece and Labienus had 1,600 notwithstanding all the losses that had been suffered during the campaign, either Pompey must have been reinforced before the battle of Pharsalia or Labienus must have raised fresh troops in the interval between the battle and the African war. Reinach himself suggests that some only of Labienus's cavalry had served under Pompey; but, according to *Bellum Africanum*,<sup>4</sup> Labienus had brought them with him from the theatre of war.

**Pompey's fleet.**—Appian<sup>5</sup> says that Pompey assembled 600 ships of war; Dio<sup>6</sup> and Plutarch<sup>7</sup> estimate the number at 500, to which the latter adds a large number of small craft. Kromayer<sup>8</sup> labours to prove that these figures are exaggerated. His method is to add up the numbers given by our authorities<sup>9</sup> of individual squadrons and to supply omissions by guess-work; by this process he arrives at the conclusion that the total must be reduced to 300. But squadrons and individual vessels which escaped the notice of the authorities may have cruised here and there: others may have been lost; and Kromayer's guesses may be wrong. All that really matters is to ascertain, if we can, how many ships were engaged on either side in this or that operation, and to bear in mind the fact, established by a consensus of evidence, that Pompey's naval strength was much greater than that of Caesar.

**The appointment of Pompey as Commander-in-Chief.**—According to Lucan,<sup>10</sup> before the year of office of the consuls Marcellus and Lentulus ended, they called a meeting of the senators in Epirus, and Pompey was appointed Commander-in-Chief. Velleius<sup>11</sup> apparently

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 60, 5; 79, 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 4, 3.

<sup>3</sup> If it was, the number of the rowers must have been greatly reduced. Cf.

C. Torr, *Anc. Ships*, 1895, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> 19, 4.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 49, 200, 204.

<sup>6</sup> xli, 52, 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Pomp.*, 64, 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Philol.*, lvi, 1897, pp. 433-7.

<sup>9</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 7, 1; 23, 1; *Bell. Alex.*, 42, 4; 44-7; App., ii, 71, 296; 88, 371.

<sup>10</sup> v, 44-9.

<sup>11</sup> ii, 49, 2.

means that he received the appointment at the outset of the war ; but this, as we may infer from a letter of Pompey himself,<sup>1</sup> is a loose statement. Pompey's military force, his authority over the treasury, and his prestige gave him a preponderating informal power, but at that time no more. Mommsen<sup>2</sup> remarks that Dio and Caesar are silent about the alleged organization of a Senate in Epirus, and, affirming wrongly that the command was conferred upon Pompey before he left Rome, concludes that Lucan invented. But Dio<sup>3</sup> is not silent, and Caesar<sup>4</sup> says expressly that the command was conferred upon Pompey ' by a resolution of the council ' (*de consilii sententia*), which called itself the Senate. Does he mean that Pompey's official authority was limited to the force which he personally commanded ? His words—*summam belli rerumque omnium Pompeio permiserint*—seem to imply that Scipio was subordinate to Pompey ; but in a later chapter<sup>5</sup> he says that Scipio was independent (*præessee suo nomine exercitui*). Pompey, indeed, treated him as such, perhaps from the motive of courtesy.<sup>6</sup>

**The legions that accompanied Caesar to Greece.**—In an earlier article (pages 384–7) I have proved that the 8th, 12th, and 13th legions, which had served under Caesar in the conquest of Italy, did not, as Stoffel supposed, take part in the Spanish campaign against Afranius and Petreius, but rested in Apulia. It follows that they were among the seven that accompanied Caesar from Brundisium to Palaeste. What were the other four ? Stoffel,<sup>7</sup> supposes that one of the seven was composed of recruits ; but he is compelled to make this assumption because, premising that Caesar had only nine veteran legions, he holds, wrongly as I have shown,<sup>8</sup> that the three which had served at Massilia were veteran, that they were ordered to march to Brundisium, and that when Caesar embarked they had not yet arrived. I maintain on the contrary that all the seven legions were veteran,<sup>9</sup> and that the three which had rested in Apulia were joined at Brundisium by the four which had been quartered at Placentia. If one of the seven was a newly raised legion, only three of the four could have arrived from Placentia in time. This is no doubt possible ; but the alternative is more probable, and Caesar would not have opened his most momentous campaign with recruits if veterans had been available. But if all the seven were veteran legions, Caesar must have had ten, not nine, veteran legions in Greece after he was joined by Antony ; for he says that three of the four which accompanied Antony were veterans.<sup>10</sup> In other words the 5th legion, called *Alaudæ*,<sup>11</sup> must have taken part in the campaign. That Caesar does not mention it is no objection ; for he omits to notice the 7th, which certainly served in Greece.

In my narrative I have disregarded the statement of Appian<sup>12</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Att.*, viii, 12 B, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Röm. Staatsr.*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1888, p. 925, n. 6.

<sup>3</sup> xli, 43, 1–2.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 16, 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 57, 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 82, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 1887, pp. 326–7.

<sup>8</sup> See pp. 384–7.

<sup>9</sup> My view is shared by Col. G. Veith (*D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium, &c.*, 1920, p. 217).

<sup>10</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 29, 2.

<sup>11</sup> See p. 355, n. 2.

<sup>12</sup> ii, 54, 221–2.



that Caesar, embarking with only five legions (and 600 cavalry), remained at anchor until two other legions reached the port.<sup>1</sup> In such matters Appian is an untrustworthy guide: he enormously exaggerated the number of Caesar's available cavalry;<sup>2</sup> and I suspect that he was misled by the authority whom Plutarch<sup>3</sup> followed when he said that Caesar sailed with only 5 legions. If Appian used this authority, he may have concluded, since he knew that Caesar really sailed with 7, that two of them reached Brundisium later than the rest.

Caesar says that when he reached Brundisium he found only ships enough to carry 15,000 men, closely packed, and 600 cavalry.<sup>4</sup> From a subsequent chapter<sup>5</sup> we learn that he bade the troops leave behind their slaves (*mancipia*<sup>6</sup>) and their baggage—evidently, as common sense and a later passage<sup>7</sup> alike show, all the baggage that was not absolutely indispensable—and that he sailed with 7 legions. This at first sight might seem to imply that each of the legions numbered little more than 2,000 men; but, as the average strength of eight legions at Pharsalia, after all the losses which they had suffered in the campaign, was 2,750,<sup>8</sup> this is out of the question. Nipperdey<sup>9</sup> accordingly suggested that Caesar wrote (*legiones*) VI; but this emendation will not serve, for when Antony reinforced Caesar he only brought four legions with him,<sup>10</sup> and Caesar had then eleven. Glandorp conjectured that in *B. C.*, iii, 2, 2 Caesar wrote not XV but XXV (*milia legionariorum militum*); Scaliger with even less probability proposed XX; and other guesses have been made, which the reader may safely ignore. Stoffel<sup>11</sup> points out that by leaving slaves and heavy baggage behind additional space was gained, and that it thus became possible to find room for seven legions, say 21,000 men. When, he remarks, Caesar says that he embarked seven legions, 'as has been pointed out above' (*ut supra demonstratum est*), he means, not 'as has been expressly stated', but 'as may be gathered from what has been already said.' As Meusel points out, in five other passages—*B. C.*, i, 48, 3; iii, 15, 1; 39, 1; 56, 1; *B. G.* v, 19, 1—the same words can bear no other interpretation.

**The mission of Vibullius Rufus.**—Stoffel<sup>1</sup>, says Mr. Peskett (in a note on *B. C.*, iii, 11, 3), 'professes to follow Plutarch (Pomp. 65)

<sup>1</sup> Stoffel (i, 327), who follows Appian, explains that Caesar embarked 'pour témoigner de son impatience'! Caesar was not a child.

<sup>2</sup> ii, 49, 201. <sup>3</sup> *Caes.*, 37, 2. <sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 2, 2. <sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 1.

<sup>6</sup> After the fall of Alesia Caesar gave one prisoner, by way of prize, to each legionary (*B. G.*, vii, 89, 5), and some legionaries may perhaps have kept their prisoners as slaves instead of selling them; but I am inclined to infer from *Bell. Afr.*, 47, 3 (*ita ex Sicilia exercitum [Caesar] transportabat ut praeter ipsum militem et arma nec vas nec mancipium neque ullam rem quae usui militi esse consuevit in naves imponi pateretur*) that *mancipia* is a synonym of *calones*.—officers' servants, muleteers, &c.; and F. Fröhlich (*D. Kriegswesen Cäsars*, 1891, p. 57 and n. 10) evidently shared this view. R. Cagnat, however (*Daremberg and Saglio, Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, iii, 417, 16<sup>b</sup>), infers from Caesar's mention of *mancipia* that privates as well as officers were generally waited upon by slaves.

<sup>7</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 75, 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 89, 2.

<sup>9</sup> pp. 153–6 of his edition.

<sup>10</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 29, 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 323–6.

in making Caesar dispatch Vibullius from Oricum, but in the first place Plutarch's language is ambiguous and Stoffel has probably misinterpreted him, and in the second place the order of Caesar's narrative suggests that Vibullius received his commission before Caesar's departure for Oricum . . . What would be his object in letting Vibullius lose time while the troops were being disembarked at Palaeste, then taking him to Oricum and there giving him his instructions ?'

Whether Plutarch's language is ambiguous or not matters nothing ; for it is needless to invoke his authority. Very likely Vibullius received his commission before Caesar left Palaeste ; but it was just because Caesar did not want him to lose time that he took him to Oricum. If Mr. Peskett will study a good map he will be convinced that Vibullius could not have hired a carriage at Palaeste, and that it was impossible to drive over the Acroceraunian mountains. Oricum, on the other hand, was linked by a road with the Egnatian Way, on which Pompey was to be found.

[Veith,<sup>1</sup> asserting, without evidence, that Caesar dispatched Vibullius 'immediately after the landing', and therefore that Vibullius started from Palaeste, assumes that he did not drive, but ride, and infers from Caesar's having said that he used *iumentis*, not *equis*, that, on account of the bad state of the roads, he used pack-animals (*Tragtiere*)—probably mules. Veith goes on to say that Plutarch's statement is rendered very suspicious by his further statement that Caesar proposed to meet Pompey 'on the third day', which, as he observes (with perfect but irrelevant truth) would have been a physical impossibility even if Caesar had known exactly where Pompey was. Veith misunderstands Plutarch, who says much the same as Caesar, namely that Caesar proposed that he and Pompey should both swear to disband their respective armies within three (or, according to our reckoning two) days—evidently counted from the date of the oath. Compare the two passages :—

*Si uterque in contione statim iuravisset se triduo proximo exercitum dimissurum, &c.*

Ἰούβιον [Vibullius] . . . πρὸς Πομπήιον ἀπέστειλε προκαλούμενος εἰς ἐν συνελθόντας ἀμφοτέρους ἡμέρᾳ τρίτῃ πάντα διαλῦσαι τὰ στρατεύματα, &c.

Plutarch to be sure fancied that Caesar proposed to meet Pompey ; but he meant, not that they were to meet three days after Vibullius started, but that they should disband their armies three days after they met. When Veith conjectures<sup>2</sup> that in the time of Caesar the Via Egnatia was in bad repair, does he not forget that Cicero, who travelled along it from Dyrrachium to Thessalonica and back, unquestionably in a carriage—imagine him perched for several successive days on the back of a mule !—refers to 'the constant traffic on the road'.<sup>3</sup> I would beg Veith to consider what became

<sup>1</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, pp. 87–8. Cf. 69–70.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 71.

<sup>3</sup> *Ego propter viae celebritatem . . . non commori me adhuc Thessalonica* (*Att.*, iii, 14, 2). Dyrrachium, like other important towns on the road, was crowded with Roman citizens (*Fam.*, xiv, 1, 7), who must have required facilities for travelling.

of Vibullius's necessary luggage. Was it strapped on the back of a sumpter-mule? Was he accompanied by a mounted guide? If not, how did he find his way through an unknown country, of the language spoken by the natives of which he was surely ignorant?]

**Amantia.**—Caesar says that after he had occupied Apollonia the people of Byllis, Amantia, and the neighbouring communities sent envoys to assure him that they would obey his commands.<sup>1</sup> Byllis was on the right bank of the Aous, close to the modern Hekalj.<sup>2</sup> As Caesar in the two passages in which he refers to Amantia<sup>3</sup> mentions Byllis first, neglecting alphabetical order, C. Patsch<sup>4</sup> concludes that Amantia was further than Byllis from Apollonia.<sup>5</sup> The argument is worth little or nothing; but the conclusion is confirmed by Ptolemy,<sup>6</sup> and Patsch reinforces it. We may infer, he says, from the second passage that the territory belonging to Amantia extended to the sea; according to Pseudo-Scylax,<sup>7</sup> Amantia was 320 stades (40 Roman miles), according to the *Table* of Peutinger.<sup>8</sup> 30 Roman miles from Apollonia; and Stephanus of Byzantium says that it was near Oricum. Patsch<sup>9</sup> concludes that it was east of the Gulf of Avlona, and identifies it with Pljoca. He admits that this position does not agree with the distance specified by the *Table*; but, as he remarks, the *Table* is often untrustworthy, and Nivicia, or Nivitza, the site selected by Leake<sup>10</sup> and adopted by H. Kiepert, is still more at variance with the *Table* and is evidently too far south.<sup>11</sup> Veith<sup>12</sup> gives reasons, which he himself describes as very doubtful, for supposing that Amantia may have stood upon the site of Kljoš, barely 2 kilometres south-east of Byllis.

**The site of Caesar's camp on the Apsus.**—According to Heuzey,<sup>13</sup> the camp which Caesar occupied during the winter of 706 (49–48 B. C.) was situated in the plain (which, I may remark, is inundated at that time of the year)<sup>14</sup> near Apollonia. Accordingly, although Caesar says that he and Pompey, who was encamped opposite him on the northern bank of the Apsus, saw the fleet that conveyed the legions of Antony from Brundisium as it sailed past Apollonia,<sup>15</sup> Heuzey says that it could only have been seen by Caesar's lookouts from the

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 12, 3–4.

<sup>2</sup> *C. I. L.*, iii, 600 (H. Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 2724). Cf. C. Patsch, *D. Sandschak Berat*, &c., 1904, col. 49.

<sup>3</sup> 12, 4; 40, 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> The site of Apollonia—Pollina, or Pojani, 7 kilometres (4½ miles) south of the Aous—is certain. G. Veith (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, 1906, p. 511) identified it with Avlona (otherwise Valona), but has since candidly recanted (*D. Feldzug von Dyrrachium*, p. 42).

<sup>6</sup> *Geogr.*, iii, 12, 3–4.

<sup>7</sup> 26.

<sup>8</sup> *Segm. VI.*

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, col. 51.

<sup>10</sup> *Travels in Northern Greece*, i, 1835, pp. 375–6.

<sup>11</sup> The same criticism applies to Bretaj, the site adopted by R. Kiepert (*Formae orbis ant.*, xvii). The writer of the article AMANTIA in W. Smith's *Dict.* says that Leake's choice 'agrees with the distances afforded by Scylax, and the Tabular Itinerary'. It cannot agree with both, and in fact it agrees with neither.

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 45–7.

<sup>13</sup> *Les opérations mil. de J. César*, 1886, p. 39.

<sup>14</sup> C. Patsch, *D. Sandschak Berat*, col. 133; G. Veith (*Anz. d. Kais. Akad. d. Wiss.*, [Vienna], philos.-hist. Kl., lii, 1915, p. 196).

<sup>15</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 30, 1.



citadel of Apollonia and by those of Pompey from the heights of Ardenitza, behind his camp. Stoffel<sup>1</sup> says substantially the same.

Colonel Veith argues that Caesar encamped on a hill by Kuči, on the upper course of the Apsus, some 32 kilometres in a straight line NE. of Apollonia. He begins<sup>2</sup> by giving reasons for believing that the Apsus (now called Semeni) did not then flow, as Heuzey and Stoffel assumed, in its present channel, but entered the sea about 20 kilometres north of Apollonia, though, for the sake of argument, he is willing to admit that it may have skirted the site which they indicated. He maintains, further,<sup>3</sup> that the direct road between Apollonia and Dyrrachium, which is not mentioned by any original authority except the *Table* of Peutinger,<sup>4</sup> did not exist in the time of Caesar, and therefore that the spot where Caesar encamped when he was obliged to abandon his attempt to cut off Pompey from Dyrrachium<sup>5</sup> must have been close to the point where the only route by which he could have marched—the southern branch of the Via Egnatia—crossed the Apsus, namely Kuči. Next he points out<sup>6</sup> that, since it is incredible that either Caesar or Pompey encamped on the inundated plain of Muzakja, our choice is restricted, even supposing that the direct road did then exist and that the Apsus did then flow in its present channel, to three sites,—a hill immediately south of Fieri on the Via Egnatia, 8 kilometres E. by N. of Apollonia; a hill opposite Gradišta, where Pompey would have encamped and which is on the northern bank of the supposed ancient bed of the Apsus, 12 kilometres from the sea; and the above-mentioned hill near Kuči. Apart from the reasons which I have already noticed, Veith<sup>7</sup> condemns Fieri because the two camps would have been separated by a distance of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres, whereas Caesar says that they were separated only by the Apsus;<sup>8</sup> because during the late war both hills were cut up by entrenchments in every direction, but no traces of ancient camps were found; and because Caesar, who says that he encamped on the Apsus in order to protect the communities that had supported him,<sup>9</sup> would not have been able to protect them, for Byllis and Amantia,<sup>10</sup> of which he was evidently thinking, lay too far to the east. The second of these reasons is certainly weighty; neither of the others will, I believe, impress any unbiased reader. Byllis and Amantia are respectively 26 and 42 kilometres SSE. and S. by E. of Fieri, and if Caesar was

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 155. Cf. 145-6.

<sup>2</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, pp. 33-5. Cf. p. 61, n. 78. Veith remarks (p. 33, n. 1) that in 1804 Leake (*Travels in Northern Greece*, i, 379) went from Pojani to Ardenica without saying that he had crossed the Apsus, and, moreover, that his map at the end of the volume shows the river winding round the north of Ardenica, which, says Veith, proves that it flowed in the hollow of Gradista. But in the same map the Apsus is shown flowing, as it flows now, only 3 miles north of Pojani (Apollonia).

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 59-63.

<sup>4</sup> Segm. VI.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 13, 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 91-2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 93-5.

<sup>8</sup> *Inter bina castra . . . flumen tantum intererat* Apsus, crebraque inter se colloquia milites habebant. *B. C.*, iii, 19, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, 13, 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, 12, 4.



encamped by Fieri, they were evidently safe unless Pompey could force the passage of the Apsus, which he had not the faintest chance of doing. The other remark on which Veith lays stress simply means, as the context shows, that the only obstacle to communication between the soldiers of the two armies was the river: whether the camps were  $3\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres (under  $2\frac{1}{4}$  miles) apart or less, matters nothing. Again, Veith condemns Gradista<sup>1</sup> because there also the hills in question are too far apart (about  $1\frac{3}{4}$  miles), Caesar would have been even less able than at Fieri to protect his allies, and, finally, Caesar's description of the observation of Antony's fleet is unintelligible unless his camp was situated far inland, namely at Kuči.

Now it may be granted that in certain respects Veith<sup>2</sup> makes out a plausible case for Kuči. The alleged camps would have been less than half a kilometre apart; some slight traces of entrenchments appear to have been discovered; potsherds, which, according to an archaeologist to whom Veith appealed, may possibly be of Caesarian date, were forthcoming; coins, which Veith was unable to see, are said to have been found; and no one will deny that Caesar could have protected his allies. But it remains to be considered whether Veith has rightly interpreted the passage in the *Commentaries* on which he principally rests his case.

In the MSS. the passage runs: *Haec eodem fere tempore Caesar atque Pompeius cognoscunt. Nam praetervectas Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque naves viderant ipsi iter secundum eas terras direxerant, sed quo essent [eae] delatae primis diebus ignorabant.*<sup>3</sup> Latin scholars will see that to extract a satisfactory meaning from *Nam . . . direxerant* is impossible. Meusel therefore adopts an emendation suggested by W. Paul, who, putting a comma (which is obviously required somewhere) after *ipsi*, inserted *ut* immediately afterwards. The subject of *direxerant* would then be *naves*, and the meaning would be, 'For they [Caesar and Pompey] had themselves seen the ships pass Apollonia and Dyrrachium, as they [the ships] had directed their course along those lands,' &c. Now it would have been impossible to see the ships from Kuči, and Veith accordingly adopts another emendation—*terra* instead of *terras*. The comma must in that case be placed after *viderant*, and the meaning becomes, 'For they had seen the ships pass Apollonia and Dyrrachium, (and) had themselves directed their course parallel with them by land,' &c. In other words, so Veith explains,<sup>4</sup> as soon as the appearance of the fleet was announced, Caesar and Pompey mounted their chargers and rode, accompanied by patrols, to watch the movement of the ships: Caesar rode from Apollonia to Ardenica (Ardenitza), Pompey from Dyrrachium to Cape Pali.

But, the reader may ask, how came Caesar to be at Apollonia and Pompey at Dyrrachium—42 and 64 kilometres (26 and 40 statute miles) from their respective camps? Because, so Veith<sup>5</sup> replies by

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 95-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 98-105.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 30, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 116-7.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 107.

anticipation, the relevant passage in Caesar proves that they were there. Yes, self-evidently—if they had encamped by Kuči; in other words, if we may beg the question. Veith supposes that Caesar, while his army remained on the Apsus, spent most of his time at Apollonia;<sup>1</sup> and I freely admit that he may have gone there when he was expecting the arrival of Antony. But what reason could Pompey have had for going to Dyrrachium—a long day's ride from his camp?<sup>2</sup> Veith does not explain.

There is another passage which may perhaps lead the Austrian expert to think again. When Pompey set out from his camp on the Apsus to prevent Antony from joining Caesar, he advanced 'by forced marches' (*Pompeius . . . magnis itineribus ad Antonium contendit*).<sup>3</sup> Veith, who has shown by cogent reasoning that the point which Pompey reached was Ciberak, a few miles south-west of Elbassan (Scampa), remarks<sup>4</sup> that it was 30 kilometres (less than 19 miles) from his alleged camp, and of course assumes that he covered this distance in a single march. But this does violence to the plural *magnis itineribus*: unless it is a rhetorical equivalent of the singular, Pompey made two long marches; and this points to the conclusion that his starting-point was Fieri. Unless and until it is proved by excavation that he had encamped by Kuči, I cannot unreservedly assent to Veith's theory.<sup>5</sup>

**The coast blockaded by Bibulus** (*B. C.*, iii, 8, 4).—We learn from this passage that Bibulus blockaded a certain extent of coast 'far and wide with his squadrons' in order to prevent any reinforcements from joining Caesar; but the terminal points of the coast are uncertain. In the groups of MSS. as  $\pi\rho$  the text runs: *a Sasonis ad Corici portum stationes litoraue omnia longe lateque classibus occupavit*: in *S* we find *Coricy* instead of *Corici*. Saso was the island (now called Saseno) off the Gulf of Valona; the other name being plainly corrupt, Mommsen<sup>6</sup> conjectured that Caesar wrote *Curici*—the (imaginary) name of a port belonging to the island of Curicta (Veglia) in the extreme north of the Adriatic. This emendation, though it showed that Mommsen had not begun to understand the conditions of the blockade which Bibulus had to enforce, has been generally adopted. Veith<sup>7</sup> elaborately demonstrates what is self-evident to every one who can understand Caesar's narrative—that Bibulus had no need to blockade the coast north

<sup>1</sup> See p. 440, n. 5.

<sup>2</sup> But, I may be asked, how, except on Veith's theory, can you explain the words *Nam praetervectas Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque naves viderant ipsi*? I can only reply that if in a corrupt passage those words are genuine, Caesar may have meant that he and Pompey had seen the ships run past Apollonia and had concluded that, as there was no port between Apollonia and Dyrrachium (which was garrisoned by Pompeians), they must pass Dyrrachium too.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 30, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

<sup>5</sup> Veith (p. 93, n. 14) tries, unsuccessfully in my opinion, to explain away the statement of Appian (ii, 56, 234) that Caesar's camp was 12 stades (1½ mile) from the river and hard by Apollonia.

<sup>6</sup> *Hermes*, ii, 1867, pp. 145–6.

<sup>7</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, pp. 201–8.

of Dyrrachium, but only to prevent reinforcements or supplies from reaching Caesar from Brundisium; but when he reads *Orici* (which, he remarks, is found in the MS. known as Lovaniensis)<sup>1</sup> I cannot follow him; for the distance from the northernmost point of Saso to Oricum is only 25 kilometres (15½ miles), and it seems to me incredible that Bibulus should have concentrated several squadrons in this little gulf and that Caesar should have used the words 'far and wide' (*longe lateque*) of movements confined within this small space. Veith himself rightly insists that Bibulus watched the coast from Saso to Coreyra: may we not then suppose that for the corrupt *Corici* and *Coricy* should be substituted *Corcyrae*?<sup>2</sup>

*B. C.*, iii, 19, 5.—The MS. reading is (*prodit*) *submissa* (oratione). With Meusel I adopt H. Schiller's emendation *et superbissima*. Mr. Peskett translates *submissa oratione*, which can only mean 'in a humble speech' (so characteristic of Labienus!) by 'in low tones'. Does he not forget that a speech so delivered would have been inaudible on the further banks of the Apsus?

**Caesar's alleged attempt to sail to Brundisium.**—Almost every ancient writer who chronicled the Civil War relates that Caesar, in his anxiety to expedite the arrival of reinforcements, hired a vessel to take him to Brundisium, but was compelled to put back by stress of weather.<sup>3</sup> Long<sup>4</sup> says that 'it is impossible to admit that Caesar would have left his troops on the Apsus in the presence of . . . Pompeius and Labienus, when he had no legates fit to command an army, or even if he had'; but almost immediately afterwards he admits that 'we cannot say whether the story was true or false', and concludes that 'it is possible that some unsuccessful attempt of some person is the foundation of the story'. If Long had first read *B. C.*, iii, 16, 1 and 51, 1, he might have written differently. From the former passage we learn that Caesar did leave his troops on the Apsus in order to visit Buthrotum: in the latter he says that when he left his camp to attack Dyrrachium he appointed Publius Sulla to command in his absence. Sulla could safely have been trusted to hold the camp on the Apsus for a few days, and Pompey would not have been so rash as to attempt to force the passage of the stream. Veith,<sup>5</sup> after collating all the relevant texts, concludes that Caesar did attempt to cross from the harbour of Apollonia.

<sup>1</sup> Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 10084.

<sup>2</sup> Remarking (p. 202) that Caesar would, if it had been possible, have brought his fleet from Messana to Brundisium in order to raise the blockade of that port and to convoy his transports, Veith argues that he was prevented from doing so by Pompey's fleet, a squadron of which must therefore have been stationed south of Coreyra. But it is not certain that Caesar had a fleet at Messana in the earlier part of 48 B. C.

<sup>3</sup> Val. Max., ix, 8, 2; Lucan, v, 476-677; Plut., *Caes.*, 38; Flor., ii, 13, 37; Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 58; App., ii, 56-8; Dio, xli, 46, 2-4; Zonaras, x, 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 139.

<sup>5</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, pp. 108-12. Why Veith supposes that Caesar spent most of his time at Apollonia while the armies confronted one another on the Apsus at a point which on his theory was more than 25 miles from Apollonia, I cannot conceive.



**The alternative landing place which Caesar indicated to Antony.**

—The MS. reading in *B. C.*, iii, 25, 4, *sive ad litora Apolloniaticum* (cursum dirigere atque eo naves eicere possent), although Stoffel<sup>1</sup> struggles desperately to explain it, is meaningless. I therefore with Meusel adopt the conjecture of F. Hofmann, who saw that some words must have dropped out of the text,—(*sive ad litora Apolloniaticum*) *sive ad Labeatum*. The Labeates possessed the seaboard north of Dyrrachium, where Antony actually landed.

**The naval squadron of Coponius.**—According to Appian,<sup>2</sup> Coponius had 20 ships; according to Caesar,<sup>3</sup> 16. Stoffel<sup>4</sup> endeavours to reconcile the two statements by assuming that besides the sixteen ‘fenced’ galleys which Caesar mentions, Coponius had four which were ‘unfenced’. But Caesar says distinctly that all Coponius’s galleys were ‘fenced’<sup>5</sup> (*tempestus . . . naves Rhodias adflixit, ita ut ad unam omnes, constratae numero XVI, eliderentur, &c.*).

**The junction of Caesar with Antony and Pompey’s retreat to Asparagium.**—Immediately after Antony landed in the port of Nymphaeum (San Giovanni di Medua) he was admitted into the fortress of Lissus (Alessio) and sent messengers to inform Caesar, who was encamped on the southern bank of the Apsus (Semeni), opposite Pompey, where he was and what troops he had brought with him. Pompey, who received the same information about the same time, started in the night to intercept Antony; Caesar started in the morning to join him. Caesar had the longer distance to march, for he was obliged to move up the valley of the Apsus in order to find a ford, whereas Pompey had not to cross the river (*flumen ei transeundum non erat*). Pompey made forced marches, and, on learning that Antony was near, encamped in a suitable position and forbade his troops to light fires, hoping to prevent Antony from finding out where he was and intending to attack his column from ambush. Some natives, however, reported Pompey’s design to Antony, who accordingly remained in his camp and sent messengers to warn Caesar, who joined him on the next day. Pompey, learning that Caesar was on the point of joining Antony, saw that he was himself in danger of being attacked in front and in rear, and accordingly retreated to a position,<sup>6</sup> which, as we learn from a later chapter,<sup>7</sup> was close to Asparagium and on the northern bank of the Genusus, now called the Shkoubmbi.<sup>8</sup>

Von Göler<sup>9</sup> and Heuzey<sup>10</sup> infer from these facts that Pompey, while he was marching against Antony, did not cross any river, and

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, i, 353–4.

<sup>2</sup> ii, 59, 243.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 27, 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, i, 154.

<sup>5</sup> *Constratae* is usually translated by ‘decked’; but, as Mr. Cecil Torr shows (*Anc. Ships*, 1895, pp. 51–2, 57), it is equivalent to *κατάπρακτοι* and denotes ‘a line of screens on either side to close the open space between the hurricane-deck and the gangway, and thus protect the rowers of the upper bank from missiles’. Caesar, like Livy, uses the terms *constratae* and *tectae* (*B. C.*, i, 56, 1) indifferently.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 29–30.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 76, 1–2.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 443.

<sup>9</sup> *Caesars gall. Krieg.*, &c., ii<sup>2</sup>, 1880, pp. 85–7.

<sup>10</sup> *Les opérations mil. de J. César*, p. 42.



that Antony had crossed the Genusus when Caesar joined him. Stoffel,<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, holds that both Pompey and Caesar crossed the Genusus; that the junction of Caesar with Antony took place at Tirana, due east of Dyrrachium; and that Pompey retreated first to the neighbourhood of Dyrrachium, and afterwards to Asparagium. 'Von Göler', he says, 'is wrong in supposing that Mark Antony left Lissus before he received the necessary instructions from Caesar. That is not the way in which things happen in war; and if any one were to argue that it was Antony's interest to join Caesar as soon as possible, I should reply that it was not his business to anticipate the intentions of his chief,' &c.

Stoffel's readers are accustomed to the lofty air with which he dogmatizes on the way in which things happen in war; and some of them have smiled when they watched other military specialists ruthlessly criticizing his judgements. Observe that in order to maintain his theory he is compelled to resort to fiction. Caesar says merely that 'Pompey, to avoid being surrounded by two armies, abandoned the position which he had occupied and made his way with his whole force to the neighbourhood of Asparagium', &c. (*Pompeius, ne duobus circumcladeretur exercitibus, ex eo loco discedit omnibusque copiis ad Asparagium . . . pervenit*,<sup>2</sup> &c.). Stoffel says that Pompey marched towards Dyrrachium, and afterwards, when he learned that Caesar had returned from Tirana to Scampa, went to Asparagium. The motive of this interpolation will be evident to every one who keeps his map open: if Caesar joined Antony at Tirana, and Pompey then retreated to Asparagium, he left Dyrrachium at Caesar's mercy!

Now let us see whether von Göler was really such an ignoramus as Stoffel would have us believe. Antony knew that Caesar was impatiently waiting for reinforcements; and Caesar, who had warned him that he might have to land north of Dyrrachium, had doubtless explained that in that case the only road by which he could bring them was the one that ran through Tirana to Scampa. If he wasted precious time at Lissus, waiting for orders, the only orders which he could receive would be to march by that road. We may therefore conclude that Antony left Lissus without waiting for orders, and that Caesar expected him to do so. As Caesar could not start until Antony's message reached him, we may infer that Antony had by that time made two or three marches, and that the junction took place much further south than Tirana,—probably not far from Scampa.

[Veith<sup>3</sup> has confirmed my argument and, moreover, having explored the theatre of the campaign far more extensively than Stoffel, has indicated the spot where Pompey must have lain in wait for Antony. If Caesar had crossed the Genusus, Pompey, encamped at Asparagium, could not have prevented him from marching direct on Dyrrachium (precisely what I said): indeed Pompey's motive

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 155-6, 160-1, 354-6; ii, 427-8.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 30, 7.

<sup>3</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, pp. 117-22.

for going to Asparagium and Caesar's for following him thither would be unintelligible. Pompey must have intended to fall upon Antony while he was marching across an open plain, not a broken hilly country where he could evade attack. Such a spot is only to be found in the neighbourhood of Belik, some 10 kilometres (6½ miles) SW. of Scampa. Pompey would have formed his ambuscade in the hills by Ciberak, about 2 kilometres west of Belik.]

**On which bank of the Genusus did Pompey encamp?**—Pompey, after he failed to prevent Caesar from joining Antony, encamped close to (*ad*) Asparagium, which was near the river Genusus.<sup>1</sup> Caesar, on learning that Pompey was at Asparagium, marched thither, encamped near Pompey (*iuxta eum*), and on the following day 'gave Pompey an opportunity of fighting a decisive battle' (*decernendi potestatem Pompeio fecit*<sup>2</sup>). From the only other passage<sup>3</sup> in which Caesar mentions Asparagium we learn that when he was retreating from his camp near Dyrrachium to Apollonia, he crossed the Genusus and occupied his old camp 'opposite Asparagium', and that Pompey also utilized his old camp 'close to Asparagium'. It follows that ('Caesar's camp was on the south bank; and a hasty reader might infer from the words *iuxta eum* that, as Stoffel<sup>4</sup> maintained, Pompey's was there too. Meusel in his note on the third passage remarks that while the words 'opposite Asparagium' (*contra Asparagium*) seem to indicate that Asparagium was on the north bank, the words 'close to Asparagium' (*ad Asparagium*) suggest that Pompey's camp was there also; and this impression is confirmed by the fact that Caesar did not attempt to prevent Pompey from taking possession of it, and by the fact that Caesar's cavalry, who were sent out ostensibly to forage, were not observed when they returned through the rear gate.<sup>5</sup> Meusel concludes that either *contra Asparagium* is an inaccurate expression or *iuxta (eum)* means the same as *contra*, in which case Caesar's offer of battle was a sham.

Now the meaning of *contra* is certain;<sup>6</sup> therefore Asparagium was north of the river. The meaning of *ad* is equally plain;<sup>7</sup> Pompey was not separated by the river from Asparagium. Caesar was justified in saying that Pompey encamped 'near' him, even though they were separated by the river. Pompey must have encamped on the north bank, for otherwise, as Veith<sup>8</sup> points out, he could not have barred the way to Dyrrachium: the road would have been open to Caesar, who, after he joined Antony, could have advanced direct to that all-important town and avoided the circuitous march which he was afterwards forced to make.<sup>9</sup> His offer of battle was no doubt a sham, in the sense that he expected that Pompey would not be so rash as to cross the river to accept it; but it served the purpose of heartening his own men.

**Asparagium.**—Asparagium was identified by Heuzey<sup>10</sup> with

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 30, 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 41, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 76, 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 160.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 76, 1.

<sup>6</sup> H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, i, 717-8.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 116-22.

<sup>8</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, p. 125.

<sup>9</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 41, 3-5.

<sup>10</sup> *Les opérations mil. de J. César*, pp. 41-2.

Bastava, which is close to the sea and, as he supposed, at the place where the direct road from Dyrrachium to Apollonia crossed the Genusus. Stoffel<sup>1</sup> conjectured that the point of intersection was about half an hour's walk above the village of Sulzoti, where some Albanians showed him the remains of an old bridge, and close to which the chain of heights on the left bank terminates. Veith,<sup>2</sup> who does not believe that in Caesar's time the direct road existed, observes (here apparently agreeing with Stoffel) that Asparagium could not have been further west than the point where the Genusus, emerging from the uplands, entered the plain, otherwise Pompey, when he first encamped there, could not have barred Caesar from advancing on Dyrrachium: all that Caesar need have done was to march up the Egnatian Way, and if Pompey had tried to stop him a battle must have ensued, which was just what Caesar wanted. Granted that Veith has traced the course of the Egnatian Way correctly, this reasoning is sound enough. On the other hand, Veith continues, Asparagium could have been no further east; for when Caesar was retreating to Apollonia, he would have avoided a needless détour. Of course; but it follows that the road diverged from the great highway that led to Thessalonica at Asparagium, whereas geographers, relying on the indications in the itineraries, have hitherto held that the junction was at Clodiana (now Pekini). But, as Veith observes,<sup>3</sup> this is not expressly stated; and he concludes that Clodiana was merely the first station on the Egnatian Way eastward of the junction of the northern branch (leading to Dyrrachium) and the southern (leading to Apollonia).

*B. C., iii, 40, 1.*—*navibus in quibus ad libram fecerat turres.* The obvious meaning of *ad libram* does not satisfy Stoffel; and accordingly Meusel, after giving it in his note, says, 'Against this explanation, however, many objections may be made.' What they are he omits to say; and my invention is not sufficiently fertile to supply the omission. Stoffel's imaginary explanation, which Meusel then proceeds to quote, is worth reproducing as a curiosity. The sea in the Bay of Oricum, he remarks, is often very rough, and but for the *ad libram* contrivance Gnaeus Pompeius's men would not have been able to launch their missiles effectively. The remedy was to suspend in the upper interior of each turret, by chains or cables joined at the point of suspension, a strong wooden framework with a floor on which the men could stand. This framework would not have been affected by the motion of the vessel.<sup>4</sup> One is reminded of the contrivance by which in the days of my youth passengers who travelled between Dover and Calais by the *Bessemer* were supposed to be rendered immune from sea-sickness. Where did Stoffel learn that the sea was rough at the entrance of the inner harbour when Gnaeus arrived? And is it likely that Caesar, who was so careful to describe novel engineering expedients, would have omitted to explain this precious device?

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 347-8.

<sup>2</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, 49-50.

<sup>3</sup> p. 56.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 368.



**The Caesarian and the Pompeian entrenchments at Dyrrachium.—**

I cancel an article in which I criticized an attempt which G. Veith made in his *Geschichte der Feldzüge C. Julius Caesars*<sup>1</sup> to amend Stoffel's tracing of the southern section of Pompey's works; for, reporting the result of his researches on the spot, he admits that he was wrong.<sup>2</sup>

**What was the hill which Caesar tried to occupy (B. C., iii, 45-6) ?—**

Caesar says that the hill which the 9th legion endeavoured to fortify was close to another hill which Pompey occupied immediately afterwards, and was approached from it by a gentle slope<sup>3</sup>. Heuzey<sup>4</sup> identifies the former with the hill of Paliama, which, he remarks, is linked by 'a kind of isthmus to the group of Tilaï'. Stoffel<sup>5</sup> identifies the hill which Caesar began to fortify with that of Tilaï, and the hill which Pompey occupied with another on the north-west of it. Veith<sup>6</sup> agrees with Heuzey, first because (as Heuzey himself observed) the 9th legion regularly occupied the extreme left of Caesar's line,<sup>7</sup> and therefore on this occasion doubtless the part that abutted on the sea; secondly because Paliama is, and Tilaï is not, connected with a gentle slope.

**B. C., iii, 50, 2.**—Von Göler,<sup>8</sup> remarking that the operations described in B. C., iii, 50 took place in the summer, thought that the fires which Caesar mentions<sup>9</sup> were lighted in order to facilitate communication between the various redoubts in the event of their being attacked by night; but the blockade of Dyrrachium really lasted from February (Julian) to the beginning of May,<sup>10</sup> when, as Stoffel<sup>11</sup> remarks, the nights are generally fresh, and he explains that the men lighted the fires to keep themselves warm or to dry the ground. Here, however, a difficulty presents itself. After describing the attacks which the Pompeian archers, guided by the illumination, made upon the bivouacs, Caesar says that his men, taught by experience, made their fires in one place [?] and . . . (*Quibus rebus nostri usu docti haec reperiabant remedia, ut alio loco ignes facerent . . .*). The lacuna has been conjecturally filled up by adding the words *alio excubarent*, so that the meaning would be 'lighted their fires in one place and bivouacked in another'; and this conjecture is adopted by Stoffel.<sup>12</sup> But what then becomes of Stoffel's explanation? If the troops bivouacked away from the fires, how did they keep warm, and what was the use of drying unoccupied ground? Did the missing words show that the fires were lighted further back, out of range of the arrows?

**Caesar's attack on Dyrrachium.—In B. C., iii, 53, 1 Caesar**

<sup>1</sup> p. 511.

<sup>2</sup> *Anz. d. Kaiserl. Akad. d. Wiss.* (Vienna), philos.-hist. Kl., 1915, pp. 194-5. Cf. *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, pp. 141, 147, 162. The pages (147-67) which Veith devotes to the question of the lines are very useful.

<sup>3</sup> B. C., iii, 45, 2-3. Cf. p. 139 of my narrative.

<sup>4</sup> *Les opérations mil. de J. César*, pp. 70-1.

<sup>5</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, pp. 139-45.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 169.

<sup>7</sup> B. C., iii, 89, 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesars gall. Krieg*, &c., ii<sup>2</sup>, 109, n. 2.

<sup>9</sup> See p. 141.

<sup>10</sup> See pp. 477-80.

<sup>11</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 363.

<sup>12</sup> *Ib.*, p. 173.



remarked that in one day three combats had taken place at Dyrrachium and three in the space between Pompey's entrenchments and his own. Two of the latter are described in 52 and the concluding phase of the other in 51; but the description of the earlier phase of this combat and of the fighting at Dyrrachium is lost. In a later chapter,<sup>1</sup> however, Caesar says that in order to prevent Pompey's cavalry in Dyrrachium from foraging he fortified the two approaches to the town, which, as he remarks, he has already [in the missing chapter or chapters] shown to be narrow. Evidently, then, in the missing chapter Caesar related that Pompey had sent this cavalry in ships to Dyrrachium,—presumably in order to enable them to obtain the forage which was not procurable within his lines<sup>2</sup> and to harass Caesar's rear. Appian<sup>3</sup> says that Caesar had been led to hope that Dyrrachium would be betrayed to him, and that he accordingly marched with a small force to the gate near the temple of Artemis; but in his narrative also there is a gap. We are obliged therefore to have recourse to Dio,<sup>4</sup> who, like Appian, says that Caesar hoped to obtain possession of Dyrrachium from traitors, and adds that he made his attempt by night and 'penetrated within the narrows' (εἶσω μὲν τῶν στενῶν παρήλθε)—the two narrow approaches to which Caesar alludes—but that he was himself attacked by a strong force in front and by another, transported by sea, in rear, lost many men, and narrowly escaped with his life. Dio was evidently thinking only of the southern approach.

Stoffel<sup>5</sup> holds that when the detachment, sent by sea, attacked Caesar's rear, he was on the southern isthmus. Veith,<sup>6</sup> on the contrary, argues that in that case the assailants would have been themselves destroyed by a counter attack from Caesar's principal camp, only 3 kilometres off. He believes that Caesar, marching round the lagoon, was attacked in front at the western end of the northern isthmus, and in the rear by the detachment, which had sailed round Cape Pali, and that while he was retreating the Pompeian cavalry harassed his rear on the eastern side of the lagoon. But the notion that Caesar intended to march right round the lagoon—24 kilometres, or over 15 miles—in order to reach the town, which was not more than 5 kilometres from his camp, seems to me not only far-fetched, but irreconcilable with the accounts of Appian and Dio; and the argument by which Veith endeavours to anticipate this objection—that as Caesar expected to surprise the place in collusion with traitors, he would have approached it from the rear—leaves me unconvinced.<sup>7</sup>

**Pompey's first attempt to break Caesar's blockade.**—Veith<sup>8</sup> argues, conclusively I think, that Heuzey<sup>9</sup> and Stoffel<sup>10</sup> were wrong

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 58, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 3–5.

<sup>3</sup> ii, 60, 250.

<sup>4</sup> xli, 50, 3–4. Florus (ii, 13, 40) is not helpful.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 364.

<sup>6</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, p. 169.

<sup>7</sup> Veith (p. 171) guesses that while Caesar was fighting (as he supposes) on the northern isthmus, a small detachment of his troops engaged the garrison on the eastern side of the town.

<sup>8</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, pp. 173–7.

<sup>9</sup> *Les opérations mil. de J. César*, pp. 81–3.

<sup>10</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 364–6.

in supposing that the redoubt defended by the 8th cohort of the 6th legion, against which Pompey directed his principal attack,<sup>1</sup> was situated on a knoll near the village of Mainz : for the contravallation was not in that region carried along the watershed ; <sup>2</sup> Pompey, in order to retreat to the hill of Giusai, which Heuzey and Stoffel identify with the hill described by Caesar in chapter 51 (§ 8), would have been forced either to make a long détour or to descend into a steeply sloping valley—precisely what Caesar says (§ 7) that he had to avoid ; and since it was to Pompey's interest to delay the arrival of reinforcements from Caesar's main camp as long as possible, and they did not actually arrive till late in the afternoon,<sup>3</sup> the redoubt must have been further south than Mainz. Veith holds that it was on the 159 metre hill, 4½ kilometres in a straight line south of Mainz, the seizure of which would have enabled him to master the 256 metre hill (about 2½ kilometres to the north), which Veith regards as the key of Caesar's position, and which he believes to have been held by Volcacius Tullus.<sup>4</sup>

**Where did Caesar concentrate his army before he retreated to Apollonia ?**—Immediately after describing the operations by which Pompey broke the blockade of his position near Dyrrachium Caesar relates that, with the view of changing his whole plan of campaign, he concentrated his army in one spot.<sup>5</sup> As he purposed to retreat to Apollonia, we may conclude that this new encampment commanded the road ; and accordingly Stoffel <sup>6</sup> located it close to the point where the road crossed the southern section of the contravallation. Veith <sup>7</sup> objects that in that case Pompey, who, after his victory, was better able to take the offensive than Caesar, could have seized the heights south of Cavaia and thus cut off Caesar's retreat. We must therefore, he holds, assume that Caesar concentrated on those heights—probably on the hill of Berzet, 8 kilometres south of the nearest point of the contravallation. Veith finds a further reason in the [alleged] statement of Caesar <sup>8</sup> that when on the first day of his retreat he had occupied his old camp opposite Asparagium, the soldiers of Pompey, who had occupied his old camp close to Asparagium, were ' tempted by the proximity of their former camp ' (*invitati propinquitate superiorum castrorum*)—that is to say, the camp which they had quitted in the morning to go back and fetch their belongings, which in the hurry of their departure they had left behind. If, says Veith, the camp in question was the one near the southern end of Pompey's lines at Dyrrachium <sup>9</sup> which Caesar mentioned in connexion with the rupture of the blockade, the Pompeians, who were obliged to get back to Asparagium in the course of the night, in order to resume the pursuit of Caesar on the following morning, would have marched 57 kilometres in one day, a feat which was obviously impossible. Veith therefore concludes that the *superiora castra* was on the hill of Stodheri, just

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 51, 1 ; 53, 3-5. See p. 142.

<sup>2</sup> *D. Feldzug*, &c., p. 154.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 51, 7.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 52, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, iii, 73, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 377.

<sup>7</sup> *D. Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, pp. 191-4.

<sup>8</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 76, 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, 65, 4.

north of Caesar's supposed camp on Berzet; in other words, that when Caesar concentrated his army at Berzet, Pompey concentrated his over against him, and Caesar's retreat began on the following day. Veith claims for this view the further advantage that it enables us to interpret in its natural sense a statement in the *Commentaries* which has occasioned some dispute. Caesar says that after making the 'fair day's march' (*confecto iusto itinere eius diei*<sup>1</sup>) which brought him to his old camp by Asparagium, he made a further march of 8 Roman miles (*duplicatoque eius diei itinere VIII milia passuum . . . procedit*) in the afternoon. If *duplicato* is to be understood in its strict sense, 'doubled,' the first march was exactly the same as the second—8 Roman miles—and this is the distance from Berzet to the old camp by Asparagium: if, on the other hand, the first march began at the point which Stoffel indicates, it is necessary to translate *duplicato itinere* loosely,—'made a renewed march'.

This is one of the few points on which I differ from Veith. It is just as natural to take *duplicato itinere* loosely as to say, So-and-So 'redoubled his efforts'; and when Caesar says in a later paragraph<sup>2</sup> *duplicato cursu*, Veith will hardly insist upon understanding the word in its literal sense. Any one who takes the trouble to consult a good dictionary will find numerous instances in which *duplicare* is used as loosely as our 'double'.<sup>3</sup> Again, Caesar does not say that 'the soldiers of Pompey' went back to fetch their belongings: he says that some of them did so; nor is there any evidence that they were obliged to get back to Asparagium the same night. It was simply a case of bad discipline.<sup>4</sup> Veith's theory is inconsistent with Caesar's narrative, every unbiased reader of which would inevitably conclude that the place where he concentrated his army was in immediate proximity to the scene of the fighting which he described in chapters 62–9. When he effected the concentration, Pompey did not know what he intended to do afterwards; otherwise he would not have been taken completely by surprise when Caesar began on the following morning to retreat. Is it not self-evident that if Caesar had moved several miles down the road towards Apollonia in order to concentrate his troops at Berzet, Pompey must have divined his purpose, and that the elaborate precautions which Caesar adopted in order to enable his baggage-train to get away unobserved would have been in vain? Can Veith believe that Caesar delayed the address by which he heartened the concentrated troops<sup>5</sup> until he

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 76, 1. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 92, 2.

<sup>3</sup> See for instance *Cic.*, *Fam.*, v, 14, 2; xvi, 21, 2; *Sall.*, *Hist.*, ii, 47, 2 (ed. Maurenbrecher).

<sup>4</sup> Veith (p. 196) affirms that Pompey permitted the soldiers to return, which is not stated by Caesar. As to the argument which he bases on the word *propinquitate*, I may remind him that he himself (p. 89) rightly observes that when Caesar said (*B. C.*, iii, 13, 3) that Pompey halted 'near Dyrrachium' (*prope Dyrrachium*) he only meant that Pompey got close enough to prevent Caesar, who was coming from Apollonia, from seizing the town: that is, he got as far as Asparagium, 36 kilometres from Dyrrachium.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 73.



had retreated to Berzet? Has he forgotten that after Caesar delivered it, some of his staff expressed the opinion that their best course would be to 'stay where they were' (*manendum eo loco*<sup>1</sup>) and retrieve the situation by fighting a pitched battle? If the *locus* in which they wished to remain was not hard by the scene of the recent fighting, if the camp which Pompey quitted on the following morning,<sup>2</sup> when he saw too late what Caesar intended to do, was not within the lines which he had occupied during the blockade, Caesar's narrative was lamentably deficient in perspicuity. If he had done what Veith imagines that he did, he would assuredly have said so, and before moving to Berzet he would have taken the precautions described in chapter 75, which, according to Veith, he deferred till the second day of the retreat.

**B. C., iii, 77, 3.**—'Pompey . . . stopped the pursuit and judged that he must adopt some other plan' (*Pompeius . . . finem sequendi fecit atque aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit*). We are not told in what direction Pompey marched when he abandoned the pursuit; but we know that he intended to rescue Scipio in case Caesar was going to attack him and to attack Domitius if Caesar decided to cling to the coast and to await reinforcements from Italy.<sup>3</sup> I believe therefore that Stoffel<sup>4</sup> is wrong in supposing that Pompey made his army return to Asparagium and went himself to Dyrrachium to prepare for his march. He had no time to lose if he were to rescue Scipio or to crush Domitius, and Caesar says that he made all possible haste.<sup>5</sup> It seems to me probable that he moved up the road that leads in a north-easterly direction from the southern branch of the Egnatian Way to Scampa.

**Caesar's route from Apollonia to Aeginium.**—When Caesar, after he had abandoned his position near Dyrrachium, left Apollonia, he marched to join Domitius, and met him at Aeginium<sup>6</sup> (close to Kalabaka). Leake<sup>7</sup> believed that he moved up the valley of the Dryno and across the plain of Jannina; Heuzey,<sup>8</sup> followed by Stoffel,<sup>9</sup> thought that he followed the valley of the Aous: both of course saw that he must have crossed the pass of Metzovo. Kromayer,<sup>10</sup> who agrees with Leake, points out that the valley of the Aous presented great difficulties; and, as he convincingly argues,<sup>11</sup> Flamininus also marched by the valley of the Dryno in 198 B. C.

**B. C., iii, 32, 1.**—After relating (*B. C.*, iii, 31) that Scipio withdrew his legions from Syria and quartered them for the winter (49 48 B. C.) in Pergamum and other wealthy cities, Caesar in the next paragraph describes the various ways in which Scipio extorted money 'throughout the whole province' (*tota provincia*); and his description begins with the word 'Meanwhile' (*Interim*). Editors and historians generally assume that the province was Asia, in which Pergamum was situated; but Meusel is inclined to think that *tota provincia*

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 74, 2.<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 75, 3.<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 78, 6.<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 238.<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 79, 1.<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 78, 2; 79, 1. 7.<sup>7</sup> *Travels in Northern Greece*, iv, 476-7.<sup>8</sup> *Les opérations mil. de J. César*, pp. 96-7.<sup>9</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 236.<sup>10</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, &c., ii, 1907, p. 401, n. 2.<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, p. 53.



means Syria. Admitting that the mention of Pergamum points to Asia, he urges that this consideration is outweighed by others. From the first sentence of 32 we learn that the sums which had been demanded (*imperatae pecuniae*) were exacted with the utmost rigour. Meusel points out that moneys had been demanded in Syria (31, 2), but not, as far as we know, in Asia; and, moreover, the moneys which had been demanded in Syria had not been paid when Scipio left it for Asia. If, Meusel argues, the *imperatae pecuniae* were levied in Asia, the word 'Meanwhile' (*Interim*) is misleading: we should expect 'Moreover' (*Praeterea*) or 'There too' (*Ibidem*). Again, in 32, 5 Caesar observes that in consequence of Scipio's extortion the indebtedness of the province was greatly increased 'in the course of those two years' (*eo biennio*). These words, says Meusel, apply to Syria, but not to Asia; for in 48 Scipio was still Governor of Syria, whereas he only remained in Asia for a short time. No doubt; but is it not reasonable to suppose that the Governor of Asia, in collusion with Scipio, had issued his 'demand-notes' while Scipio was still in Syria, and does not this also answer Meusel's first argument? As for *Interim*, I cannot see the difficulty, even if the word is here used in its strict sense, and not, as often, loosely: the taxes were being collected while Scipio's soldiers were plundering the towns in which they were quartered. Meusel argues that if by *tota provincia* Caesar had not intended to denote Scipio's own province, Syria, he would have used some more precise expression; and, he adds, it is improbable that Scipio would have inflicted a deadly insult upon his colleague, the Governor of Asia, by taxing his province in the way which Caesar describes? Did it never occur to the guileless editor that Scipio could easily have mollified the Governor of Asia by inviting him to share in the spoil? And, seeing that most of us identify *tota provincia* with Asia, was not the 'more precise expression' equally desirable if the province was Syria? Meusel, indeed, admits that there is a serious objection to identifying *tota provincia* with Syria: in the last sentence (§ 6) of 32 Caesar says that the tax-farmers were compelled to pay their dues for the following year in advance, 'as they had done in Syria' (*ut in Syria fecerant*). *Syria* is the accepted correction of the nonsensical MS. reading *sorte*; and if it is right, Meusel's whole argument collapses. In desperation he asks what other emendation can be suggested, but he can think of none that will do. His arguments have all been countered: his self-criticism is unanswerable.<sup>1</sup>

#### The operations of Scipio and Domitius in the valley of the Aliacmon.

—When Scipio, coming from the province of Asia to join Pompey in Macedonia, was only 20 Roman miles from Domitius,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mr. A. G. Peskett (*Class. Rev.*, xxi, 1907, p. 187) thinks that in 31, 4 as well as in 32 *provincia* means Asia. But Asia had nothing to fear from a Parthian invasion, to which Syria was exposed (*Summamque in sollicitudinem ac timorem Parthici belli provincia cum venisset*, &c.).

<sup>2</sup> Leake (*Trans. Roy. Soc. Lit.*, iv, 1853, pp. 74-5) thought it 'improbable that Domitius should have entered Macedonia by . . . the great route from Thessalonica to Dyrrachium, by which Pompeius had entered Illyria, and which,

he diverged from the road and marched against Lucius Cassius, who was in Thessaly. On the way he left Favonius near the Aliacmon (Vistrizta) to guard his baggage. Cassius, alarmed by the approach of Scipio, abandoned Thessaly, and Scipio was hurrying in pursuit when he was recalled by a dispatch from Favonius, who was threatened by Domitius. On rejoining Favonius, Scipio encamped near the Aliacmon, which separated him from Domitius, but two days later forded the river, constructed a new camp, and formed his line of battle immediately in front of it. Domitius, accepting the challenge, marched across open ground (*campus*) 6 Roman miles wide, which separated his camp from Scipio's, and arrayed his army close to that of Scipio, from which, however, he was separated by a rivulet, the banks of which were difficult to cross. Scipio refused to fight, recrossed the Aliacmon, and encamped near his original camp, on high ground close to the stream. A few days later he posted his cavalry in ambush in a place where the cavalry of Domitius daily foraged, and a combat followed, in which the latter were victorious. Soon afterwards Domitius struck his camp, and, after advancing three Roman miles, posted his whole force in a spot concealed from observation. Scipio determined to pursue, but sent his cavalry ahead to reconnoitre; and two of his troops (*turmae*) were cut off.<sup>1</sup> From a later chapter<sup>2</sup> we learn that Domitius, after remaining close to Scipio for several days, marched to, or towards, Heraclia (Monastir) in quest of corn, but, having escaped being intercepted by Pompey, succeeded in rejoining Caesar at Aeginium (Kalabaka).

Two theories have been constructed from this evidence. 'The Klisúra [valley] of Siátista', says Leake,<sup>3</sup> 'seems perfectly adapted to this transaction from its nature and its situation relatively to the *Haliacmon*, but still more as being the Gate which led from the . . . country watered by that river . . . into *Lyncestis*; for . . . Domitius afterwards really retired to Heraclia (of Lyncestis) . . . A position in front of a pass, which secured the entrance into a large extent of fertile country, was exactly such as we may suppose to have been chosen by Domitius.' Siátista stands on a hill 4 kilometres (about 2½ miles) from the left bank of the Aliacmon; and Leake<sup>4</sup> says that the pass was 'a valley about a quarter of a mile in width . . . between the mountain of Siátista . . . and another mountain to the south,' &c.

Heuzey,<sup>5</sup> followed by Stoffel,<sup>6</sup> locates the camps of Scipio and Domitius considerably further eastward, in the neighbourhood of Servia. He tells us that 'the significant name *Kaisaria*', belonging to a village about 3 kilometres from the left bank of the Vistrizta, led him to explore the neighbourhood. A sketch-plan, printed on

with his superior numbers, must have been entirely in his possession. Situated as Caesar was at Apollonia, it is much more likely that Domitius marched up the vale of the Apsus', &c. But when Caesar sent Domitius into Macedonia he had left Apollonia and was on or near the 'great route' (*B. C.*, iii, 30, 7; 34, 1-3; 41, 1. Cf. p. 132).

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 33; 36-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 79, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Travels in Northern Greece*, i, 314-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 312.

<sup>5</sup> *Les opérations mil. de J. César*, pp. 94-6.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 235-6.

page 95 of his *Opérations militaires de Jules César*, shows within a space of about 5 miles four rivulets, which enter the river from the west. Between the hills from which they descend and the river the sketch shows a narrow strip of low ground. Heuzey points to the Vantza, the northernmost of these rivulets, as the one which protected Scipio's camp, and, he adds, 'it was behind the considerable hill near the confluence of that rivulet with the river that Domitius afterwards concealed his whole force,' &c. Heuzey does not mark the position of Domitius's camp upon his plan: he merely observes that 'it is not impossible that the *castro* of Kaisaria . . . may have been the camp of Caesar's lieutenant'. If so, it was not more than two miles from the site which Heuzey indicates for the camp of Scipio; yet Heuzey accepts Caesar's statement, that it was six. Stoffel, who, characteristically ignoring Heuzey, adopts the view that Domitius encamped on the site of 'Kastro de Kesaria', and Scipio on the heights behind the rivulet Vantza, holds that for the MS. reading, (*miliū passuum*) VI, we must substitute II—an emendation which Meusel obediently adopts—(1) because no plain (*plaine*<sup>1</sup>) 9 kilometres wide is to be found in the valley of the Vistritza, (2) because it is improbable that the two camps were so far apart.' If the former reason is sound, Heuzey's plan is incorrect.

The reader will perhaps ask whether the ford by which Scipio crossed the Vistritza has any bearing upon the question. I doubt whether it has; for fords are not always permanent, and the Vistritza has been described as 'the most inconstant . . . of the rivers of Macedonia', and is for that reason called by the inhabitants 'the mad river'.<sup>2</sup> Leake's map, contradicting his theory, shows no open ground near Siâtista between the left bank of the river and the hills; but a Greek map<sup>3</sup> of 1897 and Kromayer's<sup>4</sup> do, of the required extent. The argument, such as it is, based upon the 'name *Kaisaria*', requires to be buttressed by doing violence to the text. Somewhat doubtfully therefore I follow Leake.

**The battle-field of Old Pharsalus.**—I. Among the problems of ancient history of which, up to the moment when I am writing, no solution has been generally recognized as definitive is that of the battle-field where the struggle between Pompey and Caesar was decided. Colonel Leake's exposition<sup>5</sup> was rejected by von Göler<sup>6</sup> and Sir William Napier;<sup>7</sup> and the paper<sup>8</sup> in which he endeavoured to vindicate it produced little effect. Napier and von Göler constructed theories which were vitiated by the misleading maps on which they worked. Léon Heuzey, the chief of the Macedonian

<sup>1</sup> Caesar's word is *campus*, not *planities*.

<sup>2</sup> V. de St. Martin, *Nouv. Dict. Géogr.*, ii, 1884, p. 842.

<sup>3</sup> Πίναξ τῆς Μακεδονίας, &c. (1/400,000). The press-mark (Brit. Mus.) is 43335. (43). The Austrian Staff Map (1/200,000) is not helpful.

<sup>4</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, ii, Karte 11.

<sup>5</sup> *Travels in Northern Greece*, iv, 1835, pp. 477–84.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesars gall. Krieg*, &c., ii<sup>2</sup>, 1880, pp. 149, 151–4.

<sup>7</sup> G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 220–1.

<sup>8</sup> *Trans. Roy. Soc. Lit.*, iv, 1853, pp. 68–87.

mission which collected information for Napoleon the Third, published a dissertation<sup>1</sup> which Colonel Stoffel<sup>2</sup> derided. Mr. Perrin's well-known article in the *American Journal of Philology*,<sup>3</sup> although it convinced some scholars that the battle had been fought, as von Göler and Napier maintained, on the northern bank of the Enipeus, was necessarily written without any knowledge of the works of Heuzey and Stoffel. Two years later (1887) the latter published his continuation of Napoleon's history, and announced that he had discovered the site on the southern bank, adding that any man with a competent knowledge of war could find it in half a day.<sup>4</sup> It is to be regretted that he did not examine the views of the consummate military expert who differed from him; but he was ignorant of English, and was probably unaware that Napier had by anticipation condemned the premisses upon which his 'discovery' rested. His authority, however, gave currency to his opinion; and it was not until 1896 that it was seriously challenged by Professor Postgate in his edition of the seventh book of Lucan's *Pharsalia*. Nevertheless Stoffel continued to hold the field until 1907, when Johannes Kromayer brought out the second volume of his *Antike Schlachtfelder*. With relentless logic he demolishes the theories of his predecessors who agree with him in maintaining the claims of the southern bank. But, like Stoffel, he does not seem to have known that Napier had ever discussed the question; and even in reply to the arguments of von Göler<sup>5</sup> he has nothing to say. In 1908 I contributed to the *Classical Quarterly* an article in which I argued that the battle was fought on the northern bank. Having lately obtained fuller information, I am now able to say where; and I reproduce the article in an abbreviated and amended form.

II. The Enipeus in that part of its course which traverses the Pharsalian plain is between 60 and 70 metres broad: it is sometimes quite dry in summer; and, according to Heuzey,<sup>6</sup> Stoffel,<sup>7</sup> and Kromayer,<sup>8</sup> its banks, which are very steep, are 6 metres high. Mr. F. L. Lucas, however, who has recently explored the plain, tells me that the banks are not uniform. 'North of Pharsalus,' he writes, 'they're as often 12 inches as 12 feet high—they're steep on the outer curve of bends, often non-existent on the inner. . . . West of Ineli they're higher, but still discontinuous: only by Kontouri and Dogandschi do they become a real unbroken obstacle, 12-18 feet, I should say, everywhere.'

III. The data furnished by Caesar are as follows. After leaving Metropolis he encamped in the open country (*in agris*)--that is, in the Pharsalian plain--intending to await Pompey's arrival.<sup>9</sup> A few days later Pompey marched southward from Larisa and encamped

<sup>1</sup> *Les opérations mil. de J. César*, pp. 104-35.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 240, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> vi, 1885, pp. 170-89.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 241.

<sup>5</sup> He gives reasons (p. 210) for rejecting von Göler's theory, but does not answer his arguments against placing the battle-field south of the river.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 406.

<sup>9</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 81, 3.



on a hill.<sup>1</sup> Caesar on several successive days offered Pompey battle, drawing up his army first at some little distance from Pompey's camp, afterwards close to the hill: Pompey, on the other hand, formed his line on its lowest slopes (*ad infimas radices montis*), apparently in the hope that Caesar would fight on unfavourable ground. Caesar, concluding that Pompey could not be induced to fight on equal terms, determined to break up his camp and keep on the move, with the object partly of facilitating his corn-supply, partly of wearing out Pompey's troops, who were not accustomed to hard labour, and of finding some opportunity of bringing him to action. He had struck his tents when it was observed that Pompey's army had advanced so far from camp that there seemed to be a chance of fighting on ground which was not unfavourable.<sup>2</sup> Pompey had 47,000 infantry in line of battle: his right wing was protected by a stream, which Caesar describes as *rivus quidam impeditis ripis* (a streamlet with banks difficult to cross)—a description which, taken by itself, leaves it doubtful whether the difficulty was due to the height of the banks or to swamps or other impassable ground in their immediate neighbourhood.<sup>3</sup> Caesar adds that 'for this reason' [that is to say, because his right was protected by the stream] Pompey had posted all his cavalry, archers, and slingers on his left.<sup>4</sup> Caesar's cavalry were on his extreme right. While the infantry on both sides were engaged Pompey's cavalry charged Caesar's, repulsed them, and began to turn Caesar's right on their right flank. Thereupon eight<sup>5</sup> cohorts of infantry, which Caesar had kept in reserve in anticipation of this movement, charged and routed Pompey's cavalry, who immediately took refuge on lofty hills (*montes altissimos*). The cohorts, continuing their charge, outflanked Pompey's left wing and attacked them in the rear. At the same time Caesar brought his third line into action; and the Pompeian infantry, attacked simultaneously in front and rear, turned tail. Their example was followed by the troops who, before the battle, had been left to defend the camp, and who now fled 'to lofty hills which adjoined the camp' (*in altissimos montes qui ad castra pertinebant*). Pompey, as soon as he saw the Caesarians inside, mounted a horse, moved out by the rear gate, and rode at full speed for Larisa. Caesar, after getting possession of the camp, began to throw up a contravallation round the hill on which the Pompeians had taken refuge, and, as the hill was without water (*quod is mons erat sine aqua*), they began to retreat along the ridge<sup>6</sup> towards Larisa. Thereupon

<sup>1</sup> *B.C.*, iii, 82, 1; 84, 2; 85, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 84, 1-2; 85, 2-4.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *B. G.*, vi, 34, 2 (*palus impedita*); vii, 19, 1; 57, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 88, 4-5. <sup>5</sup> See p. 469.

<sup>6</sup> The MS. reading (*B. C.*, iii, 97, 2) is (*relicto monte universi*) *iuris eius* (Larisam versus se recipere coeperunt). As this is nonsense, numerous emendations (H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes. Tab. Coniect.*, p. 90), most of which are justly ignored by editors, have been proposed. The one commonly accepted is *iugis eius*; but Meusel (*C. I. Caes. comm. de b. c.*, 1906, p. 342) reads *iugis iis* on the ground that 'this hill [one of the hills on the "massif" of Karadja-Ahmet, selected by Stoffel] has no *iugum*'. The fugitives would of course

Caesar marched with four of his legions 'by a more convenient route' (*commodiore itinere*) to intercept the fugitives. After advancing 6 Roman miles he formed line of battle, whereupon the fugitives halted on a hill washed by a stream. Although it was now near night he proceeded to cut off the hill from the stream by an earthwork in order to prevent them from getting water. At dawn they descended into the plain and surrendered.<sup>1</sup>

It will have been observed that Caesar mentions no place-name in connexion with the battle except Larisa. Appian, however, remarking that Pompey encamped opposite Caesar in the neighbourhood of Pharsalus, and that the two armies were 30 stades, or three Roman miles and three-quarters, apart,<sup>2</sup> adds that the armies were drawn up between Pharsalus and the Enipeus;<sup>3</sup> while, on the other hand, Hirtius,<sup>4</sup> Frontinus,<sup>5</sup> Eutropius,<sup>6</sup> and Orosius<sup>7</sup> agree that the battle was fought at Palaepharsalus. Hirtius, however, in another passage<sup>8</sup> speaks of 'the battle of Pharsalus'; and Plutarch,<sup>9</sup> Polyænus,<sup>10</sup> and Suetonius<sup>11</sup> do the same.

Plutarch says that on the morning of the battle, before Pompey's offensive movement was discerned, Caesar was about to march to Scotussa;<sup>12</sup> that Pompey's camp was 'close to marshy ground' (*πρὸς ἐλώδεσι χωρίοις*);<sup>13</sup> and that Brutus escaped after the battle to 'a marshy spot full of water and reeds' (*πρὸς τόπον ἐλώδη καὶ μεστὸν ὑδάτων καὶ καλάρμου*).<sup>14</sup>

Frontinus<sup>15</sup> states that Pompey posted 600 horsemen on his right flank 'close to the river Enipeus, which both by its channel and by its overflow made the locality impassable' (*propter flumen Enipea, qui et alveo suo et alluvie regionem impedierat . . . locavit*), and that Caesar 'posted his left on marshes, to avoid being outflanked' (*sinistrum latus, ne circumveniri posset, admovit paludibus*). Lucan's<sup>16</sup> testimony is substantially the same.

We have seen that four ancient writers, one of whom, Hirtius, was in Caesar's confidence, locate the battle-field 'at' or 'near' Palaepharsalus; and since Hirtius in one passage puts it at Palaepharsalus

have retreated as far as possible on high ground in order to keep the advantage which it afforded.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 89, 3-4; 93-8.      <sup>2</sup> ii, 65, 272.

<sup>3</sup> (Πομπήιος) παρέτασσε τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐς τὸ μεταρὺ Φαρσάλου τε πόλεως καὶ Ἐνιπέως ποταμοῦ, ἔνθα καὶ ὁ Κάϊσαρ ἀντιδιέκόμεται (ii, 75, 313).

<sup>4</sup> Caesar . . . Palaepharsali rem feliciter gerebat (*Bell. Alex.*, 48, 1).

<sup>5</sup> Pompeius adversus C. Caesarem Palaepharsali triplicem instruxit aciem (*Strat.*, ii, 3, 22).

<sup>6</sup> Apud Palaepharsalum . . . dimicaverunt (vi, 20).

<sup>7</sup> Hic exitus pugnae ad Palaepharsalum fuit (vi, 15, 27).

<sup>8</sup> *Pharsalici proelii* (*Bell. Alex.*, 42, 3). I assume that *Pharsalici* is the adjective of Pharsalus and not of Pharsalia (the Pharsalian district); but the point is immaterial.

<sup>9</sup> *Caes.*, 52, 1; *Cato min.*, 55, 2; 56, 3; *Cic.*, 39, 1; *Ant.*, 8; 62, 2; *Brut.*, 6, 1.

<sup>10</sup> viii, 23, 25.

<sup>11</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 35, 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Pomp.*, 68, 3; *Caes.*, 43, 3.

<sup>13</sup> *Brut.*, 4, 3.

<sup>14</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 1.

<sup>15</sup> *Strat.*, ii, 3, 22.

<sup>16</sup> At iuxta fluvios et stagna undantis Enipei  
Cappadocum montana cohors et largus habenae  
Ponticus ibat eques (vii, 224-6).

and in another speaks of 'the battle of Pharsalus', we are entitled to suppose that Appian, notoriously a bad geographer, may have used the word *Φάρσαλος* carelessly for *Παλαιφάρσαλος*. This supposition is not weakened but strengthened by the fact that three other writers name Pharsalus as the site; for every one will admit that those who mentioned Palaepharsalus meant Palaepharsalus, whereas nothing is more likely than that Pharsalus—the name which was common to the old town and the new—should have been loosely used to designate the former. Pharsalus was undoubtedly on the site of Fersala, about 3 miles south of the Enipeus. Stoffel<sup>1</sup> is inclined to place Palaepharsalus north of the river between Orman Magoula and Lazarbogha, where there are traces of ancient ruins; but this is a mere guess. Heuzey<sup>2</sup> thought that he had found the site on Koutouri, a hill just south of the Enipeus and about 8 miles WNW. of Fersala. Mr. Perrin,<sup>3</sup> referring to a statement of Strabo<sup>4</sup>—that the Thetidium was 'near both the Pharsali, the old and the new'—argues that 'the phrase . . . can with difficulty be accounted for if the two Pharsali were close to each other, or if either was very much nearer than the other to the Thetidium, or on the same line with it as the other. It is,' he continues, 'most naturally accounted for if Palaepharsalus and Pharsalus were approximately equidistant from the Thetidium. In that case, as Pharsalus lay at the extreme southern edge of the Pharsalian plains, Palaepharsalus would naturally be looked for towards the north or north-east.' Mr. Perrin then examines a passage in Polybius,<sup>5</sup> from which it may be inferred that the Thetidium was 'on the right of the Enipeus, on a line running south of Scotussa from Pherae westward, and on a military route between Eretria and Scotussa. These details', he observes, 'enable us to locate it [about 8 miles] NE. of Pharsalus, nearly if not exactly where Colonel Leake [and Heuzey]<sup>6</sup> identified it with ruins then visible'; and he infers that Palaepharsalus was north of the Enipeus and probably west of 'the main route between Larissa and Pharsalus'. 'Koutouri', writes Mr. F. L. Lucas, who has recently explored the country and taken photographs, 'seems to me a very strong candidate . . . both in its obvious fitness for an early Acropolis and its important position on the old Larisa road at a ford of the Enipeus. Besides, Strabo's mention of Old Pharsalus as the western boundary of Hellas<sup>7</sup> seems to me to suggest that it was west of New Pharsalus.'

IV. All unbiased commentators will agree that any competent military critic who had the foregoing data before him would decide that only one of them points to the conclusion that the battle-field was south of the Enipeus. The exception is the statement of Appian,

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 133.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 178-9.

<sup>4</sup> ἐν δὲ τῇ χώρᾳ ταύτῃ καὶ τὸ Θητιδεῖον ἐστὶ πλησίον τῶν Φαρσάλων ἀμφὲν, τῆς τε παλαιᾶς καὶ τῆς νέας (ix, 5, 6). This passage alone proves, against the view of Leake, that Palaepharsalus and Pharsalus were not on the same hill.

<sup>5</sup> xviii, 3, 1-6.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pl. vii.

<sup>7</sup> οἱ δ' ὕστερον τὴν Ἑλλάδα οἱ μὲν εἰπόντες χώραν διατετᾶσθαι φασὶν [εἰς] τὰς Θήβας τὰς Φθιώτιδας ἀπὸ Παλαιφαρσάλου (ix, 5, 6).

which all the commentators who look for the site on the southern bank regard as an article of faith. But, as I have shown, we should not be putting any undue strain upon language if we supposed that by Pharsalus Appian may have meant Old Pharsalus. Indeed, what he meant matters little. I rely upon the authoritative and more explicit statement that the battle was fought at or near Palaepharsalus, with which the statement of Appian is irreconcilable. Every other indication would lead us to believe that the scene was north of the Enipeus. We should certainly suppose that the rear-gate through which Pompey rode when he began his flight was the gate nearest to Larisa. Moreover, since Caesar's object was to bring Pompey to action as soon as possible,<sup>1</sup> we may assume that he would not have unnecessarily encamped in a position which Pompey would know that he could not even approach without heavy loss, and from which, if Pompey acted like a rational commander, it would be impossible to approach him without incurring the same fate. Again, Plutarch, as we have seen, states that on the morning of the battle Caesar was about to march to Scotussa. On the theory that the battle was fought south of the Enipeus he intended to cross the broad channel with all his equipage in the presence of Pompey's army.

Von Göler and Napier separately and independently argued that the battle could not have been fought south of the Enipeus. Von Göler<sup>2</sup> says that as Pompey came from Larisa, Caesar may be supposed to have also encamped on the northern side of the Pharsalian plain, in order to prevent him from utilizing the resources of this rich region. Heuzey<sup>3</sup> replies that 'in a civil war . . . in the midst of conquered provinces . . . bases of operations were inevitably less fixed and had less importance . . . everything would be open to the conqueror, while the conquered could not even count upon securing a line of retreat'. Pompey's base, he adds, was not Larisa only; for, according to Appian,<sup>4</sup> he had secured roads, harbours, and fortresses, by which he could draw supplies from all parts. The most important places for him to hold were the Gulf of Volo [the Sinus Pagasæus, about 25 miles east of Pharsalus], and especially Demetrias on its northern shore. It was in order to secure the routes leading to this gulf that he chose a position south-east of Caesar's camp, even at the risk of endangering his line of retreat to Larisa. Did he? Why, then, did he retreat to Larisa, and thence through the Vale of Tempe to the sea, although the road leading to the gulf was twice as short? Cannot Heuzey see that nothing was easier than for Caesar, who was the first to reach the Pharsalian plain, to encamp in such a position that he could at once command the roads leading to Pharsalus and all places to which Pharsalus gave access on the south and to the Gulf of Volo?<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 84, 1-2; 85, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 149.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 120, 122-3.

<sup>4</sup> ii, 66, 273.

<sup>5</sup> Kromayer (*op. cit.*, p. 403), who also quotes Appian and infers that Pompey must have drawn his supplies from the Gulf of Volo as well as from Larisa, argues that his lines of communication must have extended northward and



Von Göler argues further that 'the Enipeus would have formed such a serious obstacle to the flight of Pompey's troops and have contributed so greatly to the breaking up of his army that Caesar would certainly not have omitted to mention it.'<sup>1</sup>

Napier's arguments, stated in a private letter, are summarized by Long :<sup>2</sup>—'It seems impossible that a great general like Caesar should allow Pompeius to pass the Enipeus . . . and cut him off from Pharsalus and Scotussa . . . It is also impossible that so great a general as Pompeius would pass the Enipeus in the face of Caesar's army'<sup>3</sup> . . . moreover, Caesar does not mention Pompeius's passage of the river ; he does not indeed mention his own, but there was no need of that : it was part of his march when no enemy was near him. Napier [also] asks . . . how could the flying men of Pompeius cross the Enipeus and make for Larisa ? They would have been cut to pieces before they could cross the river.'<sup>4</sup>

This last objection has been turned by Heuzey, Stoffel, and Kromayer, who suppose that the beleaguered Pompeians surrendered at the foot of Karadja-Ahmet, south of the river ; but of course they are obliged to assume that the fugitives had intended to attempt the passage, and Kromayer<sup>5</sup> himself, in criticizing Mommsen, insists that it would have been impossible to cross the Enipeus in the presence of an enemy ? Is it reasonable to assume that Pompey would have placed them in a position in which they might be driven to attempt the impossible ?

Leake, however, saw nothing absurd in supposing that the routed Pompeians had made good their retreat across the Enipeus. 'What', he asks, 'was to hinder them ? The same route by which they came was still open to them ; they had begun their retreat before Caesar attacked . . . the fortified camp, which attack, with its consequences, must have occupied some hours. After such a battle, the legionaries of Caesar were not in the best condition to begin a long chase, even were it likely that Caesar should have permitted them to do so, after he had issued his commands that the adverse legionaries should be spared.'<sup>6</sup>

eastward, and Caesar's southward and westward. Pompey may have had a dépôt on the gulf ; but in answering Heuzey I have answered Kromayer. Besides, is not the passage in Appian (ἀγορὰ δὲ Πομπηίῳ μὲν ἦν πανταχόθεν οὕτω γὰρ αὐτῷ προδιέκητο καὶ ὁδοὶ καὶ λιμένες καὶ φρούρια, ὥς ἐκ τε γῆς αἰεὶ φέρεσθαι καὶ διὰ θαλάσσης πάντα ἀνεμὸν αὐτῷ φέρειν) based partly upon a reminiscence of Caesar's description (iii, 47, 3-4) of Pompey's resources at Dyrrachium,—*illi omnium rerum copia abundaret ; cotidie enim magnus undique navium numerus conveniebat, quae commeatum supportarent, neque ullus flare ventus poterat quin aliqua ex parte secundum cursum haberent ?*

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 220.

<sup>3</sup> It is hardly necessary to say that the passage of the Trebia by the Romans before the battle of the Trebia and of the Aufidus by the Romans and the Carthaginians before the battle of Cannae prove nothing against Napier's argument. The circumstances in these two cases were utterly different from those in which Pompey and Caesar acted.

<sup>4</sup> 'Napier,' says Long, 'makes some other objections,' about which Long is silent.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 410.

<sup>6</sup> *Trans. Roy. Soc. Lit.*, 1853, p. 87.

'What was to hinder them?' 'Nothing', answers Long,<sup>1</sup> 'except the impossibility of a defeated army retreating under such circumstances. But there was no retreat to Larisa even under the more favourable circumstances which existed on the real field of battle north of the Enipeus.' Caesar's legionaries, who were in better condition than those of Pompey,<sup>2</sup> were as able to pursue as the latter to retreat: at all events they were capable of beginning one earthwork, constructing and completing another, and intercepting their enemies by a six miles' march.

Heuzey<sup>3</sup> lays great stress upon the passage in which Dio<sup>4</sup> says that Pompey had not made his camp on a suitable spot and had not secured a line of retreat (οὐδὲ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ ἐποίησάτο οὐδ' ἀναφυγὴν οὐδεμίαν ἡττηθέντι οἱ παρεσκεύασε); but I suspect that Pompey knew his own business better than his rhetorical critic.<sup>5</sup>

Against the view which would discover the battle-field in the southern half of the Pharsalian plain it has been urged that Caesar would not have described the Enipeus as a streamlet (*rivus quidam*); but Stoffel<sup>6</sup> treated the objection with scorn. 'A combien de discussions oiseuses', he exclaimed, 'ne se sont pas livrés, soit les commentateurs qui n'avaient pas vu les lieux, soit les ignorants qui les ont visités, sous prétexte que le mot *rivus* . . . ne peut vouloir désigner l'Enipée. César n'écrivait ni pour les grammairiens, ni pour les discoureurs de l'avenir; il écrivait comme homme de guerre et non comme géographe. S'il donne le nom de *rivus* à l'Enipée, c'est que le jour de la bataille cette rivière n'avait pas plus d'eau qu'un ruisseau. Aussi ne fut-il frappé que de l'obstacle dû à l'escarpement des rives, "impeditis ripis," et de l'appui que cet obstacle donnait à la droite de l'armée romaine.' Caesar, I replied in my original article,<sup>7</sup> 'was a grammarian himself; and there is no necessary inconsistency between writing as a soldier and using words in a sense which is not absurd. "RIVUS", says Forcellini,<sup>8</sup> "proprie et universim est aqua fluens, a fonte vel flumine deducta, sive canali manufacto, sive naturaliter decurrens, non tamen ea quantitate ut amnis dici possit" . . . Even assuming that the Enipeus on the day of the battle contained no more water than a rivulet, would not Caesar have given to this famous river its familiar name? . . . Caesar mentions twenty-three rivers by name . . . in every instance in which he mentions a stream without naming it either it was demonstrably small, or he had not seen it himself, or it was so insignificant that he probably did not know its name.' Dialectically this argument,

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 219.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 85, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

<sup>4</sup> xlii, 1, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Kromayer (*op. cit.*, pp. 419-20) argues that 'from a strategical point of view the position [on Mount Krindir, south of the Enipeus, which he believes Pompey to have selected for his camp] was not unfavourable'; for, although 'in case of a defeat his retreat to Larisa was, to be sure, cut off, he could not have made good his retreat in any case. For him the alternatives were victory or annihilation. Besides, who in Pompey's camp admitted the possibility of defeat?'

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 243-4.

<sup>7</sup> *Class. Quart.*, ii, 1908, p. 280.

<sup>8</sup> *Totius latinitatis lex.*, v, 1871, p. 247.

which imposed upon Meusel and other scholars, may have been effective; but it was unsound. The Aternus, which Caesar omitted to mention in connexion with his blockade of Corfinium, was a considerable stream. The *rivus*—I do no violence to Forcellini's definition—could only have been a thin streamlet flowing in the broad channel of the Enipeus; for, as we shall see, the tiny rivulets on the north and the Tabakhana on the south are out of the question. Professor Postgate,<sup>1</sup> indeed, says that Stoffel, when he insists that the Enipeus had no more water than a brook, contradicts Frontinus and Lucan—'two out of the three authorities on whom the identification is based'. Does he? Frontinus does not say that the Enipeus was in flood, but that its overflow had produced a morass: if Lucan, whose words are susceptible of either interpretation, meant what the professor implies, his rhetoric may be ignored. The battle was fought on June 6 of the Julian calendar; and in summer the Enipeus is either very low or dry.

V. Let us now examine the various topographical theories.

1. Colonel Leake<sup>2</sup> has no doubt that 'the camp of Pompey was on the heights . . . eastward of Fersala [that is, the heights of Krindir], and that of Caesar at . . . the foot of the rocky height which advances into the plain three miles westward of Fersala'. Accordingly he believes that Pompey's line of battle extended, with its right resting on the Enipeus, along the Pharsalus-Larisa road. The *mons sine aqua* he identifies with 'the mountain which rises immediately above the position of the Pompeian camp';<sup>3</sup> the hill on which the Pompeians made their final stand with one of the hills near Scotussa; and the stream which flowed beneath it with that 'which Herodotus has named Onochonus.'<sup>4</sup>

Stoffel<sup>5</sup> objects that Pompey would not have had room to form his army on the days that preceded the battle on the lower slopes of the hill on which Leake supposes him to have encamped. Kromayer<sup>6</sup> (who defends Leake because he himself adopts one half of his theory) replies that Caesar does not say that Pompey's army was drawn up on the slopes of the hill on which his camp stood: according to Caesar, it was drawn up '*ad infimas radices montis* . . . and therefore', says Kromayer, 'at the foot of the hill and in the plain.' When, he adds, Caesar remarks that on the morning of the battle Pompey had advanced, contrary to his custom, 'further from the rampart . . . so that there appeared to be a chance of fighting on ground which was not unfavourable' (*longius a vallo* . . . *ut non iniquo loco posse dimicari videretur*), he makes it clear that the *iniquitas loci* consisted, not in the fact [alleged by Stoffel] that the Pompeians had previously formed upon the slopes of the hill, but in the fact that they had remained too close to their camp. I admit that Caesar's remark, *taken by itself*, might bear Kromayer's interpretation;

<sup>1</sup> *M. A. Lucani de b. c. lib. VII.*, p. xxxvii.

<sup>2</sup> *Travels in Northern Greece*, iv, 481, 483.

<sup>3</sup> *Trans. Roy. Soc. Lit.*, 1853, p. 87.

<sup>4</sup> Kiepert (*Formae orbis ant.*, xv), calls it Onchestus.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 242. <sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 415.

but I think that Stoffel understood the words *ad infimas radices montis* better than his critic. If Caesar had meant what Kromayer says, would he not have written *sub ipsis radicibus montis*?<sup>1</sup> He says that on the days which preceded the battle he 'formed his line at the foot of the hills occupied by Pompey' (*collibus Pompeianis aciem subiceret*).<sup>2</sup> Compared with the statement that Pompey regularly formed his own line *ad infimas radices montis*, do not these words prove that Pompey's line was on the lower slopes of the hill?

Let us, however, admit, for the sake of argument, that Stoffel's objection was groundless. Still, the distance in a straight line from the point where, accepting Leake's identification of the *mons sine aqua*, Caesar must have begun his march to intercept the Pompeians to the point where he must have finally confronted them, is at least nine miles. That Leake uneasily anticipated this objection may be inferred from his having, in defiance of the *Commentaries*, supposed Caesar to have computed his six miles from the banks of the Enipeus! How he contrived to persuade himself that the fugitives succeeded in passing those banks unscathed, and that this astounding feat was ignored by Caesar, we have already seen.

2. Mommsen<sup>3</sup> was in some measure impressed by von Göler's arguments, but nevertheless clung to the supposed authority of Appian. His theory was that Caesar encamped near Pharsalus; that Pompey 'pitched his camp opposite to him on the right bank . . . along the slope of the heights of Cynoscephalae'; that, 'as the armies before the battle lay three miles and a half from each other', the Pompeians could 'secure the communication with their camp by bridges', but that 'Caesar and his copyists are silent as to the crossing of the river, because this would place in too clear a light the eagerness for battle of the Pompeians apparent otherwise from the whole narrative'; that 'the battle was fought on the left bank . . . in such a way that the Pompeians, standing with their faces towards Pharsalus, leaned their right wing on the river'; that 'as soon as the obstinate resistance of the . . . guard of the [Pompeian] camp was overcome', the Pompeians were 'compelled to withdraw . . . to the heights of Crannon and Scotussa, at the foot of which the camp was pitched', and 'attempted by moving forward along these hills to regain Larisa,' &c.

Who can wonder that Stoffel<sup>4</sup> characterized Mommsen's account as a 'récit de pure fantaisie'? It is hardly necessary to point out that Pompey would have found it as hopeless to bridge the Enipeus in the presence of Caesar as the latter found it to repair the bridges over the Allier in the presence of Vercingetorix<sup>5</sup> and the bridges over the Segre in the presence of Afranius;<sup>6</sup> that neither Caesar nor his copyists could have had any motive for striving to conceal 'the eagerness of the Pompeians for battle', especially as their eagerness was 'apparent otherwise from the whole narrative'; that even if

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *B. G.*, i, 21, 1; 48, 1; *B. C.*, i, 45, 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, iii, 84, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1889, pp. 424 and note, 428 (Eng. tr., v, 1908, pp. 258-9 and note, 263).

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 252.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, vii, 35.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, i, 50.



the bridge could have been built the disorganized fugitives would have been captured or destroyed in attempting to cross it; that Pompey would not have expected on the days that preceded the battle that Caesar would be mad enough to attempt to cross the Enipeus in order to attack him, and that Caesar would not have crossed it on several successive days; that if Pompey had attempted to cross the river on the morning of the battle in order to attack Caesar, Caesar would have destroyed his army before the battle could begin; and that Caesar says that he formed his line before the battle 'on approaching Pompey's camp' (*cum Pompei castris adpropinquasset*),<sup>1</sup>—an expression which, on Mommsen's theory, he could not have used without absurdity if the camp had been 'on the slope of the heights of Cynoscephalae' on the further side of the Enipeus.

3. Heuzey identified the *rivus* with the Tabakhana, which rises just north of Fersala, and, flowing in a direction roughly parallel with the Enipeus and from 3 to 4 miles south of it, enters the Phersalitis about 12 miles west by north of Fersala. This stream, which Heuzey describes as a 'large rivulet' (*gros ruisseau*), is, he says, 4 or 5 metres wide—Kromayer,<sup>2</sup> correcting him, says only 2—and 'everywhere difficult to cross'.<sup>3</sup> The battle-field is in his opinion indicated by 14 tumuli in the plain west of Fersala, almost all of which were excavated under his supervision.<sup>4</sup> At the bottom, below interments accompanied by coins and Byzantine pottery, were found layers of cinders mingled with charcoal and white dust, which Heuzey regarded as the remains of calcined bones.<sup>5</sup> He admits that Appian, speaking of the monument which Caesar erected in honour of the centurion, Crastinus, implies that the Caesarians who fell were all buried together;<sup>6</sup> but Caesar did not bury Pompey's dead, and Heuzey argues that the inhabitants must have done so. This hypothesis, he remarks, would explain how the tumuli are scattered: they were hastily erected wherever the fugitives fell.<sup>7</sup> Pompey's camp, he maintains, can only be found at one spot:—'all this part of the chain [of heights which border the plain on the south] is a wall of precipitous rocks; it only opens at one point, about the middle, to form an amphitheatre of gentle undulating slopes, called Khaïdharia. The position is just suited for a camping-ground.'<sup>8</sup> The hill without water, which the fugitives were obliged to abandon, he identifies with the scarped plateau of Alogopati, which rises high above Khaïdharia on its south, and the hill, washed by a stream, on which they made their final stand, with Karadja-Ahmet. In other words, Heuzey, who places the battle-field more than 6 Roman miles WSW. of the site which Stoffel selected, agrees with him in his choice of the hill washed by a stream!

But although to Heuzey this fact, which compels him to set Caesar's testimony aside, presents no difficulty, he admits that his

<sup>1</sup> *B.C.*, i, 88, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 406.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 132.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 114, 116.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, ii, 82, 348.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 117-8.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, p. 133.

theory is open to one objection : the Tabakhana, 'instead of passing along the battle-field, cuts it in two.'<sup>1</sup> This difficulty, however, is only apparent; for 'the configuration of its bed and that of the country which it traverses seem to prove that its waters no longer follow their . . . primitive course. Thessaly, and in particular the Pharsalian plain, present other instances of similar changes.'<sup>2</sup>

Yes, but deserted channels remain to attest them!<sup>3</sup> If Heuzeu could produce the faintest evidence, I should be willing to admit that the Tabakhana might have changed its course in any direction, not involving a miracle, which suited his convenience. As for the tumuli, even supposing that the oldest interments which they contain could be proved to be Roman, the group whose contents are described by Heuzeu is several kilometres north-west of the alleged battle-field, and therefore obviously far from the line of flight of the Pompeians. Furthermore, as Kromayer<sup>4</sup> remarks, Heuzeu places Pompey's camp in a valley between high hills although Caesar places it on a hill : he is constrained to assume that the decuman gate, through which Pompey fled northward to Larisa, looked southward ; and the distance from his *mons sine aqua* to the place which Caesar reached *commodiore itinere* is not 6 but 9 miles in a straight line !

4. Stoffel places Pompey's camp on one of the heights of Karadja-Ahmet.<sup>5</sup> Let us provisionally accept his statement that this is the only hill [south of the Enipeus] which corresponds to Caesar's description. But it does not appear that he took the trouble to examine the country north of the river : he does not, even for the sake of argument, admit the possibility that the battle may have been fought there. See how he is obliged to twist and torture Caesar's text in order to force it, if possible, into some show of agreement with his own theory. Whereas Caesar says that the Pompeians fled along the crest of the hills (*iugis*), he tells us that their line of flight was marked by 'an extensive hollow' (*une large dépression de terrain*) ;<sup>6</sup> and, whereas Caesar makes it clear that when he began the march by which he intercepted the fugitives he started from the earthwork which he was constructing round the waterless hill (*mons sine aqua*), Stoffel is obliged, in order to extend the length of his march to 6 miles, to make him go back without any necessity and start 'from the field of battle' (*du champ de bataille*).<sup>7</sup> But the most interesting feature of the colonel's map is his delineation of the 'more convenient route' (*commodiore itinere*) by which Caesar marched. Would it have been more convenient first to cross the Enipeus, 70 yards wide with its steep banks, and then, after crossing four rivulets on its right bank, to recross it in order to construct the earthwork which was designed to prevent the fugitives from

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, p. 134.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, pl. vii. The only instance in the Pharsalian plain is that of the Aikli.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 412.

<sup>5</sup> Stoffel affirms (p. 243) that at various points on the right of Pompey's alleged camp the slopes of the hill show traces of having been scarped, which, if it is a fact, does not prove that the work was done by Pompey.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, p. 250 and Pl. 17.

getting water? And since, in order to get water, it would have been necessary first to descend the banks and then to reascend them in the presence of Caesar's troops; since, in order to retreat to Larisa, it would have been necessary to pass those same banks in despite of a victorious army, would the construction of the earthwork have been worth the trouble which it cost?

5. Next comes Kromayer,<sup>1</sup> whose theory is a combination of the theories of Leake and Stoffel. Like the former he places Pompey's camp on Mount Krindir;<sup>2</sup> like the latter he identifies the hill on which the Pompeians made their final stand with the easternmost hill of Karadja-Ahmet. He supposes that Caesar encamped about half a mile north of the Tabakhana and about two miles and one furlong north-west of Pharsalus; that Pompey's line of battle extended from the Enipeus, which it touched just east of the Larisa road, to a point about a quarter of a mile north of Pharsalus; that the hills to which his cavalry fled were south of Mount Sourla and about two miles east by south of Pharsalus; that the *mons sine aqua* was the hill just east of Mount Sourla, which, as he says, is itself inaccessible on its northern side; that the Pompeians fled thence to Karadja-Ahmet by a long and circuitous route, leading for about a mile and a quarter nearly south and then gradually winding eastward and north-eastward; and that Caesar marched in the plain along the northern fringe of the hills to intercept them, and, turning Karadja-Ahmet, constructed his earthwork along and close to the left bank of the Enipeus.

Kromayer finds no difficulty in supposing that Caesar called the Enipeus a *rivus* in chapter 88 and a *flumen* in chapter 97 without giving the slightest indication that *flumen* and *rivus* were the same. He reminds us that Caesar calls the same hill a *mons* and a *collis* in 85, and that the least insignificant of the *flumina* which he mentions in 49 is only 5 kilometres long.<sup>3</sup> But the dullest reader could

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 417-20, 424.

<sup>2</sup> Heuzey (p. 131), in criticizing Leake's theory, objects that Mount Krindir is 'covered by sharp rocks, which make it impossible to encamp there'. Kromayer (p. 417, n. 1), admitting that Heuzey's observations are correct in so far as they refer to the summit and north-eastern declivity of Krindir properly so called—the highest and northernmost of the three hills known by that name—points out that on the smaller hills and the saddle which connects them with each other and with Mount Sourla there is excellent camping-ground.

Kromayer (p. 418), remarking that Pompey must have drawn his water-supply from the Enipeus, and must therefore have made arrangements for the protection of his water-carriers, argues that one of Plutarch's statements is explained by the hypothesis that Pompey's redoubts (*castella* [*B. C.*, iii, 88, 4]) were in the plain between the camp and the river. Plutarch, as we have seen (p. 455), says that the camp was close to marshy ground, and that Brutus escaped by a gate leading to a spot full of water and reeds. Kromayer regards this as a proof that Brutus had encamped in the redoubt nearest to the river. But Plutarch does not say that Brutus had his own encampment close to marshy ground; and anyhow his statement is consistent with the view that the battlefield was north of the Enipeus. Mr. F. L. Lucas writes to me that between Mount Dogandzis and the neighbourhood of Koutouri (see p. 456) 'the ground must once have been marshy—it is still intersected by ditches full of water and reeds'.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 411, n. 3.

not fail to perceive that the *mons* of 85 was identical with or included the *collis*, whereas the most intelligent would infer *a priori* that the *flumen* of 97 was different from the *rivus* of 88.<sup>1</sup>

I need not repeat objections which apply to Kromayer's theory in common with the other four: I need not ask him how the battle-field could have been named after Palaepharsalus if it was hard by Pharsalus.<sup>2</sup> Nor need I insist upon the fact that on the days which preceded the battle Pompey formed 47,000 men in line of battle on the lower slopes of the hill on which his camp stood, and that, unless the men were packed as closely as sardines in a tin, he could not have done so on the hill of Krindir.<sup>3</sup> But one may reasonably ask whether Caesar would have said that the hills to which the Pompeian infantry fled 'adjoined the camp' (*ad castra pertinebant*) if, after abandoning it, they had been obliged to descend into the plain and move across it for 500 or 600 yards<sup>4</sup> before ascending the *mons sine aqua*; how he could have said that the circuitous route which Kromayer traces, and which in its first stage led in a direction opposite to that of Larisa, was towards Larisa; and how he could have divined that the fugitives, if they took this route, intended to cross the Enipeus near Karadja-Ahmet, where its banks are far more difficult than higher up,<sup>5</sup> or, indeed, that they intended to make for Larisa at all. Kromayer<sup>6</sup> himself insists that it would have been impossible for them to cross the Enipeus in the presence of Caesar's army: why, then, did they not cross it higher up, as, on Kromayer's theory, they could have done before Caesar had time to intercept them? Why, indeed, did they attempt to retreat to Larisa at all, seeing that, as Kromayer<sup>7</sup> assures us, by the mere fact of encamping south of the river they had made such a retreat utterly desperate?

6. Last of all I am bound to notice a theory which General Chatzimichales, formerly Chief of the Greek General Staff, has kindly submitted to me, through the Director of the British School at Athens, for criticism. He places the Pompeian camp close to and due west of Pharsalus, its northern half not being on a hill at all,<sup>8</sup> while the south-eastern angle is about 850 metres from the Acropolis. Pompey's line of battle, only 1,950 metres long—too narrow to allow room for 47,000 men, even though they were formed in three lines each ten deep<sup>9</sup>—rested on the Tabakhana, 1,700 metres west-

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Peskett (*Class. Rev.*, xxi, 1907, p. 187) pleads that the Enipeus 'might at one time be a raging torrent, at another a thread of water, in other words, it might at one time be a *rivus*, at another a *flumen*.' Not on the same day!

<sup>2</sup> Kromayer says that he does not know where Palaepharsalus was. But within limits he does know where it was not: he knows that it would be useless to look for it anywhere in the plain south of the Enipeus nearer than Mount Koutouri.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 460.

<sup>4</sup> See Kromayer's map (Karte 12) or the map that illustrated my article in *Class. Quart.*, ii, 292.

<sup>5</sup> L. Heuzey, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

<sup>6</sup> 'Diese Überschreitung ist aber eine Unmöglichkeit, wenn der Feind so nahe im Nacken sitzt' (*op. cit.*, p. 410).

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, p. 419.

<sup>8</sup> The highest point of the supposed camp is only 27 metres above the level of the Tabakhana, which in the general's map is called 'Αμδανός.

<sup>9</sup> Frontin, *Strat.*, ii, 3, 22.



ward from his camp. The waterless hill was immediately south of Pompey's camp, and the fugitives made their final stand on Karadja-Ahmet. Measured on the general's map, the *commodius iter*, by which Caesar overtook them, is more than 8 Roman miles long. This theory is rather less vulnerable than the rest; but it is open to objections which are fatal to that of Kromayer as well as to others which are common to all.

VI. Except a pen-and-ink sketch-plan by Sir William Napier, mentioned by Long,<sup>1</sup> and based upon erroneous data, the only attempt, so far as I know, that has been made in a published work to locate the battle-field on the northern bank is that of von Göler,<sup>2</sup> who also, as we have seen, was obliged to use a misleading map. He placed the contending armies between Cynoscephalae and Pharsalus; but Heuzey<sup>3</sup> believes that the site which he had in view was the plain of Inelí, between the right bank of the Enipeus and the southern slopes of the hills which extend northward towards Scotussa. If so, he identified the *rivus* with the rivulet of Orman-Magoula, which Heuzey contemptuously describes as a 'maigre filet d'eau . . . que nous avons traversé, au mois de juillet, en mouillant à peine le sabot de nos chevaux.'<sup>4</sup> Now when I found myself compelled to abandon the idea that the *rivus* was a rivulet properly so called, and to identify it with a streamlet in the channel of the Enipeus, I saw that there were only two places on the north bank at which the battle could have been fought,—the plain of Inelí and that part of the Pharsalian plain which extends from a point opposite Koutouri to the eastern slopes of Mount Dogandzis. Unfortunately the Greek staff map (Φάρσαλος, 75000) was not to be had: the best maps which I could then obtain were those of Heuzey, Stoffel, and Kromayer. None of them showed a stream which, if the battle-field was between Koutouri and Dogandzis, could be identified with the one that flowed below the hill on which the Pompeians made their final stand. I ought to have waited till I could see the staff map; but I hastily concluded that the site was the plain of Inelí—not without misgivings, for could Palaepharsalus have been so far towards the east? My misgivings were justified. Mr. Lucas, who, as I have already remarked, gives a sound reason for identifying Palaepharsalus with Koutouri, points out that 'in the plain of Inelí Pompey would have been directly in front of Scotussa', to which Caesar on the morning of the battle intended to march. It might, indeed, be replied that Pompey could not have prevented Caesar from moving on Scotussa without fighting a battle, which was what Caesar wanted him to do; but it seems improbable that Caesar with his baggage-train would have taken the only route—over the hills. Again, says Mr. Lucas, 'the ridges north of Inelí run east and west [whereas the Pompeian fugitives marched on the ridge (*iugis*) towards Larisa] and I see no *commodius iter*, and even north-west of Scotussa there's no proper *planities*'<sup>5</sup>—the plain to

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 221.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, Taf. xv, Fig. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 126.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 98, 1.

which the fugitives descended when they were about to surrender. I may add that the plain of Inelí can hardly be called a part of the Pharsalian plain.

Mr. Lucas, then, holds that Pompey encamped on the eastern slopes of Dogandzis, and Caesar hard by Koutouri. 'The flight', he writes, 'is then along the ridge running NE. <sup>1</sup> "Larisa versus" till it ends in the plain with the little river Kapakli running at its foot, 6 Roman miles from the eastern foot of Dogandzis. . . . On my theory Caesar's move on Scotussa was designed to reach the other main road . . . (Larisa-Pharsalus) and thus thrust in between Pompey and Larisa.' At all events his location of the battle-field is unassailable: I believe that it will be accepted as definitive; and I hope that it will be confirmed by excavation.<sup>2</sup>

*B. C.*, iii, 87, 7.—After describing the council of war which Pompey held a few days before the battle of Pharsalia, Caesar writes *Hæc cum facta essent in consilio, magna spe et lætitia omnium discessum est; ac iam animo victoriam præcipiebant, quod de re tanta et a tam perito imperatore nihil frustra confirmari videbatur* ('At the close of the proceedings all withdrew full of hope and exultation: in anticipation they were already victorious; for such an experienced commander would evidently not speak positively on a matter of such moment without reason'). *Tam perito imperatore*, says Meusel, 'must, according to the context, refer to Labienus, even though one would at first sight think of Pompey as the *imperator*.' I think that the first impression would be true. For, first, although chapter 87 is devoted mainly to the speech of Labienus, he only spoke in support of Pompey, whose plan, described in 86, had inspired the council with confidence of victory; and Caesar, after reporting the speech of Labienus, tells us, immediately before the sentence which we are considering, that Pompey approved what Labienus had said.

<sup>1</sup> Dogandzis is joined to the ridge by a *col*, which, Mr. Lucas tells me, is 'much higher than the general level of the Thessalian plain'. Thus, even if the true reading in *B. C.*, iii, 97, 2 is not *iugis iis*, but *iugis eius montis*, the condition is fulfilled.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lucas has written an article which will probably appear before this book is published. Writing to me just after his journey from Athens to Pharsalus, he says, 'I returned, as indeed I went, a convinced (thanks to you) North-banker. . . . It seems to me extraordinary that South-bank theorists have all ignored the fact that all Thessaly, except Larisa, and therefore Pharsalus itself, were Caesarian. If Gomphi still had military significance, was still defensible, surely Pharsalus must have been. Yet these people make Pompey fight under its very walls as if it didn't exist', &c.

An Austrian correspondent has objected that since the Enipeus contained so little water that it could be called a *rivus*, the Kapakli must have been dry. 'Not necessarily,' I said to myself—'not if, as I believe, their geological conditions were different'. I communicated this comment to Mr. Lucas, who replied: 'Your suggestion is, I think, exactly right. . . . At a level just above the Thessalian plain all round the Cynoscephalæ ridge . . . there seems to be a stratum of impervious rock, which causes springs to issue from the hillside, such as feed the Kapakli. I asked my guide definitely about a parallel smaller stream a little further east by Supli, and he assured me it flowed all the summer through . . . The existence of villages dependent on these springs is sufficient evidence in itself.' [In regard to Mr. Lucas's article see p. 569.]

Secondly, Caesar, who uses the word *imperator* more than forty times,<sup>1</sup> nowhere else uses it except of a general who had been acclaimed as *imperator* by his troops or (as in the case of Vercingetorix<sup>2</sup>) of a commander-in-chief.

Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 74, 310.—Appian relates that just before the battle of Pharsalia Caesar ordered the rampart of his camp to be dismantled and the ditch to be filled up; and Lucan<sup>3</sup> puts the same command into Caesar's mouth, but makes him add a reason which in itself would have been sound enough,—to facilitate the exit of the troops,

*sternite iam vallum fossasque implete ruina,  
exeat ut plenis acies non sparsa manipulis.*

The fable has of course been rejected; but while Mr. Perrin<sup>4</sup> regards it as a mere invention, Stoffel<sup>5</sup> conjectures that it was based upon fact. 'Afin', he writes, 'que les troupes pussent sortir plus vite, il fit sans aucun doute élargir les portes et pratiquer des coupures dans le parapet'. Professor Postgate, in his edition of Lucan's Seventh Book (p. xxvi, n. 1), remarks that 'Against this view Mr. Perrin's observation that "it would have taken more time to demolish the walls of a Roman camp than . . . to march out of the ordinary gates and form in order of battle outside", has weight.' But Perrin was replying not to Stoffel, but to Merivale, who accepted Appian's statement as literally true; and it would have taken but a very short time to do what Stoffel suggests was done. 'But', continues Professor Postgate, 'it is clear from Caesar's words [*B. C.*, iii, 85, 4] "*cum iam esset agmen in portis*", that the arrangements for marching out had already been made.' Certainly; but for an ordinary march, not for a march against an enemy. Has not my friend overlooked one word in Caesar's narrative,—*expeditas* (copias educit)? Caesar had determined to quit his camp altogether and march from place to place (*ib.*, § 2). The troops, who had already struck their tents when he learned unexpectedly that Pompey was preparing to fight, were of course carrying their packs. With these encumbrances they could not go into action. By the word *expeditas* Caesar gives us to understand that the packs were laid aside and collected (cf. *B. G.*, i, 24, 3). To deposit 22,000 packs, besides those of the auxiliaries, in an orderly manner was not the work of a moment. While it was going on the available hands would have had time to enlarge the exits.

It is inconceivable that either Lucan or Appian should have simply invented the absurd order which they attributed to Caesar, but quite intelligible that they should have misunderstood the rational order which I have no doubt that he really gave, and the object of which Lucan states with perfect clearness. Indeed Lucan may have understood the order, though he expressed it with poetical exaggeration.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 65–8.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii, 63, 6.

<sup>3</sup> vii, 326–7.

<sup>4</sup> *Amer. Journ. of Philol.*, v, 1884, pp. 325–6.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 248.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Virg., *Aen.*, v, 404–5.

**The Spanish cohorts in Pompey's army.**—Caesar says that Pompey had some Spanish cohorts on his right wing at Pharsalia, which, he adds, 'Afranius, as I have already explained, had brought over.'<sup>1</sup> The passage in which Caesar gave this information is no longer extant, and Meusel supposes that it belonged to the lost chapter in which he described his abortive attempt to seize Dyrrachium.<sup>2</sup> Plutarch<sup>3</sup> says that Afranius had arrived 'lately' (νεωστί), which is characteristically vague. Stoffel<sup>4</sup> (apparently) and von Göler<sup>5</sup> assume that the cohorts had served throughout the campaign; but in that case Caesar would surely have mentioned them in his first enumeration of Pompey's troops.<sup>6</sup> As Caesar says that Pompey regarded them as the best troops in his command,<sup>7</sup> they were evidently not recruits, but belonged to that portion of the army which Caesar had permitted, after the surrender of Afranius, to return to their homes in Spain.<sup>8</sup> See page 73.

**Caesar's legions in the battle of Pharsalia.**—Caesar had eight legions or the equivalent of 8 legions (80 cohorts) in the battle of Pharsalia; but he only names three,—the 10th, 9th, and 8th.<sup>9</sup> We know that he had ten veteran legions in the campaign.<sup>10</sup> Veith<sup>11</sup> raises the following questions:—What legion did not take part in the battle?<sup>12</sup> Was the left wing composed of two or of three legions? In what order were the legions (besides the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th, whose positions are known<sup>13</sup>) arrayed? I omit a note in which I have examined his arguments, for while his questions cannot be definitely answered, they seem to me unimportant. Incidentally, however, he makes a remark which does require notice. Caesar's fourth line, which he formed to repel the expected attack of Pompey's cavalry, was composed not, as Veith imagines, of six cohorts, but, as Caesar clearly implies,<sup>14</sup> of eight—one from each of his eight legions. It is true that Plutarch<sup>15</sup> says that it consisted of six cohorts; but Plutarch, confirmed by Appian<sup>16</sup> also says that it comprised 3,000 men, and it is not credible that when the average strength of Caesar's 80 cohorts was only 275 men,<sup>17</sup> six cohorts numbered 3,000. Plutarch, as Meusel remarks,<sup>18</sup> assumed that there were only six because [ignoramus as he was in military matters] he habitually reckoned the strength of a legion [without regard to circumstances] at 5,000.

**The charge of Crastinus.**—(Haec cum dixisset, primus ex dextro cornu procucurrit, atque) *eum electi milites circiter CXX* [voluntarii eiusdem centuriae] *sunt prosecuti*<sup>19</sup> ('With these words he charged, the foremost man on the right wing, and about 120 picked men [volunteers

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 88, 2.<sup>2</sup> See pp. 445–6.<sup>3</sup> *Caes.*, 41, 2.<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 133.<sup>5</sup> *Caesars gall. Krieg*, &c., ii<sup>2</sup>, 1880, p. 163.<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 4.<sup>7</sup> See Meusel's note on *B. C.*, iii, 88, 3.<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, i, 86, 3.<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, iii, 89, 1–2.<sup>10</sup> See p. 433.<sup>11</sup> *Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 513.<sup>12</sup> Cf. Stoffel, *Hist. de J. César*, i, 338, 340.<sup>13</sup> Cf. *B. C.*, iii, 34, 3 with 79, 7 and 89, 2.<sup>14</sup> *Ib.*, 89, 3.<sup>15</sup> *Pomp.*, 69, 2; *Caes.*, 44, 2.<sup>16</sup> ii, 76, 318.<sup>17</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 89, 2.<sup>18</sup> In his note on *B. C.*, iii, 89, 3.<sup>19</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 91, 3.



belonging to the same century] followed him'). Meusel<sup>1</sup> brackets *eiusdem centuriæ* for the sufficient reason that a century, even when its ranks were full, numbered not more than 100 men, and at Pharsalia the average strength of the centuries was barely 50.<sup>2</sup> Meusel also disposes of a futile attempt which Zander<sup>3</sup> and afterwards von Göler<sup>4</sup> made to amend the passage. In my opinion *voluntarii* is spurious also. Meusel says that the *voluntarii*, like Crastinus himself, were *evocati* (time-expired volunteers). But the men who followed Crastinus had belonged to his maniples when he was the chief centurion of the 10th legion;<sup>5</sup> and it is incredible that they should all have retired from the service when or just after Crastinus did so, hardly credible that, if they had retired, they would all have volunteered along with their old centurion. Moreover, it may be doubted whether 120 *evocati* would have been massed in one maniples, for Pompey distributed 2,000 *evocati* among his legions,<sup>6</sup> doubtless in order to exert a moral influence upon less experienced men. *Electi milites* does not, I think, mean men specially selected, but men of choice quality. [I find that Fröhlich (*D. Kriegswesen Cæsars*, 1891, pp. 15–6, n. 15) also brackets *voluntarii eiusdem centuriæ* and attaches the same meaning as I have done to *electi milites*. He explains further that these men belonged to the two first centuries of the 1st cohort, which centuries, forming a maniples, fought under one standard.]

**How Caesar's fourth line used their javelins at Pharsalia.**—Plutarch<sup>7</sup> and Appian<sup>8</sup> relate that Caesar ordered the cohorts of his fourth line to stab Pompey's cavalry in the face with their javelins instead of throwing them, because the cavalry, being young and vain of their good looks, would shrink from facial wounds. Whether the authority whom they both followed invented this rubbish or copied it from some one else, does not matter. No doubt Caesar gave an order to use the javelins as spears, for used in that way against cavalry they would be more effective. Plutarch, Appian, and the original romancer were all outdone by Mr. Froude,<sup>9</sup> who tells us that 'Pompey's brilliant squadrons were carpet knights from the saloon and the circus.' He did not know that for a generation or more the free population of Italy had not furnished a single trooper to the Roman army. If he had referred to B. C., iii, 4, he would have learned that his 'carpet knights' came from Galatia, Cappadocia, Thrace, Macedonia, Alexandria, Thessaly, and Pompey's own estates, that 800 of them were ex-herdsmen and 500 Gauls and Germans; and if he had merely used his wits, he might have reflected that Pompey, though some of his cavalry officers may have been Roman nobles,<sup>10</sup> would not have expected to defeat Caesar with the aid of fashionable fops.

<sup>1</sup> *C. I. Caes. comm. de b. c.*, p. 341.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 89, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Andeut. zur Gesch. d. röm. Kriegswesens*, 1859, p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> *Gall. Krieg, &c.*, ii<sup>2</sup>, 1880, p. 176.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 91, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 88, 4. Cf. i, 27, 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Pomp.*, 69, 2; 71, 3; *Caes.*, 45, 1–2. Cf. Frontin., *Strat.*, iv, 7, 32.

<sup>8</sup> *ii*, 76, 318.

<sup>9</sup> *Caesar: a Sketch*, ed. 1886, p. 441.

<sup>10</sup> Cicero (*De off.*, ii, 13, 45) says that his son was placed by Pompey in com-

**The work of Caesar's cavalry at Pharsalia.**—Caesar, after describing how his fourth line routed the Pompeian cavalry, and how Pompey's slingers and archers, deprived of the support of the cavalry, were slaughtered, says that the cohorts of the fourth line, continuing their victorious onset, enveloped Pompey's left wing and attacked it from the rear (*Eodem impetu cohortes sinistrum cornu . . . circumierunt eosque a tergo sunt adortae*<sup>1</sup>). H. Delbrück,<sup>2</sup> who denies that six [or rather eight<sup>3</sup>] cohorts could alone have beaten Pompey's cavalry, argues, relying upon Appian<sup>4</sup> and Florus,<sup>5</sup> that Caesar's cavalry joined the fourth line in executing the turning movement, and that the chief credit of the victory was theirs.<sup>6</sup> But Caesar says nothing about his cavalry except that they did not sustain the charge of Pompey's squadrons, but gave a little ground; Appian says that they surrounded the Pompeian infantry (evidently the archers and slingers) who were exposed by the flight of the cavalry (καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα πεζόν, εὐθὺς ἰππέων ἔρημον γινόμενον, ἐκυκλοῦντο οἱ τοῦ Καίσαρος ἰππεῖς, αὐτοὶ δείξαντες περικύκλωσιν<sup>7</sup>); and Florus apparently confounded the 'German cohorts', as he calls them, with Caesar's fourth line, for he says that they 'charged the scattered [Pompeian] cavalry with such vigour that the latter seemed to be transformed into infantry, the former into mounted men' (*Germanorum cohortes tantum in effusos equites fecere impetum ut illi esse pedites, hi venire in equis viderentur*). Caesar knew to whom the chief credit belonged; and I infer from his description and from Appian's that the cohorts of the fourth line left the cavalry to deal with the exposed archers and slingers.

Veith,<sup>8</sup> differing from Delbrück,<sup>9</sup> holds that Caesar's *antesignani* (see pages 391–7) did not fight against Pompey's cavalry, but in the ranks of the legions to which they belonged. J. Kromayer,<sup>10</sup> who agrees with Delbrück, argues that in the passage<sup>11</sup> where Caesar says

mand of a squadron; but as the boy was then barely 16, the post could only have been honorary.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 93, 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, i, 1900, pp. 514–6.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 469.

<sup>4</sup> ii, 78, 328.

<sup>5</sup> ii, 13, 48.

<sup>6</sup> Delbrück observes that Caesar had a good reason for ignoring the achievements of his cavalry—he was reproached for having employed barbarians against his own countrymen. Nonsense! Dio (xli, 54, 2), to whom Delbrück appeals, merely says that Caesar and Pompey were both obliged to use barbarian troops. Caesar emphasizes the part which his Gallic cavalry played against Afranius and Petreius (*B. C.*, i, 39, 2; 51, 1); he calls attention to the 'barbarian' cavalry who were lent to him by the king of Noricum (18, 5); and he commends the bravery of his German auxiliaries at Dyrrachium (iii, 52, 2).

<sup>7</sup> Viereck brackets ἰππεῖς, evidently thinking that the subject of ἐκυκλοῦντο is Caesar's fourth line and that πεζόν means Pompey's left wing. In other words he supposes that Appian is here referring to the movement which Caesar described by the words *Eodem impetu . . . adortae*. But the Caesarian troops who had themselves feared that they might be surrounded (αὐτοὶ δείξαντες περικύκλωσιν) were the cavalry.

<sup>8</sup> *Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 504.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 515.

<sup>10</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, ii, 1907, p. 423, n. 1.

<sup>11</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 84, 3–5—Superius tamen institutum in equitibus . . . servabat, ut, quoniam numero multis partibus esset inferior . . . expeditos ex antesignanis electis ad perniciatē armis inter equites proeliari iuberet . . . His erat rebus

that his cavalry, aided by picked *antesignani* who were interspersed in their ranks, got the better of the Pompeian cavalry, he was referring, not, as Veith of course supposes, to the skirmish which he mentions in the next sentence, and which occurred before the battle, but to the battle itself! Most of the *antesignani* (legionaries of the first line) naturally fought along with the legions to which they belonged: whether a picked body was associated with Caesar's cavalry in the battle we cannot tell.

**The numbers of the combatants in the battle of Pharsalia.**—Professor Hans Delbrück<sup>1</sup> severely criticizes the statements of Caesar about the numbers of his own troops and of the Pompeians at Pharsalia. He appeals to Plutarch, Appian, Eutropius, and Orosius, whose estimates, he says, are traceable to Asinius Pollio, and cites various passages in the *Civil War* to show that Caesar habitually minimized his own losses and exaggerated those of his opponents. Eutropius<sup>2</sup> says that Pompey had 40,000 infantry and 1,100 cavalry, while Caesar had [less than] 30,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry; Orosius<sup>3</sup> that Pompey had 88 cohorts, or 40,000 foot, in line of battle and 1,100 cavalry, while Caesar had 80 cohorts, or [less than] 30,000 foot, and 1,000 cavalry. According to Appian<sup>4</sup> and Plutarch,<sup>5</sup> Caesar's fourth line, which, on his own showing, consisted of six cohorts only, numbered 3,000 men: it follows that the average strength of these cohorts was 500. Again, Caesar<sup>6</sup> tells us that the 8th legion and the 9th were so reduced in strength that he formed out of them virtually one: thus they must have together numbered 6,000 men. It appears then that Caesar's weakest cohorts averaged 300 and his strongest 500. Take the mean, says Delbrück, and you will find that his 80 cohorts numbered 32,000, not, as he pretends, 22,000; and this estimate is confirmed by that of Pollio [!]<sup>7</sup> Pollio, moreover, was right when he affirmed that Pompey had only 88, not, as Caesar says, 110 cohorts in line of battle. The fifteen that were taken prisoners in the Adriatic<sup>8</sup> and incorporated in Pompey's army added nothing to the number of his cohorts, for the men who composed them were distributed among existing units;<sup>9</sup> and the cohorts contributed by Afranius<sup>10</sup> numbered at the most only a few hundred men, for more could not have marched through Italy without being stopped by the troops whom Caesar had quartered there.

Let us begin by examining the passages which Delbrück cites to prove Caesar's habitual mendacity. In the first he says that the cavalry of his lieutenant Domitius, being attacked by Scipio's cavalry, killed about 80 and put the rest to flight, losing only two themselves.<sup>11</sup>

effectum ut equitum mille . . . septem milium Pompeianorum impetum, cum esset usus, sustinere auderent neque magnopere eorum multitudine terrentur. Namque etiam per eos dies proelium secundum equestre fecit, &c.

<sup>1</sup> *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, i, 1900, pp. 507–14.

<sup>2</sup> vi, 20.

<sup>3</sup> vi, 15, 23–4.

<sup>4</sup> ii, 76, 318.

<sup>5</sup> *Pomp.*, 71, 4.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 89, 1.

<sup>7</sup> No. Pollio's estimate, if Eutropius and Orosius copied him, was 'less than 30,000'.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 110.

<sup>9</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 4, 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, 88, 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, 37, 7.

In the second we read that when Caesar's 9th legion, which had been prevented by Pompey from occupying a hill near Dyrrachium, succeeded in effecting their retreat, they killed many of the Pompeians, losing five of their own number;<sup>1</sup> but Delbrück omits to mention that Caesar had already emphasized his own heavy loss in wounded.<sup>2</sup> From the third passage we learn that in the six combats which occurred in one day during the blockade of Dyrrachium not more than 20 of Caesar's men were killed, while he ascertained that Pompey had lost 2,000; but here again Delbrück ignores the statement that in one redoubt every one of the Caesarians was wounded while four centurions were blinded; and it must be remembered that the Pompeians were the assailants, that they were attacking uphill, and that they were attempting to storm strongly fortified posts.<sup>3</sup> In the last passage, where Caesar implies by the word *videbantur* that his estimate of the Pompeian losses at Pharsalia was based on hearsay,<sup>4</sup> he was probably led into exaggeration; and Pollio may have gone nearer to the truth when he said that the Pompeians lost 6,000.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, Delbrück suppresses passages which show that Caesar laid stress upon his own casualties when they were serious. He speaks of the 'heavy loss' (*magna caede*<sup>6</sup>) which Pompey inflicted upon him on the last day of the fighting near Dyrrachium; he says that on the same occasion his army narrowly escaped annihilation (*His tantis malis haec subsidia succurrebant quominus omnis deleteretur exercitus*<sup>7</sup>); he records the numbers of the slain—970 legionaries, 200 horse, 32 centurions—and he frankly acknowledges the humiliating loss of 32 military standards.<sup>8</sup>

The statements of Eutropius and Orosius, whether they were derived from Pollio or not, can hardly be preferred to those of Caesar unless it can be shown that they were more probable. That we shall consider presently. Meanwhile it is pertinent to remark that Dio,<sup>9</sup> whom Delbrück forgets to quote, says that Pompey was 'far superior in numbers' (προὔχοντος δ' οὖν πολὺ τοῦ Πομπηίου τῷ πλήθει), while Plutarch<sup>10</sup> and Appian,<sup>11</sup> who both, according to Delbrück, copied Pollio, confirm Caesar's estimate. Again, the statement of Appian that six cohorts numbered 3,000 men is obviously inconsistent with the statement, in which Appian agrees with Caesar, that the whole eight legions, or 80 cohorts, numbered no more than 22,000. As I have shown in another note,<sup>12</sup> Caesar's fourth line consisted, not, as Delbrück says, of six cohorts but of eight. When Delbrück denies that Caesar with 22,000 infantry could have defeated Pompey with 47,000, and that Caesar's fourth line could, even with the aid of

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 45-6. See p. 139.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 45, 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 54.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 99, 1. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Plut., *Caes.*, 46, 2; App., ii, 82, 346. But even Pollio could not ascertain the exact number in the absence of an official list of casualties, which for obvious reasons did not exist. Plutarch says that besides the 6,000 Pompeian soldiers, camp-followers were killed when the camp was stormed.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 65, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 70, 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 71, 1.

Cf. *B. G.*, vii, 51, 1. 4.

<sup>9</sup> xli, 55, 5.

<sup>10</sup> Pomp., 69, 4; *Caes.*, 42, 2.

<sup>11</sup> ii, 70, 289.

<sup>12</sup> See p. 469.



1,000 horse, have defeated 7,000 cavalry, he leaves important considerations out of sight. The Pompeian cavalry were drawn from numerous nations, European and Asiatic, and included 800 slaves: among the Pompeian infantry were five legions which had only seven months' experience of war, besides two which for several years had served under Caesar and of whose fidelity Pompey in the preceding year had repeatedly expressed distrust.<sup>1</sup> With them, moreover, were associated those troops who had been captured less than a year before and compelled to take service under Pompey; while the whole force was a heterogeneous aggregate from many different lands. It may reasonably be supposed that they laboured in some degree under the same disadvantage as the Baluchis—a loose aggregate of tribal levies—whom, notwithstanding their enormous numerical superiority, Napier defeated in the battle of Miani.<sup>2</sup> When Caesar's fourth line, flushed with the victory which they had gained over the Pompeian cavalry, attacked the Pompeian infantry in the rear; when simultaneously Caesar's reserves attacked the Pompeian infantry in front, it is not surprising that the smaller army, a band of brothers who for many years had conquered under the same general, overpowered the larger under a lesser man.<sup>3</sup>

But it is not enough to confute Delbrück: the surest way of getting at the truth is to examine the successive statements of Caesar about his own forces and those of Pompey. After Mark Antony joined him he had 11 legions (110 cohorts);<sup>4</sup> at the time of the battle of Pharsalia 4 of these cohorts were at Apollonia, 3 at Oricum, 1 at Lissus,<sup>5</sup> and 15 in Achaia.<sup>6</sup> At Pharsalia therefore he had

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Att.*, viii, 12 C, 2, 4; 12 A, 2-3; 12 D, 1.

<sup>2</sup> See my article in *Macmillan's Magazine*, 1900, p. 181.

<sup>3</sup> G. Veith (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, pp. 501-5) and J. Kromayer (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*, ii, 426-43) have also severely criticized Delbrück's arguments. In his second edition (1908, pp. 587-9) he replied to their strictures, which largely anticipated my own. He allows that they have convinced him that Caesar had only 1,000 cavalry (a number attested by all the authorities); but he dismisses most of their arguments with the remark that for the observant reader refutation would be superfluous. In one sense it certainly would. Forced to admit that Plutarch and Appian agree with Caesar in respect to the numbers of the armies, he says that even if that proves that Pollio's estimate agreed with Caesar's, and even if Eutropius and Orosius drew from some other source, the fact remains that they do not agree with Caesar. 'I have by no means,' he insists, 'appealed to Pollio as an authority of special weight. . . . But, as we know from Appian that Pollio differed from Caesar about the number of the Pompeians who were slain, it is probable that he was also the authority whom Eutropius and Orosius followed.' Finally, reminding his critics that even Frederick the Great distorted figures for the glory of his country and that every one knows how little Napoleon cared for the truth of history, he reiterates his conviction that Caesar's story is incredible.

I have said enough to show that the inaccuracies of Frederick and the mendacities of Napoleon are alike irrelevant; and Delbrück forgets that when Appian decided to give an estimate which agreed with that of Caesar, he did so deliberately after weighing the statements of other writers. He also forgets that he himself in his first edition (p. 508) gave unanswerable reasons for preferring Caesar's statement of his losses at Dyrrachium to that of Orosius (vi, 15, 21), whose authority, he adds, was 'unquestionably Pollio'!

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 6, 2; 29, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 78, 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 56, 1 compared with 34, 2.

87 cohorts. One only of the 11 legions consisted of recruits,<sup>1</sup> and we may be sure that it was not present at Pharsalia. The 7 legions that accompanied Caesar from Brundisium were greatly depleted; <sup>2</sup> many sick veterans were left behind at Vibo <sup>3</sup> and at Brundisium.<sup>4</sup> So far as he records the losses incurred before the battle, 32 centurions and 1,205 men were killed in action,<sup>5</sup> besides the prisoners whom Labienus murdered <sup>6</sup> and an indefinite number of sick and wounded,<sup>7</sup> which must have greatly exceeded the number of the slain; while of the cavalry, originally 1,400 strong,<sup>8</sup> 202 were killed and some deserted.<sup>9</sup> It is hardly necessary to add that the losses which Caesar mentioned incidentally must have fallen far short of the whole. The statements then that his eight legions at Pharsalia in the fighting line mustered only 22,000 men and that only 1,000 cavalry were present will not be doubted by any soldier. At the outset of the campaign Pompey had 11 legions, of which 5 were newly raised,<sup>10</sup> and we are not told that he levied any more; for the recruits from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus, as well as the 15 cohorts captured from Antonius served only to increase the strength of existing corps,<sup>11</sup> and this is doubtless also true of the recruits whom Scipio enlisted.<sup>12</sup> Yet, although Pompey left 15 cohorts at Dyrrachium before he marched for Thessaly,<sup>13</sup> he had 11 legions in line of battle at Pharsalia and detailed 7 cohorts to guard his camp.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, if Caesar's figures are correct, either the reinforcements which Afranius brought from Spain <sup>15</sup> numbered 22 cohorts, or, as Stoffel <sup>16</sup> supposed, the cohorts left to guard Dyrrachium were native levies. The former alternative is incredible; the latter is quite probable, for one may doubt whether Pompey would have weakened his force by detaching regulars to hold a fortress which was not likely to be attacked, and the garrisons which he had originally posted at Corcyra, Naupactus,<sup>17</sup> Dyrrachium,<sup>18</sup> and elsewhere were, like that of Oricum,<sup>19</sup> presumably composed of native troops. But can we accept the statement that the 11 legions comprised 45,000 men, a figure yielding a far higher average than that of Caesar's corps? Pompey's losses had been considerable. Besides the troops—probably about 400 <sup>20</sup>—who were captured with the two ships that carried them when the fleet left Brundisium,<sup>21</sup> many of his men were killed in the combat of Paliamia <sup>22</sup> and 2,000 on the day when he failed to pierce Caesar's lines; <sup>23</sup> 'almost every day' men deserted from his army; <sup>24</sup> and he too must have suffered losses from disease and casualties which Caesar did not record. On the other hand, his legions had not been thinned by the malaria that reduced Caesar's strength before the campaign

<sup>1</sup> See p. 433.<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 2, 3.<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 101, 6.<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 87, 4.<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 19, 6; 28, 3-4; 37, 7; 44, 6; 45, 4; 46, 6; 53, 2-3; 60, 5; 71, 1.<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 71, 4.<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 75, 1.<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 2, 2; 29, 2.<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, 37, 7; 60, 5; 71, 1.<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, i, 25, 2; iii, 4, 1-2; *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 62, 2.<sup>11</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 4, 2.<sup>12</sup> *Ib.*, 32, 1.<sup>13</sup> *Plut.*, *Cato min.*, 55, 1.<sup>14</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 88, 4.<sup>15</sup> *Ib.*, § 2.<sup>16</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 343.<sup>17</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 35, 1.<sup>18</sup> *Ib.*, 53, 1.<sup>19</sup> *Ib.*, 11, 3.<sup>20</sup> *Ib.*, 28, 3.<sup>21</sup> *Ib.*, i, 28, 4.<sup>22</sup> *Ib.*, iii, 46, 6.<sup>23</sup> *Ib.*, 53, 1.<sup>24</sup> *Ib.*, 61, 2.

began,<sup>1</sup> and, as we have seen, their original numbers were greatly swelled in Greece. There remains the question on what Caesar's estimate was based. If after the battle he found official papers as well as the letters which he destroyed unread,<sup>2</sup> he could not err; but if he relied on the evidence of prisoners, he may have been misled.

**Did Caesar form three legions or four out of his prisoners?**—Caesar says that more than 24,000 Pompeians surrendered after the battle of Pharsalia,<sup>3</sup> and in a later passage he tells us that he ordered two legions, which he had formed out of these prisoners, to be sent from Asia to Alexandria.<sup>4</sup> Von Domaszewski affirms that four legions in all were raised from this source.<sup>5</sup> There is no direct evidence that Caesar formed more than the two to which he himself alludes. One of them, the 37th, reached him while he was engaged in the Alexandrian campaign; <sup>6</sup> the other was dispatched by land through Syria, but failed to reach Alexandria, or at all events failed to arrive in time.<sup>7</sup> But as the author of *Bellum Alexandrinum* in the same sentence in which he relates that Domitius Calvinus sent these two legions to reinforce Caesar remarks that he 'led one of three, namely the 36th' against Pharnaces (*unam ex tribus, XXXVI., secum ducit*), we may infer with certainty that the 36th, the distinguishing number of which immediately preceded that of the legion which reached Alexandria, was, like it, formed out of the Pompeian prisoners. Evidently the fourth, if it existed, had not accompanied Domitius into Asia Minor. What evidence is there that it did exist? The mere fact, on which von Domaszewski insists, that the number of the prisoners was equal to rather more than that of four normal legions proves nothing; for Caesar might well have distributed one fourth of the prisoners among some of his existing legions whose ranks had been thinned.<sup>8</sup> Von Domaszewski, however, argues <sup>9</sup> that of the two legions with which Cornificius undertook his campaign in Illyricum in the summer of 48 B.C.<sup>10</sup> one must have been formed out of Pompeians; for, he says, no troops were available except that [hypothetical] legion and the one of which eight cohorts had remained to protect Lissus, Apollonia, and Oricum,<sup>11</sup> since of the rest of the army the greater part had returned to Italy and the remainder had accompanied Caesar to Egypt. Besides, Cornificius could not have taken newly raised Italian legions to Illyricum, for until midwinter the Pompeians were so completely masters of the Adriatic that Gabinius late in the year preferred to take the land route.<sup>12</sup> But,

<sup>1</sup> B.C., iii, 2, 3; 87, 3. We read that the strength of Pompey's cavalry was the same—7,000—at Pharsalia (84, 4) as at the beginning of the campaign (4, 3), although, besides unmentioned losses, several had fallen on the banks of the Genusus (75, 5). Scipio brought cavalry from Syria (31, 3), who, apparently, were not included in the original estimate; but I suspect that in 84, 4 Caesar did not allow for wastage.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 172.

<sup>3</sup> B. C., iii, 99, 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 107, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, p. 171.

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 9, 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 34, 3.

<sup>8</sup> See Plut., *Caes.*, 46, 2; Dio, xli, 62, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 171–2.

<sup>10</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 42, 2.

<sup>11</sup> B. C., iii, 78, 5.

<sup>12</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 43, 1; App., *Ill.*, 12; B. C., ii, 59, 242.



I reply, for the same reason it would have been madness to withdraw the cohorts that garrisoned the three maritime towns, Lissus, Apollonia, and Oricum; and since Cornificius had two legions, and eight cohorts were less than one legion, how is the missing legion to be accounted for? It is doubtful whether Cornificius was sent to Illyricum from Italy at all: <sup>1</sup> if he was, he, like Gabinus, may have gone by land or, bolder than Gabinus, he may have ventured, like Antony, <sup>2</sup> to transport his army across the sea. Besides, there is no evidence that he was sent to Illyricum 'in the summer': he was sent *aestate*, which is frequently used (in contradistinction to *hiems*) in the sense of the ordinary season for campaigning, <sup>3</sup>—March or April to September or October; and since Gabinus was directed to join Cornificius when Caesar, after the battle of Pharsalia, was pursuing Pompey, <sup>4</sup> it is clear that Cornificius had then been some time in Illyricum <sup>5</sup> and could not have been accompanied thither by a legion which had not been organized until after Pompey's defeat. Evidently then the two legions which he took with him were composed of recruits. I believe therefore that three legions only were formed from the Pompeian prisoners, and that one fourth of the prisoners or more were drafted into legions that already existed.

**The chronology of Caesar's campaign.**—Readers who prefer a semblance of precision to avowed uncertainty will find in Stoffel's second volume (pages 426–9) a list of dates, of which five are known and fifty-eight conjectural. <sup>6</sup> Of the former three are important,—Caesar's departure from Brundisium on January 4, 706 <sup>7</sup> (November 5, 49 B. C.), his landing at Palaeste on the following day, <sup>8</sup> and the battle of Pharsalia, fought on August 9, 706 <sup>9</sup> (June 6, 48 B. C.).

Caesar, thinking of the time which immediately preceded the arrival of his reinforcements, says, 'Many months had now passed [since his own arrival in Greece] and winter was near its end; yet the transports with the legions from Brundisium did not come' (*Multi iam menses erant et hiems praecipitaverat, neque Brundisio naves legionesque ad Caesarem veniebant* <sup>10</sup>). According to Suetonius, <sup>11</sup> the blockade of Pompey near Dyrrachium lasted almost four months; and I. Ziehen, <sup>12</sup> calculating that its close must be dated about the 1st of July, infers that Antony landed before the end of February. This view, as O. E. Schmidt <sup>13</sup> shows, is wrong: *multi menses* can hardly mean six or seven weeks, and the words *hiems praecipitaverat*

<sup>1</sup> If Plutarch (*Caes.*, 43, 1) wrote Κορνιφίνιος, not Κορφίνιος, which is obviously wrong, it would seem that Cornificius was already in Greece or Illyricum with two legions before the battle of Pharsalia.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 26, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i, 54, 2; ii, 2, 1; 35, 2; iv, 21, 4, &c.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 42, 5.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *ib.*, § 4.

<sup>6</sup> Stoffel's figures are vitiated by his adoption of Le Verrier's reconstruction of the unreformed calendar: to correct them, antedate all those which are given under the heading 'Dates en style julien' by 23 days. See vol. i, pp. 339–41. of this history and my *Anc. Britain*, 1907, pp. 706–14.

<sup>7</sup> *B. C.*, i, 6, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *ib.*, § 3.

<sup>9</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, pp. 324, 328.

<sup>10</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 25, 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 35, 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Eph. Tull.*, &c., 1887, pp. 46, 51–3.

<sup>13</sup> *D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, pp. 190–1.



are unequivocal.<sup>1</sup> Schmidt, appealing to Cicero,<sup>2</sup> Varro,<sup>3</sup> and Columella,<sup>4</sup> maintains that we cannot fix the beginning of spring earlier than February 7 of the Julian, equivalent to April 9 of the old, calendar. Accordingly he supposes that Caesar wrote the words which I have quoted in the middle of January (Julian), and that Antony landed about the beginning of February. It is not necessary to suppose that as much as a fortnight elapsed between the time when Caesar wrote to Antony<sup>5</sup> and Antony's arrival; but Schmidt is not far wrong. He remarks, further, that Caesar, immediately after mentioning that Pompey encamped near Dyrrachium, says that he himself was obliged to send to Epirus for corn, because the ships 'which he had built in the winter in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy were delayed';<sup>6</sup> and accordingly he concludes that when the blockade of Pompey began the winter was over. Perhaps it was; but the passage which Schmidt quotes is inconclusive; the ships may have been built early in the winter. Evidently, however, as Schmidt remarks, Suetonius was at least a month out in his reckoning.

The next important date to determine is that of the end of the blockade. Stoffel,<sup>7</sup> reckoning back by the aid of such vague indications as Caesar gives from the date of the battle of Pharsalia, fixes it on July 6; Ziehen,<sup>8</sup> who calculates that at least forty days intervened between the two events, at the end of June. Schmidt relies upon two of the letters—xi, 3 and 4—which Cicero wrote to Atticus from Pompey's camp and from Dyrrachium. In the former, dated June 13, Cicero says, 'You will be able to ascertain what is going on here from the messenger who brought your letter. I have detained him rather long, because I have been daily expecting something to happen,' &c. (*cotidie aliquid novi expectabamus*<sup>9</sup>). Schmidt<sup>10</sup> infers that the letter was written 'in the final period of the blockade, when a decisive action was daily expected'. In § 2 of the second letter Cicero writes, 'You ask for the latest news. You will be able to get it from Isidorus. What remains to be done does not appear more difficult' (*Quid sit gestum novi quaeris: ex Isidoro scire poteris: reliqua non videntur esse difficiliora*). These words, which plainly show that Caesar had just suffered a reverse, are, as Schmidt remarks,<sup>11</sup> inconsistent with a sentence in § 1,—'You complain of not getting a letter from me. My difficulty is lack of matter: I have nothing worth writing about, for I am not at all satisfied with what is happening or with the measures that are being adopted' (*Meas litteras quod requiris impedior inopia rerum, quas nullas habeo litteris dignas, quippe cui nec quae accidunt nec quae aguntur ullo modo probentur*). Accordingly, says Schmidt, Manutius has proposed to

<sup>1</sup> Ziehen (*Götting. gelehrte Anz.*, i, 1894, p. 316), adhering to his opinion, insists that *multi menses* simply means more than one month, but ignores *hiems praecipitaverat*.

<sup>2</sup> *Verr.*, v, 10, 27.

<sup>3</sup> *R. R.*, i, 28, 1.

<sup>4</sup> xi, 2, 15.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 25, 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 42, 1-3.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, i, 334; ii, 428.

<sup>8</sup> *Eph. Tull.*, pp. 46, 50-5.

<sup>9</sup> *Att.*, xi, 3, 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, p. 193.

regard § 2 as a new letter. One is inclined here to interrupt and to suggest with Tyrrell and Purser that in § 2 the letter may have been 'resumed after a considerable interval'; but the editors have been converted by the arguments of Schmidt.<sup>1</sup> He asks us to observe that in § 1 the payment, which would fall due on July 1, of the second instalment of Tullia's dowry, which is mentioned with reference to the earlier letter at the end of § 2, is not alluded to. 'This circumstance', says Schmidt, 'leads me to believe that not 4, 1 but 4, 2 follows 3.' The remark which Cicero makes in 4, 1—'I am not at all satisfied with what is happening'—Schmidt explains with reference to Pompey's lack of energy in following up his victory over Caesar. In confirmation of this view Schmidt points to parallel passages in xi, 4, 1 and *Fam.*, xiv, 6, which was dated July 15:—

*Att.*, xi, 4, 1,—'My difficulty is lack of matter: I have nothing worth writing about' (*impediōr inopia rerum, quas nullas habeo litteris dignas*);

'From the latest [letter] I find that the property did not sell' (*ex proximis cognovi praedia non venisse*).

*Fam.*, xiv, 6,—... 'and I have nothing that I care to write' (*nec rem habemus ullam quam scribere velimus*);

'From your letter just received I understand that no estate has been able to find a purchaser' (*ex tuis litteris quas proxime accepi cognovi praedium nullum venire potuisse*).

Accordingly Schmidt concludes that *Att.*, xi, 4, 1 was written about the same time as *Fam.*, xiv, 6, namely July 15; and, given this premiss, it is possible to restore approximately the date of xi, 4, 2. The opening words, 'you will be able to learn from Isidorus', show that Isidorus conveyed the letter to Atticus; and the opening words of 4, 1, which *ex hypothesi* was written later—'I have received your letter from Isidorus as well as two of later date' (*Accepi ab Isidoro litteras et postea datas binas*)—show that Isidorus, after delivering 4, 2 to Atticus, returned to Cicero with the three letters the receipt of which he here acknowledged. Letters usually required 10 or 11 days for transmission from Dyrrachium to Rome and *vice versa*; <sup>2</sup> therefore xi, 4, 2 was written at least 20–22 days before July 15, that is, at the latest, on June 24, and probably some days earlier, for the words *et postea datas binas* show that either Isidorus did not return from Rome immediately or Cicero wrote 4, 2 some days after Isidorus reached him. Furthermore, says Schmidt, the words 'About the second instalment' (*De pensione altera*) at the end of 4, 2 appear to show that Cicero expected Atticus to receive the letter on or before July 1, the day on which the instalment would be due. Therefore 4, 2 was not written later than June 19, and Caesar's defeat, which was alluded to in the letter, must have occurred a day or two earlier. Thus Schmidt is obliged to suppose that at least 50 days elapsed between Caesar's defeat and the battle of Pharsalia. He has overlooked an important text. Before describing the attack which was made on the contravallation while he was fighting in Dyrrachium, Caesar says, 'the corn was now beginning to ripen' (*Iamque frumenta maturescere incipiebant* <sup>3</sup>). Thus on Schmidt's

<sup>1</sup> *The Correspondence of Cicero*, iv, 1894, pp. xci–xcii. Cf. iv<sup>2</sup>, 1918, pp. 277–8.

<sup>2</sup> Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 201–2.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 49, 1.

theory the corn was beginning to ripen several days before June 18, or before April 16 of the Julian calendar!<sup>1</sup> He failed to perceive that, as Groebe<sup>2</sup> says, Cicero in *Att.*, xi, 4, 2 may have referred, not to the so-called battle of Dyrrachium, but to the earlier reverse which Caesar had suffered on the hill of Paliama;<sup>3</sup> and, as C. Bardt has observed,<sup>4</sup> a sentence in that letter points to the same conclusion. Cicero there says that when he has thrown off the indisposition from which he is suffering he will join Pompey (*Me conficit sollicitudo, ex qua etiam summa infirmitas corporis, qua levata ero una cum eo qui negotium gerit* &c.). Evidently, says Bardt, he was not then in Pompey's camp, but in Dyrrachium; and if Pompey had already broken the blockade and had begun to march [or was on the eve of marching] towards Thessaly, Cicero would not have dreamed of travelling alone to join him.

Groebe<sup>5</sup> gives a tentative chronological table, to which I annex Stoffel's,<sup>6</sup> Veith's,<sup>7</sup> and my own:—

	Groebe.	Stoffel.	Veith.	Holmes.
Caesar's attack on Dyrrachium and Pompey's first attempt to break the blockade ( <i>B. C.</i> , iii, 51-3)	July 8	June 25		July 1
Pompey withdraws to his camp (54)	„ 13	July 2		„ 6
Desertion of Egus and Roucillus (59-61)	„ 15			
Caesar defeated (62-70)	„ 17	„ 6	July 5	„ 9
Caesar retreats to a point 8 Roman miles south of Asparagium (75-6)	„ 18	„ 7	„ 7	„ 10
Caesar reaches Apollonia (78, 1)	„ 20	„ 9	„ 10	„ 13
Caesar begins to march through Epirus (78, 5)	„ 23	„ 12	„ 12	„ 15
Pompey marches from Asparagium (?) (77, 3; 78, 6)		„ 14		
Pompey reaches Heraclia (79, 3)	„ 26	„ 19		
Domitius marches from the neighbourhood of Heraclia to join Caesar (79, 6-7)	„ 24	„ 21		„ 21
Caesar reaches Aeginium (79, 7)		„ 18	„ 28	„ 27
Domitius joins Caesar at Aeginium (79, 7)	„ 29	„ 24		„ „
Caesar's army rests	„ 30	„ 25		„ 28
Caesar reaches Gomphi (80, 1)	„ 31	„ 26		„ 29
Caesar reaches Metropolis (80, 6)	Aug. 1	„ 27		„ 30
Pompey reaches Larisa (81, 2; 82, 1)	„ 2	Aug. 1		
Caesar encamps in the Pharsalian plain <sup>8</sup> (81, 3)	„ 3	July 29	Aug. 1	Aug. 1
Pompey encamps near Caesar (82, 2; 84, 2)		Aug. 4		„ 5
Caesar offers battle to Pompey (84, 2)	„ 6-8	„ 6-8		„ 6-8
Battle of Pharsalia (88 ff.)	„ 9	„ 9	„ 9	„ 9

<sup>1</sup> According to a communication which Groebe received from M. Kiessling and C. Patsch, embodying information which they had obtained at Durazzo and the results of their own observations, the harvest in the plain of Durazzo is in June and July. If it occurred in June in 48 B. C., the corn would have served as fodder (*B. C.*, iii, 44, 3; 58, 3) in April and have begun to ripen early in May (*W. Drumann's Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 743).

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 749-50.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 139, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> In a letter to Groebe (*op. cit.*).

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 745-6.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, ii, 428-9.

<sup>7</sup> See Veith's *Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, p. 231, n. 28.

<sup>8</sup> Appian (ii, 64, 268) says that Caesar marched from Gomphi to Pharsalia

In order to check these figures we must work back from the known date, August 9. Groebe, notwithstanding Caesar's statement that Pompey arrived in Thessaly a few days (*paucis diebus*)<sup>1</sup> after he himself encamped in the (Pharsalian) plain, reverses the order. Stoffel allows only four days for the march of Domitius from a point not far south of Heraclia to Aeginium,—180 kilometres measured on the map, really rather more. This is obviously incredible: if Domitius took only six days, he marched extraordinarily fast. Again, both Stoffel and Groebe make Caesar march from Apollonia to Aeginium, a distance which Stoffel<sup>2</sup> reckons as 260, and Groebe as 270 kilometres, in seven days—on an average 23 or 24 miles a day without a halt! Veith<sup>3</sup> affirms that the distance, measured on the Austro-Hungarian staff map, is 300 kilometres, and that, as the map often neglects small curves, the actual distance must be 350. Assuming that the roads were not as good as those of Italy, he concludes that the average day's march (though Caesar says that he marched rapidly) did not exceed 20 kilometres. I rather distrust Veith's measurements,<sup>4</sup> and from comparison of staff maps with official measurements of ground over which I have walked I suspect that his allowance of 50 kilometres for neglected curves is excessive. Stoffel, supposing that Pompey did not start to join Scipio until he heard that Caesar had left Apollonia,<sup>5</sup> allows only six days for his march of 195 (?) kilometres<sup>6</sup> to Heraclia. I have given reasons<sup>7</sup> for believing that Pompey, when he abandoned his pursuit of Caesar, did not return to Asparagium, but marched to Heraclia direct. Stoffel holds that Caesar reached Apollonia in three days, although Caesar says that Pompey abandoned the pursuit on the fourth day, for he supposed that both marched by the direct road from Dyrrachium to Apollonia, which probably did not then exist.<sup>8</sup> As they passed by Asparagium, they must have gone by the southern branch of the Egnatian Way.

in 7 days. Ziehen (*op. cit.*, p. 51), who of course sees the absurdity of this statement, vainly tries to reconcile it with common sense.

<sup>1</sup> If Caesar's statement is accurate, we must take *paucis diebus* to mean not less than three days. This, however, is a point on which Caesar's memory might have failed (cf. Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 56, 4); and if I had not felt bound by the word *paucis*, I should have advanced all the dates before Aug. 5 by at least one day.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 236.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 228.

<sup>4</sup> A map-measurer requires extremely delicate manipulation. I have been using one for many years; and my measurements, thrice repeated with the same results, of Pompey's lines at Dyrrachium as traced on Stoffel's map differ from Veith's.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 157, n. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 238.

<sup>7</sup> p. 449.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 437.



## WHO WAS THE CASSIUS THAT SURRENDERED TO CAESAR IN THE HELLESPONT ?

The surrender of Cassius is mentioned by Appian,<sup>1</sup> Dio,<sup>2</sup> and Suetonius<sup>3</sup> only. Appian says that he commanded 70 triremes (which, if the rest of Appian's story is true, is incredible), and that he was one of Caesar's assassins. If so, he was Gaius Cassius, and in another passage<sup>4</sup> Appian gives him that name. Dio calls him Lucius Cassius. Suetonius, who also calls him Lucius, says that he had 10 beaked ships. The writer of the article on C. Cassius in *Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie*<sup>5</sup> affirms without giving any reason that the Cassius in question was 'L. Cassius, the brother of the murderer'. Did he forget that this L. Cassius was one of Caesar's officers, and that immediately after Mark Antony joined Caesar with reinforcements from Brundisium he was sent by Caesar on an expedition to Thessaly ?<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless it is certain that the Cassius who surrendered when Caesar was crossing the Hellespont was not the murderer; for Dio<sup>7</sup> relates that Gaius surrendered on another occasion, and we may gather from Cicero<sup>8</sup> that after the Alexandrian War Gaius was in Cilicia and there awaited Caesar's arrival. The only possible conclusion then is that, as Fabricius first suggested, the Cassius in question was a Lucius Cassius otherwise unknown.<sup>9</sup>

## CAESAR'S REFORM OF THE TAXATION OF ASIA

The late Professor H. F. Pelham<sup>10</sup> is said to have maintained, notwithstanding the express statement of Dio,<sup>11</sup> that Caesar, when he amended the system of taxation in the province of Asia, did not substitute tribute for tithes, but only modified the method of collection. V. Chapot,<sup>12</sup> however, argues that it is difficult to reconcile this theory with the statements of Appian<sup>13</sup> that after the death of Caesar Cassius exacted from Asia by anticipation ten years' tribute and that Brutus received from the same province a lump sum of 16,000 talents.

<sup>1</sup> ii, 88, 369-72.

<sup>2</sup> xlii, 6, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 63

<sup>4</sup> ii, 111, 464.

<sup>5</sup> iii, 1728-9.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 34, 2.

<sup>7</sup> xlii, 13, 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Att.*, xi, 13, 1; 15, 2; *Phil.*, ii, 11, 26. Cf. *Plut.*, *Brut.*, 6, 2.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. W. Judeich, *Caesar im Orient*, 1885, p. 60, note.

<sup>10</sup> *Trans. . . . Oxford Philol. Soc.*, 1881-2. Pelham's paper, which I have not been able to see, is cited by Chapot.

<sup>11</sup> xlii, 6, 3—τοὺς γοῦν τελώνας πικρότατά σφισι χρωμένους ἀπαλλάξας ἐς φόρου συντέλειαν τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν τελῶν κατεστήσατο.

<sup>12</sup> *La prov. rom. d'Asie*, 1904, p. 329.

<sup>13</sup> *B. C.*, iv, 74, 313 75, 316. Cf. v, 4, 19.

## THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN

**The authorship of *Bellum Alexandrinum*.**—I have assumed in my narrative that the author of *Bellum Alexandrinum* was Aulus Hirtius. The reasons, based upon minute comparison of the language with that of the *Eighth Commentary* on the Gallic War, which was undoubtedly written by Hirtius, will be found in A. Klotz's *Cäsarstudien* (1910), pages 180-204, with which compare my notice in the *Classical Review*, xxvi, 1912, page 92. E. Kalinka,<sup>1</sup> who had not seen Klotz's work, maintained that when Hirtius had written the *Eighth Commentary*, which he did not begin until after Caesar's death, he would not have had time to write *Bellum Alexandrinum*, because at the beginning of September, 44 B.C., he was ill,<sup>2</sup> his recovery was slow,<sup>3</sup> he entered on his consulship in the following year, and he died before the end of April.<sup>4</sup> (Parenthetically I may remark that Cicero,<sup>5</sup> after speaking of Hirtius's illness, says that his mind remained in full vigour throughout.) Kalinka then proceeds to argue that the earlier chapters of *Bellum Alexandrinum* were the work of Caesar! He insists that the well-known words of Hirtius in his preface to the *Eighth Commentary*—*novissimumque imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae confeci*—cannot refer to the unfinished third book of Caesar's *Civil War*. For Hirtius distinguishes between Caesar's *superiora scripta* (the Commentaries on the Gallic War) and his *insequentia scripta*, and fears the reproach of presumption for having ventured to connect the two (*qui me mediis interposuerim Caesaris scriptis*). Therefore the following sentence—'for everybody knows that nothing which other writers have carefully elaborated is not surpassed by the beauty of these commentaries' (*constat enim inter omnes nihil tam operose ab aliis esse perfectum quod non horum elegantia commentariorum superetur*)—must logically refer to both groups, and so consequently must the next words, 'which have been published' (*qui sunt editi*). It follows that the *scripta insequentia*—the books on the Civil War—must have been published before Hirtius wrote his Preface: in that case the last book of the *Civil War* could not have been called 'unfinished' (*imperfectus*), still less could Hirtius have intended to continue this already published book. The unfinished commentary, then, was none other than one which Caesar had begun on the Alexandrian War!

Is it not conceivable that a statesman, if he has no time to complete his memoirs, should publish what he has written? But, apart from this question, the least acute of our logician's readers would have the wit to ask him, 'Was not the *novissimus* (commentarius) *imperfectus* the last of the *insequentia scripta*? And since you cannot without stultifying yourself deny that it was, you are bound by your own argument to admit that it had been published and that Hirtius nevertheless continued it. Then what becomes of your argument?

<sup>1</sup> *Philol.*, lxi, 1910, pp. 485-6.

<sup>2</sup> Cic., *Phil.*, i, 15, 37.

<sup>3</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, xii, 22, 2.

<sup>4</sup> App., *B. C.*, iii, 71, 293; Dio, xli, 39, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Phil.*, vii, 4, 12.

Is it not self-evident that the last (*novissimus*) commentary was the last book of the *Civil War*, which contains an unfinished narrative of operations at Alexandria<sup>1</sup> (*rebus gestis Alexandriae*)? If any one with a feeling for style who has read the *Commentaries* will peruse the first few chapters of *Bellum Alexandrinum*, he will marvel at the mind which could attribute such inferior workmanship to Caesar.

**The force with which Caesar landed at Alexandria.**—Caesar<sup>2</sup> says that he came to Alexandria with two legions (3,200 men)<sup>3</sup> and 800 cavalry, transporting the whole force in 10 Rhodian ships of war and a few supplied by the province of Asia. Judeich<sup>4</sup> holds that he was accompanied only by the 6th legion and a part of the cavalry, while a second detachment, comprising the legion commanded by Calenus<sup>5</sup> and the rest of the cavalry, followed a few hours later. Appian,<sup>6</sup> he remarks, distinctly says that Caesar did not wait for the troops—evidently those of Calenus—that were following him; besides, the ships which Caesar mentions were too few to carry 4,000 men. Originally [?] he had 35 ships:<sup>7</sup> therefore, if he himself sailed with all of them, it follows that the ‘few Asiatic ships’ (*paucis Asiaticis*) numbered 25, which is difficult to believe.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, we learn from Lucan<sup>9</sup> and Dio<sup>10</sup> that Caesar was afraid at first to land at Alexandria because the populace were rioting; and their statements are quite intelligible if he had only one legion with him.

<sup>1</sup> See my edition of the *Bellum Gallicum*, 1914, pp. 362-3.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 106, 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> The strength of the legions was greatly reduced (*ib.*, § 2).

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar im Orient*, 1885, pp. 78-80. <sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 106, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 89, 374. Cf. Dio, xlii, 7, 2-3.

<sup>7</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 13, 5. Hirtius here states the number of the ships which Caesar commanded in the second naval battle near Alexandria. According to the MSS., he says that Caesar had 9 Rhodian vessels, one of the ten which ‘had been sent’ (*decem missis*) having been wrecked, 8 from Pontus, 5 from Lycia, and 12 from Asia,—in all 34. In 1, 1, however, he says that at the outset of the Alexandrian War Caesar sent for every available ship from Rhodes, Syria, and Cilicia (*Rhodo atque ex Syria Ciliciaque omnem classem arcessit*): accordingly for *Lycius V* in 13, 5 R. Schneider substitutes *Syrias* . . . *Cilicias V*, meaning that Caesar had in the naval battle Syrian ships, the number of which is unknown, and 5 from Cilicia. But even if his emendation is right, 13, 5 does not agree with 1, 1: for when Caesar reached Alexandria he had 10 Rhodian and ‘a few’ Asiatic ships; therefore if he sent for more Rhodian ships and if they arrived, he must have had more than 9 in the battle. I suspect that in 1, 1 Hirtius made a mistake, confounding the Rhodian and Asiatic ships which Caesar ‘originally’ had with imaginary ones which he believed him to have sent for. [Groebe (*W. Drumann's Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 477, n. 7) remarks that if Schneider's emendation were right, Caesar would have had more than 34 ships. But 14, 1-2 shows that the ships in his second line equalled in number those (17) in the first.]

<sup>8</sup> Judeich, however, himself argues (p. 60) that *paucos dies* (*B. C.*, iii, 106, 1) means about 21 days; and Cicero (*In Cat.*, iii, 1, 3) wrote *paucis ante diebus* when he meant 24 days.

<sup>9</sup> ix, 1007-10.

<sup>10</sup> xlii, 7, 2. Dio says that Caesar did not land until Pompey's head and ring were brought to him; that he took refuge in the royal palace because the populace were exasperated at the sight of his lictors; and that as some of his soldiers were despoiled of their weapons, the rest re-embarked and put to sea until all the ships arrived!

Perhaps also the attempt which, as we learn from Lucan,<sup>1</sup> Frontinus,<sup>2</sup> and Appian,<sup>3</sup> he made to conciliate the Alexandrians preceded the arrival of the second legion.

Judeich does not seem to have noticed that the guess which he hazarded about Caesar's conciliatory measures was hardly consistent with the remark which he had just made on the authority of Lucan and Dio; but in fact, if we may trust Dio, Caesar did land before all his ships arrived. That of course would not prove that he had not sailed from Asia with both his legions, and the word *paucis* presents no insuperable difficulty: in fact, if we may trust Hirtius, whose account Judeich misrepresents, the Asiatic ships were only 12.<sup>4</sup> Still, I can quite conceive that Caesar, whose accuracy was not meticulous, made the misleading statement which Judeich attributes to him; and Appian may have told the truth here.

**The lighthouse of Alexandria.**—The most famous of ancient lighthouses, one of 'The Seven Wonders of the World', stood on the eastern extremity of the island of Pharos, where its substructures form the foundation of the old Turkish fort called Kait Bey. The site, clearly indicated by Strabo<sup>5</sup> and Josephus,<sup>6</sup> has been definitely fixed by H. Thiersch.<sup>7</sup> All the evidence supplied by the Arab writers who saw the tower before it was destroyed in the fourteenth century by successive earthquakes, is marshalled in his splendid monograph; and, as J. P. Mahaffy points out,<sup>8</sup> it is corroborated by the recent discovery of 'the groundworks for artificial breakwaters along the reefs to the north of the island . . . evidently meant to keep the weight of heavy seas from shaking the lighthouse.' From the notices of Strabo, from coins, mosaics, and the Arabic descriptions Thiersch has given among his illustrations<sup>9</sup> a reconstruction of the tower, which, according to the Arab estimates, was about 110 metres<sup>10</sup> (360 feet) in height from the level of the sea to the top of the statue that stood upon the apex. The lighthouse was built of white limestone and consisted of a square tower 60 metres high, above which rose a smaller octagonal structure of 30 metres, surmounted by one of cylindrical form, which was smaller still.

**The map of Alexandria.**—Stoffel's plan of Alexandria<sup>11</sup> was a reproduction of one based upon excavations made by the Egyptian astronomer Mahmud Bey for Napoleon III. Dr. D. G. Hogarth,<sup>12</sup> confirming my suspicions, doubts the accuracy of Mahmud's map, and remarks that he had had no archaeological training and had never excavated before.<sup>13</sup> 'It is so hopeless', he concludes, 'to sift

<sup>1</sup> x, 14-9.

<sup>2</sup> Strat., i. 1, 5.

<sup>3</sup> ii, 89, 376.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 484, n. 7.

<sup>5</sup> xvii, 1, 6.

<sup>6</sup> Bell. Iud., iv, 10, 5.

<sup>7</sup> Pharos, &c., 1909, pp. 35-52, 76-83.

<sup>8</sup> Hist. of Egypt<sup>2</sup>, &c., 1914, p. 102 b. Dr. G. Botti (in his map inserted at the end of Mahaffy's volume) and other writers, perhaps misunderstanding Strabo's description, conjecturally adopted another site,—a submerged rock east of Kait Bey.

<sup>9</sup> Taf. VIII.

<sup>10</sup> Thiersch (Internat. Woch. f. Wissenschaft, Kunst u. Technik, iii, 1909, col. 622) gives, as an extreme estimate, 120 metres.

<sup>11</sup> Hist. de J. César, Pl. 19.

<sup>12</sup> Report on Prospects of Research in Alexandria, 1895, p. 1, note.

<sup>13</sup> Ib., pp. 17-8, n. 1.



his work now, that I and all who treat of the site scientifically must . . . ignore him, and start *de novo*,’ &c. ‘More recent excavations’, says Haverfield,<sup>1</sup> ‘carried out by Dr. Noack in 1898–9 seemed to show that . . . if some items in Mahmud’s plans are possibly right, the errors and omissions are serious. We may accept as certain the statement that Alexandria was laid out with a rectangular town-plan; <sup>2</sup> we cannot safely assume that Mahmud has given a faithful picture of it.’ In a footnote Haverfield adds, ‘Dr. Noack thought that his results confirmed Mahmud; to me, as to some others, they seem rather to yield the conclusions indicated in the text.’<sup>3</sup> My own plan, omitting buildings the exact positions of which are uncertain, is intended only to illustrate my narrative.

M. G. Jondet, ‘Ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées, Ingénieur en chef des Ponts et Phares,’ has expressed the hope that it will be possible by hydrographical research to determine with precision the coast-line of the island of Pharos, as it was in the time of Caesar.<sup>4</sup>

**Caesar’s narrative of his earlier operations compared with the narratives of Plutarch, Appian, and Dio.**—Any one who may compare Caesar’s truncated account of his earlier operations at Alexandria<sup>5</sup> with the narratives, which supplement it, of the Greek historians, will notice that he says nothing about the debt which he recovered;<sup>6</sup> that he does not tell us how he settled the dispute between Ptolemy and Cleopatra;<sup>7</sup> and that, as he was a gentleman, he kept his love affair to himself. Plutarch’s statement<sup>8</sup> that he sent for Cleopatra is not necessarily inconsistent with Dio’s,<sup>9</sup> that Cleopatra asked him to receive her. Plutarch<sup>10</sup> ante-dates the death of Pothinus, who was not executed until after war had broken out:<sup>11</sup> Plutarch and Dio<sup>12</sup> give different reasons for the execution, and Caesar says nothing of the plot which Plutarch describes. The ‘escape’ of Achilles, related by Plutarch,<sup>13</sup> is evidently fictitious. Plutarch<sup>14</sup> and Appian<sup>15</sup> blunder when they say that Achilles was put to death by Caesar; for we learn from Hirtius<sup>16</sup> that Arsinoe had him killed through the agency of Ganymedes. Dio’s narrative agrees more or less closely with that of Caesar, so far as the latter goes; but (to say nothing of his usual embroidery) he mentions three distinct attempts which Caesar made to avert hostilities,<sup>17</sup> whereas Caesar<sup>18</sup> alludes only to the second. Judeich<sup>19</sup> maintains that there is no reason to question Dio’s veracity. I can only say that while it is reasonable to believe that Caesar did his utmost to extricate himself without fighting from

<sup>1</sup> *Anc. Town-Planning*, 1913, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, xvii, 1, 8.

<sup>3</sup> Noack really said much the same as Haverfield. Emphasizing the discrepancies between the results of his own excavations and those of Mahmud, he admitted that Mahmud’s researches had not been absolutely futile (*Mitth. d. Kaiserl. deutschen archæol. Instituts*, Ath. Abth., xxv, 1900, pp. 216, 232–4, 237).

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. archéol. d’Alexandrie*, nouv. sér., iii, 1912, pp. 254, 266.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 106–12.

<sup>6</sup> Plut., *Caes.*, 48, 5; Dio, xlii, 9, 1; 34, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Plut., 49, 1; Dio, xlii, 9, 1; 35, 1, 4–6.

<sup>8</sup> 48, 5.

<sup>9</sup> xlii, 34, 3–6.

<sup>10</sup> 49, 2.

<sup>11</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 112, 11.

<sup>12</sup> xlii, 39, 1–2.

<sup>13</sup> 49, 2.

<sup>14</sup> *Pomp.*, 80, 5.

<sup>15</sup> ii, 90, 377.

<sup>16</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 4, 1.

<sup>17</sup> xlii, 35, 1, 3–6; 39, 2–3.

<sup>18</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 109, 3–5.

<sup>19</sup> *Caesar im Orient*, pp. 80–2.

his perilous position, Dio's narrative is so confused and, as I shall subsequently show, contains in later chapters so many blunders that one may doubt whether the overtures for peace were made in the way or at the time which he records. He places the first naval battle not only before the Roman supply of water was secured, but even before the execution of Pothinus,<sup>1</sup> whereas we learn not only from Caesar<sup>2</sup> but also from Hirtius<sup>3</sup> that it followed both. As for the alleged grant of Cyprus, which for nine years had been a Roman province, to Ptolemy and Cleopatra,<sup>4</sup> Judeich<sup>5</sup> suggests that it was merely a temporary expedient and not seriously meant: Mahaffy<sup>6</sup> accepts Dio's statement without question.

**The alleged destruction of the Alexandrian library.**—Every one has heard that the great library of Alexandria was destroyed by fire; but as reasons have been given for doubting the truth of the story, we may as well examine the evidence.

Caesar<sup>7</sup> merely states that in the struggle for the mastery of the Great Harbour he burned the Egyptian fleet, including the ships in dock. According to Seneca,<sup>8</sup> 400,000 books were burned; and he goes on to remark that Livy eulogized 'the noblest monument [by which he seems to mean the library itself] of the wealth of the kings' (*pulcherrimum regiae opulentiae monumentum*). Orosius,<sup>9</sup> whose authority was also Livy, says that the fire kindled by Caesar spread to a part of the city and consumed 400,000 books *which happened to be stored in the nearest buildings (ea flamma cum partem quoque urbis invasisset, quadringenta milia librorum proximis forte aedibus condita exussit)*. Lucan,<sup>10</sup> who says nothing about books, states, like Orosius (his authority being the same), that the fire spread to adjoining buildings (*nec puppibus ignis/Incubuit solis: sed quae vicina fuere/Tecta mari longis rapuere vaporibus ignem*). Gellius<sup>11</sup> tells us that the books, numbering 700,000, which had been collected by the Ptolemies were accidentally burned by [Caesar's] soldiers. Ammianus Marcellinus,<sup>12</sup> who evidently either used the same authority as Gellius or copied him, after remarking that there were libraries of priceless value in the Serapeum, adds that the books, which were credibly reported to have numbered 700,000, were burnt in the Alexandrian War. Plutarch<sup>13</sup> and Dio<sup>14</sup> do not state the number of the books: the former, however, affirms that the fire, spreading from the docks, destroyed the great library (*πυρὸς . . . ὃ καὶ τὴν μεγάλην βιβλιοθήκην ἐκ τῶν νεωρίων ἐπινεμόμενον διέφθειρε*); the latter that the dockyard and the repositories containing corn and books, said to have been both numerous and valuable, were burnt

<sup>1</sup> xlii, 38, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar's narrative breaks off before the battle.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 11.

<sup>4</sup> Dio, xlii, 35, 6.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 81. Cf. Bouché-Leclercq, *Hist. des Lagides*, ii<sup>2</sup>, 1904, p. 193.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. of Egypt*<sup>2</sup>, p. 243.

<sup>7</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 111, 6.

<sup>8</sup> *De tranquillitate animi*, 9, 5.

<sup>9</sup> vi, 15, 31.

<sup>10</sup> x, 497-9.

<sup>11</sup> vii, 17, 3.

<sup>12</sup> xxii, 16, 12-3. C. Dziatzko, the writer of the article 'Bibliotheken' in *Paulys Real-Encyc.* (iii, 410), infers from comparison with earlier figures that the number of volumes given by Gellius and Marcellinus is more likely to be correct for Caesar's time.

<sup>13</sup> *Caes.*, 49, 3.

<sup>14</sup> xlii, 38, 2.

(ὥστε ἄλλα τε καὶ τὸ νεώριον, τὰς τε ἀποθήκας καὶ τοῦ σίτου καὶ τῶν βίβλων (πλείστων δὲ καὶ ἀρίστων, ὡς φασι, γενομένων) καυθῆναι). Thus, except Plutarch, not one of the ancient writers who mention the destruction of books expressly says that the library itself was burnt; but all, except Dio and Orosius, perhaps believed that it was.

Where was the great library? There was a library in the Serapeum; but, Marcellinus notwithstanding, it was comparatively small<sup>1</sup> and was certainly not destroyed by Caesar, for the Serapeum was west of the Heptastadium,<sup>2</sup> far from the scene of the fighting in the course of which the fire was kindled. The great library was in the Bruchion<sup>3</sup> and formed a part of the Museum,<sup>4</sup> which was in the palace,<sup>5</sup> or, to speak more precisely, the royal buildings. The area of the Bruchion cannot be defined, and the exact site of the Museum is unknown;<sup>6</sup> but the royal buildings, which covered a considerable part of the city, extended northward into the promontory of Lochias, east of the Great Harbour.<sup>7</sup>

C. Dziatzko<sup>8</sup> says that the great library was certainly not near the harbour, for Strabo<sup>9</sup> does not mention it among the buildings that were visible therefrom. But Strabo does mention the palace, within the precincts of which the library was included; it is conceivable that the library was obscured by intervening buildings; and the palace was close to the harbour. Dziatzko also infers from the words of Orosius that the books which were burnt had been removed from the library. He finds support in the statement of Hirtius<sup>10</sup> that the Alexandrian buildings were fire-proof; but he seems to have forgotten that the buildings mentioned by Orosius were burnt.<sup>11</sup> Plutarch and Dio, who, he remarks, evidently meant by ἀποθήκαι βίβλων the library itself, must have drawn an erroneous inference from a statement in their authority that books were destroyed as well as the dockyard (νεώριον). Yes, Plutarch very likely, but not Dio. Dio certainly did not mean by τὰς ἀποθήκας . . . τῶν βίβλων the library, for ἀποθήκας belongs jointly to τοῦ σίτου (corn) and τῶν βίβλων (books): the passage of Dio (liii, 1) to which Dziatzko appeals is not relevant, for there, as the context shows, τὰς ἀποθήκας τῶν βιβλίων cannot mean anything but a library, but when the general term ἀποθήκας denotes in one sentence both receptacles for

<sup>1</sup> Epiphanius, *Liber de . . . ponderibus*, xi, 168 B (J. P. Migne, *Patrol. cursus*, xliii, 1858, p. 253).

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, xvii, 1, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Epiphanius, *op. cit.*, ix, 166 C (Migne, p. 250). Cf. Amm. Marc., xxii, 16, 15.

<sup>4</sup> Athenaeus, v, 203 e. Cf. G. Parthey, *Das alex. Museum*, 1838, pp. 53, 65.

<sup>5</sup> Strabo, xvii, 1, 8. J. Tzetzes, a Byzantine grammarian, states that the great library was in the royal buildings, and the smaller one outside. Ptolemy Philadelphus, he says, δυοὶ βιβλιοθήκαι ταύτας [βίβλους] ἐπέθετο ὡν τῆς ἐκτὸς μὲν ἦν ἀριθμὸς τετράκις μύρια δις χίλια ὑκτακόσια, τῆς δ' ἐσω τῶν ἀνακτόρων καὶ βασιλείου βίβλων μὲν συμμιγῶν ἀριθμὸς τεσσαράκοντα μυριάδες (*In Aristophanem prolegomena* [printed in *Lexicon Vindobonense*, ed. A. Nauck, 1867, p. 243, ll. 2-5]).

<sup>6</sup> See D. G. Hogarth's *Report on Prospects of Research, &c.*, p. 22.

<sup>7</sup> Strabo, xvii, 1, 8-9.

<sup>8</sup> *Paulys Real-Ency.*, iii, 410.

<sup>9</sup> xvii, 1, 8.

<sup>10</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 1, 3.

<sup>11</sup> Whether *aedes* could mean wooden sheds, as distinguished from buildings of brick or stone, seems doubtful. See *Thes. ling. Lat.*, i, 909-10.

corn and receptacles for books, or repositories which happened to contain both, the case is different.

F. J. Teggart<sup>1</sup> rightly holds that the ἀποθήκαι, as Dio understood the term, were identical with the warehouses or sheds (ἀποστάσεις) mentioned by Strabo,<sup>2</sup> which adjoined the docks. Accordingly he concludes that the books burnt 'were not those of the Museum library'. It would be safer to say that they were not then in the library; as Dziatzko suggests, they may have been removed from it to the quay.

My view is this. It is doubtful whether the great library was near enough to the harbour to catch fire; and if it was, the Museum must have been burnt too, of which there is no evidence. Plutarch, the only authority who says that the library was destroyed, may well have assumed that it was when he read that so many books, which he would naturally have supposed to be on the shelves, were burnt. Orosius and Dio, whose statement bears the impress of careful research, both imply that the books were not in the library. I therefore agree with Dziatzko and Teggart that the current tale is false.<sup>3</sup>

[Prof. E. Meyer (*Caesars Monarchie*<sup>2</sup>, 1919, pp. 499–500) remarks that the library was 'bekanntlich <!\> in den Kämpfen Caesars . . . in Flammen aufgegangen'. His book betrays throughout deplorable neglect of non-German modern literature.]

*B. C.*, iii, 112, 4–8; *Bell. Alex.*, 1, 4–6.—It is impossible to define exactly the area occupied by Caesar after he had seized the eastern end of the island of Pharos. Mahmud Bey,<sup>4</sup> followed by Stoffel,<sup>5</sup> supposed that it comprised Cape Lochias and an irregular crescent-shaped tract extending about three-quarters of a mile on either side of it; but Stoffel<sup>6</sup> was careful to point out that the area shaded in his map must only be taken as approximately correct, and that Caesar's position may not have extended so far eastward as Mahmud believed. It unquestionably included the palace and adjoining parts of the city. Judeich<sup>7</sup> holds that Mahmud's tracing is stultified by the narratives of Caesar, Hirtius,<sup>8</sup> Appian,<sup>9</sup> and Dio.<sup>10</sup> Hirtius implies that the king's private harbour west of Cape Lochias was in the power of the Alexandrians, which, however, does not prove that they held the promontory itself; but the other three texts

<sup>1</sup> *Centralblatt f. Bibliothekswesen*, xvi, 1899, p. 472.

<sup>2</sup> xvii, 1, 9.

<sup>3</sup> Mahaffy (*Hist. of Egypt*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 242–3) says, 'This accident produced no impression whatever on contemporaries, even such as Cicero . . . Strabo, who saw Alexandria in the next generation, says not a word on the subject . . . in Seneca's day, people had come to believe that the great library had been burned. The general silence of contemporaries is to my mind conclusive.' But Cicero's contemporary letters show that he knew nothing of what was going on in Alexandria, and even of Cleopatra there is no mention in his correspondence before Caesar's death. Moreover, since Seneca apparently found in Livy the statement that 400,000 books were burnt, and since Livy certainly did not invent the story, it would seem that some contemporary was impressed by the accident.

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. sur l'ant. Alexandrie*, 1872, pp. 109–10.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, Atlas, Pl. 19.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, ii, 260.

<sup>7</sup> *Caesar im Orient*, p. 84.

<sup>8</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 13, 1.

<sup>9</sup> ii, 90, 377.

<sup>10</sup> xlii, 37, 3.



certainly support Judeich's argument.<sup>1</sup> Caesar says that after he had seized the eastern end of Pharos, he fortified essential positions, including those adjoining the palace, which he already occupied, and the theatre; Appian that fighting took place near the palace and on the adjacent shore; Dio that Caesar fortified the palace and the neighbouring buildings as far as the sea. These passages do not justify Mahmud in making Caesar's fortifications stretch so far towards the east. It is more important, however, to ascertain the whereabouts of the marsh, which, as Hirtius says, Caesar endeavoured to seize early in the campaign,—evidently soon after he had established a footing in Pharos. Hirtius relates that he 'aimed at cutting off the narrowest part of the town—narrowed by the intrusion of a marsh on the south—by entrenchments . . . from the rest of the city, his object being, first of all, when the town had been divided in two, to direct the movements of his army on one plan and with one undivided control; secondly, to be able to reinforce his troops, if they were hard pressed, from the other side; but, above all, to get plenty of water and forage . . . both of which were yielded in abundance by the marsh' (*Caesar maxime studebat ut, quam angustissimam partem oppidi palus a meridie interiecta efficiebat, hanc operibus . . . ab reliqua parte urbis excluderet, illud spectans, primum ut, cum in duas partes urbs esset divisa, acies uno consilio atque imperio administraretur, deinde ut laborantibus succurri atque ex altera oppidi parte auxilium ferri posset, in primis vero ut aqua pabuloque abundaret . . . quod utrumque large palus praeberere poterat*<sup>2</sup>). Long<sup>3</sup> offers the following explanation:—'Caesar laboured . . . to separate from the part which he held that part of the city where the width from north to south, from the harbour of Eunostus to lake Mareotis, was the least,' &c. This explanation is open to objections which are fatal: Caesar was nowhere near the harbour of Eunostus, but a mile or more east of it; *palus*, unless Hirtius gave it a new sense, cannot mean Lake Mareotis; and, finally, Caesar was not then strong enough to entrench the space—nearly two miles—which separated his position from the lake. Mahmud,<sup>4</sup> whom Stoffel<sup>5</sup> follows, identified the marsh with a depression, which he claimed to have discovered in the course of his excavations, extending over a breadth of about three furlongs (600 metres) from Cape Lochias to the lake, and which, he argues, would have been converted by the infiltration of water from the lake into a morass. Judeich<sup>6</sup> gives two reasons for rejecting this view, first, that it does not satisfactorily explain where the water which Caesar intended to procure was to come from, and, secondly, that he would not have extended his lines into a valley the higher ground on either side of which was occupied by the enemy. Another difficulty, which neither Mahmud nor Stoffel attempted to remove,

<sup>1</sup> Noack (*Mith. d. Kaiserl. deutschen archaeol. Instituts*, Ath. Abth., xxv, 1900, p. 276) substantially agrees with Judeich.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, i, 4–6.

<sup>3</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 251.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 27–8, 109–11.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 258–60.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

is that the valley would have cut the city in two and interrupted the continuity of the streets which Strabo and Diodorus describe.<sup>1</sup> Mahmud's excavations are said to have revealed the remains of streets which crossed the alleged marsh from north to south; but he and Stoffel of course assumed that the streets were constructed under the Empire after the marsh had been drained. What communication was there then between Western and Eastern Alexandria in the time of Caesar?

Judeich holds that Caesar simply extended his entrenchment southward towards the hill of Paneum; but, as he too identifies the marsh with Lake Mareotis, he evidently thinks that the forage and the water were only to be procured from the lake itself and its immediate neighbourhood. Stoffel scoffs at the ignorance of Mommsen<sup>2</sup> in supposing that Caesar with his inadequate force intended to push his way to the lake.

The only satisfactory explanation has been given by Dr. Noack.<sup>3</sup> He holds that the view of Mahmud and Stoffel and that of Mommsen and Judeich both combine truth with error. Accepting Mahmud's statement of the existence of the depression, he asks us to bear in mind that the level of Alexandria sank in post-classical times [in other words, that in 48 B. C. any marsh that may have formed in the depression must have been less extensive than Mahmud thought]: on the other hand, he notes that Mommsen and Judeich alike disregard the statement of Hirtius that on the south the city was narrowed by the intrusion of a marsh. That marsh, he argues, could not have been permanent; for in that case it would have supplied neither the forage nor the drinkable water which Caesar desired to obtain. Evidently it was produced by the overflow of the lake, and we have no right to assume that the overflow extended so far as the point which Mahmud indicated as the northern limit of the marsh. Thus, I may remark, the difficulty which Mahmud's theory involves as to the interruption of communication between the eastern and the western parts of the city is removed. But why had the lake overflowed? Noack points out that in the time of Strabo<sup>4</sup> it was supplied with water from the Nile by canals, and that it was affected by the annual rise of the river. It is therefore probable that when the Nile rose the southern and deeper part of the depression which Mahmud found was inundated. Between the harbour and the inundation was that narrowest part of the city (*angustissima pars oppidi*) of which Hirtius spoke. The Nile reaches its greatest height on the 7th of October; and September was far advanced when Caesar began the movement which Hirtius describes.

Hirtius says nothing about the result of this work, which was perhaps not completed; and his later narrative<sup>5</sup> suggests that Caesar obtained little or no water by his enterprise.

One word more. It was from the position assigned by Mahmud

<sup>1</sup> I find that my comment has been substantially anticipated by Noack (*op. cit.*, p. 275).

<sup>2</sup> *Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>8</sup>, 1889, p. 439 (Eng. tr., v, 1908, p. 277).

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 273-7.

<sup>4</sup> xvii, 1, 7.

<sup>5</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 5-8.

to the marsh that Stoffel inferred that the area occupied by Caesar extended eastward as well as westward of Cape Lochias. But, as we now see, the inference was not founded upon fact.

*Bell. Alex.*, 8, 2.—Caesar, says Hirtius, told his men that they could get water 'either on the left from Paratonium or on the right from the island' (*vel a sinistra parte a Paratonio vel a dextra ab insula*). Long,<sup>1</sup> referring to Strabo,<sup>2</sup> supposes that Paratonium was the same as Παραιτώνιον (Kasr Medjed), which is 215 kilometres (about 134 miles) west of Alexandria. This is of course out of the question, and Mahmud Bey's<sup>3</sup> identification of the place with the mouth of a stream (El Baradan) 56 kilometres west of Aboukir is generally accepted. Mahmud's<sup>4</sup> view, adopted by Stoffel,<sup>5</sup> that the *insula* was some unknown island near the Canopic mouth of the Nile can hardly be true: in that case Hirtius would either have named it or have called it 'a certain island' (*insula quadam*). Perhaps Drumann<sup>6</sup> was right in equating *insula* with the Delta, which Strabo<sup>7</sup> described as an island (γέγονε δὴ νήσος ἐκ τε τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τῶν ῥευμάτων ἀμφοῖν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, καὶ καλεῖται Δέλτα, &c.).

**Mommsen in aberration.**—Mommsen<sup>8</sup> says that the Alexandrians, 'after having vainly attempted to introduce fire-ships from the western into the eastern harbour, equipped . . . a small squadron with which they blocked the way of Caesar's vessels when they were towing in a fleet of transports with a legion that had arrived from Asia Minor';<sup>9</sup> but Caesar's excellent Rhodian mariners mastered the enemy. Not long afterwards, however, the citizens captured the lighthouse-island, and from that point entirely closed the . . . mouth of the eastern harbour for larger ships, so that Caesar's fleet was compelled to lie in the open roads . . . Caesar's fleet, attacked repeatedly in the roadstead by the superior naval force of the enemy, could neither avoid the unequal contest . . . nor depart . . . the Alexandrians renewed and increased their naval armaments with unwearied perseverance; the besieged had to fight as often as the besiegers pleased . . . It was absolutely necessary to make an attempt to recover the lighthouse-island,' &c., &c. In a footnote the historian in his earlier editions assured us that 'The loss of the lighthouse-island must together with the description of a second naval engagement in which the Egyptian fleet beaten at Chersonesus was annihilated, have been inserted where there is now a gap (*B. A.* 12), for the island was at first in Caesar's power (*B. C.*, iii, 12; *B. A.*, 8).' In the eighth edition he expunged the words 'together with . . . annihilated', but omitted to amend his text.

Now the first comment which my readers will have made, after

<sup>1</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 254, n. 5.

<sup>2</sup> xvii, 1, 14.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. sur l'ant. Alexandrie*, p. 92.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 54.

<sup>6</sup> *Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 485, n. 3.

<sup>7</sup> xvii, 1, 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Röm. Gesch.*, iii<sup>a</sup>, 1889, pp. 439-40 (Eng. tr., v, 1908, p. 278).

<sup>9</sup> The fire-ships (*Bell. Alex.*, 14, 4) were not employed until 'a few days' (13, 3) after the transports had been safely towed in (11, 6). Mommsen has tried to combine the narrative of Hirtius with that of Dio (xlii, 38, 3 4); but the two are irreconcilable, and Dio's is nonsensical.

noticing the muddle in Mommsen's opening sentence, is that 'the lighthouse-island', by which he means the island Pharos, was never lost. There is no evidence that the piquet which he posted there was ever dislodged; and since the position was supremely important and the piquet had doubtless fortified itself, Mommsen's guess is not only unsupported, but in the last degree improbable. Why he ever thought it necessary to imagine that the description of 'a second naval engagement in which the Egyptian fleet beaten at Chersonesus was annihilated' was inserted in the gap which exists in chapter 12, baffles comprehension: the 'second naval engagement' was that which Hirtius describes in chapters 14 and 15, and in which, as Mommsen says, 'Caesar's excellent Rhodian mariners mastered the enemy'; if, as he fancied, a second engagement was chronicled in the gap, the victory gained by the Rhodians was not the second, but the third. If the Egyptian fleet was 'annihilated' in the 'second naval engagement', how did Ganymedes contrive afterwards to repair his ships? <sup>1</sup> By what miracle did it come to pass that after three successive defeats, the second of which resulted in annihilation, besides the loss of 'more than 110 ships of war in the harbour and the dockyards' (*amplius CX navibus longis in portu navalibusque amiserant* <sup>2</sup>), the Egyptians still possessed 'the superior naval force' and, not content with superiority, 'renewed and increased their naval armaments'? The passage which I have quoted is pure fiction of the clumsiest kind, which, if it had been written by any one but Mommsen, might be left to the oblivion which it deserves. <sup>3</sup>

**Caesar's attack on the island of Pharos.**—Hirtius says that when Caesar had determined to seize the island of Pharos, he embarked troops in boats and other small craft and, 'in order to create a diversion, attacked the other part of the island with fenced vessels' (*alteram insulae partem destinendae manus causa constratis navibus adgreditur* <sup>4</sup>). Stoffel, assuming that the small craft attacked that part of Pharos which lay immediately east of the Heptastadium, concludes that 'the other part of the island' was 'probablement au nord de l'attaque principale'. <sup>5</sup> I believe, on the contrary, that while the principal attack was directed from the Great Harbour against the southern side of the island, the diversion was to be created by attacking the opposite, or northern, side from the open sea.

I have written in my narrative <sup>6</sup> that after the Romans had

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 12, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>3</sup> Judeich also must needs try to fill up that unfortunate gap. He supposes (*Caesar im Orient*, p. 89) that in it Hirtius described the alleged attempt of the Alexandrians, recorded by Dio, xlii, 38, 3-4, to block the western harbour after they had been defeated at Chersonesus. But at that time Caesar had no conceivable motive for entering the western harbour. He did enter it a few days later (*Bell. Alex.*, 13, 3 compared with 14, 1); for the second naval action, described by Hirtius in chapters 14 and 15, was fought in the harbour of Eunostus. How Dio managed to blunder, matters little; but I believe that he confounded this battle with the later combat in which Caesar caused large stones to be sunk in order to block the southern passage in the Heptastadium (*ib.*, 19, 4. Cf. p. 195). Any one who carefully reads the narrative of Hirtius will conclude that the gap was insignificant.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 17, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 59, 264.

<sup>6</sup> p. 194.



effected a landing on the island and driven off the inhabitants, 'the Alexandrian seamen in the harbour of Eunostus rowed round the western end of the island, ran their vessels ashore, and swarmed into the deserted houses to defend them.'<sup>1</sup> The Romans had neglected to bring scaling ladders or other appliances for assault; but the seamen were so unnerved by the loss of a few of their number, following the flight of the townsmen [the inhabitants of the island] that they abandoned their strong position and rushed on to the mole.' These sentences are based upon the narrative of Hirtius;<sup>2</sup> but Stoffel<sup>3</sup> invents other details. 'La plupart des fuyards', he says, 'venaient de la partie orientale de l'île de Pharos . . . : pour gagner le port d'Eunoste, ils avaient . . . à monter sur l'Heptastade par les escaliers et les échelles qui garnissaient son flanc droit',—in other words, its eastern side, which faced the Great Harbour. Why should the fugitives have clambered on to the Heptastadium by ladders when, as Stoffel's map<sup>4</sup> shows, all that they had to do was to walk across the bridge that connected its northern end with the island? Stoffel would have replied, because that part of the island was occupied by Caesar. But this is a mere assumption: there is no evidence that Caesar could then prevent the fugitives from passing over it. And if the assumption is true, how did the fugitives gain access to the foot of the ladders? Did they swim?

**Stoffel contradicts himself.**—Stoffel, commenting on the situation in which Caesar found himself after he failed to capture the Heptastadium, says 'César se voyait plus fortement impliqué dans une guerre dont rien ne permettait de prévoir la fin. . . . Il expédia des courriers à son lieutenant [Domitius] pour le mettre au courant des choses, lui ordonnant . . . de faire partir deux légions pour l'Égypte et de les amener lui-même par la Syrie.'<sup>5</sup> This statement is evidently founded upon *Bell. Alex.*, 38, 1, from which we learn that just before the battle of Nicopolis messengers, carrying dispatches from Caesar to Domitius, were intercepted by Pharnaces, who learned from them that Caesar was hard pressed and that he required Domitius to send him reinforcements—not two legions—immediately and to advance himself towards Alexandria. Stoffel would have done well to consult his own 'Tableau des dates'<sup>6</sup> before he wrote that sentence. He would there have found that he had assigned the battle of Nicopolis to the 28th of December<sup>7</sup> (of the unreformed calendar), 48 B. C., and Caesar's repulse to the 7th of the following month. Therefore it would seem that a letter dispatched from Alexandria after January 7 reached Nicopolis before the preceding December 28. This reminds one of Mr. H. G. Wells's romance, *The Time Machine*.

<sup>1</sup> Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 264), who accepts the MS. reading in *Bell. Alex.*, 17, 6—*His pulsus custodia portus relictâ naves ad litora et vicum adplicarunt seque ex navibus ad tuenda aedificia eiecerunt*—seems to think that the subject of *adplicarunt*, which Schneider regards as having dropped out after *pulsus*, is *Romani*; but it is evidently opposed to *nostrî* (= *Romani*) in § 5. Stoffel fancies that *custodia* means the boats and the five galleys that protected the approaches to the island!

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 264.

<sup>4</sup> Pl. 19.

<sup>5</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 17, 6; 18, 1-3.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 62.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, p. 432.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 208, n. 3, *supra*.

**Judeich's championship of Cassius Dio.**—Dio,<sup>1</sup> immediately after describing the combat in which Caesar was obliged to swim for his life,<sup>2</sup> says that as reinforcements from Syria were now approaching, the Egyptians occupied all the landing-places and inflicted great loss upon the troops. Caesar, he adds, rendered some assistance to those who were coming to the shore; but the Egyptians lighted fires near the [Canopic] mouth of the Nile, thus deceiving many into the belief that the Romans occupied the coast, and captured them, so that the rest dared not approach until Tiberius Nero, sailing into the river, defeated the enemy and enabled the reinforcements to land. In *Bellum Alexandrinum*<sup>3</sup> we read that just after the Romans had succeeded in baffling the attempt of Ganymedes to deprive them of water, a fleet conveying the 37th legion, which had been sent by Domitius from Syria, anchored west of Alexandria. As their supply of water was failing, Caesar went to their assistance, defeated the Alexandrian fleet, and towed the transports carrying the legion to Alexandria. A second naval action followed which the Romans won; and not long afterwards occurred the combat in which Caesar was obliged to swim for his life. Then, after relating how Caesar allowed Ptolemy to join the officers who commanded the Alexandrian army, Hirtius tells us that it was rumoured that reinforcements from Syria were coming by land to join Caesar, whereupon the Alexandrians determined to intercept his seaborne supplies. Caesar sent his fleet under Nero to attack them, and a naval action followed off the Canopic mouth of the Nile, the result of which Hirtius leaves uncertain.

Comparing the two narratives and knowing my Dio of old, I saw that he had confounded the ships that were carrying Caesar's supplies with the expected reinforcements, which were marching by land; but Judeich thinks that his story can be reconciled with that of Hirtius. In order to effect this reconciliation he has to demonstrate that the reinforcements—in other words, the second legion sent by Domitius—which, as Hirtius expressly says, 'had been dispatched by the land route through Syria' (*itinere terrestri per Syriam erat missa*<sup>4</sup>), made an unsuccessful attempt to disembark off the Canopic mouth of the Nile! Remarking that Dio's words, 'Caesar rendered some assistance to those of them who were approaching Africa' (τοῖς μὲν πρὸς τὴν Αἰβύην σφῶν προσπίπτουσιν ὁ Καῖσαρ τρόπον τινὰ ἤμυνε), point to the landing of the 37th legion, he adds that it is at least probable that the 'many' whom the Egyptians lured ashore were also legionaries. Therefore, he concludes, 'an attempt on the part of Roman legionaries to land did take place.' It is true, he admits, that, according to Hirtius, the original intention of Domitius was to send the second legion by land; but if we suppose that it attempted to disembark just before Nero's fleet put to sea, 'all difficulties disappear. The legion was forced to make an emergency march because, after vainly attempting to land, it was obliged to put

<sup>1</sup> xlii, 40, 5-6.

<sup>2</sup> See *Bell. Alex.*, 21, 1-2 and p. 196, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> 9-25.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 34, 3.

to shore outside the hostile positions before it could begin the march by land' (. . . so lösen sich alle Schwierigkeiten. Die Legion war zum Sondermarsch genötigt, weil sie nach vergeblicher Landung ausserhalb der feindlichen Stellungen wieder anlegen musste, ehe sie den Marsch zu Lande beginnen konnte).

Refutation of such an argument may be thought superfluous; but Judeich's book has achieved a considerable reputation and is frequently cited by distinguished scholars. If the words (τοῖς μὲν . . . ἡμῖν) which he quotes from Dio refer to the landing of the 37th legion, Dio must have fancied that that corps, which, as Judeich himself says (see his chronological table) arrived more than two months before the alleged attempt of the second legion to disembark, accompanied that legion; for, according to Dio, 'those of them who were approaching Africa' belonged to the reinforcements which attempted to land. Furthermore, Hirtius unmistakably means that the second legion marched by land from the moment when it quitted the camp of Domitius, and he says that it was sent through Syria: would Judeich argue that after it failed to land in the Canopic mouth of the Nile it sailed all the way back to Syria, landed there, and then marched for Alexandria?

Dio's account of the Alexandrian War is so confused and inaccurate as to be almost worthless; and I therefore refrain from commenting upon another passage (xlii, 38, 2-4) in which Judeich struggles to defend him against the criticisms of Drumann.

**The campaign of Mithradates.**—Judeich<sup>1</sup> remarks that while Josephus<sup>2</sup> describes the combat that took place at 'The Encampment of the Jews'<sup>3</sup> as a pitched battle, Hirtius<sup>4</sup> represents it as merely the defence of a camp. Josephus, moreover, states that after this affair further combats followed between Mithradates and the Egyptians. Judeich<sup>5</sup> believes that Hirtius confused the fighting at 'The Encampment of the Jews' with the last action which Mithradates fought before he joined Caesar. Comparing Hirtius's narrative of the march of Mithradates with his precise description of Caesar's campaign in Asia Minor<sup>6</sup> and pointing to his statement, 'Not so very far from Alexandria there is a place, practically the best known in the country, called Delta' (*Locus est fere regionum illarum nobilissimus non ita longe ab Alexandria, qui nominatur Delta*?), he concludes that he had no knowledge of the geography.

The instance which Judeich gives of the ignorance of Hirtius illustrates his own. Hirtius's use of the word *Delta*, which denoted not only the triangular tract known now by that name and its apex,

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar im Orient*, p. 95.

<sup>2</sup> *Ant.*, xiv, 8, 2; *Bell. Iud.*, i, 9, 4. J. von Destimon (*D. Quellen d. Flavius Josephus*, 1882, pp. 103-4) argues that the authority whom Josephus followed in his narrative of the campaign was Nicolaus of Damascus. Cf. *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1896, col. 1096.

<sup>3</sup> H. Jung (*Caesar in Aegypten*, 1910, p. 41, n. 1) remarks that *Tell el-Yehâdiye*, the modern name of the supposed site of the battle, means not 'the encampment of the Jews', but 'the hill of the Jews'.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 27, 5-8. <sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 95-6.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 5; *Bell. Alex.*, 66-76. <sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 27, 1.



but also a village situated there, is confirmed by Strabo.<sup>1</sup> That Hirtius represented the combat at 'The Encampment of the Jews' as merely the defence of a camp is false; he says that Mithradates, after repelling the attempt which the enemy made to attack his camp, sallied forth, slaughtered them in great numbers, and would have annihilated them if the survivors had not contrived to escape by their knowledge of the topography and by taking refuge in the vessels in which they had crossed the Nile. What Josephus says about 'further combats' is brief and vague to the last degree and probably refers only to the decisive battle of the Nile, which he omits to mention. Hirtius's narrative of the campaign,<sup>2</sup> which is far more minute than that of Josephus, is fully as precise as his description of Caesar's campaign in Asia, and of all our authorities he is the only one who deserves the epithet 'original'. Though he locates the victory of Mithradates east, and Josephus west of the Nile, I cannot doubt whose authority to prefer.<sup>3</sup>

We must be content to remain ignorant of what happened to

<sup>1</sup> xvii, 1, 4—τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ κορυφῇ χωρίον ὁμωνύμως κέκληται διὰ τὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῦ λεχθέντος σχήματος, καὶ ἡ κόμη δὲ ἣ ἐπ' αὐτῷ καλεῖται Δέλτα. Jung (*op. cit.*, pp. 39-40) has offered an explanation of Hirtius's description of the Delta, which may be worth mentioning as an instance of the vagaries into which scholars are sometimes seduced by the desire to say something new. The passage in question is notoriously corrupt, but its general sense is plain:—*Locus est fere regionum illarum nobilissimus non ita longe ab Alexandria, qui nominatur Delta, quod nomen a similitudine litterae cepit: nam pars quaedam fluminis Nili derivata inter se duobus itineribus paulatim paulatim medium inter se spatium relinquens diversissimo ad litus intervallo a mari coniungitur.* According to Jung, Hirtius meant by *pars quaedam fluminis Nili* a branch of the Nile which diverged from the Canopic branch: the divergent branch was the one called Bolbitic, and the Delta was formed by the two. Hirtius, who had never been in Egypt, transferred to the minor Delta the expressions *nobilissimus* and *diversissimo intervallo*, which really belonged only to the Delta properly so called. This theory obviously implies that Mithradates did not, as all other commentators of course suppose, turn the greater Delta, but marched right across it from Pelusium to the neighbourhood of Alexandria; and Jung does not explain how he transported his army across its network of watercourses.

<sup>2</sup> *B. Alex.*, 26-31.

<sup>3</sup> Bouché-Leclercq (*Hist. des Lagides*, ii<sup>2</sup>, 1904, p. 210, n. 2) says, 'On se demande seulement si le combat livré περί τὸ καλούμενον Ἰουδαίων στρατόπεδον, après que l'armée eut contourné τὸ καλούμενον Δέλτα, est bien celui que relate Hirtius (*B. Alex.*, 27),' &c.

Aem. Pintschovius (*Neue philol. Rundschau*, 1904, pp. 124-5) argues that the battle must have been fought west of the Nile, because after it was over the Egyptians were masters of the river. The narrative of Josephus, on which he relies, was derived, he thinks, from Strabo's historical work, and Stoffel (*Hist. de J. César*, ii, 266) is wrong in saying that it contradicts Hirtius. If Josephus does not contradict Hirtius, he places the battle east of the Nile, for Hirtius unquestionably does; but Stoffel is right: there is a contradiction, for Josephus (*Ant.*, xiv, 8, 1) says that before the battle Mithradates came to Memphis and (§ 2) that the battle was fought after he had turned the Delta (τὸ καλούμενον Δέλτα ἤδη περιελθούσε). We have to choose between the two authorities; and I agree with Judeich (*op. cit.*, p. 94) that Josephus was wrong. It is not certain that his account was derived from Strabo, although he cites him (§ 3) as the authority for the statement that Mithradates was accompanied by Hyrcanus; nor can I see any reason for preferring Strabo to Hirtius. That the Egyptian army controlled the Nile after the battle is pure fiction.



Mithradates between his victory and his junction with Caesar. Hirtius merely says<sup>1</sup> that the advanced guard of the Egyptians, whom he had defeated, began as soon as they had recovered from their alarm to attack him again in co-operation with the rest of the force; but in a later sentence,<sup>2</sup> where he says that Caesar 'was joined by the victorious general with his army intact', he seems to imply that the second attack failed.

**The site of the battle of the Nile.**—After Mithradates of Pergamum had repulsed the advanced guard of the Egyptian army on the eastern side of the eastern branch of the Nile, the beaten troops recrossed the stream above the Delta, rejoined their comrades, and prepared to attack him again. When news of the battle reached Alexandria, Ptolemy embarked an army and sailed up the western branch of the Nile to attack Mithradates, while almost simultaneously Caesar sailed westward, landed his army, and succeeded in joining Mithradates before Ptolemy could encounter him. [Evidently Mithradates had crossed the Nile above the Delta and marched to meet Caesar.] Ptolemy encamped on high ground, protected by nature on three sides, one being so close to the Nile that troops attacking it would be within range of slingers and archers stationed in boats on the river, another hemmed in by a marsh, while the third and highest coincided with one face of the camp. The fourth side was comparatively easy of access. Seven miles from the camp a canal with high banks, which joined the Nile, crossed the road by which Caesar advanced against Ptolemy; and near this canal there were large trees. Not far from the camp there was a village. Caesar, after defeating Ptolemy, rode back to Alexandria accompanied by his cavalry alone. Such is the evidence of Hirtius.<sup>3</sup>

Dio, who omits to mention the march which, according to Hirtius and Josephus, Mithradates made round the Delta, and merely remarks that, after capturing Pelusium, he moved towards Alexandria,<sup>4</sup> says that the Egyptians threw his army into confusion near the lake (τὸν ἐλῶν) (Mareotis) 'at a place between the river and the marshes'. Caesar, he continues, did not pursue them immediately, for he feared an ambush; but in the night he embarked his army, apparently intending to make for one of the mouths of the Nile, presently returned, sailed round the city, and landed at Cape Chersonesus. Thence he marched round the lake and attacked the Egyptians at dawn.<sup>5</sup> Thus Dio seems to locate the battle-field between Lake Mareotis and the Nile. But although at first sight he appears to say that the battle began in the early morning after Caesar quitted Alexandria, his narrative is inconsistent with this meaning: Caesar would have had to march at least 40 miles from the promontory of Chersonesus before he could approach the Nile; and to do this in one night, part of which was spent in sailing from Alexandria to the promontory, would have been obviously impossible.

Stoffel,<sup>6</sup> who prefers the authority of Hirtius to that of Dio, tells

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 27, 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 28, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 27-31.

<sup>4</sup> *xlii*, 41.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 43, 1-3.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 266-9.

us that, according to every one whom he consulted and according to the maps which he inspected, no place between Lake Mareotis and the Nile corresponds to Hirtius's description. Having carefully scrutinized the staff map ( $\frac{1}{50000}$ , Sheet VI-IV NW.), I can confirm his assertion. As he did not himself visit Egypt, he requested Mahmud Bey to explore the region where the Canopic branch of the Nile approached 'the Libyan mountains' (*sic*), at the same time informing him that the great Napoleon<sup>1</sup> had conjecturally located the battle-field at Ilkam (Alqam), 115 kilometres in a straight line south-east of Cape Chersonesus. Mahmud reported that the section of the Nile which extends past Alqam between Menouf and Tiaï el Baroud was the only one that approached 'the heights'; but, says Stoffel, 'Unfortunately Mahmoud Bey lacks the knowledge requisite for identifying military positions on the terrain.' Stoffel was therefore obliged to leave the problem unsolved. He argued, however, that the mere fact of Caesar's having ridden back to Alexandria with his cavalry alone would lead any soldier to believe that the battle-field was distant several marches from Alexandria; for in a single day the cavalry would not have gained appreciably on the legions if they had started together.

How Mahmud was qualified to inform Stoffel may be judged from two passages in his *Mémoire sur l'antique Alexandrie*, pages 84, 120. Premising that the 'villages Com-cherik et Ilkam' are 'situés au pied de la montagne à environ douze kilomètres et demi l'un de l'autre', he says that all he had to do in order to find the battle-field was 'de chercher sur le sol actuel les endroits où le Nil touchait à la montagne libyque', and accordingly concludes that 'ce fut . . . entre Com-cherik et Ilkam qu'eut lieu la bataille décisive', &c. The only comment necessary is that in this neighbourhood no mountains, great or small, exist. I have had photographs taken which prove what I affirm: where 'la montagne libyque' is situated I cannot say.

Judeich,<sup>2</sup> who wrote before Stoffel's work appeared, gives the following reasons (I notice them because they apply equally to another site, Teiriya, which I shall consider presently) for rejecting Mahmud's choice. First the statement of Hirtius that Caesar after his victory 'moved rapidly by land with his cavalry to Alexandria' (*Re felicissime . . . gesta Caesar . . . proximo terrestri itinere Alexandriam cum equitibus contendit*<sup>3</sup>) proves that he arrived thither on the day of the battle, and therefore that the battle-field was much nearer than Alqam to Alexandria.<sup>4</sup> To this argument, which Stoffel

<sup>1</sup> *Précis des guerres de César*, 1836, p. 165.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar im Orient*, pp. 99-103.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 32, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Judeich observes that while we learn from the *Fasti Maffeiiani* (*C. I. L.*, i, 304) that Caesar got possession of Alexandria on March 27, 707, a statement in the *Hemerologium Caeretanum* (*Eph. epigr.*, iii, 1877, p. 6)—*fer(ias) quod eo die C. Caes(ar) vicit Alexand(reae)*—shows that he 'conquered at Alexandria' on that day. But, as H. Jung (*Caesar in Aegypten*, p. 46, n. 1) points out, *vicit Alexandreae* does not refer to the battle of the Nile, but only to the fact that Caesar, having before been blockaded in Alexandria, gained the mastery of it on that day: in other words, it means the same as *Alexand. recepit* in the *Fasti*.

answered by anticipation, I reply that Judeich might as well maintain that Caesar, who, on leaving Firmum, *Corfinium contendit*,<sup>1</sup> accomplished the distance in a single day! Secondly, says Judeich, it would be difficult to find a marsh near Alqam. But Judeich himself assures us, when his own theory requires it, that Lower Egypt has undergone great changes since the time of Caesar. Thirdly, Hirtius says that Ptolemy encamped 'on a position naturally strong, for it was high above the plain which lay on all sides below' (*loco natura munito, quod erat ipse excelsior planitie ex omnibus partibus subiecta*<sup>2</sup>); and 'there can be no question of a broad plain on the strip of land, barely two or three kilometres wide,' between the hills and the Nile by Alqam. The hills, as I have shown, are non-existent; but there is a broad plain—the desert. Unless Judeich is prepared to throw Hirtius overboard, he must admit that the strip of land between the eminence which Hirtius describes and the river was narrow.

While Judeich locates the battle-field at Chaerea [or Chaereou], about 15 miles in a straight line E. by S. of Alexandria, he perforce admits that in that neighbourhood a hill (*sic*) such as that which Hirtius describes is not to be found; but he brushes aside this objection with the remark that the whole sea-board from Pelusium to Alexandria is sinking, that the hills bordering the valley of the Nile are 'crumbling and disintegrating', and that the 'hill' described by Hirtius was 'most probably a kind of large sand-dune, which may long since have disappeared'. The subsidence of the sea-board does not imply the disappearance of a hill; I doubt whether the writer<sup>3</sup> whom Judeich quotes to prove 'crumbling and disintegration', which have caused some slight diminution in the altitude of the hills, would have allowed his authority to be invoked to attest the extinction of the eminence which Hirtius described; and to entrench<sup>4</sup> the small sand-dunes that exist near the Nile would puzzle the most resourceful engineer.

Judeich has still to account for Caesar's march from Cape Chersonesus to the battle-field, which, he says, relying upon Dio, was performed in a single day. He admits<sup>5</sup> that if Lake Mareotis, as Mahmud<sup>6</sup> affirmed, was the same in 47 B. C. as it is now, Caesar would have had to march between 10 and 11 German geographical (46.1 and 50.71 English) miles, which, as he truly says, was impossible. Accordingly, to save his theory from collapse, he must prove that the lake has shrunk; and this feat he attempts by appealing to Strabo,<sup>7</sup> who said that the lake was more than 150 stades (18½ Roman miles) wide and less than 300 long. Having thus, to his own satisfaction, reduced the size of the lake, he proceeds to trace Caesar's line of march, and assures us that it was not more than from 5 to 6 German (23.05 to 27.6 English) miles. Fortunately he has enabled us to check this estimate by tracing the route on his map. According to Dio, Caesar attacked the Egyptians at dawn, and when he attacked

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i, 16, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 28, 3.

<sup>3</sup> R. Hartmann, *Naturgesch.-medicin. Skizze d. Nilländer*, 1865, pp. 51-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 30, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. sur l'ant. Alexandrie*, pp. 99-103.

<sup>7</sup> xvii, 1, 14.

them they were 7 Roman miles from the scene of the second and decisive battle, which Judeich places at Chaerea. Several times I have measured with a map-measurer the distance on Judeich's map from Caesar's starting-point to the spot which is indicated as the scene of the first attack, and always with the same result,—60 kilometres, or about 37 English miles. Such a march is of course out of the question.

The theory of H. Jung,<sup>1</sup> whose curious explanation of the passage in which Hirtius mentions the Delta I have noticed in the preceding article, needs no refutation. He holds that Ptolemy's camp was inside the space (which he identified with the Delta) enclosed by the Canopic and the Bolbitic branches of the river, and that Caesar was therefore obliged to transport his army across the former. The mere fact that none of the authorities mentions the alleged crossing seems to him no objection.

One other theory remains to be considered. Aem. Pintschovius<sup>2</sup> holds that the battle-field was even further south than Alqam, perhaps near Aoussim, or Ausim; for, he argues, Mithradates could hardly have left the 'Camp of the Jews' until Caesar enabled him to do so, since, although he had defeated the Egyptians, they had been reinforced and had attacked him again,<sup>3</sup> and, according to Hirtius,<sup>4</sup> he did not join Caesar until after the latter had defeated Ptolemy, not, as Judeich<sup>5</sup> and Stoffel<sup>6</sup> say, before. Our authorities do not tell us where Mithradates was when the Egyptians attacked him again; but Hirtius nowhere says that Mithradates did not join Caesar until after the battle of the Nile. Before describing the position which Ptolemy had occupied and the decisive battle which followed, he says that Caesar 'came into touch with the King's force before he could attack Mithradates, and was joined by the victorious general with his army intact' (*prius tamen regis copiis occurrit quam is Mithridatem aggredi posset, eumque ad se victorem incolumi exercitu recepit*). Pintschovius evidently thinks that *victorem* agrees with *se* (Caesar); but since *incolumi exercitu* obviously denotes the army of Mithradates, it seems reasonable to take *victorem* with *eum* (Mithradates). Moreover, in the neighbourhood of Ausim there is no eminence and no trace of an old canal.

The accounts of Dio and Hirtius are irreconcilable, and we must choose between them. I unhesitatingly reject the former, because Dio's narrative of the Egyptian campaign is hopelessly inaccurate, and also because Hirtius's description of the battle and of the operations that led to it is far more detailed.<sup>8</sup> Dio might easily have been led astray by reading in his authority that Caesar marched past the lake, as he must in any case have done, and that the decisive battle was fought near the Nile.

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar in Aegypten*, pp. 43-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Neue philol. Rundschau*, 1904, pp. 125-6.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 27, 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 28, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 99.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

<sup>7</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 28, 2.

<sup>8</sup> As H. Grohs remarks (*D. Wert . . . d. Cassius Dio*, 1884, p. 7), Hirtius's narrative impresses one as based upon the report of an eye-witness.



After studying the staff map I formed the opinion that the battle-field was more probably near Teiriya, 10 kilometres ( $6\frac{1}{4}$  miles) north of Alqam, than at Alqam itself; for I noticed that about six miles north of Teiriya a canal (which was also marked by Colonel W. M. Leake in his map of the Delta) entered the Nile. On January 16 and 17, 1920, Major F. G. Hill, M.C., R.E., kindly examined at my request the country between Alqam and Teiriya, took photographs and made sketches, and sent with them a full report. 'As the photographs and sketches show', he writes, 'there are no hills worthy of the name in the neighbourhood . . . between Teiriya and Alqam . . . the ground rises gently towards the west, covered for the most part with sand dunes which increase in size towards the west. Alqam is a most improbable site . . . as except for the nearness to the river Nile there are no other features in its neighbourhood corresponding to the description given by Aulus Hirtius. It would also be a most difficult place to defend from the north, south, and west . . . Teiriya village, which stands on ground 2 to 3 metres higher than the ground to the north of it is a more probable site, altho' it by no means corresponds with the description given of the battle-field. It would be . . . the most likely spot selected for defence in this neighbourhood against an enemy advancing from the north, for the following reasons :—(a) east flank protected by Nile; (b) west flank protected by sand dunes which would make approach difficult for heavily armed soldiers . . . (c) in front the slight rise on which it stands would give the defenders a good advantage . . . (d) . . . the movements of their [the defenders'] own troops would be concealed . . . No morass [however] exists at present near Teiriya village, and the main stream of the Nile is too far away [nearly one kilometre] for bows or slings to be very effective. Two explanations . . . [may] account for this. The first is that the site of the battle was . . . closer to the main stream of the Nile . . . The morass would then be represented by what is now an arm of the Nile. The second explanation is that the main stream of the Nile has moved to the east . . . since the battle was fought. This is a most probable explanation, for its course perceptibly changes year by year. The flat cultivated area runs up to east of the village site, and this might easily have been flooded from the Nile and thereby account for the morass.

Various small hills, none more than 8 to 10 metres above the surrounding country, were noticed near the west bank of the main stream of the Nile south of Alqam, notably

(a) opposite kilometre 66 on railway;

(b)       "       "       60   "   "       (Khatatba).

(c)       "       "       35   "   "

. . . they certainly answer more favourably to the description than does Teiriya, owing to the presence of a small but distinct hill in each case . . . Also in the third case, opposite kilometre 35, on the western flank there exists at present a large swamp or morass.

Enquiries were made regarding the canal running from west to

east, about six miles north of Teiriya village, and it was elicited that this canal is an old one. It is quite probable therefore that this canal existed in Caesar's time, and if so this forms the strongest evidence for placing the site of the battle near Teiriya.'

Sheet II—4 NW. of the Staff Map ( $\frac{1}{100000}$ ) shows 3 sand hills opposite kilometre 66, the nearest and largest of which, about 300 yards in diameter, is rather more than a mile from the river. As the course of the Nile at this point has not changed, at all events since the end of the eighteenth century, when Napoleon's maps were made, the hill is too far from the bank to correspond to Hirtius's description. I learn from Mr. W. M. Hayes of the Survey of Egypt, to whom and to the Surveyor-General, Mr. Weldon, I am grateful, that on the  $\frac{1}{50000}$  map no hills are shown opposite kilometres 60 and 35. Presumably they are insignificant.

**The legions which Caesar left to protect Cleopatra.**—When Caesar quitted Egypt for Syria he took the 6th legion with him and left the rest to protect Cleopatra (*Legiones ibi veterana sexta secum reducta ceteras reliquit*<sup>1</sup>). Of the three<sup>2</sup> which Hirtius calls 'the rest' (*ceteras*) one was the 27th<sup>3</sup> and another the 37th:<sup>4</sup> what was the third? Rudolf Schneider<sup>5</sup> says that it was the legion which Domitius Calvinus dispatched from Asia Minor through Syria to reinforce his chief, but which was too late to take part in the Alexandrian campaign.<sup>6</sup> Von Domaszewski,<sup>7</sup> on the contrary, maintains that this legion remained in Syria, and that it was the one which Caesar, when he marched against Pharnaces, left under the command of Sextus Caesar to hold that province.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly he concludes that the third legion which Caesar left to protect Cleopatra was formed out of the soldiers who had served in Egypt seven years before under Gabinius and had settled in Alexandria. I cannot settle the question; but I am rather inclined to think that von Domaszewski is right, because it would appear from *B. C.*, iii, 31, 4 that Scipio in 48 B. C. had left Syria unprotected.

**Caesarion.**—Plutarch<sup>9</sup> relates that soon after Caesar established Cleopatra as Queen of Egypt she bore a son, whom the Alexandrians named Caesarion. Suetonius<sup>10</sup> says that Caesar allowed her to call her son after him, and that Antony declared to the Senate that, as Matius, Oppius, and the rest of Caesar's friends were aware, Caesar had acknowledged his paternity; but he adds that Oppius published a book to show that Caesarion was not Caesar's son. Suetonius<sup>11</sup> states, further, that Augustus, after the suicide of Cleopatra, put Caesarion to death, whom Cleopatra asserted to be her son by Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 33, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Suet. Div. Iul.*, 76, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 106, 1, compared with 56, 1 and 34, 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 9, 3.

<sup>5</sup> In a footnote (33, 4) of his edition of *Bell. Alex.*

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 34, 3. See pp. 197, 495-6.

<sup>7</sup> *Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, p. 173.

<sup>8</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 66, 1 (*legionibus Syriaeque praefecit*). Von Domaszewski (*op. cit.*, p. 173, n. 2) maintains that the MS. reading *legionibus* must be wrong, because Appian (iii, 77, 312) states that Caesar left only one legion under Sextus.

<sup>9</sup> *Caesar*, 49, 4.

<sup>10</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 52, 1-2.

<sup>11</sup> *Aug.*, 17, 5.

According to Dio,<sup>1</sup> Antony in his will again affirmed that Caesarion was the son of Caesar; but Dio<sup>2</sup> himself, perhaps following Oppius, says that Cleopatra's statement was a fiction. Cicero,<sup>3</sup> referring about two months after Caesar's death to a report that some misfortune had befallen Cleopatra, wrote, 'I hope it is true about the queen and that creature Caesar.'

Froude wrote a note<sup>4</sup> and a paragraph<sup>5</sup> on the question, which, as specimens of his scholarship, are worth quoting. He calls Cleopatra, who, when she first met Caesar, was in her twenty-second year,<sup>6</sup> 'a loose girl of sixteen.' Oppius, he says, 'proved that the child could not have been his—of course therefore that the intrigue was a fable; and the boy was afterwards put to death by Augustus as an impostor . . . The details of Caesar's stay at Alexandria, so minutely given by Hirtius, show that there was not a moment when such an expedition [as that which, according to Appian and Suetonius, Caesar made with Cleopatra up the Nile] could have been contemplated . . . Immediately after the insurrection was put down, he was obliged to hurry off on matters of instant and urgent moment.' Finally, after remarking that it was believed 'a hundred years after his death' that Cleopatra 'was living with him in his house at the time of the murder', Froude continues, 'Cleopatra is said to have joined Caesar at Rome after his return from Spain, and to have resided openly with him as his mistress. Supposing that she did come to Rome, it is still certain that Calpurnia was in Caesar's house when he was killed. Cleopatra must have been Calpurnia's guest as well as her husband's, and her presence . . . could not possibly have borne the avowed complexion which tradition assigned to it. But was Cleopatra at Rome at all? The only real evidence of her presence there will be found in a few words of Cicero: "*Reginae fuga mihi non molesta.*"—"I am not sorry to hear of the flight of the queen." There is nothing to show that the "queen" was the Egyptian queen. Granting that the word Egyptian is to be understood, Cicero may have referred to Arsinoë, who was called queen as well as her sister, and was sent to Rome to be shown at Caesar's triumph.'

How did Froude ascertain that Oppius, whose pamphlet has perished, 'proved' that Caesarion was not Caesar's son? Or that, even if he did prove it, 'the intrigue was a fable'? And if it was, why did Froude contradict himself by admitting that 'an amour with Cleopatra may have been an accident of his presence in Alexandria'?<sup>7</sup> Caesarion was an inconvenient reminder of Caesar's amour with a woman whose connexion with him had caused scandal in Rome; and what we know of Augustus justifies us in concluding that no scruple would have prevented him from removing Caesarion even if he had accepted Antony's assurance that Caesarion was Caesar's son. Practically indeed he had accepted it; for, as Dio<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 1, 3, 3-5.      <sup>2</sup> xlvii, 31, 5.      <sup>3</sup> *Att.*, xiv, 20, 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, 1886, p. 456, n. 2.      <sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 546.

<sup>6</sup> She was thirty-nine in 30 B. C. (*Plut.*, *Ant.*, 86, 4).

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 456, n. 2.      <sup>8</sup> xlvii, 31, 5.

says, in 712 (42 B. C.) the triumvirs granted Cleopatra's request that her son, under the name of Ptolemy, should be appointed King of Egypt; and, as Mommsen<sup>1</sup> (who of course holds that the father of Caesarion was Caesar) points out, Dio's statement is confirmed by an inscription,<sup>2</sup> in which Caesarion is designated as Πτολεμαῖον τοῦ καὶ Καίσαρος θεοῦ φιλοπάτορος φιλομήτορος. Evidently Froude had not studied Hirtius's 'minute details' in connexion with Roman chronology. The Alexandrian 'insurrection was put down' on March 27, 707, of the unreformed calendar;<sup>3</sup> Caesar did not leave Alexandria before June 7 or 8.<sup>4</sup> This is what Froude calls being 'obliged to hurry off immediately'. When Froude says that it was believed a hundred years after Caesar's death that Cleopatra 'was living with him in his house at the time of the murder', he apparently fancies that Caesar had only one house. Dio<sup>5</sup> says that when Cleopatra came to Rome (not, as Froude imagines, after Caesar's return from Spain, but before his departure for Spain), she was domiciled in a house belonging to Caesar (ἐς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Καίσαρος ἐσφύκισθη); and, as we learn from Cicero,<sup>6</sup> this house was in Caesar's gardens on the right bank of the Tiber. Therefore when Froude says that 'she must have been Calpurnia's guest as well as her husband's', he is withdrawing Calpurnia from her proper domestic sphere. It is said that Victor Hugo, when he was living in Guernsey, introduced a guest first to 'Madame, mon amie' and then to 'Madame, la mère de mes enfants', and that the two ladies sat down peaceably at the same table. But Caesar was a man of the world as well as a gentleman; and he took care that his wife and his mistress should not meet. When Froude says that 'the only real evidence' for Cleopatra's presence in Rome is one sentence of Cicero's letters, he forgets that Cicero mentions 'the queen' in five other letters<sup>7</sup> and that, to say nothing of Dio's statement, Appian<sup>8</sup> affirms that the statue of Cleopatra which Caesar placed in the temple of Venus Genetrix, side by side with that of the goddess, was standing there in his own day. When Froude insists that 'there is nothing to show that "the queen" was the Egyptian queen' and that 'Cicero may have referred to Arsinoë', he forgets or he is ignorant that Cicero coupled 'the queen' with *Caesare illo*, who could only have been Caesarion; that Cicero was not likely to mention Arsinoë six times; that he could have had no motive for saying 'I hate the queen' (*Reginam odi*<sup>9</sup>) if she was Arsinoë; that Caesar would not have entertained Arsinoë, who had figured in his triumph as a captive and of whom he was not enamoured, in his suburban villa; and that although Arsinoë called herself queen when Caesar was in Alexandria, nobody else did so except her own partisans.

Caesar made love to Cleopatra when he was in Egypt; she had a child soon after he left Egypt; she brought that child to Rome,

<sup>1</sup> *Röm. Gesch.*, v, 1885, p. 361, n. 1 (*The Provinces*, &c., ii, 25, n. 1).

<sup>2</sup> *C. I. Gr.*, 4717.

<sup>3</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, p. 304.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 509.

<sup>5</sup> xliii, 27, 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Att.*, xv, 15, 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Att.*, xiv, 20, 2; xv, 1 A, 5; 4 B, 4; 15, 2; 17, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 102, 424.

<sup>9</sup> *Att.*, xv, 15, 2.



and she lived there in a house belonging to Caesar; Caesar erected a statue to her in the temple of Venus; Antony, to whom all his papers were entrusted by Calpurnia,<sup>1</sup> solemnly affirmed that that child was his; and Nicolaus of Damascus,<sup>2</sup> an honoured friend of Augustus, said the same. George Long was right when he concluded that 'the evidence that Caesarion was his son is stronger than the assertions of Oppius and others that Caesar was not the father':<sup>3</sup> he might have added that it is irrefragable.

## THE CAMPAIGN OF DOMITIUS CALVINUS

**The cavalry of Domitius.**—According to the MSS. of *Bellum Alexandrinum* (34, 4), Domitius, who had four legions, borrowed 100 cavalry from Deiotarus and the same number from Ariobarzanes. O. Schambach,<sup>4</sup> seeing that the number was extraordinarily small, proposed to substitute *D* (500) for *C*. I think that the omission of *D* was more likely than the confusion of *D* with *C*, and therefore suggest that the true reading is either *CD* (400) or *DC* (600).

**The battle of Nicopolis.**—The locality of the battle of Nicopolis is disputed; but we know that it was close to Purkh, on the site of which Nicopolis had been founded.<sup>5</sup> Mr. J. A. R. Munro,<sup>6</sup> however, concludes from the description of the campaign given by Hirtius<sup>7</sup> that the Nicopolis founded by Pompey<sup>8</sup> was about 3 miles east of Purkh on the site of a village called Eski Sheher, and that the town of the same name which has been identified by inscriptions with Purkh was built later. The data furnished by Hirtius seem to me sufficient. When Domitius, coming from Comana (Gumenek), was approaching Nicopolis, which was situated on level ground and flanked on two sides at a considerable distance by high mountains, he encamped about 7 Roman miles from the wall. In order to attack Pharnaces, who was in the town, he would have to pass through a defile (*locus angustus atque impeditus*). On the following day he moved nearer to Nicopolis and encamped close by. Then comes the description of the battle, at the close of which we are told that Domitius's 36th legion retreated to the lower slopes of the hills.

Mr. Munro holds that Domitius, coming from Comana, 'marched . . . past Nicopolis, and encamped near Ashkhar' (which is about 7 miles S. by E. of Purkh) in a 'narrow valley' between Ashkhar and Eski Sheher. But Eski Sheher, which, as Mr. Munro says,<sup>9</sup> is 'on a steep rocky spur', does not agree with Hirtius's description of the site of Nicopolis<sup>10</sup>—'on a level spot, which, however, was flanked on two sides by high mountains' (*plano ipsum loco montibus tamen altis ab duobus lateribus obiectis*); and it is surely rash to guess that the Nicopolis which Pompey founded was abandoned for another site.

<sup>1</sup> Plut., *Ant.*, 15; App., iii, 5, 16; Dio, xlv, 53, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Vita Caes.*, 20.

<sup>3</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 385.

<sup>4</sup> *D. Reiterei bei Caesar*, 1881, p. 13, n. 6.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. i, pp. 211–12.

<sup>6</sup> *Royal Geogr. Soc. Suppl. Papers*, iii, 1893, pp. 726–8.

<sup>7</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 36–40.

<sup>8</sup> See vol. i, pp. 431–2.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 726.

<sup>10</sup> I find that my argument has been anticipated by F. and E. Cumont (*Studia Pontica*, ii, 1906, p. 306, n. 2).

## CAESAR'S DECREES IN FAVOUR OF THE JEWS

Josephus's report of the decrees which Caesar made in favour of the Jews has occasioned voluminous controversy; but whoever follows it will find that the points in dispute are comparatively unimportant and that the statements which command general assent suffice for the essential truth of history. It may be useful to reproduce, with insignificant omissions, the gist of what the historian said.

(1) *Ant.*, xiv, 8, 3 (cf. *Bell. Iud.*, i, 9, 5). Caesar, on arriving in Syria (June 707 [47 B. C.]), confirmed Hyrcanus in the high-priesthood, granted Roman citizenship to Antipater, and freed the Jews from the obligation of paying tribute to Rome.

(2) *Ant.*, xiv, 8, 4 (cf. *Bell. Iud.*, i, 10, 1-2). Antigonus, addressing Caesar, brought charges against Antipater and Hyrcanus: Antipater defended himself.

(3) *Ant.*, xiv, 8, 5. Caesar, after hearing the defence, appointed Hyrcanus high priest, made Antipater administrator of Judaea, and authorized Hyrcanus to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem, which Pompey had destroyed (cf. *Bell. Iud.*, i, 10, 3). Caesar sent a record of the award to Rome, to be engraved in the Capitol.—Josephus then gives the text of a senatorial decree, the date of which has been disputed, but, like the decree itself, is, for the purpose of this history, negligible.

(4) *Ant.*, xiv, 10, 1. After Caesar returned to Rome and just before he started for Africa ambassadors came to him from Hyrcanus, requesting him to ratify the existing league of friendship between the Romans and the Jews.—I suppose (and so, I find, does Judeich<sup>1</sup>) that Josephus meant to identify this embassy with the one which he mentions in *Ant.*, xiv, 8, 5. Anyhow *Ant.*, xiv, 10, 1 is evidence that a Jewish embassy reached Rome towards the end of 47 B. C.

(5) *Ant.*, xiv, 10, 2. Josephus gives the text of a letter which Caesar, 'imperator, chief pontiff, and dictator II.', that is in 47 B. C. after he arrived in Syria, sent to 'the magistrates, senate, and people of Sidon', and of a decree which he then made in favour of the Jews: in return for the aid which Hyrcanus had given to Caesar in the Alexandrian campaign, he and his descendants were to be ethnarchs of the Jews and high priests for ever, while the Jews were to be exempt from providing winter-quarters for troops, and no money was to be exacted from them.

(6) *Ant.*, xiv, 10, 3. A decree of Caesar, 'consul,' substantially identical with the one mentioned in § 2, is quoted.—As Caesar was not consul in 47 B. C., it would seem that the decree in question was issued either in 46 or in 45 or in 44 B. C.

(7) *Ant.*, xiv, 10, 4 contains a decree which Caesar, 'imperator, dictator, consul' made in favour of Hyrcanus and his children.—As it merely repeats or confirms what has been said before, it matters

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar im Orient*, 1885, p. 136. Cf. E. Taubler, *Imperium Rom.*, 1913, p. 160, n. 4.

nothing whether it and the decree mentioned in § 3 belonged, as E. Schürer<sup>1</sup> thinks, to 46 B. C., or whether, as Judeich<sup>2</sup> holds, § 3 belonged to 47, and § 4 to 44.

(8) *Ant.*, xiv, 10, 5. A decree is quoted in which Caesar, 'consul V.', that is in 44 B. C., authorized the Jews to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem and directed that every second year Hyrcanus and his sons should make a certain deduction from the tribute of the Jews (ὅπως τε Ἰουδαίους ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς μισθώσεως ἔτει τῆς προσόδου κύρον ὑπεξέλωνται), which was not to be paid through Roman tax-collectors.

Schürer<sup>3</sup> finds it difficult to reconcile the date—44 B. C.—with the statement that permission was given to rebuild the walls; for it had been given already in 47 B. C., and, as we learn from another passage (*Ant.*, xiv, 9, 1. Cf. *Bell. Iud.*, i, 10, 4), the walls were actually rebuilt in that year: but, as Schürer himself adds, the explanation, suggested by B. Niese, is that the permission which Caesar had granted in 47 was confirmed by the Senate in 44.

(9) *Ant.*, xiv, 10, 6 a. Caesar, 'imperator II.', that is in 47 B. C., enacted that Judaea, Joppa excepted, should pay tribute annually, except every seventh year, to Rome (?);<sup>4</sup> no auxiliaries for the Roman army were to be raised in Judaea, nor might Roman soldiers exact money on any pretence from the Jews. b. Joppa was to be restored to the Jews.—Mendelssohn<sup>5</sup> holds that in §§ 5 and 6 a we have a decree of Caesar, issued in 47 B. C., but distinct from the one mentioned in § 2; but in order to maintain this theory, he is compelled to do violence to the text: instead of ὑπατος τὸ πέμπτον (consul V.) he substitutes αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ἀρχιερεὺς, δικτάτωρ τὸ δεύτερον<sup>6</sup> (imperator and chief pontiff, dictator II.). Judeich,<sup>7</sup> remarking reasonably enough that § 5 undoubtedly belongs to 44 B. C., and holding, like Mendelssohn, that 6 a is inseparable from it, of course refers 6 a to the same date. But since the statement in 6 a that Caesar was 'imperator II.' is irreconcilable with this theory, Judeich also is obliged to resort to emendation, albeit of a less drastic kind. For αὐτοκράτωρ τὸ δεύτερον he substitutes, following Niese, αὐτοκράτωρ,

<sup>1</sup> *Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes*, i<sup>4</sup>, 1901, pp. 346–7, n. 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 136, 139–40. Judeich apparently forgets that in 47 B. C. Caesar was not consul.

<sup>3</sup> *l. c.*

<sup>4</sup> The ordinary reading, retained by S. A. Naber in his edition of 1892, is ὅπως τελῶσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἱεροσολυμιτῶν πόλεως, ἰσχύος ὑπεξαιρουμένης, χάρις τοῦ ἐβδόμου ἔτους; but Schürer (*op. cit.*, p. 347, n. 25), following the old Latin translation—*ut per singulos annos Ioppenses tributa Hierosolymorum civitati praestent, excepto septimo anno* (see Mendelssohn, *Acta soc. philol. Lips.*, v, 1875, p. 198)—reads ὅπως τελῶσιν . . . πόλεως Ἰοπηνοί, ὑπεξαιρουμένου τοῦ ἐβδόμου ἔτους. In other words, Schürer, like Mendelssohn and Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.*, v, 1885, p. 501, n. 1 [*The Provinces*, &c., ii, 175, n. 1]), holds that a part of the tribute which the people of Joppa used under Pompey's ordinance to pay to the Romans was to be paid to the Jews. It is evident, Mendelssohn adds, that § 5 is mutilated and that the words ὅπως τε Ἰουδαίους . . . ὑπεξέλωνται must have been preceded by a statement of the general reform of the regulations made by Caesar as to tribute.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 197–202.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 200.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 140–1.

δικτάτωρ τὸ δ<sup>1</sup> (imperator, dictator IV.). Now Judeich himself holds<sup>2</sup> that the decrees recorded in §§ 4-7 merely contained a revised and detailed statement of privileges which had been granted in 47 B. C.; and whether 6 *a* is to be referred to that year or to 44 is, from a historical point of view, unimportant.

## CAESAR'S CAMPAIGN IN ASIA MINOR

**The dates of Caesar's departure from Alexandria and of his movements in Syria and Asia Minor.**—W. Judeich<sup>3</sup> and O. E. Schmidt<sup>4</sup> rely upon the authority of Ioannes Malalas, a Byzantine writer of the sixth century, who says<sup>5</sup> that Caesar entered Antioch on the 23rd day of the [Syro-Macedonian] month Artemisius, which, as Judeich calculates, corresponded with June 28 of the unreformed Roman calendar. Malalas, just before giving this date, states that Caesar reigned as dictator for 18 years; and just after, that he went from Antioch to Alexandria and waged war there, that his 'little son' [Caesarion] died, and that he straightway returned to Rome. Though this string of absurdities may not inspire faith in his chronological accuracy, there is reason to believe that his dates, in respect to which there was less room for blundering, were right. For Cicero heard on July 5 that Caesar had quitted Alexandria,<sup>6</sup> and, as Schmidt has shown,<sup>7</sup> it is probable that the messengers who brought the news were nearly a month on the way. Remarking that, according to Malalas, Caesar's arrival in Syria was known at Antioch on 12 Artemisius (June 17), Schmidt concludes that he must have reached Ace Ptolemais, about 300 Roman miles south of Antioch, by June 11 or 12, and must therefore have left Alexandria on June 7 or 8.<sup>8</sup>

Working back from the certain date—July 29—of Caesar's arrival in Pontus, Schmidt<sup>9</sup> argues that he must have left Antioch about July 3. He reckons one or two days for the voyage from Seleucia (the port of Antioch) to the mouth of the Cydnus; three or four days for Caesar's sojourn in Tarsus;<sup>10</sup> and 18 days (including two

<sup>1</sup> Niese himself in his edition of Josephus (vol. 3, 1892, p. 277), published some years later than Judeich's book, reads αὐτοκράτωρ τὸ δεύτερον.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 106-10.

<sup>4</sup> *D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, pp. 224-5.

<sup>5</sup> *Corpus script. hist. Byzant.*, viii, 1831, p. 216.

<sup>6</sup> *Att.*, xi, 25, 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 205-7, 224.

<sup>8</sup> Judeich, who assumes that the 'few days' which, according to Hirtius, (*Bell. Alex.*, 66, 1), Caesar spent in Syria could not have been more than five, infers (*op. cit.*, p. 112) that he must have reached Ace Ptolemais about June 23, and therefore must have left Alexandria about June 20. Thus, while he accepts one of the dates given by Malalas, he rejects the other! He insists that his own is confirmed by the letter (*Att.*, xi, 25, 2) in which Cicero mentioned the rumour that Caesar had left Alexandria; but Schmidt (*op. cit.*, pp. 205-7) proves that the time which Judeich allowed for the news to travel from Alexandria to Brundisium is too short, and I may add that Judeich himself elsewhere (p. 60) argues that Caesar (*B. C.*, iii, 106, 1) meant by 'a few days' (*paucos dies*) 'about three weeks'.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 225.

<sup>10</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 66, 2-3.



days' rest, but excluding the two days spent at Mazaca<sup>1</sup>) for the march of about 350 Roman miles from Tarsus to the frontier of Pontus. The time allowed for the march is not enough. Assume that Caesar marched 18 Roman miles a day—as fast as in the famous march from Corfinium to Brundisium; the whole march would then have required 23 or 24 days. Stoffel<sup>2</sup> supposes that Caesar travelled by carriage from Tarsus, having sent on the 6th legion in advance; but he was compelled to make this assumption because he dated Caesar's departure from Alexandria too late.<sup>3</sup>

For the sake of argument I have accepted Schmidt's computation of the distance from Tarsus to the frontier of Pontus. Stoffel<sup>4</sup> reckons it as 400 kilometres, or about 270 Roman miles. The difference between the two estimates is 80 miles! Schmidt followed Judeich,<sup>5</sup> who, referring to the statement of Hirtius that Caesar advanced 'close to Pontus and the frontier of Galatia' (*propius Pontum finesque Gallograeciae*<sup>6</sup>), supposed that instead of taking the direct route from Mazaca, he moved north-westward by the road leading to Tavium, and hard by the Galatian frontier diverged eastward, arriving on the 29th of July at Doranum in Pontus, 25 miles from Zela. I cannot see why he should have adopted this circuitous route. The word *propius* is vague, and if Caesar, who, as Hirtius implies,<sup>7</sup> was pressed for time, had taken the shortest road, he would not have been far from the Galatian frontier. If Stoffel's estimate is right, he might have marched 400 kilometres in 18 days, including two days' rest.

**Caesar's march from Mazaca to Zela.**—We learn from Hirtius—  
—I provisionally assume the correctness of the accepted text—that Caesar made forced marches from Tarsus and, after halting two days at Mazaca, arrived at Comana, which contained the most venerated temple in Cappadocia, assigned the custody of the temple to Lycomedes, a Bithynian belonging to the royal family of Cappadocia, marched on rapidly into Pontus, and finally advanced to the outskirts of Zela.<sup>8</sup> The narrative presents a difficulty. The Cappadocian Comana is about 60 miles south-east of Mazaca; yet Caesar's objective was Zela, and Hirtius, who repeatedly insists on the rapidity with which he marched, implies that he was anxious to encounter Pharnaces as soon as possible.<sup>9</sup> Is it credible that after reaching Mazaca he went 60 miles out of his way and came back again, thus losing precious time? Turning to Strabo,<sup>10</sup> we find that Lycomedes received the priesthood not of the Cappadocian, but of the Pontic Comana; and this statement is confirmed by Appian.<sup>11</sup> Drumann<sup>12</sup> believed that Hirtius confounded the two Comanas, and that, as Appian implies, Caesar did not appoint Lycomedes to the priesthood until after he had won the battle. Stoffel,<sup>13</sup> who accepts

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 66, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 1887, pp. 75-6, 271-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 433. Cf. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 418, n. \*.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 271-2.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 113-5.

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 67, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 66, 3-4. 6; 71, 1-2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 66-72.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, 66, 3-4. 6; 71, 1-2.

<sup>10</sup> xii, 3, 35.

<sup>11</sup> *Mithr.*, 121.

<sup>12</sup> *Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, pp. 498 n. 2, 503.

<sup>13</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 272. See the preceding article.

the statement of Hirtius, but is either ignorant of or ignores the statements of Strabo and Appian which contradict it, affirms that Caesar had sent on the 6th legion in advance from Tarsus and was therefore able to travel (by carriage) between 80 and 100 kilometres a day; but even so he lets Caesar lose at least 3 days, and he does not attempt to reconcile his view with the emphasis which Hirtius lays on Caesar's haste.

The accepted version of the relevant passage in *Bellum Alexandrinum*<sup>1</sup> runs: . . . *magnisque itineribus per Cappadociam confectis biduum Mazacae commoratus Comana <venit>, vetustissimum et sanctissimum in Cappadocia Bellonae templum, quod tanta religione colitur ut sacerdos eius deae maiestate, imperio, potentia secundus a rege consensu gentis illius habeatur. Id homini nobilissimo Lycomedi Bithyno adiudicavit, &c.* Judeich,<sup>2</sup> remarking that *venit* is merely conjectural,<sup>3</sup> and that the text, as it stands in the MSS., is quite acceptable, says that before *id homini* a comma should be inserted instead of a full stop. Thus he holds that, according to Hirtius, Caesar made Lycomedes chief priest of the Cappadocian Comana while he was staying at Mazaca, but did not himself go to Comana. He maintains, however, following Strabo, that Lycomedes was made chief priest of the Pontic Comana, and that Hirtius confused the two names. The error, he explains, is all the more intelligible because Lycomedes was of Cappadocian descent. But, he insists, the appointment was made in Mazaca—so far we must believe Hirtius—though of course Lycomedes did not enter upon office until after Caesar's victory.

I agree with Judeich that the appointment was made at Mazaca; but his amended punctuation attributes to Hirtius an intolerable sentence: is it not more satisfactory to suppose that *Id* was inserted by a scribe who misunderstood the text, and to delete it?

Groebe<sup>4</sup> holds that *venit* or some similar word must have been written after *Comana*, and therefore that, according to Hirtius, Caesar did go to Comana. In his view the question whether Hirtius on the one hand or Strabo and Appian on the other were right, remains unsolved. To my mind the authority of Strabo, himself a Cappadocian, is unimpeachable, and that Caesar wasted time in going to Comana I do not believe.

**The battle-field of Zela.**—Hirtius<sup>5</sup> says that Pharnaces occupied the highest of the hills by which Zela (Zilleh) was encompassed—or perhaps he meant 'one of the hills, which was very high'—and that it was 'not much more than 3 [Roman] miles' from the town. Caesar, who had encamped 5 miles south of this hill, marched in the fourth watch, and at dawn occupied the hill on which Mithradates had defeated Triarius.<sup>6</sup> This hill was separated from the enemy's camp by a valley not more than a mile wide;<sup>7</sup> but it would appear

<sup>1</sup> 66, 4-5.    <sup>2</sup> *Caesar in Orient*, p. 118.    <sup>3</sup> Inferior MSS. have *venit Comana*.

<sup>4</sup> W. Drumann, *op. cit.*, p. 498, n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 72, 2-3.

<sup>6</sup> See vol. i, p. 199.

<sup>7</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 73, 3.

from a later statement of the writer<sup>1</sup> that in this distance were included the steep sides of the valley.

W. J. Hamilton,<sup>2</sup> describing a journey which he made from Zilleh to Amasia, says, 'on quitting the town [we] ascended the bed of a torrent . . . to the north-west for about two miles . . . until we reached the gorge from which the scanty stream issued, where a winding road led along the bottom . . . between steep and rocky cliffs . . . [One hour after starting] we were still ascending the narrow ravine, which is . . . the spot described in Caesar's Commentaries (*sic*) where the great battle took place between him and Pharnaces . . . Pansa [the careless fellow means the author, whom he has just before wrongly identified with Caesar, of *Bellum Alexandrinum*] describes a deep ravine about three miles north of the city, the opposite sides of which were occupied by the . . . armies before Caesar's victory, and which closely agrees with the . . . characteristics . . . of this pass.' Turn now to the description given by the famous archaeologist, Georges Perrot.<sup>3</sup> He points out that one road only leads northward from Zela, towards Amasia.<sup>4</sup> This road, the general direction of which is NNW. or N. by W., follows a narrow gorge, more than once crossing the torrent which runs through it. At a point rather more than 6 kilometres from Zela the gorge divides into two ravines, extending respectively eastward and westward; but the road leads on to the summit—a nearly rectangular plateau—of a high hill surrounded by ravines. After reaching the plateau the road skirts its eastern edge, and then rapidly descends into a ravine beyond which rises the mountain-mass called Altiagatch Dag, the highest hill near Zela, some 2,000 feet above the plain. Perrot identified this hill, or rather its 'first terrace',<sup>5</sup> with the 'highest (?) hill' (*collis editissimus*) which Pharnaces occupied. Here he would have covered Amasia and Sinope, and thus, in case of defeat, his retreat would be secure.<sup>6</sup> The only difficulty, says Perrot,<sup>7</sup> is the distance—nearly 12 kilometres, or about 8 Roman miles—from Zela. But, he suggests, Zela probably extended considerably beyond the northern limits of its modern representative, as far as the point where the gorge begins, the distance from which to Altiagatch Dag is  $7\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres. Stoffel,<sup>8</sup> who did not explore Asia Minor, provisionally accepted Perrot's choice.

When I first read Perrot's article I conjectured that Caesar occupied the hill immediately south of the western branch of the ravine, and Pharnaces the hill immediately north of it. Even the desperate expedient of giving an enormous imaginary extension to the town of Zela cannot save Perrot's theory: for when a serious writer says 'not much more than three miles' he does not mean 'five'; and,

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 74, 3-4.—[Pharnaces] descendere <in> praeruptam vallem coepit . . . in proclivem descenderat vallem.

<sup>2</sup> *Researches in Asia Minor*, &c., i, 1842, pp. 362-3.

<sup>3</sup> *Comptes rendus . . . de l'Acad. des Inscr.*, &c., 1871, pp. 319-28.


<sup>4</sup> See Sheet 4 B of R. Kiepert's *Karte von Kleinasien*, 1902-6.

<sup>5</sup> Perrot, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 319-22.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, p. 324.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 77, 273-4.





moreover, it is incredible that Caesar, starting from a point two miles south of Zela in the 'fourth watch', which on the 2nd of August (May 20 of the Julian calendar) was little more than two hours long, reached the summit of a hill 6 miles north of it at dawn (*prima luce*), that is half an hour or so before the fourth watch ended.<sup>1</sup>

*Bell. Alex.*, 73, 3; 74, 1.—Hirtius says that Caesar ordered the camp-followers to carry the wood which had been collected for fortification from his original camp near Zela to the site selected for the new camp, 'in order that none of the legionaries might have to leave the work of entrenching' (*ne quis ab opere miles discederet*). Stoffel<sup>2</sup> interprets this as meaning 'afin que tous les légionnaires sans exception pussent travailler aux nouveaux retranchements'. That the words which I have italicized are incorrect is proved by Hirtius's next two sentences, from which we learn that when Caesar noticed the enemy's line of battle being formed, he thought that the object of Pharnaces was perhaps to compel him to keep *more* men under arms and so to hinder the construction of the camp (*credebat instrui Caesar vel ad opus suum tardandum, quo plures in armis tenerentur*, &c.). By *ne quis . . . discederet* Hirtius meant that none of the men who had been detailed to work on the entrenchments might be obliged to leave.

## WAS CAESAR INVESTED WITH THE TRIBUNICIAN POWER?

According to Dio Cassius,<sup>3</sup> the tribunician power, or quasi-tribunician power,<sup>4</sup> was granted to Caesar for life in 48 B. C. after his victory at Pharsalia. No other authority confirms this statement,<sup>5</sup> or even says that such power was ever conferred upon Caesar; and since Dio<sup>6</sup> relates that in 44 B. C. the right of sitting at the public games on the bench reserved for the tribunes was given to him—a privilege which, one would suppose, he already possessed if he had the tribunician power—L. Wiegandt<sup>7</sup> concludes that one or the other of Dio's statements is untrue and devotes his treatise to discrediting the

<sup>1</sup> Judeich (*Caesar im Orient*, pp. 144-5) raises further objections against Altiagatch Dag, which seem to me inconclusive. For instance, he says that a hill rising 500 or 600 metres above the plain could not be called a *collis*. Caesar (*B. G.*, vii, 46, 3; 51, 4) calls Gergovia, which rises 1,200 feet above the plain, a *collis*, which, like *mons*, is a very elastic term. However I am glad to find that on the main point we are in agreement. Judeich holds, as I do, that *collis editissimus* may mean, not 'the highest hill' but, 'a very high hill', and the hill which he selects is the same as mine.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 77-8.

<sup>3</sup> xlii, 20, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Dio's words are *τὴν τε ἐξουσίαν τῶν δημάρχων διὰ βίου, ὡς εἰπεῖν, προσέθετο*. The qualifying words *ὡς εἰπεῖν* can hardly refer to *διὰ βίου*; and the Latin version, *tribunitiam quoque quodammodo potestatem per omnem vitam suam accepit*, is, I think, substantially correct.

<sup>5</sup> I do not count Ioannes Lydus, a Byzantine writer of the sixth century, who (*περὶ ἀρχῶν τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας*, ii, 2) makes various absurd mis-statements about Caesar.

<sup>6</sup> xliv, 4, 2.

<sup>7</sup> *C. J. Caesar u. d. tribun. Gewalt*, 1890, p. 7.

former. Nicolaus of Damascus<sup>1</sup> tells us that the conspirators who afterwards murdered Caesar proposed in the Senate that his person should be declared sacrosanct; and this, Wiegandt argues,<sup>2</sup> is a proof that he was not invested with sacrosanctity, which belonged to the tribunes, before. Wiegandt<sup>3</sup> argues, further, that Cicero's speeches *Pro Marcello*<sup>4</sup> and *Pro Deiotaro*<sup>5</sup> also prove indirectly that he was not inviolable before 44; for when in the former Cicero spoke of the danger to which Caesar's life was exposed, he would hardly have omitted to allude to his inviolability if it had existed. Accordingly Wiegandt concludes<sup>6</sup> that, as the earlier passage in Dio is untrue, Caesar never possessed the tribunician power, but merely two of the privileges that belonged to it. In the speech which he delivered in 46 on his return from Africa Dio<sup>7</sup> makes him speak of himself as consul and dictator, not as tribune. Again, when Dio<sup>8</sup> says that Octavian assumed the title *imperator*, he adds that Caesar had held it before; but when he mentions the tribunician power exercised by Augustus,<sup>9</sup> he never remarks that Caesar had possessed it. Nor is there a word about it in the funeral oration of Antony, though he enumerates the offices which Caesar had held<sup>10</sup> and, I may add, goes on to say that he was sacrosanct.<sup>11</sup> Finally, says Wiegandt,<sup>12</sup> it is hardly conceivable that when Tacitus<sup>13</sup> spoke of the assumption of the tribunician power by Augustus—'This phrase Augustus invented to denote the possession of supreme power; for while avoiding the title of king or dictator, he desired a designation that would place him above every other authority'<sup>14</sup> (*id summi fastigii vocabulum Augustus repperit, ne regis aut dictatoris nomen adsumeret ac tamen appellatione aliqua cetera imperia praemineret*)—he would have expressed himself as he did if Augustus had merely given the name to an office the substance of which his adoptive father had already held. E. Herzog,<sup>15</sup> indeed, holds that the tribunician power mentioned by Dio was merely a 'protective measure' (*eine Schutz-massregel*), and therefore that the words of Tacitus are justified; but Wiegandt replies that there is nothing in the language of Dio to show that the power given to Caesar was so limited, and that, even if it was, the omission in the lists of Caesar's titles remains unexplained.

Wiegandt makes out a plausible case; but I doubt whether he has sufficiently considered the significance of Dio's qualifying words *ὡς εἰπέν*. Is it not conceivable that what Dio meant was that Caesar had the power without the title of tribune, and therefore that the other two grants were necessary? Dio makes many blunders; but the statement which Wiegandt endeavoured to disprove can

<sup>1</sup> *Vita Caes.*, 22. Cf. Livy, *Epit.*, 116, and App., ii, 106, 442. Dio himself (xliv, 5, 3) says that in 44 B. C. inviolability, one of the privileges of the tribune, was granted to Caesar.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 23.

<sup>4</sup> 7.

<sup>5</sup> 5, 15.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>7</sup> xliii, 17, 2.

<sup>8</sup> lii, 40.

<sup>9</sup> li, 19; liii, 17; 32; liv, 12; 28; lv, 9; 13.

<sup>10</sup> Dio, xliv, 48, 3.

<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, 49, 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 28-9.

<sup>13</sup> *Ann.*, iii, 56.

<sup>14</sup> I have slightly modified G. G. Ramsay's translation.

<sup>15</sup> *Gesch. . . d. röm. Staatsverfassung*, ii, 1887, p. 6, n. 1.

hardly be dismissed as a pure invention. Still, there is a reason for suspecting its accuracy. In the same breath in which Dio says that Caesar received quasi-tribunician power in 47 he makes the remark, which he repeats later, about the right of sitting on the same bench with the tribunes ; and though he may have said this by anticipation, one asks oneself whether that right *plus sacrosanctity*, conferred in 44, did not alone constitute the quasi-tribunician power, which Dio perhaps ante-dated.

## HOW OLD WAS DOLABELLA WHEN HE ENTERED PUBLIC LIFE ?

If Appian<sup>1</sup> and the MSS. of his *Civil Wars* may be trusted, Dolabella was only 25 in 44 B. C. It would follow that he was born in 69 or, at the earliest, in 70 ; that he became a *quindecimvir*<sup>2</sup> (one of the keepers of the Sibylline books) when he was 18 ; that at the same age his standing was high enough to make Cicero desire his friendship,<sup>3</sup> he was divorced by his wife, and impeached Appius Claudius, the late Governor of Cilicia ;<sup>4</sup> that he was a boy of 19 when Caelius, congratulating Cicero on having him as a son-in-law, seriously observed that some of the faults of his character had already been removed by age (*cetera porro, quibus adhuc ille sibi parum utilis fuit, et aetate iam sunt decussa*, &c.<sup>5</sup>) ; that when he was still a youth of 20 Caesar spoke of him in respectful terms<sup>6</sup> and appointed him to command a fleet ;<sup>7</sup> and that when he was not more than 21 he became a tribune of the plebs.<sup>8</sup> All this puts a strain even upon credulity ; and W. Wegehaupt<sup>9</sup> reasonably suggests that Appian wrote λ' (35), not κ' (25). Anyhow, if the MSS. are right, readers who have become acquainted with Appian will refuse to believe an improbable statement upon his unsupported authority.<sup>10</sup>

## THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

### THE FIRST PHASE : RUSPINA

**Ruspina.**—It is certain that Ruspina was either on the site of Monastir or quite close to it. We are told that it was two miles from the harbour<sup>11</sup> and that when Caesar was about to commence active operations against Scipio, he moved from his camp to the town, and thence, descending by a gentle slope (*inde parvula proclivitate*

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 129, 539.

<sup>2</sup> *Cic., Fam.*, viii, 4, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, vii, 32, 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, viii, 6, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 13, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Att.*, ix, 16, 2.

<sup>7</sup> *App.* ii, 41, 166.

<sup>8</sup> *Dio*, xlii, 29, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *P. Cornelius Dolabella*, 1880. I have not been able to see this work, but it is reviewed in Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, xxiii, 1880 (1882), p. 480.

<sup>10</sup> Cicero, who spoke of himself as having been a young man (*adolescens*) when he was 43 (*Phil.*, ii, 46, 118), applied the same term to Dolabella in 50 B. C. (*Att.*, vi, 6, 1). If Dolabella was only 19 then, not 29, Cicero would surely have written not *adolescentis*, but *adolescentuli*.

<sup>11</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 10, 2.

*degressus*), marched over the left side of the plain near the sea.<sup>1</sup> According to Stoffel,<sup>2</sup> the gentle slope was 'la pente douce qui mène depuis la ville vers le bord de la mer'. I can positively affirm that the slope which leads from Monastir to the coast is insensible.<sup>3</sup> Evidently Ruspina was on the plateau which extends south of Monastir, and Veith<sup>4</sup> is probably right in locating it at the ruins known as Henchir Tenir; for this spot is just two Roman miles from the harbour and on the edge of the plateau, where, as we may infer from the statement about the gentle slope, Ruspina must have been.

Caesar's camp, as one may gather from the fact, recorded in *Bellum Africanum*,<sup>5</sup> that he passed by or through Ruspina when he was about to march southward against Scipio, was north of the town.<sup>6</sup>

*Bell. Afr.*, 14, 2.—'The Numidian [auxiliary] infantry . . . hurled javelins into the ranks of the legionaries' (*pedites Numidae . . . inter legionarios pedites iacula coiciunt*). How many javelins did each Numidian carry, and when he had used them all how did he continue fighting? I suppose that he was supplied with new ones from the

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 37, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 124.

<sup>3</sup> G. Veith (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, 1912, pp. 777-8) confirms the observation which I made on the spot. Those who identify Ruspina with Monastir suppose that the *parvula proclivitas* was the slope from the western, or inland side of Monastir to the harbour. Even if this interpretation were not forced, the gradient—15 metres in 2 kilometres, or about 1 in 133—would have been hardly noticeable. This is alone enough to show that Ruspina was not on the site of Monastir; but Veith (pp. 776-7, 783-4) gives other reasons. Remarking that it was the business of Caesar to control the entire plateau, and not to allow his enemy to fortify the slopes which descended on the west and the south-west to the plain, lest they should prevent him from advancing inland, he points out that if Ruspina and Monastir were one, Caesar must have left a large part of the plateau in the enemy's power: for his camp was close to Ruspina (*Bell. Afr.*, 6, 1), and he drew trenches from the town to the sea on one side and from his camp to the sea on the other (*ib.*, 20, 1); therefore, if Ruspina is to be identified with Monastir, he was satisfied with entrenching the north-eastern portion of the plateau, while Scipio, whose camp was only 3 Roman miles from his (*ib.*, 24, 1), neglected to seize the larger portion although it was left open. Again in the case supposed it would be impossible to explain the statement (*ib.*, 24, 3) that Caesar in the first period of the campaign occupied only an area which extended 6 Roman miles in every direction (*neque amplius m. p. VI terrae Africae quoquo versus tenebant*). Stoffel (*op. cit.*, p. 294) takes this extent to be the circuit of Caesar's trenches, an interpretation which does violence to the Latin. But Veith is himself obliged to resort to an emendation in order to reconcile his view with the words in question: he suggests (p. 783) that the true reading is *III* or *IV*. I am rather inclined to believe that the author was thinking of the distance—about 6 miles—from Ruspina to Leptis, which Caesar also occupied, and that he used the word *quoquo* loosely. Thirdly, the harbour is barely two kilometres (2,186 yards) from Monastir, whereas the distance from Ruspina was two Roman miles (3,234 yards).

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 776-81.

<sup>5</sup> 37, 2.

<sup>6</sup> Tissot (*Géogr. . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, Atlas, pl. x), who rightly supposed that Caesar's camp was on the plateau, made the mistake of placing it at the northernmost end. For, as Veith (*op. cit.*, pp. 776-7) points out, if it had been there, the entrenchment which Caesar drew from his camp to the sea would have completely protected him, and the second entrenchment which he constructed from Ruspina (wrongly identified by Tissot with Monastir) to the sea would have been superfluous.



rear, just as the mounted archers who defeated Crassus at Carrhae were enabled to refill their quivers.<sup>1</sup> The late Lieutenant G. L. Cheesman<sup>2</sup> pointed out that, according to Josephus,<sup>3</sup> cavalry attached to Roman armies carried spare javelins in a quiver.

**The combat near Ruspina.**—Stoffel,<sup>4</sup> wrongly identifying Ruspina with Monastir and accordingly placing Caesar's camp too far northwards,<sup>5</sup> is forced to look for the battle-field too near the southern edge of the plateau and therefore to conclude that the hills beyond which Caesar is said to have driven the enemy's cavalry<sup>6</sup> were north-east of the field,—in other words, the plateau itself! As to the famous manœuvre (described in *Bellum Africanum*, 17, 1–2) by which Caesar saved his army from destruction, see A. von Domaszewski's remarks in *Abhandl. d. archaeol.-epigr. Seminares d. Univ. Wien*, 1885, pp. 3–4; Stoffel, *op. cit.*, pp. 287–9; R. Schneider's ed. of *Bell. Afr.*, pp. 153–4; H. Delbrück, *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, i, 1900, p. 521; G. Veith, *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, pp. 788–90; and p. 569, *infra*.

*Bell. Afr.*, 20, 1.—'Caesar . . . constructed a rampart from the town of Ruspina to the sea and another from his camp in the same direction' (*Caesar . . . vallum . . . ab oppido Ruspina usque ad mare ducere et a castris alterum eodem*, &c.). According to Stoffel,<sup>7</sup> 'le camp de l'armée était à l'ouest de Ruspina; le premier retranchement joignait la place à la mer, l'autre allait du camp à la place: on voit donc que le *eodem* se rapporte à *oppidum* et non pas à *mare*.' This reasoning is characteristically Stoffelian: the conclusion is deduced from a questionable assertion. The obvious meaning of *eodem* is *ad mare*; but I am inclined to suppose that besides the two ramparts which touched the sea there was a third which connected the camp with the town.<sup>8</sup>

**Acylla.**—The town which, if the MSS. can be trusted, the author of *Bellum Africanum*<sup>9</sup> calls *Acylla* or *Achilla*,<sup>10</sup> is commonly identified with the Achulla of Strabo,<sup>11</sup> which stood upon the site of El Aalia, about 19 miles due south of Thapsus.<sup>12</sup> Considering, however, that when Caesar was about to march from his camp opposite Uzita to Aggar (by Ksour es Saf<sup>13</sup>) he left garrisons in Ruspina, Leptis, and Acylla,<sup>14</sup> I am unable to accept this identification; for El Aalia is 7 miles south of Aggar, and one may doubt whether it would have been worth while to detach troops for its protection. Veith,<sup>15</sup> who, I am glad to find, has given the same reasons, adds that it is most

<sup>1</sup> Plut., *Cras.*, 25, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army*, 1914, p. 126.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Iud.*, iii, 5, 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 285.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 517.

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 18, 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 294.

<sup>8</sup> I am glad to find that Veith (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, pp. 766, 782; Karte 19 a) agrees with me.

<sup>9</sup> 33, 2–5; 43; 67, 1.

<sup>10</sup> There are other variants.

<sup>11</sup> xvii, 3, 12.

<sup>12</sup> C. Tissot, *Géogr. . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, ii, 10–3, 179. An argument which Tissot based upon the supposed direction of the eastern frontier of Numidia is negligible, for the direction was not then known.

<sup>13</sup> See p. 525.

<sup>14</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 67, 1.

<sup>15</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, 1912, pp. 823–4.

unlikely that Caesar would have occupied a place so remote at a time when he was confined to the defensive, holding not a foot of ground except Leptis and the plateau of Ruspina. Moreover, as he aptly remarks, there were two Aggars, two Uzitas, more than one Zama, and more than one Leptis; while the Vaga alluded to by Sallust<sup>1</sup> was different from the town of the same name mentioned in *Bellum Africanum*. I have refrained from marking Acylla on the map; but Veith<sup>2</sup> may be right in tentatively identifying it with the ruins near Kasser Helal. He remarks that as it was mentioned in the same breath with Ruspina and Leptis, it was probably near them; and he conjectures that the chief motive of Considius for raising the blockade of Acylla<sup>3</sup> was fear that Caesar, by moving from Ruspina to the heights east of Uzita and thus placing himself between Scipio and Acylla, might endanger his safety. This condition is fulfilled by Kasser Helal.

## THE SECOND PHASE: UZITA

**Was Scipio's camp near Uzita different from that which he occupied when he first joined Labienus?**—When Scipio, coming from Utica, joined Labienus and Petreius, he encamped 3 Roman miles from Caesar's camp near Ruspina.<sup>4</sup> Stoffel<sup>5</sup> places the camp of the Republican leaders about a mile north of Knaïs and 3 Roman miles S. by W. of Monastir. But, as Scipio was evidently not there when Caesar moved from Ruspina to the hills east of Uzita<sup>6</sup>—for Caesar would not have made a dangerous flank march—Stoffel<sup>7</sup> assumes that he had made a new camp—the one which he occupied during the second phase of the campaign—in order to procure water and other supplies. But, Veith<sup>8</sup> objects, there was water in the cisterns near Knaïs, and such as was to be got near Uzita must also have been in cisterns;<sup>9</sup> for the water of the Oued Melah, which flows, or trickles, past Uzita, is not drinkable: besides, it is hardly credible that the writer of *Bellum Africanum* would have neglected to point out that Scipio, by abandoning the alleged camp near Knaïs, had left the only road between Ruspina and the hills open to his enemy. Veith then proceeds<sup>10</sup> to search for the site of Scipio's camp. As we have seen, it was 3 miles from Caesar's camp near Ruspina: the hill east of Uzita in which Scipio posted a piquet and which Veith identifies with Hamadet el Guebla, was the nearest to it of the series of hills which close the plain of Uzita on that side;<sup>11</sup> and it was 2½ Roman miles from the ridge.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly Veith<sup>13</sup> locates it

<sup>1</sup> *Iug.*, 29, 4; 47, 1.<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 824-5.<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 43.<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 24, 1.—(Scipio . . . cum Labieni et Petrei copii <se> coniungit, atque unis castris factis) *III milia passuum longe . . . considunt*. Kübler, followed by R. Schneider, fills up the lacuna in the MSS. with the words *a Caesaris castris*.<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 118.<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 37, 2-3.<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 123.<sup>8</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, p. 775.<sup>9</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 41, 2 proves this.<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 783-4.<sup>11</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 37, 4; 38, 1.<sup>12</sup> *Ib.*, 38, 4; 39, 2.<sup>13</sup> Karte 19 b.

about one Roman mile north-west of the village called Mnara and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres (rather more than a mile and a half) NNE. of Uzita. This position is certainly not far wrong; whether it is more than approximately true depends upon Veith's identification of the nearest hill with Hamadet el Guebla. As I believe, for reasons which I shall state in the next article, that the hill in question was not Hamadet el Guebla, but the one immediately south of it, I have drawn my map accordingly.<sup>1</sup>

**The earlier operations near Uzita.**—The second phase of Caesar's African campaign presents few difficulties; for the writer of *Bellum Africanum* has portrayed the theatre with marvellous fidelity. Veith has explained the operations with admirable lucidity; but on certain points I am unable to agree with him. The first problem is to identify the hill on which Scipio had posted a piquet. The anonymous writer, after describing the plain in which Uzita was situated, says that in the ridge which bounds it on the seaward [or eastern] side there are a few hills, on each of which stood an ancient watch-tower and in the last of which Scipio had an outpost (*quarum* [turrium specularumque] *apud ultimam praesidium et statio fuit Scipionis*<sup>2</sup>). In the first sentence of the next paragraph<sup>3</sup> he tells us that Caesar, after he reached the [northern extremity of the] ridge, ascended to each hill and tower (*ascendit in unumquemque collem turremque*) and began to construct redoubts, a movement which he accomplished in less than half an hour, and that when 'he was not so very far from the last hill and tower' (*postquam non ita longe ab ultimo colle turrique fuit*), which was the nearest to the enemy's camp and on which Scipio had posted a Numidian piquet, he halted for a short time. It is evident from a later chapter<sup>4</sup> that this 'last hill' was not, as one might at first sight suppose, the southernmost hill of the ridge, but the southernmost of those hills on which the towers stood.

It is not clear from Stoffel's narrative, from his notes, or from his map (Pl. 20) what hill he identified with the *ultimus collis*. Veith<sup>5</sup> points to the height called Hamadet el Guebla,—the third from the northern end of the ridge. He gives the following reasons:—first, since Caesar ascended 'each several hill' (*in unumquemque collem*), he must have ascended at least two; secondly, he reached the *ultimus collis*—note Veith's inaccuracy—in less than half an hour, and, as he was marching by night, and not on a road, he could not have covered more than two kilometres (rather less than a mile and a quarter) in that time: Hamadet el Guebla is just this distance from the northern end of the ridge. Veith remarks<sup>6</sup> that he was originally inclined to agree with Tissot,<sup>7</sup> who decided for Hamadet

<sup>1</sup> The position of Juba's camp cannot be fixed with precision. Stoffel (ii, 127 and Pl. 20) locates it a little further than that of Scipio from Uzita: Veith (p. 805) thinks that it was probably nearer, because after the skirmish near Uzita, described in *Bell. Afr.*, 52, 1-3, the Numidians fled 'to the king's camp' (*in castra regia*). <sup>2</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 37, 4. <sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 38, 1. <sup>4</sup> 49.

<sup>5</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, pp. 797-9.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 800, n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. . . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, ii, 737.

el Ressas ; but, he argues, if this had been the ' last hill ', it would have been unnecessary for Caesar to advance further along the foot of the ridge in order to approach Uzita,<sup>1</sup> nor would he have been able to prolong the earthwork which he had begun to construct.<sup>2</sup> One can see, Veith concludes, why Scipio had selected Hamadet el Guebla : not only did it command a good view over the plateau of Ruspina [which Caesar still occupied at the time when the piquet was posted], but across it ran the shortest road to Leptis, which Caesar held<sup>3</sup> and which Scipio was therefore obliged to watch.

Now there is one word in our authority which would alone prevent any Latin scholar from accepting Veith's theory,—*unumquemque*. Veith, while he insists that we must infer from this word that Caesar ascended at least two hills, maintains that he ascended no more than two,—that is, before the combat which interrupted his advance and which is described in paragraphs 39 and 40 of *Bellum Africanum*, began. But even the writer of *Bellum Africanum* would not have said that Caesar ascended *unumquemque* of only two hills : he must have ascended not less than three. Secondly, Veith seems to forget that when Caesar halted he had not yet reached the *ultimus collis* : he was ' not so very far ' from it ; therefore, if the *ultimus collis* was Hamadet el Guebla, he had not covered even the two kilometres which Veith allows. But surely he could have covered a little more ?<sup>4</sup> Nobody will believe that he personally ascended the successive hills and superintended even the beginning of the work of fortification : *qui facit per alium facit per se*. Of course what he did was to detach sappers under field engineers. Thirdly, Veith apparently again forgets that when Caesar, after the combat described in paragraphs 39 and 40, began to advance further along the foot of the heights, he had not yet reached the *ultimus collis*. Finally, if Hamadet el Guebla commands a good view over the plateau of Ruspina, so also does Hamadet el Ressas, which is 6 metres higher ; and I cannot see why Scipio should have thought it necessary to secure communication with Leptis unless he intended to attack the garrison which Caesar had established there, thus incurring the danger of letting the attacking force be cut off and destroyed.

For these reasons I unhesitatingly identify the *ultimus collis* with Hamadet el Ressas.

**Did Labienus encamp separately from Scipio and Juba during the operations near Uzita ?**—Veith,<sup>5</sup> differing from Stoffel, argues that during the operations near Uzita Labienus had a separate camp. He remarks that when Caesar attempted to seize the hill called Sidi Jeha<sup>6</sup> Labienus had already reconnoitred the

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 41, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 37, 2-3 ; 47, 2 ; 49, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 9, 1.

<sup>4</sup> One must not rely blindly upon the words ' less than half an hour ' (*minus semihora*), which obviously represent a guess.

<sup>5</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, pp. 805-6.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 255. Caesar... *capiendo loca excelsa occupare contendit, <ne> adversarii magnitudine copiarum confisi proximum collem occupa<rent> atque ita longius sibi progrediendi erip<erent> facultatem. Eiusdem collis occupandi [gratia] Labienus consilium ceperat et, quo propiore loco fuerat, eo celerius occurrerat* (*Bell. Afr.*, 49).



position<sup>1</sup> and was nearer to it than Caesar.<sup>2</sup> I do not think this decisive, though it may suggest that Veith is right. What tells more in favour of his view is that the writer of *Bellum Africanum* alludes to 'all the camps' (*ex castris omnibus*)<sup>3</sup> and says that Juba, Scipio, and Labienus attacked Caesar.<sup>4</sup> In the former passage Franz Fröhlich,<sup>5</sup> followed by R. Schneider, changes *omnibus* into *duobus*, on the ground that Labienus had not a camp of his own; but the only evidence which they can produce in support of this assertion is the text<sup>6</sup> from which we learn that *while Caesar was still encamped near Ruspina* Scipio shared his camp with Labienus and Petreius. In the other passage Fröhlich<sup>7</sup> and Schneider, finding that the word *Scipio* tends to stultify their theory, calmly delete it: 'the true reading,' Schneider naïvely adds, 'has not yet been found.' The true reading is *Scipio*; no other is conceivable except *Petreius*, and the part which Petreius played in the campaign was quite subordinate. Finally, in a subsequent chapter<sup>8</sup> a camp belonging to Labienus is expressly mentioned.

I conclude that at all events during the later part of the operations Labienus encamped separately, though at first he had shared the camp of Scipio.<sup>9</sup>

**Caesar's principal camp near Uzita.**—The writer of *Bellum Africa-*

So runs the passage as restored by Nipperdey. Instead of *occuparent* and *eriperent* we find in the MSS. *occupaverunt* and *eripuerunt*: the nonsensical meaning would then be, 'Caesar . . . made an effort to occupy the heights. The enemy, relying upon the strength of their forces, occupied the nearest hill and thus deprived themselves of the power of advancing further,' &c. By way of making sense Schneider, who ignored Nipperdey's emendation, offered another, which only shows that he completely misunderstood the situation. Assuming that something had dropped out of the text between *occupare* and *contendit*, he substituted *ibi* for *sibi*. The bewildered reader, after pondering Schneider's version, is driven to conclude that although the enemy (*adversarii*) had already occupied the nearest hill, Labienus, the one able officer whom they possessed, formed the plan of occupying the same hill (*eiusdem collis*) and hurried up to do so. Asking himself whether Schneider could have been labouring under temporary insanity, he turns to the footnotes, and finds (1) that '*occupare* requires an object, which is not to be found with certainty'; (2) that '*eiusdem collis* cannot refer to *proximum collem*'; perhaps the words relate to the missing object of *occupare*. The unhappy editor failed to see that the object of *occupare* (as well as of *capiendo*) was *excelsa loca*, and to perceive that if *eiusdem collis* did not refer to *proximum collem* it was devoid of meaning. To make it relate to the imaginary object of *occupare* would imply that while the enemy as a whole barred Caesar's progress by seizing the hill immediately south of him, Labienus rushed forward unnecessarily to seize some other (undiscoverable) position, which Caesar wished to secure. If Schneider had consulted the Staff Map, he might have avoided this absurdity. Obviously the meaning of the passage is that which results from Nipperdey's emendation. Caesar made all speed to prevent the enemy from forestalling him and seizing the all-important hill, Sidi Jeha. Labienus was nearer than Caesar to this hill, and tried to anticipate him.

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 50, 2.      <sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 49, 3.      <sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 58, 1.      <sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 52, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *D. bell. Afr.*, 1872, p. 68.      <sup>6</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 24, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 66. Fröhlich deletes *Scipio* on the ground that Scipio is nowhere else (!) mentioned in *Bell. Afr.* in connexion with an attack made by cavalry and light-armed troops. But see 24, 2; 30, 2; 38, 4, &c.

<sup>8</sup> 65, 2.      <sup>9</sup> 38, 4. Cf. Veith, p. 799.

*num* says that after Caesar had fortified his camp 'on the hill of which he had taken possession' [namely Sidi Jeha<sup>1</sup>], he drew two trenches 'from his largest camp' (*ab suis maximis castris*<sup>2</sup>) towards Uzita. Where was this camp? Veith,<sup>3</sup> remarking that it could not have been on any of the hills that formed the ridge between Uzita and the sea, since none of them afforded space for the five legions or more, which it contained,<sup>4</sup> concludes that it must have been further back (that is eastward) and on the plateau. Accordingly he locates it about 5 furlongs (just over one kilometre) eastward of the redoubt which Caesar constructed on the hill called Rhar ed Deba. This conclusion clashes with the statement that the trenches started from the camp itself; and turning to Veith's map (Karte 19 b), we find that he traces them, not from the camp but from the transverse entrenchment, first mentioned in chapter 38,<sup>5</sup> which ran along the western slope of the ridge. Thus he leaves a space of five furlongs unaccounted for. Clearly he is wrong, and Stoffel<sup>6</sup> was doubtless right in placing the camp on the lower slopes of the ridge.<sup>7</sup>

*Bell. Afr.*, 60, 2.—Caesar had ten legions, all told, in the African campaign.<sup>8</sup> Five—the 5th, 9th, 10th, 13th, and 14th—were composed of veterans, five of recruits. Of the latter the numbers of four are stated, namely, XXVI, XXVIII, XXVIII, and XXX. Stoffel<sup>9</sup> guessed that the missing number was XXV; Nipperdey conjectured that XXV should be substituted for XXX, because the 30th legion was raised in 49 B.C.,<sup>10</sup> and therefore was no longer composed of *tirones* in the year of the African campaign. This is a good if not conclusive reason. R. Schneider remarks that we cannot suppose that the missing number was, as one might have expected, XXVII, because the 27th was mentioned by Caesar<sup>11</sup> in his narrative of the events of 48 B. C. Yet Schneider, though he accepts Nipperdey's conjecture, himself affirms that the 30th was a newly raised legion!<sup>12</sup> The conclusion appears to be that only three of the numbers are known; but the question is historically unimportant.

*Bell. Afr.*, 67, 1.—Our authority tells us that Caesar, before marching for Aggar, burned his camp. In my narrative I have followed Stoffel's explanation.<sup>13</sup> R. Schneider, referring to *Bell. Hisp.*, 7, 1 and 10, 2, where we are told that Gnaeus Pompeius burned his camp before undertaking marches the direction of which he had no motive for concealing, suggests that Caesar intended to prevent Scipio from using his camp, and points out that as timber suitable for fortification was rare in Africa, the construction of a camp was

<sup>1</sup> See p. 255.    <sup>2</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 51, 2.    <sup>3</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, pp. 803-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 56, 1.    <sup>5</sup> §§ 2-3.    <sup>6</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 127.

<sup>7</sup> Veith admits that the site which he has selected is only 5 Roman miles from the harbour of Leptis, whereas, according to *Bell. Afr.*, 63, 1, it was 6; but, he adds, the difference is negligible, and, besides, the writer probably meant to indicate the distance between Leptis and the smaller camp on Sidi Jeha. Readers who consult the passage will not accept this suggestion.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 535.    <sup>9</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 295.    <sup>10</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 53, 5.

<sup>11</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 34, 2.    <sup>12</sup> See his note on *Bell. Afr.*, 2, 1.

<sup>13</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 136.

tedious and laborious. No doubt: Caesar did well to prevent Scipio from using the wood; but what motive could Scipio have had for occupying Caesar's deserted camp?

### THE THIRD PHASE: AGGAR AND THE OPERATIONS CONNECTED THEREWITH

**Aggar.**—To determine the site of Aggar is important, not only because it would help us to locate three other towns—Zeta, Vaga, and Tegea—but also because it is essential to a full understanding of the movements that preceded the battle of Thapsus. The data are as follows.—Caesar marched from his camp, about 6 miles west of Leptis, to Aggar, which was 16 or, according to the MS. known as V, 13 Roman miles from the outskirts of Thapsus, and encamped in a plain in its neighbourhood.<sup>1</sup> Scipio, who had been encamped a little to the west of Caesar's former position, followed him along the crest of the ridge [east of Uzita], encamped 6 miles from his camp and evidently west of it, and sent two legions in quest of corn to Zeta, 10 miles westward or north-westward from his own camp and 14 miles from Caesar's.<sup>2</sup> On hearing of this move, Caesar constructed a new camp on a hill, left a detachment to hold it, marched past Scipio's camp, and took possession of Zeta.<sup>3</sup> Some days later he marched from Aggar—or rather, as our authority doubtless means, from his new camp near Aggar—to the outskirts of Thapsus. Scipio and Juba followed him, marching on high ground, and established two separate camps 8 miles from Thapsus. Scipio, finding himself prevented by Caesar's piquets from relieving Thapsus, turned back, marched round the western side of the salt marsh of Moknine, and, entering the isthmus which separated it on the north from the sea (*itinere supra stagnum . . . confecto*), encamped a mile and a half from Caesar's camp and close to the shore.<sup>4</sup>

Stoffel<sup>5</sup> locates Aggar about two miles south of Lemta and one kilometre north-west of Kasser Helal, on a site where, he remarks, traces of an ancient town have been discovered. With characteristic dogmatism he asserts that military reasons establish this identification, and with characteristic contempt for his readers he omits to explain them. Colonel Veith, as we shall see, rejects them. Meanwhile it is sufficient to say that they are at variance with the statement that Scipio followed Caesar when the latter marched from Aggar to Thapsus. For if Stoffel's location of Aggar is right, Caesar evidently marched from Aggar along the northern edge of the marsh of Moknine; but Scipio in the first instance marched along its southern side. Besides, Aggar was 16, or perhaps 13, Roman miles from the outskirts of Thapsus, whereas the site which Stoffel identified with that of Aggar is only 10 from Thapsus itself; and accordingly Stoffel,<sup>6</sup> submissively followed by Rudolf Schneider, substituted X for XVI.

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 63, 1; 67; 79, 2.      <sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 67, 3; 68, 1.      See p. 525.      <sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 79, 2–80, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 280.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 297.



Tissot,<sup>1</sup> who saw that Scipio must have followed Caesar, located Aggar at Beni Hassan, 11 kilometres (about 7 miles) west of the marsh. He of course supposed that Caesar marched for Thapsus round the northern side of the marsh, and that Scipio, following him, encamped at Sokrine, about 8 Roman miles west of Thapsus. But this assumption compelled him to mistranslate *supra stagnum*. He argued that when Scipio found himself barred by Caesar's piquets, he turned back and marched round the southern side of the marsh.<sup>2</sup>

Veith<sup>3</sup> places Aggar about two kilometres north of Ksour es Saf, which is 15 Roman miles, in a straight line, south of Thapsus; and this view seems to me unassailable.

**Zeta.**—Zeta was 10 Roman miles from Scipio's encampment near Tegea in the direction—evidently westward—of which he was master,<sup>4</sup> and 14<sup>5</sup> (or 18<sup>5</sup> or 19<sup>5</sup>) from Caesar's original camp near Aggar. When Caesar was returning from Zeta to his second camp near the same town, he was obliged to pass Scipio's encampment.<sup>6</sup> Tissot<sup>7</sup> identifies Zeta with Knaïs, and Stoffel<sup>8</sup> with Bourdjine; but it is unnecessary to discuss their arguments, because they misplace Aggar and, as we shall presently see, Tegea, upon their identification of which their reasoning depends. Veith<sup>9</sup> decides for Beni Hassan, 10 miles north-west of Tegea (Henchir Merbesse<sup>10</sup>) and a little less from Scipio's encampment. He is, I am sure, right in adopting the reading *XIV*; for in face of the persistent attacks which Caesar encountered when he was returning,<sup>11</sup> and which compelled him to move very slowly, he could hardly have covered 18 or 19 miles even in a long day's march.

**Caesar's flank march from Aggar to Zeta.**—Stoffel<sup>12</sup> thinks that Caesar undertook this hazardous march simply in order to procure grain, and asserts that he returned 'avec de grands approvisionnements'. This is an invention. Apparently Stoffel forgets that Scipio's legions went to collect grain not in Zeta itself but in the surrounding country, and that Caesar did not venture to attack them.<sup>13</sup>

I wish that our authority had explained how Caesar succeeded in marching 6 miles in two or three hours, whereas he had just before taken four hours to advance less than 160 yards.<sup>14</sup> We may, I think, find a partial explanation in the nature of the country. As Veith remarks,<sup>15</sup> Caesar moved first across the low-lying tract near Sidi Neja, then over hilly ground close to the northernmost of Scipio's three camps, which, while it was sufficiently flat to allow Labienus's cavalry to act, offered cover for ambushes and sudden attacks.

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, ii, 744.

<sup>2</sup> Veith (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, pp. 812-4, 835, n. 3) gives additional reasons for rejecting the theories of Tissot and Stoffel.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 811-9.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 68, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.* The various readings are *XIV* (L), *XVIII* (ρ SVW), *XVIII* (T).

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 69, 1. <sup>7</sup> *Géogr. . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, ii, 744-7.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 280-1. <sup>9</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, p. 820.

<sup>10</sup> See p. 527.

<sup>11</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 68-9.

<sup>12</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 136.

<sup>13</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 67, 3-4. <sup>14</sup> Cf. 67, 3 with 69-70.

<sup>15</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, p. 820.



He was obliged to move about 5 kilometres over this country before he reached the plain, where he could march faster.

**The meaning of *levis armatura*.**—The expression *levis armatura* (light-armed troops) is occasionally obscure, for instance in *Bell. Afr.*, 81, 1 (*sagittariis, funditoribus in utrisque cornibus dispositis levique armatura inter equites interiecta*), where it evidently denotes troops who were neither archers nor slingers. The only light troops in Caesar's army who can be certainly identified were (1) archers, (2) slingers, (3) the runners who regularly accompanied his Gallic and German cavalry,<sup>1</sup> and (4) the picked legionaries (*antesignani*) who, specially armed, occasionally served as light infantry.<sup>2</sup> In the passage which I have quoted and in *Bell. Civ.*, iii, 45, 3 *levis armatura* is unmistakably distinct from *antesignani* as well as from archers and slingers. I can only suggest that they were the light infantry attached to the cavalry, who, though they usually fought in conjunction with them,<sup>3</sup> sometimes, as in the blockade of Dyrrachium,<sup>4</sup> acted independently, and perhaps also Spanish 'targeteers' like those whom Afranius and Petreius had enlisted for the campaign of Ilorda.<sup>5</sup>

*Bell. Afr.*, 76, 3.—When Caesar found that he could not safely attack Thisdra (El Djem), he marched in quest of water to a point about 4 miles from the town—probably on its north-east, where the site of a well is marked on the Staff Map<sup>6</sup>—and, moving thence on the fourth day, returned to the camp which he had occupied near Aggar (*atque inde quarto die egressus redit rursus ad ea castra quae ad Aggar habuerat*). Stoffel<sup>7</sup> insists that *egressus* is a substantive (!) and translates *quarto die egressus* by 'le quatrième jour de sa sortie'. His faithful henchman, Rudolf Schneider, who was at all events a scholar, ignores this absurdity and says that '*quarto die* belongs not to *egressus*, but to *redit*'. The whole expedition, he explains, lasted four days. On the first Caesar captured Sarsura; on the second he marched past Thisdra to the watering-place [which does not exist on the further side of Thisdra<sup>8</sup>]; on the third he began his return march; and on the fourth he reached Aggar. Schneider was compelled to devise this explanation of the text because, blindly following Stoffel, he misplaced Aggar 31 miles from the watering-place. The distance (15½ miles) was really not more than one day's march.<sup>9</sup> Caesar quitted the watering-place on the fourth day and reached his camp near Aggar in the afternoon.

**Thabena.**—Thabena is not mentioned by any ancient writer except the author of *Bellum Africanum*.<sup>10</sup> Colonel Moinier<sup>11</sup> pro-

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i, 48, 5-7; vii, 18, 1; 80, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 78, 5. Cf. *B. C.*, iii, 75, 5; 84, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 60, 5.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, iii, 45, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, i, 39, 1. According to Appian (ii, 96, 401), Scipio had targeteers.

<sup>6</sup> *Atlas archéol. de la Tunisie*, Feuille LXXIII.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 296-7.

<sup>8</sup> The writer does not say (*protinus progressus*, but *profectus*).

<sup>9</sup> Surely Veith (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, 1912, p. 874), who agrees with Schneider, does not mean, as his map (Karte 18) seems to imply, that Caesar returned by Sarsura, thus going far out of his way?

<sup>10</sup> 77, 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Rev. afr.*, xlv, 1902, p. 340.

poses to read *Thena*, the name of a town which, according to Strabo,<sup>1</sup> Caesar captured in the course of the campaign. But, according to the anonymous historian, Caesar garrisoned Thabena at the request of its inhabitants.

*Bell. Afr.*, 77, 3.—After the arrival of his final reinforcements Caesar had ten complete legions as well as seven veteran cohorts.<sup>2</sup> In order to estimate the number of men who were available for service in the field, we must deduct the cohorts which had been detached to garrison Ruspina, Leptis, Acylla, Zeta, and Thabena. The original garrison of Leptis consisted of 6 cohorts,<sup>3</sup> that of Thabena, a comparatively unimportant place, of 3 or perhaps only one.<sup>4</sup> The strength of the other three garrisons is not stated. Those of Acylla, Leptis, and Ruspina were probably increased when Caesar marched to Aggar;<sup>5</sup> but they may have been reduced when he quitted Ruspina to take the offensive against Scipio.<sup>5</sup>

**Tegea.**—All that we are told about the geographical position of Tegea is that it was 'below' (*infra*) Scipio's three camps, which were 6 Roman miles W. by N. of Caesar's original camp near Aggar,<sup>6</sup> and therefore on the lower slopes of the hills which on that side close the plain. Tissot<sup>7</sup> and Stoffel,<sup>8</sup> who both misplaced Aggar, located Tegea at Bourdjine and Beni Hassan respectively: as it was in the plain and so situated that the cavalry piquets which had been posted outside its walls could threaten Caesar's flank when he was advancing against Scipio, Veith<sup>9</sup> rightly identifies it with the ruins called Henchir Merbesse, about a mile from the foot of the hills.

*Bell. Afr.*, 78.—The original account of the combat of Tegea presents one difficulty. Caesar ordered 'squadrons of his cavalry to attack the enemy's cavalry outposts near the town, and sent up light-armed troops, archers, and slingers to the same point' (*equitum turmas suorum iubet in hostium equitatum, qui ad oppidum in statione erant, facere impressionem, levemque armaturam, sagittarios funditoresque eodem submittit*). After the squadrons had charged, Pacideius (who commanded under Labienus) began to deploy his cavalry with the object of enveloping the squadrons. Caesar thereupon sent

<sup>1</sup> xvii, 3, 12. Moinier identifies *Thena* with Henchir Tiné, about 7 miles south-west of Sfax, which is itself some 80 miles south of Thapsus! What had Caesar to do with that remote tract?

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 534-6. <sup>3</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 9, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 77, 2. The MSS. differ: S, which Schneider follows, has *tribus cum cohortibus*, T *cum cohortibus tribus*, V *cum tribus cohortibus*, W *tribunum cum cohorte*. If the last-named reading, adopted by Kübler and Veith, is correct, the tribune was Marcius Crispus, who is mentioned in all the MSS. immediately before.

<sup>5</sup> I see that Veith (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, pp. 872, 884) has anticipated my conjecture.

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 67, 3. We learn from 75, 1 and 77, 4 (where, as the editors agree, the other two passages show that for the MS. *VIII* we must substitute *V*) that Scipio's encampment was 7 Roman miles from the second camp which Caesar constructed near Aggar (68, 2). If these figures were correct, the position which Veith (Karte 20) has assigned to Caesar's original camp is too far east.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, ii, 746-7.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 280.

<sup>9</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, p. 819.

300 men (part of his 'light brigade'), belonging to the legion nearest to the scene of the combat, to support his cavalry; Labienus meanwhile reinforced *his* cavalry; and as Caesar's cavalry, which numbered only 400, were unable to make head against the enemy, he sent the other wing (*alteram alam mittit*) to assist them. The reader asks himself whether Caesar had originally sent his squadrons (*equitum turmas suorum*) against one only of the enemy's outposts (which were on the west and the east of the town) or against both. As he mentions *alteram alam* afterwards, R. Schneider infers that instead of *suorum*, which, as he remarks, is superfluous, we ought to read *sinistrorsum*. If this conjecture is right, the squadrons were sent in the first instance against the left, or western, outpost only.

#### THE FINAL PHASE: THAPSUS

*Bell. Afr.*, 79, 2.—Veith<sup>1</sup> affirms that the 'suitable positions' (*loca idonea oportunaque*) at which Caesar posted piquets when he reached the outskirts of Thapsus were the knolls called El Faca and Dahret el Hafsa, and whoever consults the *Atlas archéologique de la Tunisie* (Feuille LXVI) will see that he has chosen well. But these are the only *loca* which he marks on his map (Karte 21); yet the writer of *Bellum Africanum* says that there were several (*complura*), implying that there were at least three. The additional site which I have indicated is of course conjectural.

*Bell. Afr.*, 80, 2.—The writer says that when Caesar was blockading Thapsus he occupied a crescent-shaped camp (*ipse cum reliquis copiis lunatis castris Thapsum operibus circummunivit*). Stoffel<sup>2</sup> supposes that he made three camps on a crescent-shaped line. R. Schneider, who observes that *lunatis* (castris) cannot mean this, substitutes an emendation of his own, *locatis*, remarking that Roman camps were always rectangular unless the nature of the ground rendered it necessary to adopt another form. But his conjecture is demonstrably wrong; for, as Veith<sup>3</sup> observes, *locare* never means 'to pitch' a camp: the proper word is *ponere*, to which he might have added *communire*, *facere*, *metari*, and *munire*.<sup>4</sup> Remarking that the two knolls called El Behira, which dominated Thapsus, were undoubtedly the site of the principal camp, he argues that in the interval—less than five furlongs (about one kilometre)—between the knolls and the sea on either side other camps would have been superfluous, entrenchments being quite enough. The crescent was formed by camp and entrenchments combined.

Did Scipio originally intend to blockade Caesar at Thapsus?—

<sup>1</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, pp. 834–5.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 142.

<sup>3</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, p. 834, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, i, 460–5. Schneider refers to *Bell. Afr.*, 36, 4 (*castrum . . . loco munito locatum*) and 56, 3 (*castra, quae erant in campo proxime . . . Uzitae locata*); but these texts are obviously irrelevant. The words *loco munito* and *in campo*, with which *locare* is coupled, make all the difference; *locare* is not used to show that a camp was constructed, but to indicate where it was. Cf. *Thes. ling. Lat.*, iii, 549.



Veith,<sup>1</sup> evidently referring to Stoffel,<sup>2</sup> scornfully observes that Scipio's march from Tegea to the southern end of the isthmus (of Thapsus)<sup>3</sup> 'has been represented as an attempt to succour Thapsus!' Why not? Consider what Veith's theory—that Scipio's *original* purpose was to blockade both the southern and the northern end—involves. It implies that Scipio marched without the slightest necessity far out of his way, and thus did his best to endanger the success of his alleged plan, although, as Veith himself truly says, every moment was precious. Very likely, as both Veith<sup>4</sup> and I have surmised, the leading spirit on the side of the allies was Labienus; but it does not follow that the renegade's genius had free play, and Scipio was no general. If Scipio's original plan was to blockade both the exits of the isthmus, surely his best course would have been to detach the divisions of Juba and Afranius, which actually encamped at the southern end, and to march with the rest of the force to the position which he ultimately occupied on the north. Veith<sup>5</sup> supposes that he intended in company with Labienus to gain the northern isthmus 'by the shortest way behind and round Thapsus'—in other words, along a strip of ground barely two miles wide, which was already occupied by Caesar's army! If Scipio had formed this wild project, would Labienus have abetted him? The writer of *Bellum Africanum* says that Scipio found himself unable to approach Thapsus from the south because Caesar had constructed a redoubt on that side and there established a piquet.<sup>6</sup> Where was this redoubt? Veith<sup>7</sup> says that it was unquestionably on Dahret el Hafsa; in other words he identifies it with one of the 'several' (*complura*) fortified posts which Caesar established round Thapsus. I suggest that this, so far from being unquestionable, is improbable. Our authority, after saying that Scipio intended to enter the narrow passage between the salt marsh [of Moknine] and the sea and relieve the garrison of Thapsus, tells us that Caesar, anticipating his design, had established a fortified post *on that spot*, and *leaving* a garrison to hold it, proceeded with the rest of his force to surround Thapsus with earthworks (*Erat stagnum salinarum, inter quod et mare angustiae quaedam . . . intererant; quas Scipio intrare et Thapsitanis auxilium ferre conabatur. Quod futurum Caesarem non fefellerat. Namque pridie in eo loco castello munito ibique III <cohortium> praesidio relicto ipse cum reliquis copiis lunatis castris Thapsum operibus circummunivit*). I take it that *angustiae* denotes the southern end of the isthmus, and

<sup>1</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, p. 905.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 142.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 79, 3; 80, 1.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 274, n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 876.

<sup>6</sup> 80, 2. *Namque pridie in eo loco castello munito ibique III. praesidio relicto. The numeral III. (=tertio) would imply that Caesar had posted two piquets on the western side of Thapsus; but in the preceding paragraph (79, 2) we are informed that he had posted several (oppidum . . . circummunire coepit locaque idonea oportunaque complura praesidiis occupare). Stoffel (ii, 297) merely remarks that legionum cannot have dropped out of the text after III, for a fortified position occupied by three legions could not have been called a castellum, and I may add that there were not three legions to spare. Veith (pp. 851 n. 1, 853 n. 1) suggests, reasonably enough, that the missing word is cohortium.*

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 836.



the words printed in open italics prove that Caesar established the redoubt there, and then marched on to fortify the outskirts of Thapsus. I believe therefore that the redoubt was either on the 21 metre or on the 26 metre hill near the southern end. Veith<sup>1</sup> supposes that on the day after Scipio reached the isthmus he and Labienus, leaving Afranius and Juba behind, marched northward to seize Dahret el Hafsa, but, finding it occupied by Caesar, were obliged to turn back and make the détour right round the marsh. But, apart from the fact that the passage which I have quoted throws doubt upon his theory, is it conceivable that Labienus would have expected to find that Caesar had neglected to secure that all-important hill? Is it not obvious that by marching to Dahret el Hafsa and thus revealing his intention Scipio would have done his best to put Caesar on his guard and thus thrown away his only chance of being able to complete the contravallation which he began after he had marched round the marsh before Caesar could discover him? Even if he had seized Dahret el Hafsa, that would not have enabled him to gain the northern isthmus in the teeth of Caesar's army.

*Bell. Afr.*, 80, 3-4.—'Meanwhile Scipio, baffled [in his attempt to relieve Thapsus from the south], turned the northern side of the morass and, completing his march within the following day and night, halted at dawn not far from the camp [Caesar's] and the strong position above mentioned, and began to entrench his camp' (*Scipio interim exclusus ab incepto, itinere supra stagnum postero die et nocte confecto caelo albente non longe a castris praesidioque, quod supra commemoravi . . . consedit et castra munire coepit*). The meaning, one would think, is unmistakable; but Stoffel<sup>2</sup> mistook it. He says that Scipio and Juba, [whom the writer does not mention in this connexion] after marching round the southern and western sides of the marsh, encamped in two camps.—one just north-east of Moknine, the other about a mile and a quarter east of it; and that in the following night Scipio moved on and began to construct a new camp (*castra munire coepit*) just west of Bekalta. The fictitious location of two camps near Moknine is evidently due to Stoffel's having misunderstood the passage<sup>3</sup> in which the writer says that after the battle of Thapsus Scipio's troops fled first to Scipio's [other] camp and then to Juba's. He failed to see that the camps to which the troops fled were those (mentioned in 79, 3) which Scipio and Juba had constructed near the south-eastern corner of the marsh. Even Schneider here rebels against his master, though he reproduces his map!

Why, Veith<sup>4</sup> asks, did Scipio come so close to Caesar's camp instead of trying to block the northern isthmus at its western end? Because, he replies, the part which he selected for entrenchment was stronger and its breadth less. No doubt; but even if he had halted on the western side, he could not have escaped detection or completed the works in time.

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 876.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 85, 3-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 143, 293.

<sup>4</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, pp. 848-9.

The first sentence of the passage which I have quoted requires careful examination. I have reproduced it as it stands in the MSS.—*Scipio . . . itinere supra stagnum postero die et nocte confecto caelo albente . . . consedit*, &c. Schneider, remarking that the length of the marsh, according to Stoffel's map (Pl. 20), was at the most 20 kilometres (12½ miles), argues that it must have begun in the night, and accordingly deletes *et*. The argument is worthless, because Schneider puts the starting-point much too far west.<sup>1</sup> Veith,<sup>2</sup> however, adopts Schneider's conclusion for a different reason. If, he says, we accept the MS. reading, we get one day too much for the interval between the date—*Prid. Non. April.*—on which Caesar started from his camp near Aggar for Thapsus<sup>3</sup> and the date of the battle,—*a. d. VIII. Id. April.*<sup>4</sup> The latter date coincides with April 6 of the unreformed calendar: the former with April 4. I cannot see the force of Veith's objection. Let me present the order of events as I conceive it:—

April 4 (before daybreak)	Caesar quits Aggar.
" "	" encamps near Thapsus.
" , (before daybreak)	Scipio quits his camp near Tegea.
" "	" reaches the southern end of the isthmus.
" 5	" marches round the marsh and, after allowing his troops time for food and rest, reaches the northern end of the isthmus before dawn (April 6), and proceeds to entrench it.
" 6	Battle of Thapsus.

Is not everything in order? Scipio, as *postero die* shows, passed the night of April 4 at the southern end of the isthmus. Veith holds that on the following day (*postero die*), April 5, he and Labienus first marched northward in the hope of gaining the northern end of the isthmus by passing round Thapsus, and then turned back and marched in the night round the marsh; but I have already given reasons<sup>5</sup> for dissenting from this view. I hold that the redoubt which Scipio found himself unable to turn<sup>6</sup> was near the two camps which he and Labienus, Afranius and Juba had formed; that he turned back in the course of the day and allowed his men some hours for sleep in the night.

**The battle and the pursuit.**—1. Before the battle of Thapsus the bulk of Caesar's infantry was formed, as usual, in three lines, two veteran legions<sup>7</sup> being on the right wing, two others on the left, and one or two of the newly raised legions in the centre:<sup>8</sup> the 5th legion

<sup>1</sup> See p. 266, n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 838, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 79, 2.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 540.

<sup>5</sup> pp. 529-30.

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 80, 2.

<sup>7</sup> According to the MSS., 'the 10th and the 2nd' (*X. secundaque*); but the 2nd legion took no part in the campaign. Nipperdey (followed by Veith) proposed *X. XIII.que* and instead of *VIII. et VIII.*, which, according to the MSS., were on the left, *XVIII. et VIII.*; for the 8th legion also was absent. Schneider, referring to 60, 2, suggests *X. VIII.que dextro cornu, XIII. et XIII. sinistro*. For a right understanding of the battle the matter is unimportant.

<sup>8</sup> The writer of *Bell. Afr.* does not say how many legions of recruits formed the centre. There were five such legions in all. Two of them were doubtless the legions which Caesar left to guard his camp. Veith (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*,

was disposed in two groups, each composed of five cohorts, forming a fourth line, 'by the wings' (*ad ipsa cornua*), to encounter Scipio's elephants; while the archers and slingers were posted on either wing (*in utrisque cornibus*), and light infantry were interspersed in the ranks of the cavalry.<sup>1</sup> When we read that the veteran legions were posted 'on the right wing and the left' (*dextro cornu* and *sinistro*) and that the archers and slingers were on either wing, we ask ourselves whether the archers and slingers were formed in prolongation of the wings or immediately in front of them. I conclude that the former is the meaning; for they opened the attack on the elephants,<sup>2</sup> which the cohorts of the 5th legion were to support,<sup>3</sup> and were evidently stationed in front of those cohorts.<sup>4</sup> The cavalry must have formed the extreme right and left.<sup>5</sup>

2. 'As Caesar hesitated . . . and loudly insisted that he did not approve of a disorderly attack' (*Dubitante Caesare . . . sibi que eruptione pugnari non placere clamitante* [*Bell. Afr.*, 82, 3]). These words have puzzled many commentators. R. Schneider says that *eruptione* is unintelligible. I was at first inclined to suggest that the true reading is *irruptione*, meaning 'a [premature] attempt to storm [Scipio's] camp'; but I now believe that Veith<sup>6</sup> has solved the difficulty. He conjectures that when Caesar made the remark in question the deploying of the troops on the left wing, where the ground presented obstacles, was incomplete, but that the right wing, where the author of *Bellum Africanum* probably stood, did not allow for this and impatiently pressed on. Thus *eruptione pugnari* would denote an uncontrollable advance, made with an imperfectly dressed line. If Caesar had not been prevented by indiscipline from throwing all his legions simultaneously against the enemy, their centre and right, when the overthrow of their left decided the battle, would have been unable to retreat and, assailed in flank and rear from the captured camp, would have been annihilated or forced into the marsh of Moknine. This picture of what might have happened is perhaps fancifully coloured; but why Caesar wished to wait is clear. The reasons which Stoffel<sup>7</sup> suggests for Caesar's having been reluctant to yield to the impetuosity of his troops, whether they were formed independently or borrowed without acknowledgement from Guischart,<sup>8</sup> are virtually identical with his; but they have nothing to do with the words *eruptione pugnari*. Guischart says, 'soit qu'il n'eut pas achevé ses dispositions, soit qu'il voulut augmenter le feu de ses troupes', &c.; Stoffel, 'Soit qu'il eût l'intention de modifier ses dispositions prises, soit qu'il voulût exciter encore l'ardeur de ses troupes', &c. Neither suggestion will commend itself. The dis-

iii. 2, p. 839) thinks that there was not room for more than one in the centre. If so, the remaining two had doubtless been detached to garrison Ruspina, Leptis, Acylla, Zeta, and Thabena.

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 81, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 83, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 84.

<sup>4</sup> Stoffel (*Hist. de J. César*, ii, 144) supposes that the cohorts of the 5th legion were ranged obliquely.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Veith, *op. cit.*, p. 840.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 840-1.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 144.

<sup>8</sup> *Mém. mil.*, ii, 1758, p. 272.

positions had been made; the ardour of the troops needed no stimulus, for it was already uncontrollable.<sup>1</sup>

3. The writer of *Bellum Africanum* (47, 3) says that Caesar had forbidden any slaves to accompany the legions from Sicily to Africa (*ita ex Sicilia exercitum transportabat ut . . . nec mancipium neque ullam rem quae usui militi esse consuevit in naves imponi pateretur*). If this is to be understood literally, the slaves (*servitia*) who repulsed the garrison of Thapsus<sup>2</sup> must have belonged to the traders who accompanied the army,<sup>3</sup> or else the troops must have procured servants in Africa.

4. Veith<sup>4</sup> infers from the silence of our authorities that Caesar's cavalry took no part in the battle, and he adds that if they had done so, the fugitives could hardly have reached the camp of Afranius 'without serious hindrance'. Where then, he asks, were the bulk of the cavalry during the action? Probably, he replies, they were pushed southward with orders to oppose Juba and Afranius in case they should attempt to advance.

Veith's question can be readily answered. The Caesarian cavalry, according to *Bellum Africanum*,<sup>5</sup> were on the wings. If they, or the bulk of them, had been detached to threaten Juba and Afranius, surely the two legions which had been left in Caesar's camp<sup>6</sup> would have been sent to support them; but Veith says that they remained there until after the victory. The silence of Plutarch, Appian, and Dio, whose narratives are very brief, proves nothing: the author of *Bellum Africanum* may well have omitted to state that the cavalry joined in the pursuit, seeing that that was what his readers would assume; and, for aught that we know, the flight may have been seriously hindered.

5. 'Meanwhile, Scipio's troops being overthrown and flying helter-skelter all over the field, Caesar's legions pursued' (*Interim Scipionis copiis prostratis passimque toto campo fugientibus confestim Caesaris legiones consequi* [*Bell. Afr.*, 85, 3]). This statement notwithstanding, Veith<sup>7</sup> supposes that a part only of the Caesarian troops which fought in the battle pursued the fugitives, and that Caesar, detaching the rest, marched with them and the two legions which had been left to guard the camp<sup>8</sup> to dispose of Afranius and Juba. Surely the two legions, which had not been in action, would have sufficed to deal with Juba and Afranius, whose troops were doubtless panic-stricken by news of the rout.

6. The site of Parada, which was pillaged by Scipio's cavalry when they were retreating after the battle of Thapsus to Utica,<sup>9</sup> is unknown. Colonel Moinier<sup>10</sup> conjecturally identifies it with Phara, which,

<sup>1</sup> Groebe (W. Drumann's *Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 535, n. 1), alluding to the report noticed by Plutarch (*Caes.*, 53, 3) that Caesar was taken ill while he was forming his line, guesses that it originated in an endeavour to conceal the fact that he lost control over his veterans and to exonerate him from responsibility for the massacre that followed the battle.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 85, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 75, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 843-4.

<sup>5</sup> 81, 1.

<sup>6</sup> 80, 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 844.

<sup>8</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 80, 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, 87, 1-2.

<sup>10</sup> *Rev. afr.*, xlv, 1902, p. 353.



according to Strabo,<sup>1</sup> was burnt by Scipio's cavalry. Strabo does not say where Phara was; but in the previous sentence he mentions that Caesar captured the island of Cercina.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly C. Müller in his edition of Strabo<sup>3</sup> supposes that Φαράν is corrupt, and that the place which the geographer meant was Taphrura, opposite Cercina. So we are to assume that Scipio's cavalry on their way from Thapsus to Utica strayed to the Lesser Syrtis!

7. A series of articles by A. Langhammer, intended to discredit the author of *Bellum Africanum*, has appeared in the *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*<sup>4</sup> and in *Klio*.<sup>5</sup> After reading the last-named and the article in the *Wochenschrift* (1907, col. 1278-9) to which Langhammer invites special attention, I was reminded of what Haverfield once said to me about Dr. Emil Reich,—‘when I see Reich's name at the head of an article I read no further’. Veith,<sup>6</sup> however, has thought it worth while to confute Langhammer in detail.

**Caesar's forces in the final period of the campaign.**—Often as I read *Bellum Africanum* before composing my narrative of the campaign, it never occurred to me then that it would be necessary to write this article; for the information given by the author about the troops with which Caesar took the field and the successive reinforcements which he received is so transparently clear that it seemed impossible to misunderstand it. But I forgot to allow for the ingenuity that imagines difficulties. When Caesar reached Lilybaeum, whence he sailed for Africa, he found one legion of recruits and about 600 cavalry awaiting him.<sup>7</sup> A few days later four more legions of recruits, a veteran legion (the 5th), and 2,000 cavalry arrived.<sup>8</sup> The six legions immediately embarked along with 2,000 cavalry.<sup>9</sup> Here a little difficulty does arise. Did our author write ‘2,000’ (*equitum II milibus*) by mistake for ‘2,600’, or did he mean to imply that the odd 600 were left behind in Sicily? And in the latter case did the odd 600 remain in Sicily during the campaign, or were they included in cavalry which sailed for Africa later? These questions cannot be answered; but their importance is infinitesimal. An incidental remark of the writer<sup>10</sup> shows that the six legions and the 2,000 (or 2,600) cavalry were accompanied by seven cohorts belonging to certain veteran legions. The reinforcements crossed from Sicily to Africa in three successive convoys: first came the 13th legion and the 14th, 800 Gallic cavalry, and 1,000 archers and slingers;<sup>11</sup> next the 9th legion and the 10th;<sup>12</sup> finally 4,000 legionaries, who, from illness or from having had leave of absence, had been unable to accompany their respective corps, 400 cavalry, 1,000 archers and slingers.<sup>13</sup> Between the arrival of the second and that of the third convoy<sup>14</sup> about 1,000 Gaetulian cavalry deserted to Caesar;<sup>15</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> xvii, 3, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Bell. Afr.*, 8, 3.

<sup>3</sup> p. 1043.

<sup>4</sup> 1906, col. 1598; 1907, col. 1278-9; 1908, col. 1548; 1911, col. 948.

<sup>5</sup> ix, 1909, pp. 395-9. See p. 570, *infra*.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 816, 831-2, 840-1, 846-7, 850-2.

<sup>7</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 1, 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, § 5.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, 2, 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, 10, 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, 34, 4.

<sup>12</sup> *Ib.*, 53, 1.

<sup>13</sup> *Ib.*, 77, 3.

<sup>14</sup> I mean of course the third convoy of reinforcements. Including the troops with which Caesar himself embarked, there were four convoys. <sup>15</sup> *Ib.*, 56, 4.

various other deserters are mentioned in the narrative.<sup>1</sup> It is certain, moreover, that archers accompanied the six legions and the cavalry which originally sailed from Sicily; for before the arrival of the first convoy that conveyed reinforcements 150 archers served in the operations near Ruspina.<sup>2</sup> Finally, 'light troops' (*levis armatura*), who were neither archers nor slingers, are noticed from time to time.<sup>3</sup> Thus Caesar had altogether five veteran legions, seven veteran cohorts, five legions of recruits, at least 2,150 archers and slingers, certain light troops, 4,200 (or 4,800) cavalry, and an indeterminate number of deserters.

So far the facts are undeniable. But for those who lack the discernment to interpret a somewhat ill-arranged narrative one passage (62, 1) has left an opening for error:— 'Meanwhile Varus, learning that the 7th legion and the 9th were approaching from Sicily, hurriedly launched the fleet which he had previously hauled up ashore at Utica for the winter,' &c. (*Interim Varus classem, quam antea Uticae hiemis gratia subduxerat, cognito legionis VII. et VIII. ex Sicilia adventu celeriter deducit*). So runs the passage in the MSS. known as  $\pi$ :  $\rho$ SW have *VII. et VIII.* Thus, according to the latter group, two new legions appear; according to the former, one. Whereupon Tissot,<sup>4</sup> accepting the reading of  $\rho$ SW, concludes that 'Caesar's force in the last period of the campaign consisted of twelve legions'; while Stoffel<sup>5</sup> first asserts that 'the two legions mentioned in the first sentence [of chapter 62] can only be the 7th and 8th', and immediately afterwards, forgetting that the 7th and the 8th were veteran legions and that Caesar already had five others—the 5th, 9th, 10th, 13th, and 14th—observes that 'Caesar had only five veteran legions' (*César n'avait que cinq vieilles légions*), the inference being that two *plus* five equal five. This reminds me of the title of a German mathematical treatise by Fred. Bon, which is to be found in the British Museum,—*Ist es wahr, dass  $2 \times 2 = 4$  ist?* (Is it true that twice two is four?). Now when I first read *Bellum Africanum* I noted in the margin that chapter 62 evidently referred back to chapter 53, and I was glad to find that Rudolf Schneider in a footnote had said the same. In other words, the author dumped down in 62, 63, and 64 the story of events which he ought to have described in connexion with 53. And since in 53 we learn that the 9th and the 10th sailed from Sicily, it follows that in 62 both groups of MSS. are wrong, and that the correction proposed by Wölfflin—*X. et VIII.*—is right.<sup>6</sup> I doubt whether any reader who had familiarized himself with the author's style and had noticed the

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, 32, 3; 35, 6; 52, 5-6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 12, 3. Cf. 20, 2.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 526.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. . . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, ii, 757, n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 296.

<sup>6</sup> Nipperdey (*C. I. Caesaris comm.*, 1847, p. 220), remarking that in 44, 2 we are told that some soldiers belonging to the 13th and 14th legions were captured by the fleet of Varus, concludes that what the author really wrote in 62, 1 was (cognito legionis) *XIII. et XIII.* (ex Sicilia adventu). But it is clear that when the first convoy of reinforcements with the 13th and 14th legions arrived Varus had not yet hauled up his ships for the winter; and who will believe that in 62 the author was referring to the first rather than to the second convoy, when he had already mentioned both?

precision with which he chronicled the arrival of each successive convoy would believe that he merely mentioned the arrival of two additional legions in the allusive way supposed by Tissot and Stoffel. I find that Veith has anticipated this observation, though he refutes the two critics at much greater length than I have thought necessary.<sup>1</sup> Groebe<sup>2</sup> endeavoured to bolster up a hopeless case by arguments which Veith has thought it necessary to answer.<sup>3</sup>

## ZAMA

For this history it matters little where Zama was, for it lay outside the theatre of the African campaign; but although the battle, called after Zama, in which Scipio Africanus defeated Hannibal, was not fought there, but in the neighbourhood of Naraggara, some readers may wish to inform themselves about the place where Juba sought refuge just before he died.

The sites of two Numidian towns called Zama have been fixed by the discovery of inscriptions: one is represented by Sidi Abd el Djedidi,<sup>4</sup> 50 kilometres, or about 31 miles, north-west of Kairouan; the other by Jama,<sup>5</sup> some 40 kilometres further west. Which, if either, was the Zama of which we are in search?

We learn from *Bellum Africanum*<sup>6</sup> that at Zama Juba had a palace where his wives and children lived; that all his treasure and valuables were deposited in the town; and that at the beginning

<sup>1</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii. 2, pp. 881-3.

<sup>2</sup> W. Drumann's *Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, pp. 713-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 884-7. Perhaps I ought myself to notice Groebe's least vulnerable argument. The author of *Bellum Africanum* (81, 1), immediately after mentioning the four legions which in the battle of Thapsus formed Caesar's wings and immediately before saying that five cohorts were posted as a fourth line by each of the wings, mentions (if the MSS. are right) five legions (*quinque legiones*). Thus the text runs: *ipse [Caesar] acie triplici conlocata, legione X. secundaque dextro cornu, VIII. et VIIII. sinistro oppositis, quinque legiones in quarta acie ad ipsa cornua quinque cohortibus contra bestias conlocatis, &c.* Since *quinque legiones*, as the text stands, is unintelligible, Groebe and the editors who accept this reading are obliged to suppose that some words have dropped out. Vielhaber, assuming that the writer would have stated what troops formed the centre, and perceiving that five legions were too many, conjectured that what he wrote was (*oppositis*) *duabus in media, quintae legionis* (in quarta acie, &c.). In other words, he guessed that the centre was composed of two legions, and that the ten cohorts which formed the fourth line belonged to the 5th legion. Schneider adopted the latter part of this emendation, but rejected the former, arguing, reasonably enough, that the writer thought it unnecessary to mention the legion or legions of recruits, which, as the latter part of the chapter shows, formed the centre. His correction, which merely substitutes *quintae legionis* for *quinque legiones*, makes it unnecessary to suppose that anything has dropped out of the text and, in agreement with Veith (p. 839, n. 3) I accept it. Groebe (*op. cit.*, pp. 534-5, n. 8) of course adopts the reading *quinque legiones*, in order to prop up his theory that Caesar had twelve legions in all. Thus he supposes that while the two wings comprised four legions only, the centre consisted of five. If this were true, ten legions, besides cavalry, archers, slingers, and other light-armed troops would have been arrayed on a front of about 2,700 yards! Cf. Veith, pp. 885-6.

<sup>4</sup> *C. I. L.*, viii, Suppl. i, 12018. <sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 16442 (=H. Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 6789).

<sup>6</sup> 91, 2.



of the war he had strengthened it by fortifications. Naturally then it is generally agreed that this Zama was identical with the 'Royal Zama' (*Zama Regia*) mentioned in the *Table* of Peutinger.<sup>1</sup> Sallust<sup>2</sup> says that in the Jugurthine War Metellus after the battle of the Muthul (Oued Mellegue) moved against Zama, which he calls 'the stronghold of the kingdom' (*arcem regni*) and describes as situated in a plain and fortified, but not naturally strong (*in campo situm, magis opere quam natura munitum*<sup>3</sup>), adding that hard by there was a low eminence, which the Romans occupied (*Romani . . . locum cepere paulo quam alii editiorem*<sup>4</sup>). On the march Metellus dispatched Marius in quest of grain to Sicca,<sup>5</sup> which stood upon the site of El Kef,<sup>6</sup> east of the Muthul, but about 50 kilometres west of Jama. One may infer that Sallust's Zama was either identical with Jama or close by; at all events that it is not to be confounded with Sidi Abd el Djedidi. Moreover, the words *arcem regni* may suggest that it was the same as Zama Regia, which, as the *Table* shows, was between Assures (Zanfour<sup>7</sup>) and Uzappa (El Ksour<sup>8</sup>), the former being about 27 kilometres south-west of Jama, the latter about 37 kilometres south-west of Sidi Abd el Djedidi. Polybius<sup>9</sup> tells us that when Hannibal, marching from Hadrumetum (Sousse) to encounter Scipio, reached the neighbourhood of Zama, 'about five days' march west of Carthage', he sent scouts to reconnoitre Scipio's camp, and that soon afterwards Scipio moved to Naraggara (Sidi Youssef<sup>10</sup>), 80 kilometres west of Jama, whence he sent to inform Hannibal, who had solicited an interview, that he was ready to meet him. Nepos<sup>11</sup> says that Hannibal after his defeat reached Hadrumetum in two days and two nights. Ptolemy<sup>12</sup> mentions *Zama maior*; but the passage does not help us to determine the site.

Mommsen<sup>13</sup> thought that the narrative of Polybius was equally applicable to Jama and to Sidi Abd el Djedidi; but the former might reasonably be called west of Carthage, whereas the latter is nearly due south,—strictly about SSW. Furthermore, as Veith argues,<sup>14</sup> since Hannibal sent out his scouts from Zama, we may infer that Zama was nearer to Scipio's original camp, which was not far from Naraggara, than to Hadrumetum,—an inference which precludes us from identifying the Zama of Polybius with Sidi Abd el Djedidi. Besides, the statement that Hannibal, flying from the battle-field, reached Hadrumetum in two days, agrees better with the western than with the eastern Zama, which is only about 90 kilometres by road from Sousse.<sup>15</sup> Thus it would seem that the Zama of Polybius was the same as Zama Regia—the Zama of Sallust and of the *Table*—and, as we have seen, the identification of Zama Regia with Sidi Abd el Djedidi is irreconcilable with the *Table*. This is the general conclusion; and before Veith's book appeared almost all inquirers

<sup>1</sup> Segm. IV.

<sup>2</sup> *Jug.*, 56, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 57, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 58, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 56, 3.

<sup>6</sup> *C. I. L.*, viii, 1641, 1647.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 1798 (= Dessau, 437).

<sup>8</sup> *Eph. epigr.*, v, 1884, pp. 278–9, No. 286.

<sup>9</sup> xv, 5, 1; 6, 1. Cf. Livy, xxx, 29.

<sup>10</sup> *C. I. L.*, viii, p. 468.

<sup>11</sup> *Hannibal*, 6, 3.

<sup>12</sup> *Géogr.*, iv, 3, 33.

<sup>13</sup> *Hermes*, xx, 1885, p. 146.

<sup>14</sup> *Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, p. 618.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. S. Reinach's remarks (*Tissot, Géogr. . . . de la prov. rom. d'Afrique*, ii, 82–3).



identified Zama Regia with Jama. Mommsen,<sup>1</sup> who holds that the decision depends upon the *Table*, maintains that the conclusion is inevitable, 'even if Sallust's *campus* should be transformed into rocky steep.'<sup>2</sup>

But at this point Veith<sup>3</sup> joins issue. He points out that Jama, standing, as it does, upon the mountain mass of Djebel Massouge, does not in the least correspond with Sallust's description; and, having thoroughly explored the country, he can find only one place which does,—Seba Biar, about 18 kilometres south-west of Jama. The distance of Zama Regia from Assures, according to the *Table*, was 10 Roman miles; Seba Biar is 13 kilometres (nearly 9 Roman miles) from Zanford, Jama is more than twice as far. According to Tissot,<sup>4</sup> indeed, only two roads could have led from Assures through Zama to Uzappa,—one, the more southerly, by way of Ellès, Maghraoua, and Ain Mdoudja, the other round the north of the mountain mass of Oulad Aoun, the latter being, as the *Table* requires, just 53 Roman miles. Veith,<sup>5</sup> however, affirms that south of Djebel Massouge there is a practicable road, which passes Seba Biar, and that in this direction traces of a Roman road are visible at Kebour Klip. But another objection has been raised against Veith's theory. Seba Biar, as Veith himself insists,<sup>6</sup> is entirely wanting in Roman remains, which are conspicuous at Jama; and A. Merlin,<sup>7</sup> remarking that topographical observations, such as Veith made at Seba Biar, are often too subjective to command general assent, holds that the absence of Roman remains alone disposes of the alleged identity of that place with Zama Regia, which was raised to the rank of a colony by Hadrian:<sup>8</sup> accordingly he concludes<sup>9</sup> that we must rest satisfied with the knowledge that Zama Regia was somewhere between Zanford and Bordj Abd el Melah [or, as it is called on the Staff Map, El Ksour]. Merlin, however, omits to say that Veith has enabled us to check his observations by photographs,<sup>10</sup> which confirm his text; and, moreover, he has replied by anticipation to Merlin's argument. We learn from Dio<sup>11</sup> that Zama was captured by T. Sextius in 41 B.C., and from Strabo<sup>12</sup> that Zama Regia was destroyed by the Romans. Is it not conceivable, asks Veith,<sup>13</sup> that when it was afterwards found worth while to rebuild the ruined town, the builders abandoned the comparatively weak site, Seba Biar, and established the new foundation on the strong site of Jama? A new settlement, he adds, may also have been formed at Seba Biar, though it could not be called a town. Veith then strives to refute the obvious objection that on his theory the *Table* took account not of the important new foundation at Jama, but only of the insignificant and hypothetical new settlement at Seba Biar; and incidentally he lets us see why he was obliged to postulate the existence of the

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 147.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Klio*, ii, 1902, p. 79, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 620-1.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 584.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 624.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 621, note; 626.

<sup>7</sup> *Journ. des Savants*, nouv. sér., x, 1912, pp. 512-3.

<sup>8</sup> *C. I. L.*, vi, No. 1686; Dessau, 6111 c.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 514.

<sup>10</sup> See pp. 622-3 of Veith's work and also his Karte 11.

<sup>11</sup> xlviii, 23, 4.

<sup>12</sup> xvii, 3, 9. Cf. § 12.

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 626.

latter. It remained, he explains, an important meeting-place of roads, and the new Zama (Jama) could easily be connected with the road that passed through Seba Biar. Accordingly Veith decides that there were three Zamas,—Sidi Abd el Djedidi, Jama (Zama maior?), and Seba Biar (Zama Regia).<sup>1</sup>

My conclusion is that Mommsen and his followers on one side, Veith on the other, are both right and both wrong. Whoever identifies the Zama of Sallust with Jama must be prepared to maintain that the historian who governed Africa, including Numidia, in 46 and 45 B. C. described the town in words which exactly reversed the truth. No other site except Seba Biar corresponds with his description. So far I agree with Veith. But when he suggests that the compiler of the *Table* meant by Zama Regia this town, which on Veith's own showing had sunk into insignificance and was, moreover, non-Roman, and ignored the Zama which Hadrian honoured, he must, I think, be conscious that his case is weak. May not Seba Biar represent an earlier capital, abandoned after the time of Marius, while Jama stands upon the site of Zama Regia, built we know not when, where Juba left his family and deposited his treasure, and which was afterwards raised to colonial rank? <sup>2</sup>

## THE FATE OF JUBA AND PETREIUS

According to Seneca,<sup>3</sup> Appian,<sup>4</sup> and Dio,<sup>5</sup> Juba and Petreius perished together in single combat; according to the *Epitome*<sup>6</sup> of Livy, Florus,<sup>7</sup> and Ampelius,<sup>8</sup> Petreius killed Juba and then himself; Orosius<sup>9</sup> says that Juba paid an assassin to kill him and that Petreius killed himself with the same sword; Eutropius,<sup>10</sup> whose compressed narrative breeds errors in detail, that Cato, Scipio, Juba, and Petreius all committed suicide. The author of *Bellum Africanum*<sup>11</sup> was of course in a better position than any of these writers to learn the truth. He tells us, if we can trust the MSS., that 'Juba, being the more robust, easily overpowered the feeble Petreius' (*firmiter imbecilliore Iuba Petreium facile consumpsit*) and then induced his slave to kill him. R. Schneider,<sup>12</sup> minutely examining the various texts, concludes that (apart from the inaccuracies of the later authorities) the decision lies between this statement and that of the epitomator,—*Petreius Iubam seque interfecit*. But the order of the words *firmiter imbecilliore Iuba Petreium* is not good Latin: it should be either *firmiter imbecilliore Petreium Iuba* or *firmiter imbecilliore Iubam Petreius*. Thus a natural emendation brings the author into harmony with Livy.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, p. 627.

<sup>2</sup> The arguments of J. Schmidt (*Rhein. Mus.*, xliv, 1889, pp. 397-402; *C. I. L.*, viii, Suppl. i, p. 1240), who identified Zama Regia with Sidi Abd el Djedidi, have been confuted by Veith (*op. cit.*, pp. 628-30, 639-40); the absurd identification, proposed by Wilmanns (*C. I. L.*, viii, pp. 210-1) of Zama Regia with Ellès, by Tissot (*op. cit.*, pp. 571-2) and Veith (p. 620).

<sup>3</sup> *De provid.*, 2, 10; *Suas.*, vii, 14.

<sup>4</sup> ii, 100, 415.

<sup>5</sup> xliii, 8, 4.

<sup>6</sup> 114.

<sup>7</sup> ii, 13, 69.

<sup>8</sup> 38.

<sup>9</sup> vi, 16, 4.

<sup>10</sup> vi, 23.

<sup>11</sup> 94.

<sup>12</sup> *Berl. philol. Woch.*, Aug. 20, 1904, col. 1083-6.

The conclusion is probable enough; but it assumes that our author, whose work is not a model of Latinity, was incapable of a pardonable solecism.

## CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

		Unreformed calendar	Julian calendar
Caesar reaches Lilybaeum <sup>1</sup>	Dec. 17, 707	( <i>Bell. Afr.</i> , 1, 1)	Sept. 30, 47 B. C.
" embarks for Africa	25	( " 2, 4)	Oct. 8
" lands at Hadrumetum	28	( " 2, 5; 3, 1-2)	" 11
" marches to Ruspina	29	( " 5)	" 12
" marches from Ruspina to Leptis	Jan. 1, 708	( " 7, 1)	" 13
Caesar returns to Ruspina	" 2	( " 9, 1)	" 14
" embarks at Ruspina with 7 cohorts	" "	( " 10, 2)	" "
Caesar disembarks on the arrival of reinforcements	" 3	( " 11, 1-2)	" 15
Combat near Ruspina	" 4	( " 19, 7)	" 16
Caesar hears that Scipio is approaching	" 6	( " 20, 2)	" 18
Scipio encamps 3 miles from Caesar		( " 24, 1)	
Caesar's second convoy reaches Ruspina		( " 34, 4)	
Caesar prepares to march against Scipio	" 25	( " 37, 1)	Nov. 6
Caesar marches	" 26	( " 37, 2)	" 7
" offers battle to Scipio	" 27	( " 41, 1)	" 8
" 'purifies' his army	March 21	( " 75, 1)	Jan. 21 46 B. C.
" marches for Sarsura	" 22	( " 75, 3)	" 22
" arrives at Thisdra	" 23	( " 76, 2)	" 23
" returns to Aggar	" 25	( " 76, 3)	" 25
" marches thence to Thapsus	April 4	( " 79, 2)	Feb. 4
Scipio encamps west of Thapsus	" 6 <sup>2</sup>	( " 80, 3)	" 6
Battle of Thapsus	" "	( " 80, 4-6; 81, 3)	" "
News of the battle reaches Utica	" 8	( <i>Plut., Cato min.</i> , 58)	" 8
Caesar reaches Utica	" 18 ?	( <i>Bell. Afr.</i> , 89, 4)	" 18
" sails from Utica	June 13	( " 98, 1)	April 14
" lands in Sardinia	" 15	( " " )	" 16
" arrives at Rome	July 13	( " " )	May 13

<sup>1</sup> The author of *Bellum Africanum* says that Caesar reached Lilybaeum on Dec. 17, 'making marches of normal length without the omission of a single day' (*itineribus iustis confectis nullo die intermisso*). O. E. Schmidt (*D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, p. 233) infers that he marched through Sicily from Messina to Lilybaeum along with troops: R. Schneider in his note on the passage maintains, quoting Cicero (*Deinde cogitabam sine ulla mora iusta itinera facere* [*Att.*, v, 2, 1]), that the words *itineribus iustis* simply mean that Caesar travelled at the usual rate of about 50 Roman miles a day (see pp. 376-7). But it seems unlikely that the writer would have thought it remarkable that in a journey of only 240 miles (*Itin. Ant.*, ed. Wesseling, p. 86) Caesar did not lose a day; whereas if he had marched with troops, the fact of his not allowing a day for rest was worthy of mention. I therefore agree with Schmidt. It follows that Caesar reached Messina about Dec. 2 and left Rome about Nov. 24 (Sept. 8 of the Julian calendar).

<sup>2</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, 316; Ovid, *Fasti*, iv, 379-80.

## WAS LABERIUS HUMILIATED IN 46 OR IN 45 B.C. ?

Before the publication of O. E. Schmidt's *Der Briefwechsel des M. Tullius Cicero* the appearance of Laberius on the stage was generally referred to 45 B.C. Suetonius<sup>1</sup> appears to mean that it occurred in the previous year, for he mentions it in his description of the festivities which followed Caesar's first triumph; but he is notoriously careless in chronology. Cicero refers to the incident in a letter addressed to Cornificius,<sup>2</sup> which Tyrrell and Purser in their fifth volume assigned to October, 45; but in their fourth volume<sup>3</sup> they remark that 'Caesar was absent in Spain in 709 (45); and it is unlikely that he would have determined to humiliate Laberius in games at which he himself was not present.' More than unlikely! Apparently the editors forget that the presence of Caesar, implied by Suetonius, is expressly attested by Macrobius;<sup>4</sup> and it is unnecessary to reproduce their other arguments,<sup>5</sup> which are not only weak but superfluous. According to Cicero, the incident occurred 'at Caesar's games' (*ludis Caesaris*). Schmidt<sup>6</sup> observes that Cicero 'refers to . . . the *Ludi victoriae Caesaris*, which in the year 46 were instituted and celebrated by Caesar in person.' After the reform of the calendar, that is in 45 B. C. and later, these games were held on July 20-30.<sup>7</sup> But in 45 Caesar had not by that time returned to Rome. In 46 the games were held on September 22-October 2, which corresponded to the Julian dates. It is clear therefore that Laberius was humiliated in 46.

## THE SPANISH CAMPAIGN

*Bell. Hisp.*, 1, 5.—The author of *Bellum Hispaniense*, after describing the measures by which Gnaeus Pompeius established his authority in Further Spain, says that the communities opposed to him dispatched a succession of messengers to Italy, to ask for aid, and in the next sentence relates that Caesar marched for the peninsula.<sup>8</sup> Caesar began his march towards the end of the year 708 (46 B. C.). The exact date is not known, although Dr. Shuckburgh says without giving any reasons that 'Caesar only left Rome for Spain on the 2nd of December';<sup>9</sup> but it can be fixed approximately. One of Cicero's letters,<sup>10</sup> written before the speech *Pro Ligario*, shows that

<sup>1</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 39, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Fam.*, xii, 18, 2.

<sup>3</sup> p. liv, n. † (=2nd. ed., 1918, p. lxi, n. 2).

<sup>4</sup> *Sat.*, ii, 7, 4-5.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, and vol. v, p. xvii, n. †.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 252-3. Cf. *Philol.*, liii, 1894, p. 134.

<sup>7</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, 397.

<sup>8</sup> 1, 5; 2, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *The Letters of Cicero*, iii, 1900, p. 173, n. 1. On p. 379 of the same volume Shuckburgh, again without citing any evidence, says, 'Caesar leaves Rome for Spain, December 1st.'

<sup>10</sup> *Fam.*, vi, 14, 2.



Caesar was still in Rome 'on the fifth day before the Kalends of the first intercalary month', in other words, on the 26th of November of the unreformed calendar. He heard Cicero deliver this speech, and O. E. Schmidt<sup>1</sup> has shown that he did not start before the second intercalary month, about November 5 of the Julian calendar.<sup>2</sup>

**The armies of Caesar and of Gnaeus Pompeius.**—We do not know the strength of the force which Pedius and Fabius Maximus commanded before Caesar reached Obulco<sup>3</sup> or what legions followed Caesar to Spain.<sup>4</sup> The legions in his army which we can certainly identify were the 3rd, the 5th (the legion called *Alaudae*<sup>5</sup>), the 6th,<sup>6</sup> the 10th,<sup>7</sup> the 28th, and the 30th.<sup>8</sup> The 30th had served under Quintus Cassius.<sup>9</sup> What had become of his other four legions?<sup>10</sup> Only two of them are mentioned in *Bellum Hispaniense*, namely, 'the two native legions (*duae vernaculae*) which had deserted from Trebonius:'<sup>11</sup> one of them had served under Varro;<sup>12</sup> the other was the 5th (not *Alaudae*), which Cassius had himself raised.<sup>13</sup> I infer that the 2nd and the 21st,<sup>14</sup> which had served under Cassius, remained faithful to Caesar and with the 30th, which had served in Africa, formed part of the army which he found in Spain. If they had joined Gnaeus, the author would doubtless have reckoned them among the few legions which, as he said, possessed *aliquid firmamenti*;<sup>15</sup> for, being Roman soldiers, they were presumably as good or better than the native legions, upon which Gnaeus relied.

The author says twice<sup>16</sup> that Gnaeus had 13 legions; but if, as we are told in the second passage, he had 13 in the battle of Munda, he must have had 15 altogether, for two legions garrisoned Corduba.<sup>17</sup> Probably in the second passage the writer made a mistake; for Cicero,<sup>18</sup> writing to Quintus Lepta in January, 45 B. C., said, 'Caesar

<sup>1</sup> *D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, pp. 256–60, 422.

<sup>2</sup> Shuckburgh (*op. cit.*, p. 85, n. 2) argues that appeals for help reached Italy from Quintus Pedius, who commanded Caesar's troops in Spain, as early as June 13 (April 14 of the reformed calendar). If he is right, it follows that Caesar did not go to the assistance of his lieutenant for seven months after the appeals began to arrive. His conclusion depends upon an arbitrary interpretation of the passage which I have cited from *Bell. Hisp.* and a droll emendation of his own—*Q. Pedio* for the nonsensical *clippo* in Cicero's letter of June 13 (*Att.*, xii, 3, 2)—which he would not have made if he had attended to chronology. The army which Pedius commanded was sent to Spain from Sardinia, which Caesar did not reach on returning from Africa till June 15 (*Bell. Afr.*, 98, 1).

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 2, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Dio, xliii, 32, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 23, 3; 30, 7. See p. 355, n. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 12, 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 30, 7; 31, 4.

<sup>8</sup> The 28th and the 30th were in Spain after Caesar's death (*Cic.*, *Fam.*, x, 32, 4).

<sup>9</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 53, 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>11</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 7, 4. Mommsen (*Hermes*, xix, 1884, p. 13, n. 2) inaccurately says that 'the two native legions' were those which Varro had commanded in 49 B. C. Varro had only one native legion.

<sup>12</sup> *B.C.*, ii, 20, 4.

<sup>13</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 50, 3. See p. 355, n. 3.

<sup>14</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 53, 4–5; 54, 2–3; 57, 1–3.

<sup>15</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 7, 4.

<sup>16</sup> *Ib.*, 7, 4; 30, 1.

<sup>17</sup> *Ib.*, 34, 2.

<sup>18</sup> *Fam.*, vi, 18, 2.

has himself sent me a copy of a dispatch from Paciaecus, in which the number [of Gnaeus's troops] was reckoned as eleven legions.'<sup>1</sup>

**Munda and other localities mentioned in *Bell. Hisp.***—In order to search for Munda, it is necessary to determine the general direction of Caesar's march as far as Ventipo,<sup>2</sup> after capturing which he began his final advance. Ulia has been identified beyond dispute with Monte Mayor,<sup>3</sup> about 17 miles south of Cordoba. From Corduba (Cordova) Caesar marched to besiege Ategua,<sup>4</sup> which, according to Stoffel,<sup>5</sup> was 'incontestably' upon the hill called Teba la vieja, some 14 miles south-east of Cordoba, on the right bank of the Guadajoz. The Salsum, on the right bank of which Ategua lay,<sup>6</sup> must have been the Guadajoz; for it was not far from Corduba<sup>7</sup> and from Ucubi,<sup>8</sup> which was at or close to Espejo,<sup>9</sup> 5 miles south of Teba la vieja, and no other river exists which fulfils this condition. Moreover, remains of an ancient stronghold have been observed upon Teba la vieja; and for these reasons as well as because of the resemblance, such as it is, between the names, Spanish antiquaries have affirmed the identity of Ategua with Teba.<sup>10</sup> During the siege of Ategua Caesar occupied a fort called Castra Postumiana, situated on a knoll about 4 miles from Gnaeus's camp:<sup>11</sup> the hill of Harinilla, 3 miles south-west of Teba la vieja, on which Stoffel places the fort, answers as well as or better than any other to the chronicler's description. Gnaeus, on learning that Caesar had received the surrender of Ategua, moved from the position which he had occupied opposite it, on the left bank of the Guadajoz, towards Ucubi; and Caesar followed him.<sup>12</sup> A few days later the two armies converged upon the outskirts of Soricaria.<sup>13</sup> Gnaeus found that he was in danger of being cut off from a fort named Aspavia, 5 Roman miles from Ucubi; and in order to extricate himself, he attempted to seize a knoll,—a manœuvre which led to two successive combats.<sup>14</sup> Stoffel<sup>15</sup> attempted to locate these three places; and his reasoning, although he developed it with less than his usual confidence, is fairly satisfactory. Starting from the assumption that Ategua stood on the hill of Teba la vieja, he pointed out that Gnaeus, when he moved towards Ucubi, must have encamped [in order to get water] in the confined space between Ucubi and the Guadajoz. When Caesar, moving from Ategua, encamped near Gnaeus, he was evidently still on the right bank of the Guadajoz; for we are informed that in the course of a combat which followed two of his officers crossed the river to rally the men.<sup>16</sup> But when, or immediately after, the armies met outside Soricaria, Caesar must have crossed to the left bank; for otherwise he could not have cut off Gnaeus from Aspavia, which was

<sup>1</sup> Dio (xliii, 36, 1) wrongly says that Bocchus sent his sons to join Gnaeus. Bocchus had aided Caesar in Africa, and had been rewarded.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 27, 5.

<sup>3</sup> *C. I. L.*, ii, Nos. 1532-3.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 6, 1-3.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 306.

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 6, 3-4; 7, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 6, 2-3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 7, 1.

<sup>9</sup> *C. I. L.*, ii, 210 and Nos. 1553, 1559.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 194, 210.

<sup>11</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 8, 6.

<sup>12</sup> *Ib.*, 20, 1.

<sup>13</sup> *Ib.*, 24, 1.

<sup>14</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 3-6; 25.

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 310-2.

<sup>16</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 23, 3.

manifestly on that side of the stream. Now in the course of the first combat for the possession of the knoll the enemy were driven down into a plain (*sunt deiecti planitie*<sup>1</sup>); and Stoffel observes that the only plain discoverable is the low ground traversed by the Guadajoz at Castro del Rio, 6 miles south-east of Teba la vieja. Castro del Rio, then, according to Stoffel, represents Soricaria. Five Roman miles east of Ucubi and about two miles south by east of Castro del Rio he finds Aspavia, and the knoll about the same distance west of the latter.

After the failure of his operations at Soricaria Gnaeus moved on, still in a southerly direction, and encamped in an olive plantation over against 'Spalis'.<sup>2</sup> Apparently the MS. reading is corrupt. *Hispalis* (Seville), the conjecture which most editors have adopted, is manifestly out of the question; and where 'Spalis' was it is useless to guess. But now comes a most important indication. 'Afterwards', says the chronicler, 'Caesar proceeded to besiege Ventipo, and, on its surrender, marched on Carruca, and encamped opposite Pompey.'<sup>3</sup> Nobody knows where Carruca was; but Stoffel<sup>4</sup> notwithstanding, the site of Ventipo has been fixed by two inscriptions:<sup>5</sup> it was at Vado Garcia, close to Casariche, about 20 Roman miles south of Montilla. Thence the armies moved to the plain of Munda (*in campum Mundensem*<sup>6</sup>).

The remaining sites are all known. Gnaeus offered battle at Munda to restore the waning confidence of the citizens of Ursao,<sup>7</sup> or Urso, which is represented by Osuna, 35 miles south-west of Montilla.<sup>8</sup> Carteia, to which Gnaeus fled after his defeat,<sup>9</sup> has been identified by an inscribed tile found in the farm of El Rocadillo, between Gibraltar and Algeciras.<sup>10</sup> Gades, as everybody knows, was the city which is now Cadiz. Hasta, whither Caesar went after he had recovered Hispalis, is represented by Mesa de Asta,<sup>11</sup> about 20 miles north-north-west of Cadiz.

Now for Munda. Stoffel heads the article in which he professes to close the discussion 'DÉCOUVERTE DU CHAMP DE BATAILLE DE MUNDA'.<sup>12</sup> Munda, he tells us, stood upon the site of Montilla: the battle-field was the hill that extends north-eastward from the town nearly down to the rivulet of San Cristobal: the *campus Mundensis*

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 24, 3.

<sup>2</sup> 27, 3. The chronicler tells us that when Gnaeus quitted his camp in the plantation he ordered the detachment which he had left at Ucubi to burn the town and then to rejoin him; and a few lines further on, after relating that Caesar took Ventipo, marched on Carruca, and encamped opposite Pompey, he says that Pompey 'burned the town for having shut its gates against his troops' (*Pompeius oppidum, quod contra sua praesidia portas clausisset, incendit*). Mommsen (*Hermes*, xxviii, 1893, p. 613) insists that this town 'can only be Ucubi',—Ucubi which Pompey had already ordered to be burned, and which was far north of Ventipo, therefore presumably also of Carruca, outside which Pompey was then encamped! Obviously the town which Pompey himself burned was Carruca.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 27, 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 306-7.

<sup>5</sup> *C. I. L.*, ii, Nos. 1467-8.

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 27, 6.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 26, 3-6; 28, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *C. I. L.*, ii, 191.

<sup>9</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 32, 6.

<sup>10</sup> *C. I. L.*, ii, No. 1928

<sup>11</sup> *Paulys Real-Ency.*, vii, 2508.

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 312.

was the undulating plain traversed by the rivulet of Carchena, into which the San Cristobal flows. Stoffel's case rests upon the theory that the theatre of war was restricted to a small space; 'the essential condition', he says, 'which controls all the others and which gives to the war its peculiar character is that Gnaeus Pompey was unable to move far from Corduba, which he had made his principal dépôt, and where he had left his brother with a strong garrison.' In support of this pronouncement Stoffel points out that the author of *Bellum Hispaniense*, after remarking that Pompey's camp at Munda was defended by the nature of the ground, adds, *Namque, ut superius demonstravimus, loca excellentia tumultis contineri, interim nulla planitia dividit*;<sup>1</sup> and *ut superius demonstravimus* refers to chapter 7, where the region of Ucubi is described by the words *Haec loca sunt montuosa et natura edita ad rem militarem*. One can only conclude, says Stoffel, giving the sense of *Namque . . . dividit*, that the country round Munda, like that of which Ucubi was the centre, presented eminences so close to one another that the intervening spaces could not be called plains. Again, we learn from chapters 32 and 33 that after Sextus Pompeius heard of his brother's defeat he quitted Corduba 'in the second watch'.<sup>2</sup> Why, asks Stoffel, should the writer have indicated so precisely the time of Sextus's departure if he had not left Corduba until the second or the third night after the battle? 'The statement proves conclusively that the distance from the battle-field to Corduba could be covered on horseback in a few hours.' Stoffel then adds that the only site, corresponding to the description given in *Bellum Hispaniense*, which can be found within a few hours' ride from Corduba is the one at Montilla.

Let us see whether these reasons outweigh the fact that Ventipo, which Caesar captured on his march from Corduba to Munda, was a long day's march south of the site which Stoffel identifies with the battle-field. The argument based on the mention of 'the second watch' will not impress any one who has observed the chronicler's habit of recording trivialities. Turn to other passages in which, without adding to the clearness of his narrative, he refers this or that movement to a certain watch of the night or some other point of time,—for instance, 9. 1, 11. 2, 19. 1, and especially 27. 3, where he remarks that before Caesar started for 'Spalis' 'the moon was visible about the sixth hour' (*Caesar priusquam eodem est profectus, luna hora circiter sexta visa est*). As to the supposed comparison between the country round Ucubi and the country round Munda, the writer says that the former is 'hilly and offers natural obstacles to military operations: it is divided by a plain, formed by the river Salsum' (*Haec loca sunt montuosa et natura impedita ad rem militarem; quae planitiae dividuntur, Salso flumine, &c.*). In the description of the country round Munda the words *nulla planitia dividit* are a correction, the MS. readings—*nulla planitia edividit* (S), *nullā planitiae dividit* (ρT), and *nullam planitiem dividi* (V)—being all corrupt; but even if the correction is right, it is not clear why the author

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 28, 4.<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 32, 5.



compared a passage in which he said that 'no plain breaks the continuity' of the hills with one in which he said that the hilly region north of Ucubi is 'divided by a plain'. Be this, however, as it may, and granted that the hill on which Montilla stands consists, as Stoffel says, of 'hauteurs mamelonnées', could he have denied that any more southerly hill presented similar features? I have left his fundamental argument to the last. No doubt Corduba was Pompey's principal dépôt *during the siege of Ategua*; but could he have maintained his communications with Corduba after Ategua surrendered and while Caesar was forcing him southward? And, seeing that Caesar somehow fed his army throughout the campaign, what right had Stoffel to assume that Pompey could not have done likewise even if he was cut off from Corduba? Anyhow the fact remains that the theatre of the campaign did extend as far southward as Ventipo, the site of which is nearly as far from Montilla as Montilla is from Cordoba. That Pompey, after he had been pushed southward to the latitude of Ventipo, should have doubled back northward to Montilla, although his main object was to reassure the inhabitants of Ursao, which was even further south than Ventipo, is at least improbable. Again, Fabius, after he had captured Munda, marched against Ursao;<sup>1</sup> and the anonymous writer says that as no timber for constructing the necessary towers and sappers' huts was to be found at a less distance than 6 Roman miles, the besiegers were compelled to fetch it from Munda.<sup>2</sup> Now Montilla, according to Stoffel himself,<sup>3</sup> is 66 kilometres, or about 44½ Roman miles, from Osuna. Who will believe that the besiegers sent fatigue parties so far to fetch the wood when they could get it only 6 miles off?

I may add that 'los llanos de Vanda' is not a plain at all, though to the eye of an unwary reader Stoffel in his map<sup>4</sup> contrives to make it look like one by adroitly leaving out the shading which he puts in elsewhere between the contours.

The reasons which I have given are perhaps sufficient; but Emil Hübner has pointed out another.<sup>5</sup> Munda, as we may infer from Pliny<sup>6</sup> as well as from the omission of its name in Ptolemy's Geography and in the itineraries, was either destroyed by its captor, Fabius Maximus, or abandoned early in the imperial era: numerous inscriptions have been found near Montilla.<sup>7</sup> Hübner himself pointed to a site which was approved by Kiepert.<sup>8</sup> South-west of Casariche, north-west of Ronda, and about two Spanish leagues west of Ronda la Vieja, which is itself 9 or 10 miles north of Ronda, is a hamlet called la Torre Alháuquime, belonging to which is a tract called by the people of the country Campo de Munda. The name, says Hübner, is traceable to the middle of the fifteenth century, and the place

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 41, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 5-6.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 308.

<sup>4</sup> Pl. 24.

<sup>5</sup> *Neue Jahrb. f. Philol.*, &c., lxxxv, 1862, p. 39.

<sup>6</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 1 (3), 12.—Huius conventus sunt reliquae coloniae immunes . . . Ucubi quae Claritas Iulia, Urso quae Genua Urbanorum, inter quae fuit Munda cum Pompeio filio rapta.

<sup>7</sup> *C. I. L.*, ii, Nos. 1541-50, 4975. 40. 76; Suppl. No 5463.

<sup>8</sup> *Formae orbis ant.*, xxvii.

corresponds exactly with the topographical features described by the author of *Bellum Hispaniense*. No doubt; but not with the statement of the writer of *Bellum Hispaniense* that the besiegers of Ursao were obliged to go for timber to Munda. Hübner's site is at least 30 Roman miles south of Ursao.<sup>1</sup>

Since Gnaeus evidently fought at Munda in order to save Ursao,<sup>2</sup> and since the besiegers of Ursao, who could not get timber at a distance of less than 6 Roman miles, had to fetch it from Munda, it seems probable, if not certain, that Munda was 6 miles from Ursao, or not much more. In that neighbourhood then we have to search for a plain about 5 Roman miles wide, separated by a rivulet from a hill. Five years ago I found in sheet 1005 of the *Mapa topográfico de España* a plain of the required width in the required position and bounded on the west by a rivulet, Arroyo del Peinado. The rivulet was almost in contact with the north-western margin of the map, and the adjoining sheet, 1004, had not then been published. A few weeks ago both it and 1006—the sheet, containing Casariche, which adjoins 1005 on the east—reached the British Museum. In 1006 there is nothing which can be identified with Munda. Turning to 1004, I found, close to the eastern margin and just south of the railway, a hill or group of closely connected heights, the summit of which (235 metres) is about 9 kilometres, or 6 Roman miles, west by north of Osuna, while the lowest contour is just west of the rivulet (which there bends to the right)<sup>3</sup> and of the plain. On that hill, which Colonel Georg Veith had selected, for the same reasons, a few days before I did, Munda surely stood. As far as I can tell from the map, it might be aptly characterized by the words which Stoffel emphasizes—*loci excellentia tumulis contineri, interim nulla planities dividit*—and in every other respect it corresponds exactly to the description given by the anonymous chronicler.

**The operations near Soricaria.**—The account in *Bellum Hispaniense* of the fighting that took place near Soricaria is not quite clear. The writer says that Pompey, finding himself cut off from the fort of Aspavia, was compelled to fight, but that, as he would not fight on level ground, his troops endeavoured to seize a 'lofty knoll' (*excelsum tumulum*<sup>4</sup>). Both armies—Pompey's and Caesar's—made for a 'high knoll' (*tumulum excellentem*), with the result that the Pompeians were driven off into a plain,<sup>5</sup> and were only saved from destruction by a 'hill' (*quibus mons saluti, non virtus fuit*<sup>6</sup>). The *tumulus excellens* was evidently identical with the *excelsus tumulus*; but the *mons* was certainly different. On the following day Pompey's

<sup>1</sup> The statement in Strabo (iii, 2, 2), that Munda was 1,400 stades (175 Roman miles) from Carteia, is obviously corrupt. Mommsen (*Hermes*, 1893, p. 613) acutely observed that the error was not in the figures, but in the name: for *Μούνδα* we should read *Κόρδουβα*. According to the MSS. of Strabo, Munda was the capital of the province, while the author of *Bell. Hispan.* (3, 1) says the same of Corduba, and in another passage (32, 6) states that Corduba was 170 miles from Carteia.

<sup>2</sup> *Bell. Hispan.*, 26, 3-5; 28, 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 28, 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, § 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 24, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, § 5.

force moved 'to the same place' (*ad eundem locum*), and while the Caesarians were dispersed 'in the work of entrenching' (*in opere*) the mounted troops of the two armies became engaged.<sup>1</sup> What was the *idem locus*? Was it the *tumulus* or the *mons*? I cannot answer the question, and Stoffel, whose narrative is loose and obscure, evades it. He merely says that Pompey 'rangea ses légions sur les hauteurs',<sup>2</sup>—where? What again was the *opus* on which the Caesarians were engaged? Fortifying their camp, says Stoffel. But why should Caesar have constructed a camp then? He must have passed the previous night in a camp, and there is no apparent reason for his having made a new one. Recognizing these and other obscurities and also the comparative insignificance of the movements in question, I have deliberately restricted my narrative of the operations that intervened between the fall of Ategua and the battle of Munda within the narrowest limits.

**The battle of Munda.**—The writer of *Bellum Hispaniense*, after remarking that the plain of Munda was bounded [on the side adjacent to the hill on which Pompey's army was drawn up] by a rivulet, which presented a formidable obstacle to Caesar's army, goes on to say that 'Accordingly Caesar, having observed [Pompey's] line of battle, had no doubt that the enemy would advance through the middle of the plain on to level ground and fight a decisive battle' (*Itaque Caesar cum aciem directam vidisset, non habuit dubium quin media planitie in aequum ad dimicandum adversarii procederent*<sup>3</sup>). In other words, Caesar had no doubt that the enemy would oblige him by dispensing with the formidable obstacle and fighting on ground which suited him, but did not suit them. And Stoffel, who is never tired of posing as the military expert to whose judgement the lay reader, shutting his eyes to what other military experts may say, must humbly defer, accepts this statement.<sup>4</sup> Did Stoffel suppose that Caesar communicated his thoughts to the author of *Bellum Hispaniense*? Is it credible that Caesar, who had learned by experience that the thing which Gnaeus was determined not to do was to fight on level ground, 'had no doubt' that Gnaeus was going at the twelfth hour to throw away the advantage which the high ground afforded him?

Coming to the battle, we find a bombastic but on the whole credible story, told evidently by an eyewitness, in *Bellum Hispaniense* and additional details in the compilations of Velleius,<sup>5</sup> Plutarch,<sup>6</sup> Frontinus,<sup>7</sup> Florus,<sup>8</sup> Suetonius,<sup>9</sup> Appian,<sup>10</sup> Dio,<sup>11</sup> Polyænus,<sup>12</sup> Eutropius,<sup>13</sup> and Orosius.<sup>14</sup> Velleius, Florus, Dio, Eutropius, and Orosius derived their information wholly or in part from Livy; Plutarch and Appian [directly or indirectly] from Asinius Pollio. A. Klotz<sup>15</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 25, 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 183.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Hisp.*, 29, 3. *Itaque* is Nipperdey's emendation for *Id quod*, which is nonsense.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de J. César*, ii, 186-7.

<sup>5</sup> ii, 55, 3-4.

<sup>6</sup> *Caes.*, 56, 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Strat.*, ii, 8, 13.

<sup>8</sup> ii, 13, 81-3.

<sup>9</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 36.

<sup>10</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 104.

<sup>11</sup> xliiii, 37, 38, 1-3.

<sup>12</sup> viii, 23, 16.

<sup>13</sup> vi, 24.

<sup>14</sup> vi, 16, 7-8.

<sup>15</sup> *Neue Jahrb. f. d. Klass. Altertum*, xxiii, 1909, p. 571.

argues with considerable probability that Livy himself worked upon the narrative of Hirtius, who took part in the campaign<sup>1</sup> and wrote a history of the events of 51-44 B. C.<sup>2</sup> Frontinus and Polyænus, whoever their authority may have been, merely confirm what others record. All agree that the struggle was desperate; all, except Dio, affirm either that Caesar was nearly beaten or that some of his men were forced to give ground.

The writer of *Bellum Hispaniense*<sup>3</sup> says that when the Caesarians, having reached the extremity of the plain, found the hill immediately in front of them, it became obvious that to advance further would be dangerous. 'Noticing this', he continues, 'Caesar began to limit the ground, for fear any disaster might occur through the fault of his men'—that is, through their pressing on impetuously. (*Quod cum a Caesare esset animadversum, ne quid temere culpa suorum admitteretur, eum locum definire coepit*). Long<sup>4</sup> mistranslates *locum definire coepit*, which he takes to mean 'looked out for a fit place to cross the stream'. Evidently Caesar had already crossed; and Stoffel rightly interprets the words as meaning that Caesar set a limit to the ground which his troops might occupy,—in other words, refused to advance until the enemy descended some way down the slope.<sup>5</sup>

Now we come to the real difficulty. The writer of *Bellum Hispaniense*,<sup>6</sup> after describing the struggle between the two lines of infantry, says that the 10th legion, on Caesar's extreme right, fought with such energy that the enemy, to prevent their left from being outflanked, tried to transfer a legion from their right to support it. This attempt was frustrated by Caesar's cavalry, and the Caesarian infantry, pressing their advantage, won the battle. Plutarch and Appian mention neither the movement of the Pompeian legion nor that of the Caesarian cavalry; but their accounts are so brief that it would be rash to assume that their authority did not record those incidents. Florus relates that five cohorts—not, as the author of *Bellum Hispaniense* says, a legion—'which Labienus had sent to protect the endangered [Pompeian] camp' (*quas Labienus periclitantibus castris praesidio miserat*), were moved 'transversely along the line' (*per transversam aciem*); that the Caesarians, encouraged by the sight of this movement, pressed on; and that the Pompeians, believing that their comrades were retreating, began to flee. He omits to mention the movement of the Caesarian cavalry;

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xii, 37, 4. Cf. *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*<sup>2</sup>, 1911, p. 825.

<sup>2</sup> See A. Klotz, *Cäsarstudien*, 1910, pp. 155-6. <sup>3</sup> 30, 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 397.

<sup>5</sup> I cancel a note in which I showed that Veith (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 451) was wrong in translating *locum definire* by 'to reconnoitre', for I learn from a memorandum which he has kindly sent to me that he now interprets the words as I have done. He still thinks, however, that the Pompeians descended from their original position because they saw a chance of attacking Caesar while he was crossing the stream or at least while his line was disordered. But Caesar had already crossed, and the writer of *Bell. Hispan.* (30, 6) says that the Pompeians descended because they regarded Caesar's halt as a sign of fear.

<sup>6</sup> 31, 4-5.



but the words *periclitantibus castris* imply that it had been made. According to Dio, King Bogud, who commanded a corps of Moorish cavalry under Caesar, attempted to capture the Pompeian camp; Labienus thereupon quitted his position in the line and moved to encounter Bogud; and the Pompeians, supposing that Labienus was retreating, lost heart, and found out their mistake too late.

Klotz, who has published a valuable study of the battle,<sup>1</sup> holds that the object of Labienus in transferring the five cohorts [or the legion] was misunderstood by the author of *Bellum Hispaniense*, because he was ignorant of what happened in the general's entourage; and also by Florus and Dio, because Hirtius, from whom their authority, Livy, derived his information, knew little of war. The words of Florus—'which Labienus had sent to protect the endangered camp'—are, he insists, inconsistent with the preceding words, 'transversely along the line'. Bogud's cavalry would never have been able to storm the Pompeian camp, which was defended by infantry. What Bogud really intended was to create disorder in the Pompeian line by attacking their left flank and rear. Since Labienus endeavoured to counter this attack with infantry, it is evident, notwithstanding the silence of all the authorities, that the Pompeian cavalry must have been overwhelmed by Caesar's superior force at the outset of the battle.<sup>2</sup>

Now the reason which Klotz gives for denying that Bogud would have ventured to attack the Pompeian camp is hardly sufficient: everything depends upon the strength of Bogud's cavalry and that of the detachment which held the camp; and we are ignorant of both. Klotz perhaps forgot that Labienus in the African campaign attempted with cavalry alone to storm Leptis, which was garrisoned by six cohorts.<sup>3</sup> Still, the intention which he ascribes to Bogud is the more probable, especially if Dio was right in saying that the movement of Bogud preceded the transference of the infantry.<sup>4</sup> Klotz insists that Dio is supported by the author of *Bellum Hispaniense*. Remarking that 'In *Bellum Hispaniense* the movement of the hostile detachment of infantry is accounted for differently', he goes on to say, 'But from this description also it follows that it [the movement of the infantry] was occasioned by the attack made by Bogud's cavalry: the coincidence [of the two movements] in point of time tells unmistakably in favour of this view'.<sup>5</sup> Does it? The writer of *Bellum Hispaniense*, immediately after saying that a Pompeian legion 'began to be transferred from the right wing, to prevent the Caesarians from outflanking the enemy', adds that 'As

<sup>1</sup> *Neue Jahrb.*, &c., 1909, pp. 560-73.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 563-4, 572-3. Veith, here differing from Klotz, with whom he in the main agrees, points out that Caesar's cavalry were all on his left wing (*B. II.*, 30, 7) while Pompey's were on both wings (30, 1). I suggest that Caesar's cavalry had beaten the Pompeian right brigade.

<sup>3</sup> *Bell. Afr.*, 29, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Veith, remarking that the fact that Bogud's attack could be described as directed against the camp is only explicable if the Pompeian left wing was close to the camp, concludes that Bogud moved towards the camp, intending to wheel in on the Pompeian rear.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 573.

soon as it [the legion] was put in motion Caesar's cavalry began to press the left wing . . . so that there was no opportunity of supporting the line' (. . . *ut ad subsidium, ne ab latere nostri occuparent, legio adversariorum traduci coepta sit a dextro. Quae simul est mota, equitatus Caesaris sinistro cornu premere coepit . . . ut locus in aciem ad subsidium veniundi non daretur*<sup>1</sup>). Evidently, according to the writer, the movement of the infantry was not occasioned by the attack of the cavalry, but the attack of the cavalry by the movement of the infantry. Klotz insists that the writer could only describe from personal knowledge what happened on Caesar's left wing, because he was there himself.<sup>2</sup> But even if this is true, he could inform himself after the battle; and on Klotz's theory Hirtius could only describe from personal knowledge what happened on Caesar's right.

We have to choose, then, between two discordant accounts. Now, even supposing that Hirtius was in a better position to observe than the writer of *Bellum Hispaniense*, we must remember that on Klotz's theory Florus and Dio used the evidence of Hirtius at second hand, transmitted as it was by Livy, whose accuracy is not above suspicion. *Prima facie*, then, the authority of *Bellum Hispaniense* would seem to be better than that of Florus and Dio; and it is evident from all the sources that before the movements of the legion and of the cavalry began Caesar had succeeded in reviving the morale of his infantry. Nevertheless I believe with Klotz that Florus and Dio were right. For although, as Klotz himself would doubtless admit, we must suppose that the writer of *Bellum Hispaniense* accurately described what he saw, and therefore that the cavalry did not begin to attack the Pompeian left until just after the legion (or the five cohorts) began to move, the cavalry may have received their orders before the legion stirred. But what principally leads me to follow Dio is the probability that Bogud did not attack on his own initiative, but in obedience to an order from Caesar, who, with his usual clearness of vision and rapidity of decision, saw that such a movement would at last decide the long-drawn-out battle. And if Caesar gave the order, he must have given it before Labienus moved.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Bell. Hosp.*, 31, 4-5.

<sup>2</sup> Veith argues that the writer was on the right wing. We cannot tell, and it does not matter.

<sup>3</sup> Stoffel (*op. cit.*, pp. 187-90) helping out the materials with a little invention, produces an eloquent account of the battle; but the invention is, I think, such as to distort the sequence of events. For, although Dio seems to describe Caesar's personal intervention as having occurred not long after the battle began, Stoffel puts it after the vigorous onset of the 10th legion, which, according to *Bellum Hispaniense*, marked the turning-point of the battle. Since the 10th compelled the Pompeians to weaken their right in order to save their left, why should Caesar afterwards have found it necessary to risk his life in order to rally his line? Stoffel must have felt this difficulty; for he removed it—by a fiction. After remarking that Pompey was compelled by the action of Caesar's cavalry to abandon his attempt to succour his left wing, he coolly says that the left wing 'had succeeded in regaining the ground which the 10th legion by the vigour of its attack had won from it' ('il fallut que Cnaeus

*Bell. Hisp.*, 32, 2.—The following words in my narrative (page 308) —‘the Caesarians, before beginning to form a contravallation [round Munda], piled up corpses as a rampart to bar the gates and fixed javelins which they picked up as a palisade’—are based upon a passage of which the text does not satisfy the latest editor, B. Kübler. In the MSS. it runs *pro cespite cadavera conlocabantur, scuta (scutumque ρV) et pila pro vallo*. *Vallo* here obviously means a palisade, and the MS. reading yields perfect sense: the shields and javelins served as a palisade, the corpses (*cadavera*) as a rampart (*cespite*). However C. Fleischer must needs make an emendation—*scuta et pila pro cespite, pro vallo cadavera conlocabantur*—which turns sense into nonsense, but has been adopted by Kübler, who ought to have known better. The incident is also recorded by Appian,<sup>1</sup> who with characteristic inaccuracy transfers the scene to Corduba, and by Dio,<sup>2</sup> who omits to mention the shields and javelins.

### THE LETTERS WRITTEN BY SALLUST (?) TO CAESAR

Professor Eduard Meyer<sup>3</sup> maintains that the two letters, ostensibly addressed to Caesar, which are printed in the collected works of Sallust, but have generally been attributed to a rhetorician of the Christian era, were genuine. There has indeed of late been a reaction in this sense.<sup>4</sup> Meyer, who holds that the second letter was the earlier, regards the earnestness with which both advocate reform as an argument for their authenticity, and insists that the animated description of the nobility (ii, 8, 7—9, 4) could only have been the work of a contemporary, that it is ‘Sallustian through and through’, and that it must have been written when Bibulus, Domitius, and Favonius, who are named in it, were still alive. He admits that ii, 4, 2 has furnished a plausible argument against the genuineness of the letters, for such a massacre as it describes (*a M. Catone L. Domitio ceterisque eiusdem factionis quadraginta senatores, multi praeterea . . . adulescentes sicutei hostiae mactati sunt, &c.*) is incredible. But no rhetorician could have invented it, for the writer had personal knowledge of the history of the time. Meyer offers a solution of the riddle. The words [following the mention of the massacre] *acerbius in dies male faciundo ac dicundo dignitate alios, alios civitate eversum irent* refer to the judicial condemnations of 52–50 B. C. and the harsh measures of the censors in 50. The ‘massacre’ therefore was the

Pompée renouât à secourir sa gauche. Celle-ci était parvenue à regagner le terrain que lui avait fait perdre la 10<sup>e</sup> légion par l’impétuosité de ses attaques’). Not only is this statement not supported by any evidence, but the author of *Bellum Hispaniense* implicitly contradicts it. He was in no sense a military critic: but he witnessed the battle; he was an honest man; and his narrative is the only original authority for the story of this campaign.

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 105, 434. <sup>2</sup> xliii, 38, 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesars Monarchie*, &c., 1919, pp. 563–88.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. M. Schanz, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, i<sup>3</sup>, 1909, p. 183, and *Philol. Woch.*, 18 Feb., 1922, col. 165–7.



murder of Clodius and the violent scenes that followed it,<sup>1</sup> the punishment of the Clodian rabble by Pompey's soldiers,<sup>2</sup> &c. Similar scenes had occurred in 55, and in that year Cato and Domitius played a prominent part when their election was opposed.—No doubt; but Sallust, if he wrote the letters, was guilty of gross exaggeration. Still, I am inclined to acquiesce in the conclusion of Schanz, that, in default of strong reasons to the contrary, their authenticity should be admitted. I have not, however, noticed them in my narrative; for, as Meyer remarks,<sup>3</sup> the only measure of Caesar's that related to any one of the writer's suggestions for constitutional reform was the increase of the number of the senators, and Caesar acted on his own initiative, not under the influence of the writer.

### THE *LEX IULIA MUNICIPALIS*

In 1732 a brass tablet, inscribed with the fragment of a law, was discovered in the alluvium of the river Salandra, between Heraclea and Metapontum, on the western shore of the Gulf of Tarentum. It is known as the Table of Heraclea, and is supposed to have been originally set up in that town. The fragment consists of three sections. The first (lines 1–19) is evidently incomplete and in the absence of its earlier portion cannot be fully understood. It enacts that certain individuals are to make a declaration in person, or, if they are absent from Rome, by proxy, or, if they are minors or women under guardianship, through their guardians, before certain magistrates. A list of these individuals is to be deposited in the public records; a duplicate is to be exhibited at the place where corn is gratuitously distributed; and any official who gives corn to any one whose name appears in the list is to be fined. The second section (20–82) lays down regulations as to the maintenance of the roads and footpaths, the control of vehicular traffic, &c. in Rome. The third (83–163) relates to municipalities other than Rome, and contains three parts, the first (83–141) making provisions with regard to municipal councils, the second (142–158) framing regulations for a municipal census, and the third (159–163) providing that existing municipal charters are to be amended within a fixed time.<sup>4</sup>

The document was interpreted by Savigny<sup>5</sup> and Mommsen<sup>6</sup> as the concluding portion of a general law, called *lex Iulia municipalis*, by which Caesar was supposed to have regulated the institutions of all the Italian municipalities, including Rome. This theory remained dominant until 1903, when, after the discovery

<sup>1</sup> Ascon. ed. Clark, p. 33 (ed. Stangl, p. 32); Dio, xl, 50, 1. Meyer quotes from Asconius *compluresque noti homines elisi sunt inter quos C. Vibienus senator*, a reading which Clark rejects. Cicero, however (*Pro Mil.*, 14, 37), attests the fate of Vibienus.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 53, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 398.

<sup>4</sup> K. G. Bruns, *Fontes iuris Rom.*, 1909, pp. 102–10. Dr. E. G. Hardy (*Roman Laws and Charters*, 1912) gives an English translation along with the text.

<sup>5</sup> *Vermischte Schriften*, iii, 1850, pp. 327–400.

<sup>6</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, pp. 123–4.



of a fragment of a law framed by a commissioner or commissioners for the city of Tarentum, Mommsen recanted, saying, 'I deny that any law of the Roman People, regulating by a general ordinance the constitution of municipalities and colonies, whether Roman or Latin, ever existed' (*legem populi Romani nego ullam exstitisse, quae statum municipiorum et coloniarum, sive civium Romanorum sive Latinorum, generaliter ordinaret*<sup>1</sup>). In 1907 Dr. H. Legras published a dissertation,<sup>2</sup> in which he endeavoured not only to demolish the 'classical theory' of Savigny and Mommsen, but also to prove that the law belonged for the most part to the time of Sulla. This treatise provoked much discussion, and while some critics persisted in attributing the law to Caesar, the unanimous opinion was that Legras had failed to establish the constructive part of his theory.<sup>3</sup> In 1910 a Dutch savant, J. M. Nap,<sup>4</sup> argued that the law belonged to some time between 65 and 59 B. C.; but his reconstruction was not more acceptable than that of Legras.<sup>5</sup> In 1914 Dr. Hardy<sup>6</sup> severely criticized both Legras and Nap, and attempted 'to vindicate not only the Caesarian authorship of the document, but some part of the theory of a general law'; for, as he says, it is now generally admitted that 'the document, when complete, was not the copy of a general municipal law', but 'a composite document, made up of different measures'.<sup>7</sup>

1. Dr. Hardy,<sup>8</sup> after disposing of Legras's<sup>9</sup> attempt to connect the first section with Sulla and of Nap's<sup>10</sup> attempt to refer it to 65 B. C., argues, following Mommsen's original theory, that it may be explained by comparison with the passage in which Suetonius<sup>11</sup> describes the reform made by Caesar in the gratuitous distribution of corn,—*Recensum populi nec more nec loco solito, sed vicatim per dominos insularum egit, atque ex viginti trecentisque milibus accipientium frumentum e publico ad centum quinquaginta retraxit; ac ne qui novi coetus recensitionis causa moveri quandoque possent, instituit, quot annis in demortuorum locum ex iis qui recens non essent subsortitio a praetore fieret*. I provisionally translate,—'He made an enumeration of the people not in the usual manner or place, but from street to street through the landlords of tenements, and reduced the number of persons who received grain at the public expense from three hundred and twenty thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand. To prevent new assemblies from congregating at any time for the purpose of enrolment, he enacted that the places of those who died should be annually filled by the praetor by lot from those who had not been enumerated.'

<sup>1</sup> *Eph. epigr.*, ix, p. 6 (= *Gesamm. Schr.*, i, 1905, p. 153).

<sup>2</sup> *La table lat. d'Héraclée*.

<sup>3</sup> See M. Besnier's article in *Rev. des études anc.*, xiv, 1912, pp. 43, 46-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Verhand. d. Koninkl. Akad. van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam*, Afd. Letterkunde, xi, No. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Besnier, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-51.

<sup>6</sup> *Journ. Roman Studies* (hereafter quoted as *J. R. S.*), iv, 1914, pp. 65-110.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 66-7.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 68-71.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 361-8.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 24-42.

<sup>11</sup> *Div. Iul.*, 41, 3.

Dr. Hardy<sup>1</sup> remarks that 'it is obvious that this system necessitated a second list made out each year, to which the lot was to be applied. To get on to this preliminary list, application in person or by proxy would be necessary, and this would naturally take the form of a definite "professio" [declaration] before specified magistrates.<sup>2</sup> It is equally clear that an official copy of this list . . . would have to be kept in the "tabulae publicae" [public records] to be used for the "subsortitio" [selection by lot] at the end of the year. But that there might be no suspicion of unfair dealing, and to give opportunities for checking and exposing false statements, a second copy was put up in the forum.' Legras<sup>3</sup> argues that minors and women under guardianship would not have been included in a list framed in connexion with the distribution of corn; but Dr. Hardy replies that 'even if before and after Caesar the privilege of receiving corn was confined to adult male citizens the dictator's law may have introduced an innovation which did not survive. As his object was to transform a political bribe into a means of poor-relief, it is conceivable that a widow or a son still under wardship may have been allowed to receive corn for a family. It seems to me therefore,' Dr. Hardy concludes, 'that Mommsen's identification of these lines [1-19] with the conclusion of Caesar's *lex frumentaria* still holds the field'.<sup>4</sup> One can assent to this without committing oneself to entire agreement with Dr. Hardy: to hint but one doubt—is it certain that women of the class which received doles of corn were regularly placed under guardianship? I put this question to Dr. Hardy. 'Generally', he replied, 'the women and boys of the lower classes would have no need of "guardians", but if . . . they were called upon to make some formal declaration before a magistrate, they could always apply for a guardian under the . . . *lex Atilia* . . . The chance of getting on the list of "recensi" would be well worth the trouble of applying for a "tutor".' But Dr. Hardy candidly added, 'this explanation is somewhat conjectural.'

Professor J. S. Reid, who holds as strongly as Dr. Hardy that 'the returns [*professiones*] ordered by the *Tabula* were . . . connected with a diminution in the number of persons entitled to share in the

<sup>1</sup> *J. R. S.*, p. 70. See also Dr. Hardy's re-statement of his view in *Class. Quart.*, xi, 1917, pp. 27-8.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Jefferson Elmore (*J. R. S.*, 1915, pp. 129-33) thinks that a clue to the nature of the *professiones* mentioned in the tablet—the declarations that were to be made by certain individuals or by their representatives—is to be found in two of Cicero's letters,—*Att.*, xiii, 33, 1 and *Fam.*, xvi, 23, 1. It is unnecessary here to summarize his theory, which has been demolished both by Dr. Hardy (*Class. Quart.*, 1917, pp. 31-4) and by Prof. J. S. Reid (*J. R. S.*, 1915, pp. 207-13). These scholars (*C. Q.*, pp. 27-36; *J. R. S.*, pp. 215 n. 6, 218 note) also confute another contention of Prof. Elmore (pp. 127-8, 133),—that the words *recensus populi* in the relevant passage of Suetonius mean, not 'a special list of citizens' drawn up in view of the distribution of corn, but a 'census of population'. Prof. Elmore reiterated his opinions in the *Classical Quarterly*, 1918, pp. 38-45, but without meeting most of the criticisms that had been directed against them. His paper was noticed by Dr. Hardy in the same periodical (1919, pp. 49-51).

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 40-1.

<sup>4</sup> *J. R. S.*, p. 71.

food,'<sup>1</sup> in other words, with the reform attributed by Suetonius to Caesar, differs from him in regard to the 'returns' themselves. He suggests<sup>2</sup> that the *domini insularum* mentioned by Suetonius—the proprietors of the tenements in which the poor of Rome mostly lived—are 'the very persons who make the "professiones" . . . and are excluded from the' distribution of corn. This suggestion, he claims, 'affords a reasonable explanation of two stumbling-blocks',—the exclusion of those who made the declarations from the distribution and the mention of minors and women under guardianship. 'These minors', he explains, 'are concerned as owners of *insulae* [tenements], for whom naturally their guardians must act'. Then, remarking<sup>3</sup> that the proper meaning of the word *recensi* is 'those enumerated', he argues that 'to apply it [as Dr. Hardy does] to the reduced number of burgesses who, by Caesar's innovation, had the right to corn without payment . . . is surely unnatural', for they 'were only a portion of the enumerated'. This objection must, I think, have presented itself to every one who has studied Dr. Hardy's paper. But Professor Reid does not pretend that his own explanation is unassailable. 'The question', he continues, 'may be asked: would not an enactment to the effect that no owner of dwellings [*insulae*] and no tenant of a separate "domus" [private house] should be deemed to be qualified [for a share in the distribution] have been sufficient? Doubtless there was such an ordinance. Why add to it a list of owners to be exhibited in the forum . . . ? if all "domini insularum" had been like Crassus and other wealthy men who drew great incomes from "slum" dwellings, the query would not admit of an answer. . . . But there is reason<sup>4</sup> to believe that a single great block of tenements was often divided among many proprietors . . . proprietors of a small building, or of a portion of a large one would often live in it and would not be very prosperous. Such people might be tempted to secure free corn for themselves, and the published list would be a safeguard.' To acquiesce in this explanation may need an effort; but one might be less disposed to rebel if Professor Reid could justify the final comment<sup>5</sup> which he makes on Dr. Hardy's alternative:—'a gigantic list [containing the names of 'the 170,000 who . . . were deprived of the right to the dole'], exhibited, be it remembered, for "the greater part of a day", would do nothing to restrain impostors'. 'I imagine,' he concludes,<sup>6</sup> 'that the placard [exhibited in the Forum] merely stated how many names each "dominus" had mentioned in his return . . . The "subsortitio" must have taken account solely of those whose names had not been included in the large preliminary list to which the "recensus" had led. This is the only conclusion that can fairly be drawn from the words "ex iis qui recensi non essent".'

Dr. Hardy will not admit this. He denies that *recensi* means merely 'those enumerated'. Dio,<sup>7</sup> he observes, calls the *recensus* an

<sup>1</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1915, p. 214.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 218.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 219.

<sup>4</sup> Unhappily the professor does not definitely state it.

<sup>5</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1915, p. 220.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 221.

<sup>7</sup> xliii, 21, 4.

ἐξέτασις—a scrutiny. 'Why', he asks, 'should it not connote a process first of reaching a total by means of an enumeration, and then of reducing it by some selective method to a smaller total?'<sup>1</sup> To prevent misunderstanding let me put the views of the two scholars side by side. Dr. Hardy holds that the vacancies caused by death were to be filled up from the 170,000 persons who had been rejected after the original scrutiny: Professor Reid, insisting that *is qui recens non essent* (from whom the vacancies were to be filled) means 'those who had not been enumerated,' in other words those who were not included in the original 320,000, identifies them with 'citizens who had become domiciled in Rome or had become adult there during the year.'<sup>2</sup> But, Dr. Hardy asks, 'if the *recensus* was over and done with as soon as the total of 320,000 *recensi* was arrived at, how was it that Caesar foresaw . . . the possibility of disorderly assemblies *recensionis causa*? This phrase . . . is really fatal to his [Professor Reid's] theory. It proves that the *recensus* was not a process which took place once and once only, since the *subsortitio* is represented as a contrivance for making the *recensio* in future years more orderly.'<sup>3</sup> Dr. Hardy cannot believe that the arrangement imagined by the professor 'would have prevented the disorderly assemblies . . . Would the older citizens,' he asks, 'many of whom had shared in the corn doles for years . . . be content quietly to stand aside and see the coveted vacancies filled by these youths and interlopers . . . ?'<sup>4</sup>

Dr. Hardy considers, further, whether Professor Reid's theory that the persons who made the *professiones* were the landlords makes the Table easier to understand. He points out<sup>5</sup> that along with the names of the landlords it would have been obligatory to publish the contents of their returns (*ea quae professus erit* [lines 13-4])—in other words (if Professor Reid's view of the *recensus* is correct), the names of the 320,000 tenants. Professor Reid evades this difficulty by assuming that, while the names were recorded in the archives, the published list was a mere summary, containing the names of the landlords and under each the number without the names of the tenants. But this assumption is irreconcilable with the provision in the Table (lines 14-5) that the two lists were to be identical. Finally, Dr. Hardy denies<sup>6</sup> that his explanation involves the necessity of assuming that 170,000 names were posted in the Forum; for, he argues, 'it is not necessary to suppose that all the excluded, *qui recens non essent* . . . were allowed to register themselves as candidates for the *subsortitio*.'

The reader should now be qualified to form his own opinion. To me it seems that on the two last questions, relating to the *professiones* and the supposed 170,000 names, Dr. Hardy has the best of the argument. But in the matter of the *recensus* and the *recensi* I am not convinced by his reasoning. How would he *translate* the words *recensus* and *qui recens non essent*? By the latter he evidently

<sup>1</sup> *Journ. of Philol.*, xxxv, 23.

<sup>2</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1915, p. 221.

<sup>3</sup> *Journ. of Philol.*, xxxv, 24.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 26.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 25.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 27.



means 'those who had not passed the scrutiny' or 'those who had been excluded by the "selective method"', which he imagines. Would not such a rendering put a breaking strain upon the Latin? Scrutiny and 'selective method' were obviously connoted; but Suetonius left them to the imagination. Besides, is it not clear that *recensi* connotes the process which Suetonius in the same breath calls *recensum*—in other words, that the 170,000 persons whom Dr. Hardy identifies with *iis qui recensi non essent* had been subjected to the *recensus* and therefore *had* been *recensi*? I cannot see that the phrase *recensionis causa* is 'fatal' to Professor Reid's theory. He does not mean that the *recensus* was a process which took place once and once only: he means that, *as applied to the 320,000*, it took place only once, which is not inconsistent with the supposition that for the numerous candidates for vacancies caused by death a fresh *recensio* or *recensus* would be required. As for 'the older citizens', I see no reason for believing that they were more likely to cause disorder when vacancies occurred than when they were first excluded by Caesar's law, or than 'the youths' who must have equally desired to get free corn. Suetonius indeed says nothing about disorder. Neither 'the exclusion of those who made the declarations from the distribution' nor 'the mention of minors and women' seems to me a 'stumbling-block'. Dr. Hardy has accounted not unreasonably for the latter, and I would suggest that those who made the declarations were not all permanently excluded from the distribution, but only until the *subsortitio* had been applied to the list of candidates and perhaps until the minors came of age.

2. Dr. Hardy suggests that the second section may perhaps be 'merely an extract from a larger law, dealing with the municipal administration of Rome'.<sup>1</sup> This question, however, has nothing to do with the date, with which alone we are here concerned. Legras<sup>2</sup> gives reasons, which Dr. Hardy refutes,<sup>3</sup> for assigning it to the second century B.C.; but while he himself refers it to the dictatorship of Caesar, he admits that the reasons are not conclusive.<sup>4</sup> Briefly, they are that Caesar unquestionably did much for the convenience of the population of Rome; that one of the magistrates mentioned in the section is described as 'the urban quaestor or whoever shall have charge of the treasury' (*quaestor urbanus quive aerario praeerit*)<sup>5</sup> and there is no evidence that there was any question of removing the quaestor from this charge before 45 B.C.;<sup>6</sup> and that both in this section<sup>7</sup> and in the third<sup>8</sup> there occurs the phrase *censor aliusve quis magistratus* (the censor or any other magistrate), 'which seems quite appropriate to the last two years of Caesar's life, when the constitution was almost in the melting-pot, and when the dictator himself had assumed the office of censor under the title of "praefectus morum"'.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1914, p. 72.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 63-105.

<sup>3</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1914, pp. 72-6. Cf. *ib.*, 1915, p. 225.

<sup>4</sup> *ib.*, 1914, pp. 76-8. Cf. 1915, p. 226.

<sup>5</sup> l. 49.

<sup>6</sup> See Dio, xliii, 48, 3.

<sup>7</sup> l. 73.

<sup>8</sup> l. 144.

<sup>9</sup> Caesar was both censor and *praefectus morum*. See pp. 276, 332, *supra*.

3. The strongest argument for assigning the third section to the dictatorship of Caesar is to be found in a letter which Cicero wrote in January, 45 B. C. to one Quintus Lepta.—‘Immediately after I received the letter from the hands of your man, Seleucus, I sent a note to Balbus, asking him what the clause of the law was. He replied that practising auctioneers were excluded from being municipal councillors, but that retired auctioneers were not. So your friends and mine need not be alarmed; for it would be intolerable that while men who are now practising divination are on the roll of the Senate at Rome, those who had ever been auctioneers should not be allowed to become councillors in the municipal towns’ (*Simul atque accepi a Seleuco tuo litteras, statim quaesivi e Balbo per codicillos quid esset in lege. Rescripsit eos qui facerent praeconium vetari esse in decurionibus: qui fecissent non vetari. Quare bono animo sint et tui et mei familiares, neque enim erat ferendum, cum qui hodie haruspicinam facerent in senatum Romae legerentur, eos qui aliquando praeconium fecissent in municipiis decuriones esse non licere*<sup>1</sup>). Now, according to lines 94–95 of the Table, no practising auctioneer, beadle, or undertaker might sit in the council of any municipality (*neve quis qui praeconium dissignationem libitinamve faciet, dum eorum quid faciet, in municipio colonia praefectura . . . senator neve decurio neve conscriptus esto*). ‘The inference’, says Dr. Hardy, ‘seems irresistible that at the beginning of 45, while Caesar was in Spain, there were rumours of a law being prepared dealing with the qualifications for local senates; that Seleucus<sup>2</sup> or Lepta had friends whom this particular disqualification might affect; that Cicero on their behalf consulted Balbus, Caesar’s agent and confidant, and received a reply which was verified by the . . . law published later in the same year.’<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless the inference has been resisted, both by Legras<sup>4</sup> and by Nap.<sup>5</sup> The former argues that even if the law to which Cicero referred was a projected and not an existing law, it need not necessarily have been the law of the Table: more probably it was a law to be framed for some town in Spain, of which country Balbus was a native, or of some town in the East, to which Seleucus belonged. Besides, Legras adds, Cicero speaks of a *lex* (law), not of a *rogatio* (bill), which proves that the law in question already existed: it may, indeed, have been the law preserved by the Table, but in that case it must have been earlier than 45,—much earlier, or there would have been no need to take so much trouble in order to ascertain its provisions. Again, it is not likely that Balbus would have betrayed Caesar’s confidence by disclosing the details of an unpublished law. Nap insists that the law to which Cicero referred must have been earlier than 59, the year in which Caesar, as consul, started the regular publication of the senatorial transactions (*acta diurna*<sup>6</sup>); for if it had been contained in the *acta*, Lepta could have ascertained

<sup>1</sup> *Fam.*, vi, 18, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Surely not Seleucus, who was evidently Lepta’s messenger?

<sup>3</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1914, p. 83.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 286–96.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 32–3.

<sup>6</sup> Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 20, 1.

its provisions without consulting Cicero : the mere fact that Cicero referred to Balbus, who was then acting for Caesar at Rome, proves that it was necessary to investigate the archives deposited in the treasury.

Now it is hardly necessary to say that Lepta and his friends would not have been anxious about a clause relating to the qualification of retired auctioneers, if the law which contained it was applicable only to a town in Spain.<sup>1</sup> Dr. Hardy points out that "lex" is constantly used of a law not passed, and, he adds, 'the trifling matter enquired about was no state secret which Balbus would scruple to disclose.' Moreover, as Dr. Hardy remarks, if it was an old law, it must have been one from which the corresponding clause of the Table was a copy :—'It was on the face of it to apply to all Italian towns . . . How was it that the details of such a law were unknown not only to Cicero, but to his municipal friends . . . the law could not have been obsolete, or Lepta's friends would not have been so anxious. Again, if Cicero wanted information about this old law, why did he not go and consult it at the aerarium [treasury] ? . . . Or, if he had to enquire of another person, why did he choose Balbus ? Balbus was the obvious person to consult about a measure of Caesar, but he was less likely than Cicero himself to be acquainted with Sulla's laws or with previous Roman legislation.'<sup>2</sup>

Legras and Nap have been answered : the reader will have noticed a sentence in Cicero's letter which proves that the law to which he was referring was a projected and not an old law :—'it would be intolerable that while men who are now practising divination are on the roll of the Senate at Rome, those who had ever been auctioneers should not be allowed to become councillors in the municipal towns.' Even if we knew nothing about the relation of diviners (*haruspices*) to the Senate, this sentence would suggest to any unbiased reader that the law was only about to be passed, and that it was Caesar who had admitted *haruspices* into the Senate ; for there would be little point in complaining that a clause in an old law was intolerable merely because *haruspices* sat in the Senate at the time when Cicero was writing. But we know that before the age of revolution *haruspices*, whose profession was of foreign origin, could only attend sittings of the Senate when they were specially introduced by permission of the president ;<sup>3</sup> and, apart from Cicero's word *hodie*, there is reason to believe that it was Caesar who had granted to certain *haruspices* the privilege of becoming members.<sup>4</sup> Who else would have done so ? Did not Caesar incur odium by admitting to the Senate the sons of freedmen,<sup>5</sup> freedmen themselves,<sup>6</sup> retired centurions, and even retired legionaries ?<sup>7</sup> And did not Cicero complain that under the dictatorship of Caesar it was easier to become a senator at Rome

<sup>1</sup> I found after writing the sentence in the text that Dr. Hardy (p. 85) had anticipated me.

<sup>2</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1914, p. 84.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxxii, 1, 14.

<sup>4</sup> This, I find, was the view of Marquardt (*Röm. Staatsverw.*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1885, p. 415, n. 5).

<sup>5</sup> Dio, xliii, 47, 3.

<sup>6</sup> Cic., *De off.*, ii, 8, 29.

<sup>7</sup> Dio, xlii, 51, 5.

than a councillor at Pompeii? <sup>1</sup> Professor Reid, <sup>2</sup> however, while he admits that Cicero's letter 'is good evidence that Caesar drafted a law bearing on qualifications, and . . . raises a possibility that such a law was passed', nevertheless insists that 'it affords no proof whatever that this portion of the Tabula is extracted from that law. The disability about which Seleucus was concerned was of long standing, and the only necessary conclusion from . . . Cicero's letter is that it was not changed by Caesar's contemplated measure . . . the sole reason for connecting' this part of the law 'with the measure mentioned in Cicero's letter is its appearance on the same tablet with some other provisions which may reasonably be assigned to the age of Caesar.' Dr. Hardy is ready with an answer. He shows that the passage <sup>3</sup> which Professor Reid presumably has in mind does not prove that 'the disability, as stated on the Table, i. e. limited to those actually carrying on the trade of a *praeco* [auctioneer], was of long standing', and, he asks, 'If the provision on the Table was in existence before Caesar's dictatorship, why should he have legislated on the subject . . . ?' <sup>4</sup>

Legras <sup>5</sup> and Professor Reid <sup>6</sup> assign the second division of the third section to the period following the Social War, because they hold that a municipal census could not have been postponed till the dictatorship of Caesar, but must have been held immediately after the Italians received the Roman citizenship. Dr. Hardy, <sup>7</sup> however, points out that the essence of the provision in the Table 'is not the establishment of a municipal census, but its synchronism with that held in Rome' (*qui in eis municipiis . . . maximum mag<istratum> . . . habebit tum, cum censor aliusve quis mag<istratus> Romae populi censum aget, is diebus LX proxumeis, quibus sciet Romae censum populi agi, omnium municipium . . . censum agito* <sup>8</sup>). 'Such a regulation', he adds, 'might well have been left till Caesar's time. Indeed a scheme which involved such combination, such elaborate machinery and such unsparing labour as a simultaneous census of all Italy, was exactly suited to the character and genius of Caesar.' Dr. Hardy does not claim that this reason is conclusive; but he pleads that it counters the strongest argument for an earlier date. The plea might be admitted if it were certain that 'the scheme' did really involve 'a simultaneous census of all Italy'. But is it? Does *omnium municipium* necessarily mean 'all the municipalities of Italy'? Such a census, says Professor Reid, <sup>9</sup> 'was already provided by the system which required all burgesses to be registered at Rome.' Dr. Hardy, however, does not admit that a simultaneous census was already provided. 'It was probably', he insists, 'just because the *frequentia Italiae* carried out for the last time in 70 [B. C.] had proved impracticable that decentralisation by means of a simultaneous census was resorted to . . . To what statesman after 62 B. C. other than

<sup>1</sup> Macrob., *Sat.*, ii, 3, 11.

<sup>2</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1915, p. 235.

<sup>3</sup> Cic., *Verr.*, ii, 2, 49, 122.

<sup>4</sup> *Journ. of Philol.*, xxxv, 32-3.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 142-9.

<sup>6</sup> *The Municipalities of the Roman Empire*, 1913, pp. 131-2.

<sup>7</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1914, pp. 86-7.

<sup>8</sup> ll. 142-6.

<sup>9</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1915, p. 236.



Caesar would Professor Reid attribute so wide reaching a measure, and if it was Caesar's law, was any date so probable as during the dictatorship? <sup>1</sup>

Coming to the last division, Dr. Hardy argues that 'the only possible reason why all commissioners should have to make changes in their charters at the same time must surely be that these changes were necessitated by some provision or provisions applying to all Italian towns.' This, he urges, is confirmed by the fact that the clause in question 'is immediately preceded on the Table by two provisions precisely of this character'.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly he arrives at the conclusion that, 'apart from the question of a general law, there is a preponderance of probability throughout, and in many points a preponderance of actual evidence, in favour of attributing every provision in the inscription to . . . Caesar's dictatorship'.<sup>3</sup> Professor Reid, on the contrary, urging<sup>4</sup> that it is 'wholly in accord with the spirit of Roman government to suppose that the acceptance of the *lex Iulia* [of 90 B. C., by which the franchise was conceded to all the Italian cities that chose to accept it] merely entitled the cities to the privileges of Roman citizens and left their internal codes untouched', suggests<sup>5</sup> that the law from which this division of the tablet was an extract 'was one of a series of exceptional statutes by which Caesar arranged the municipal affairs', not of all Italy but of Cisalpine Gaul. A single sentence in Dr. Hardy's rejoinder, confirming a comment which had already suggested itself to me, seems unanswerable. 'The reluctance', he says, 'of Heraclea and Naples to accept the citizenship is unintelligible, if its acceptance "merely entitled the cities to the privileges of Roman citizens, and left their internal codes untouched."'<sup>6</sup> Then, remarking that for the exceptional statutes which the professor postulates 'there is no evidence whatever', he asks why, if the commissioners, as the professor maintains, had framed their *leges datae* after the enfranchisement of Cisalpine Gaul in March, 49, they should have been called upon to revise them only four years later.<sup>7</sup>

I have left to the last one piece of evidence upon which Dr. Hardy lays special stress. That a *lex Iulia municipalis* did exist is proved by an inscription, found at Padua (Patavium), in which one Junius Sabinus is described as *vivir aediliciae potestatis e lege Iulia municipalis*.<sup>8</sup> Mommsen<sup>9</sup> argued that the *lex* mentioned in this inscription was only a particular law, framed by Caesar for the municipality of Patavium; but Dr. Hardy remains unmoved. "Lex Julia Municipalis", he says, 'could not possibly have been the official title of a local *lex data*, because *ex hypothesi* a local *lex data* refers to a particular *municipium*, and this title leaves the particular *municipium* out. Pompey's law [regulating the affairs of Bithynia] was not *Lex Pompeia provincialis*, but *Lex Pompeia de Bithynia provincia*. The

<sup>1</sup> *Journ. of Philol.*, xxxv, 34-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 94.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 1915, p. 239.

<sup>2</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1914, pp. 87-90.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 242.

<sup>6</sup> *Journ. of Philol.*, xxxv, 39. Cf. *Class. Rev.*, xxxi, 1917, pp. 132-4.

<sup>7</sup> *Journ. of Philol.*, xxxv, 44, 46.

<sup>8</sup> *C. I. L.*, v, No. 2864 (= H. Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 5406).

<sup>9</sup> *Eph. epigr.*, ix, p. 6, n. 34.

*Lex Rubria*, a *lex data* in Mommsen's view, was not *Lex Rubria provincialis* . . . but *de Gallia Cisalpina*. I do not see how the conclusion can be avoided that a *lex data* for Padua must have been not *Lex Julia Municipalis*, but *Lex Julia de municipio Patavino*. I pass over the improbability that Caesar between 49 B. C. and his death would have undertaken the task of himself framing a charter for this particular town.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, Dr. Hardy, remarking that the third section of the Table was obviously 'a general municipal law', discusses the question whether, 'besides being general in its applicability', it was also 'general in the sense of dealing comprehensively with all parts of municipal constitutions and municipal administration.'<sup>2</sup> Mommsen in the last year of his life observed that in the writings of the jurists such a law, if it existed, was treated with 'profound silence';<sup>3</sup> nor is it mentioned in the chapters which Suetonius and Dio devote to Caesar's legislation. Legras<sup>4</sup> goes further: he derides the suggestion that while every Italian town had a charter of its own, there was also a general law defining the principles on which the constitutions of all Italian towns were to be framed and their administration to be conducted. But, Dr. Hardy asks, 'what is the inconsistency so repugnant to common sense between a general law and particular "*leges datae*" [laws framed for particular towns]? Legras himself admits that commissioners may have received direction and guidance . . . from laws which, though not amounting to general municipal codes, nevertheless contained provisions of general applicability. Even if he had not admitted this, we happen to have in the latter half of the Table of Heraclea conclusive proof that it was so . . . the additions and corrections which commissioners are to make in their charters are unintelligible, except on the supposition that they are to be made in the light of some general directions . . . If it is asked why the charters of Tarentum, Urso and Malaca all contained prohibitions against the demolition of houses, when there was a general law prohibiting it, the answer is simple. The "*leges datae*" were the constitutional and administrative statutes which were immediately obligatory on the municipal magistrates and their townsmen. The general law was intended . . . to bind the commissioners [who framed the *leges datae*] in respect to principles, and to afford them guidance, though naturally in greater laxity, in matters of detail.'<sup>5</sup> The hypothesis which Dr. Hardy proposes is that the *lex Iulia municipalis* 'was not the first formulation of a general municipal law, but a revision and re-enactment of earlier laws, together with certain new provisions, of which two are preserved on the Table of Heraclea, and of which some others were probably contained on the first and missing portion of that document'.<sup>6</sup> That the Table was originally set up at Heraclea is not certain; but, assuming that it was, the reader may ask why it should have been placed there when two of its three sections related only to Rome, and when Heraclea must already have had

<sup>1</sup> *Roman Laws and Charters*, pp. 165-6. Cf. *J. R. S.*, 1914, pp. 108-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 96-110.

<sup>3</sup> *Eph. epigr.*, ix, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 254-5.

<sup>5</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1914, pp. 99-100.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 108.

a charter of its own. The answer which suggested itself to me has been anticipated by Dr. Hardy, and I will put it in his words. We have seen that the last clause of the Table provided that certain existing municipal charters were to be amended. 'If,' says Dr. Hardy, 'any recent legislation in Rome, affecting the municipal affairs of the capital, struck a commissioner as applicable or useful to his town, it would be open to him to embody their effect, mutatis mutandis, in his revised "lex data"'.<sup>1</sup>

To me it seems that Dr. Hardy has been for the most part successful in defending his theory against criticism. But after all one may not be able to set at rest the doubt whether the 'profound silence' in juristic literature which Mommsen emphasized can be explained away.<sup>2</sup>

### CAESAR'S DICTATORSHIPS

Groebe<sup>3</sup> observes that it is a widespread error to say that Caesar held his first dictatorship for only 11 days, and Mommsen, whom he mentions as the chief delinquent, seems to have held this opinion;<sup>4</sup> but I am not sure that he did not mean, what was the fact, that Caesar only exercised his dictatorial power during the eleven days which he spent in Rome on returning from Massilia and before he started to encounter Pompey. Perhaps this was what Plutarch,<sup>5</sup> to whom Groebe attributes the error, meant to convey. Caesar himself tells us that he received the news of his appointment while he was staying at Massilia after he returned from Spain.<sup>6</sup>

Mommsen, finding discrepancies between the literary evidence and the coins, of course preferred the latter, and drew up the following scheme:—

705/49 B. C.	Nov./Dec. during 11 days	. . .	dict. I.
706/48 "	Beginning till Oct. . . . .	cos. II.	
	Oct. till end of year . . . . .	cos. II.	dict. II.
707/47 "	. . . . .		dict. II.
708/46 "	. . . . .	cos. III.	dict. II.
709/45 "	. . . . .	cos. IIII.	dict. III.
710/44 "	Beginning till Jan. 26 . . . . .	cos. V.	dict. IIII.
	Feb. 15 till March 15 . . . . .	cos. V.	dict. perp.

Some years later F. L. Ganter<sup>7</sup> published a new scheme, which coincided with Mommsen's till the end of 707/47, but thenceforward differed from it:—

708/46 B. C.	Beginning till about mid-April . . . . .	cos. III.	dict. II.
	About mid-April till end of year . . . . .	cos. III.	dict. III.
709/45 "	Beginning till about mid-April . . . . .	cos. IIII.	dict. III.
	About mid-April till end of year . . . . .	cos. IIII.	dict. IIII.
710/44 "	Beginning till March 15 . . . . .	cos. V.	dict. IIII.

<sup>1</sup> *J. R. S.*, 1914, p. 95.

<sup>2</sup> E. Meyer (*Caesars Monarchie*<sup>2</sup>, 1919, pp. 425-6), who appears to agree substantially with Dr. Hardy, though he does not refer to him, praises a work by G. Muttelsee—*Unters. über d. lex Iul. mun.*, 1913—which I have not been able to see. Cf. L. Mitteis (*Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stift. f. Rechtsgesch.*, rom. Abt., xxxiii, 1912, pp. 161-2, 164, 177-8).

<sup>3</sup> W. Drumann's *Gesch. Roms*, iii<sup>2</sup>, 1906, p. 426, n. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, pp. 451-3.

<sup>5</sup> *Caes.*, 37, l. Cf. App., *B. C.*, ii, 48, 196.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, ii, 21, 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Zeitschr. f. Numism.*, xix, 1894, p. 191.



Before examining Ganter's theory, which is commonly accepted by his countrymen as definitive, I may point out that both he and Mommsen are wrong in assigning the eleven days during which Caesar exercised his first dictatorship to 'Nov./Dec.' The eleven days were all included in December; for Caesar did not sail from Brundisium until the 4th of January,<sup>1</sup> and must therefore have left Rome after the 11th of December.

It is certain and is admitted by all scholars that Caesar was appointed dictator for the second time in September or October, 48 B. C.<sup>2</sup> According to the writer of *Bellum Hispaniense*,<sup>3</sup> when he arrived in Spain in December, 46,<sup>4</sup> and was about to undertake the campaign against the sons of Pompey, he was dictator for the third time and dictator designate for the fourth. Plutarch<sup>5</sup> and Dio<sup>6</sup> say that his second dictatorship was to last one year. Dio<sup>7</sup> affirms that in the year of his third consulship (46) he was dictator for the third time; that after the news of the battle of Thapsus reached Rome and before he himself returned, he was appointed dictator for ten consecutive years;<sup>8</sup> that in the year after the battle of Munda

<sup>1</sup> B. C., iii, 6, 2.

<sup>2</sup> O. E. Schmidt (*D. Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, pp. 210-2), inferring from a letter of Cicero (*Att.*, xi, 7, 2), written on December 17, that Antony was appointed Master of the Horse by the beginning of that month, concludes that Caesar, who was at Alexandria, had nominated him about 35 days earlier, say on October 25, and accordingly that Caesar, who, he assumes, had learned shortly before that he had himself been made dictator, was appointed about the middle of September. The conclusion rests upon a calculation of the time which Antony's messenger would have taken to travel from Campania to Brundisium, where Cicero was staying, and Cicero's messenger from Brundisium to Campania and back, and of the time required for the transmission of messages between Rome and Alexandria. Schmidt argues that it is confirmed by Dio's statement (xlii, 35, 5) that Caesar had heard of his own appointment at the time—probably about the end of October (W. Judeich, *Caesar im Orient*, 1885, pp. 66-7)—when he gave his decision on the dispute between Ptolemy and Cleopatra. Groebe, on the other hand (Drumann, *op. cit.*, i<sup>2</sup>, 1899, pp. 404-5), observing that the first news of the battle of Pharsalia, which occurred on August 9, was long disbelieved at Rome (Dio, xlii, 18, 1) and that Caesar did not send a dispatch to his brother consul about his victory (Cic., *Phil.*, xiv, 8, 23), argues that his appointment must have been later than mid-September. Besides, he insists, according to Cicero (*Phil.*, ii, 25, 62), Antony was named Master of the Horse without Caesar's knowledge. To procure the dictatorship for Caesar was part of Antony's business; and since he returned to Italy later than Cicero (*ib.*, 24, 59), who did not return before the middle of October (Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-200, reasoning from *Fam.*, xiv, 12 and *Att.*, xi, 5, 1), Caesar could not have been appointed dictator before the end of the month.

<sup>3</sup> 2, 1. The passage is corrupt. In the MSS. known as πSW it runs (C. Caesar) *dictator tertio, designatus dictator quarto multis iterante diebus coniectis*, &c.: in ρ *dictator quarto multis iterante diebus coniectis tertio designatus dictator*, &c. Ganter (*op. cit.*, p. 194), referring to Mommsen's restoration—*Caesar dictator tertio, designatus dictator quarto multis iter ante diebus confecit quam crederes festinans ad bellum conficiendum. In Hispanium cum venisset*, &c.—remarks that, in order to establish his chronological scheme, he arbitrarily assumed that the titles in question belonged only to the year—45 B. C.—that followed Caesar's arrival, whereas Ganter's scheme holds good whether Caesar arrived before or after Jan. 1, 45.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 542.

<sup>5</sup> *Caes.*, 51, 1.

<sup>6</sup> xlii, 20, 3.

<sup>7</sup> xliii, 1, 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 14, 4.



(44) he was dictator for the fifth time; <sup>1</sup> and that, finally, in the same year he was made dictator for life.<sup>2</sup> From Josephus <sup>3</sup> we learn that Caesar was simultaneously [in 44] imperator, dictator for the fourth time, consul for the fifth, and dictator designate for life.

In the earlier part of the year 46 Caesar was still *dictator II.*, for one of his coins shows that he was simultaneously *dictator iter.* (= II.) and consul.<sup>4</sup> Evidently therefore Plutarch and Dio were wrong in saying that the second dictatorship was granted for one year only, unless we may suppose, what is extremely improbable, that it was subsequently extended, but did not carry with it the title of *dictator III.*

The news of the battle of Thapsus, which was fought on April 6,<sup>5</sup> doubtless reached Rome before the end of the month, and immediately afterwards Caesar was appointed dictator for ten successive years. When he received the appointment he became *dictator III.*, for, as Ganter points out,<sup>6</sup> the Senate at the same time authorized him to have 72 lictors—24 for each of his three dictatorships—in the triumph which he was to celebrate in the same year.<sup>7</sup> Since in December, when he arrived in Spain, he was still *dictator III.*, but was designated *dictator IIII.*, it follows that, although he had received the appointment for ten years, his dictatorships were to be reckoned as annual. From what I have already said it is clear that unless there was a break, of which there is no evidence, between the second and the third dictatorship, he became *dictator III.* towards the end of April, 46.

The news of the battle of Munda reached Rome on April 20.<sup>8</sup> Ganter <sup>9</sup> observes that, according to Dio,<sup>10</sup> the senatorial decree that conferred upon Caesar the title of Imperator followed soon after that which gave him the right to wear a laurel wreath,<sup>11</sup> and that coins issued after the bestowal of the title bear the designation *IMP.* and upon the reverse the image of Venus, which does not appear upon the coins issued by M. Mettius with the legend *CAESAR DICT. QUART.*<sup>12</sup> Presumably, Ganter concludes, these coins were earlier than those that bear the title *IMP.*; in other words, Caesar became *dictator IIII.* before he received the title Imperator: on the other hand, they are later than the coins issued by Chilo which show Caesar's portrait without any inscription,<sup>13</sup> and which represent the first issue with the laurel wreath: the coins with the legend *CAESAR DICT.*

<sup>1</sup> xliii, 49, 1.

<sup>2</sup> xliv, 8, 4. Cf. Livy, *Epit.*, 116; Plut., *Caes.*, 57, 1; Flor., ii, 13, 91; App., ii, 106, 442.

<sup>3</sup> E. Babelon, *Monn. de la répub. rom.*, ii, 1886, p. 14, No. 16. <sup>4</sup> *Ant.*, xiv, 10, 7. <sup>5</sup> See p. 540.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 192.

<sup>7</sup> Dio, xliii, 14, 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 42, 3.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 190-1.

<sup>10</sup> xliii, 43, 1; 44, 1-2.

<sup>11</sup> Ganter (*op. cit.*, p. 190), who asserts that the title Imperator was bestowed 'at the latest in May, 45', remarks that Cicero (*Fam.*, xiii, 15 and 16) greets Caesar as *imperator*. But these letters were written before the news of the victory of Munda reached Rome, and the title (which is given only in xiii, 15) referred to the designation *imperator* conferred upon Caesar by his troops after the surrender of Ategua on Feb. 19 (*Bell. Hisp.*, 19, 6).

<sup>12</sup> Babelon, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-1, Nos. 31-2.

<sup>13</sup> *Ib.*, p. 26, No. 45.

QUART. were therefore issued at the end of April or the beginning of May, 45. Now Dio <sup>1</sup> mentions the coins that bore Caesar's portrait only in conjunction with the bestowal of the title *Pater* (or *Parens*) *patriae*, which Caesar certainly received in 44; and Ganter's reasoning does not convince me that they were first struck in 45. But the conclusion that Caesar became *dictator IIII.* at the end of April, 45 does not depend upon the date in question.

When Ganter affirms that Caesar was *dictator IIII.* from the beginning of 44 B. C. till his death (March 15), I cannot follow him. As G. Henzen pointed out,<sup>2</sup> we learn from the *Acta triumphorum* <sup>3</sup> that on January 26 Caesar was *dictator IIII.*; an inscription ending with the line *C. IVLIVS C. F. C. H. CAESAR IIII. ABD.* shows that he resigned this office; and Cicero <sup>4</sup> says that on the day of the Lupercalia (February 15) he was *dictator perpetuus*. I would suggest, further, that his abdication of the fourth dictatorship immediately before he assumed the office for life may explain Dio's loose statement (for repeating which Groebe corrects Drumann) that in 44 B. C. he was *dictator V.*

My scheme therefore is as follows:—

705/49 B. C.	Oct.—Dec.	. . . . .			dict. I.
706/48 „	Beginning till Oct.	. . . . .	cos. II.		
	Oct. till end of year	. . . . .	cos. II.		dict. II.
707/47 „	. . . . .	. . . . .			dict. II.
708/46 „	Beginning till late in April	. . . . .	cos. III.		dict. II.
	Late in April till end of year	. . . . .	cos. III.		dict. III.
709/45 „	Beginning till late in April	. . . . .	cos. IIII.		dict. III.
	Late in April till end of year	. . . . .	cos. IIII.		dict. IIII.
710/44 „	Beginning till some day between				
	Jan. 26 and Feb. 15	. . . . .	cos. V.		dict. IIII.
	Some day between Jan. 26 and Feb. 15 <sup>5</sup>				
	till March 15	. . . . .	cos. V.		dict. perp.

<sup>1</sup> xliv, 4, 4. Cf. A. von Sallet in *Comm. philol. in honorem Th. Mommseni*, 1877, p. 85.

<sup>2</sup> *Eph. epigr.*, ii, 1875, p. 285. <sup>3</sup> *C. I. L.*, i, p. 461.

<sup>4</sup> *Phil.*, ii, 34, 87.

<sup>5</sup> E. Meyer (*Caesars Monarchie*<sup>2</sup>, 1919, p. 526 and n. 2) conjectures that Caesar ceased to be *dictator IIII.* and became *dictator perpetuus* on Feb. 14, because on the day on which he first sat on his gilded chair, that is just after he received the senatorial deputation which granted him among other honours the dictatorship for life, Spurinna warned him to beware of the next thirty days (Feb. 15–March 15). See Cic., *De div.*, i, 52, 119 and Val. Max., viii, 11, 2.

Ganter (*op. cit.*, p. 191), remarking that on the two latest coins issued by Sepullius Macer (Babelon, p. 28, Nos. 50–1) that show Caesar's portrait, one bearing the inscription *CAESAR DICT. PERPETVO* and the other *CAESAR PARENS PATRIAE*, the head is veiled (Caesar being *pontifex maximus*), argues that the title *DICT. PERPETVO* was earlier than *PARENS PATRIAE*, for two other coins of Macer (Babelon, Nos. 48–9) have *DICT. PERPETVO* with the head not veiled. The argument seems to me weak; and according to Dio (xliv, 4, 4; 8, 4), on whose evidence Ganter elsewhere relies, Caesar became *dictator perpetuus* after he received the other title.

## THE EVENTS OF MARCH 15-16, 44 B. C.

The events that occurred between the murder of Caesar and the meeting of the Senate on March 17 are described by Nicolaus of Damascus, Plutarch, Appian, and Cassius Dio. Whoever takes the trouble to collate their narratives will find that there are two questions about which he must make up his mind. It is proved by the testimony of Cicero <sup>1</sup> and Dio <sup>2</sup> that on the evening of the 15th Cicero and others visited the assassins on the Capitol. According to Nicolaus,<sup>3</sup> the assassins descended on the 15th, harangued the populace, and returned on the same day. It does not matter whether Cassius and Brutus went down alone, as Appian says, or, as we are told by Nicolaus, the assassins in a body; but the date is more important. Plutarch,<sup>4</sup> differing from Nicolaus, implies that it was the 16th; Appian,<sup>5</sup> though his narrative is obscure, seems to agree with Plutarch. Again, both Nicolaus <sup>6</sup> and Appian<sup>7</sup> relate that the assassins, after returning to the Capitol [and presumably after Cicero left them], sent envoys to Antony and Lepidus: Nicolaus refers this to the 15th, Appian apparently to the 16th. Otto Schmidt<sup>8</sup> argues that Nicolaus is the best authority, and, though Schmidt overrates his merits, I believe that on the points in question he was right. I have come to this conclusion not because Nicolaus was a friend of Augustus (for there is no reason to suppose that Augustus was better informed than the authorities whom the other writers followed), but because, while Plutarch and Appian make many chronological mistakes, Nicolaus states that Antony and Lepidus promised the envoys that they would reply to the conspirators on the following day (which implies that they made the promise on the 15th), and because his narrative leaves on my mind the impression that he used his authorities with care.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Att.*, xiv, 10, 1.

<sup>2</sup> xlv, 21, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Vita Caes.*, 26-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Caes.*, 67, 3; *Brut.*, 18, 3-4; 19, 1.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. ii, 125, 524 with 126, 525.

<sup>6</sup> 27.

<sup>7</sup> 123, 515.

<sup>8</sup> *Jahrb. f. class. Philol.*, 13. Suppl., 1884, pp. 679-81; *Berl. philol. Woch.*, 10 Sept., 1892, col. 1162-3. Cf. P. Groebe (*W. Drumann's Gesch. Roms*, i<sup>2</sup>, 1899, pp. 408-14).

<sup>9</sup> I have not referred to the much-disputed letter of Decimus Brutus (*Cic., Fam.*, xi, 1), for Prof. E. T. Merrill (*Class. Philol.*, x, 1915, pp. 241-59) has proved that it was not written on either March 16 or 17, and even on the assumption that it was, it is not in my opinion important for determining the order of events.

## A D D E N D A

PAGE 146. 'The lines . . . fifteen miles'. Caesar (*B. C.*, iii, 63, 4) reckoned the extent of his contravallation as 17 Roman (about 15½ English) miles. After repeated measurements I find that the line drawn on G. Veith's map (*Der Feldzug von Dyrrhachium*, Karte II b) represents 19 kilometres (not quite 12 English miles): Veith (*op. cit.*, p. 162), allowing, I suppose, for the redoubts (*castella*), the number of which is uncertain, though Caesar (iii, 44, 3) says that Pompey had twenty-four, obtains a different result—21 kilometres. In the hilly country near Dyrrachium the real would of course exceed the cartographic measurement, but hardly in the proportion of 5:4 or even 6:5 (see p. 481). Caesar's estimate was probably conjectural.

PAGES 244 ('But Caesar saw . . . ruptured them') and 518 ('As to the famous manœuvre . . . 788-90'). Th. Steinwender (*Klio*, xvii, 1921, p. 214), criticizing Veith's explanation (*Ant. Schlachtfelder*, iii, 2, 1913, p. 789) of the manœuvre by which Caesar saved his army near Ruspina, says that it is not true that the result of the frontal attack which immediately followed the manœuvre was to rupture at the wings the Numidian line that encompassed the Romans, for the words of the author of *Bellum Africanum* (17, 2)—*ita coronam hostium dextro sinistroque cornu mediam dividit et una parte ab altera exclusa adortus cum peditatu telis coniectis in fugam convertit*—prove that the frontal attack followed the rupture. Veith himself in another passage (p. 863) apparently takes the same view as Steinwender: but the word *ita* ('thus'), which immediately follows the description of the manœuvre, shows that, according to our original authority, the rupture of the wings was a consequence of the manœuvre which made the frontal attack possible; and the passage which I have quoted merely shows that the rout of the Numidians followed the rupture, and is not inconsistent with the supposition that the frontal attack may have begun before the rupture was accomplished.

PAGE 467, note 2. Mr. F. L. Lucas's article, 'The Battle-field of Pharsalos', has appeared in the *Annual of the British School at Athens* (xxiv, 1919-21). On pages 45-6 he criticizes the view which I formed in 1920, when I had not seen the indispensable staff map (p. 466, *supra*). That view was never published: Mr. Lucas learned it from a marginal note written in a copy of my article in the *Classical Quarterly* (see p. 453, *supra*) which he read just before he explored the Pharsalian plain. In May, 1921, immediately after I heard from him that a river, for which I had looked in vain in the maps of Heuzey, Stoffel, and Kromayer, flowed beneath a hill north of Mount Dogandzis, I told him, communicating the substance of what I have written on p. 466, that I accepted his conclusion.

Professor Postgate, after reading Mr. Lucas's article in proof, remarked to me that an explanation of Caesar's having called the Enipeus a *rivus* (p. 460, *supra*) was desirable. I suggest that Caesar, who had never been in Thessaly before 48 B. C., and whose public life had been spent almost entirely in Italy, Gaul, and Spain, had probably never heard of the Enipeus, which was not mentioned in Latin literature before the Augustan age, and, seeing a narrow streamlet trickling in the broad channel, aptly called it a *rivus*. Professor Postgate thinks this explanation 'quite tenable'.



PAGES 542-4. Langhammer has recently attempted (*Klio*, xvii, 1921, pp. 102-4) to rebut Veith's criticism of the articles in which he expounded his theory of the battle of Thapsus. Rejecting Veith's explanation of *eruptione pugnari* (see p. 542), he adheres to his own view that the expression refers to 'the breaking out from the strong position in front of Thapsus against the advancing enemy'; in other words, he insists that Caesar's plan was not to attack Scipio, but, sheltered by his entrenchment, to await Scipio's attack. Does he imagine that Caesar expected that Scipio would be mad enough to attempt to storm the entrenchment? Does he forget that the enemy were not 'advancing', but, as I have written (p. 268), 'nervously hurrying from place to place, falling back from the line of battle through the gates of the camp, then streaming out of it in disorder' (*animadvertit hostes citra vallum trepidare atque ultro citroque pavidos concursare et modo se intra portas recipere, modo inconstanter immoderateque prodire* [Bell. Afr., 82, 1])? Who can believe that Caesar, who had been trying for months to provoke the enemy to fight a decisive battle, intended to throw away the opportunity, which at last presented itself, of attacking them when they were not prepared?

Perhaps I ought to notice a theory of Professor Eduard Meyer, epitomized in the sub-title of his recent book, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius*, though I am not sure that its influence has been appreciable. He holds (pp. 4-5) that the war between Caesar and Pompey was not, as it is so often described, notably by Mommsen, a struggle between two pretenders to monarchy. Rather there were three forces in conflict—the old Republic in the form of senatorial supremacy, Caesar's absolute monarchy, and, between those two, the military and political direction of the State by the unofficial representative of the Senate and the aristocracy, the *princeps*, Pompey, whose position was in essentials that of the principate of Augustus. 'Therein', he says, 'rests the pre-eminent importance of Pompey in the world's history, almost surpassing that of Caesar.'

It is true, as Meyer observes, that Cicero (*Pro Sest.*, 39, 84; *Fam.*, i, 9, 11; *Pro Planc.*, 39, 93; &c.) called Pompey *princeps*, *princeps vir*, and *princeps civitatis*; but Cicero (*Fam.* vi, 6, 5) and Suetonius (*Div. Iul.*, 29) used the same expression of Caesar; and though, as the late Professor Pelham remarked (*Outlines of Roman History*, p. 370), Cicero in his treatise *De republica* 'had argued in favour of such a constitutional "primacy" or "principate" as was . . . conceded to Augustus', it does not follow that Pompey and Augustus were *principes* in the same sense. Pompey, acting with the Catonian party, which distrusted him, fought against Caesar, as Cicero saw, for his own ends, and Meyer admits this when he says (p. 189), 'That he was in reality very little fitted for this rôle [of a constitutional *princeps*], as Cicero conceived it, that he strove for autocratic power, and intended not to subordinate himself to the principles of the aristocracy, but to force it into subjection to his will, is manifest'.

## CORRIGENDA

- PAGE 162, last line. Insert *their before* debauch.  
 PAGE 266, note 5. For See p. 529 and n. 6 read See pp. 529-30.  
 PAGE 436, note 5. For south read north.

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## POSTSCRIPT

VOL. I, PAGE 22, note 2. See also *Class. Rev.*, xxv, 1911, pp. 106-7.

VOL. I, PAGE 34. 'Bestia and Scaurus . . . compromise.' M. G. Bloch, whose views are summarized in the *Classical Review*, xxv, 1911, pp. 18-9, has attempted to exonerate Scaurus from the charge of corruption, on the grounds that Cicero, Horace, Seneca, Tacitus, and Juvenal had a high opinion of his character and that Sallust was prejudiced against the Optimates. M. Bloch, however, cannot deny that Scaurus was rapacious, and Sallust is supported by Florus.

VOL. I, PAGES 43-4. 'A novel feature of the bill, however, was a clause which gave the courts power to take cognizance of cases in which jurors might be accused of corruption. . . . The knights, who, as such, were no longer to be represented in the courts, resented a proviso which reflected on their honour,' &c. When I referred (p. 356) to Dr. Hardy's article (*Class. Rev.*, xxvii, 1913, pp. 261-3) I omitted to say that he believed that what I have described as a clause in Drusus's judiciary law was really a subsequent law, which he so framed 'as to bind equites as well as the . . . senatorial judices'. Dr. Hardy formed this opinion in consequence of a suggestion made by his pupil, Mr. P. A. Seymour (*ibid.*, xxvi, 1912, pp. 218-9), who observed that as equestrian jurors had hitherto been immune from the charge of corruption, and 'as the 300 equites, who alone of that order were to have judicial functions in future [under the judiciary law], were [according to Appian] to pass out of that order and to become senators, there is no meaning in Appian's statement that the equites were aggrieved at the revival of a charge which, now that they were to be no longer jurors, could not possibly affect them in any way'. It seems to me that the knights may have resented a provision which affected senators who had been members of the equestrian order, even though, on becoming senators, they would cease to belong to it. It is true that Cicero (*Pro Rab. Post.*, 7, 16) spoke of Drusus as having made the equestrian order liable to prosecution on the charge of judicial corruption (*in equestrem ordinem quaestionem ferenti: si quis ob rem iudicantem pecuniam cepisset*); and, said Dr. Hardy (*Class. Rev.*, 1912, p. 219), 'This obviously can have no meaning, unless there were still to be jurors belonging to the equestrian order. . . . There is therefore a very strong case for accepting the version of the epitomator' [of Livy], according to whom the judicial power was to be shared equally between the Senate and the equestrian order. Now, as my readers will have observed (see vol. i, p. 356), I hold that the epitomizer meant the same as Appian; I am not sure that Cicero, whose historical statements were often loose, did not mean that the provision of Drusus concerned the 300 knights who were to be promoted from the equestrian order into the Senate; and Dr. Hardy himself in his second article maintained on reconsideration that there were not to be jurors actually belonging to the equestrian order.

VOL. I, PAGES 352-4. I omitted to notice an article (*Class. Rev.*, xxvii, 1913, pp. 23-4) in which Mr. F. C. Thompson supported Dr. Hardy's view that Thorius was the author of the law attributed to him by Appian, and argued that he 're-imposed the customary state dues which [Tiberius] Gracchus had remitted [as compensation for improvements] to possessors who suffered deprivation under his law'.

VOL. III, PAGE 325, note 6. I ought to have referred also to Cic., *Att.*, xiv, 12, 1.

VOL. III, PAGE 334. 'some of the crowd . . . not King but Caesar.' The passage in Suetonius (*Div. Iul.*, 79, 2) on which these words are based runs *plebei regem se salutanti Caesarem se, non regem esse responderit*. I was of course aware that it had been suggested that Caesar meant the crowd to understand that his *cognomen* was not Rex, but Caesar, and therefore that for *regem* we should read *Regem*; but I had overlooked articles in the *Classical Review* (xxiii, 1909, p. 189 [cf. 240]; xxiv, 1910, pp. 38-9) in which Mr. Caspari defends this suggestion. When he argues that Caesar's reply, as it is commonly printed, 'contains a comparison of disparate terms: "I am not king but Caesar" is equivalent to "I do not hold the regal office, but my family's name is Caesar"'—a sentence truly worthy of Ollendorff's Grammar', does he not forget a significant passage in *Bell. Hisp.*, 19, 6—*Quibus [legatis] respondit se Caesarem esse fidemque praestaturum*? May not Caesar have said, 'I am not King but Caesar', meaning that he had made that name illustrious?





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